Bad beliefs: automaticity, arationality, and intervention

References

• Béna, J., Rihet, M., Carreras, O., & Terrier, P. (2022). Repetition could increase the perceived truth of conspiracy theories.
   Google Scholar
• Beran, D. (2019). It came from something awful: How a toxic troll army accidentally memed Donald Trump into office. All Points Books.
   Google Scholar
• Caro, R. A. (2012). The passage of power: The years of Lyndon Johnson IV (Vol. 4). Vintage.
   Google Scholar
• Dutilh Novaes, C. (forthcoming). Attention and trust as higher-order evidence—comments on Levy’s Bad Beliefs. Philosophical Psychology.
   Google Scholar
• Fazio, L. K., Brashier, N. M., Payne, B. K., & Marsh, E. J. (2015). Knowledge does not protect against illusory truth. Journal of Experimental Psychology General, 144(5), 993. https://doi.org/10.1037/xge0000098
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Fazio, L. K., Rand, D. G., & Pennycook, G. (2019). Repetition increases perceived truth equally for plausible and implausible statements. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 26(5), 1705–1710. https://doi.org/10.3758/s13423-019-01651-4
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Flores, C., & Woodard, E. (2022). Epistemic norms on evidence-gathering. Philosophical Studies.
   Google Scholar
• Frost-Arnold, K. (2023). Who should we be online?: A social epistemology for the internet. Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Gilbert, D. T., Krull, D. S., & Malone, P. S. (1990). Unbelieving the unbelievable: Some problems in the rejection of false information. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 59(4), 601. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.59.4.601
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Gilbert, D. T., Tafarodi, R. W., & Malone, P. S. (1993). You can’t not believe everything you read. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 65(2), 221. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.65.2.221
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Hasher, L., Goldstein, D., & Toppino, T. (1977). Frequency and the conference of referential validity. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 16(1), 107–112. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0022-5371(77)80012-1
   Google Scholar
• Heersmink, R. (2018). A virtue epistemology of the Internet: Search engines, intellectual virtues and education. Social Epistemology, 32(1), 1–12. https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2017.1383530
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Koebler, J. (2016, July 12). How r/the_donald became a melting pot of frustration and hate. Vice. https://www.vice.com/en/article/53d5xb/what-is-rthedonald-donald-trump-subreddit
   Google Scholar
• Lacassagne, D., Béna, J., & Corneille, O. (2022). Is Earth a perfect square? Repetition increases the perceived truth of highly implausible statements. Cognition, 223, 105052. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2022.105052
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Levy, N. (2019). Is conspiracy theorising irrational. Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective, 8(10), 65–76.
   Google Scholar
• Levy, N. (2021). Bad beliefs: Why they happen to good people. Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Levy, N. (2022). Bad beliefs–a precis. Philosophical Psychology, 1–6. https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2022.2108390
   Google Scholar
• Levy, N., & Mandelbaum, E. (2014). The powers that bind: Doxastic voluntarism and epistemic obligation. In J. Matheson & R. Vitz (Eds.), The ethics of belief: Individual and social (pp. 15–32). New York: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Mandelbaum, E. (2014). Thinking is believing. Inquiry, 57(1), 55–96. https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2014.858417
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• McClellan, S. (2008). What happened: Inside the bush White House and Washington’s culture of deception. PublicAffairs.
   Google Scholar
• Melnikoff, D. E., & Strohminger, N. (2020). The automatic influence of advocacy on lawyers and novices. Nature Human Behaviour, 4(12), 1258–1264. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-020-00943-3
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Mercier, H. (2020). Not born yesterday: The Science of Who We Trust and What We Believe. Princeton University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Nagle, A. (2017). Kill all normies: The online culture wars from Tumblr and 4chan to the alt-right and Trump. Zero Books.
   Google Scholar
• Nguyen, C. T. (2020). Echo chambers and epistemic bubbles. Episteme, 17(2), 141–161. https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2018.32
   Google Scholar
• Pariser, E. (2011). The filter bubble: What the internet is hiding from you. penguin UK.
   Google Scholar
• Pennycook, G., Cannon, T. D., & Rand, D. G. (2018). Prior exposure increases perceived accuracy of fake news. Journal of Experimental Psychology General, 147(12), 1865. https://doi.org/10.1037/xge0000465
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Pennycook, G., & Rand, D. G. (2019). Lazy, not biased: Susceptibility to partisan fake news is better explained by lack of reasoning than by motivated reasoning. Cognition, 188, 39–50. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2018.06.011
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Strohminger, N., & Melnikoff, D. (2022). Breaking reality’s constraints on motivated cognition.
   Google Scholar
• Sullivan Bissett, E. (2022). Believing badly ain’t so bad. Philosophical Psychology, 1–9. https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2022.2077717
   Google Scholar
• Tappin, B. M., & Gadsby, S. (2019). Biased belief in the Bayesian brain: A deeper look at the evidence. Consciousness and Cognition, 68, 107–114. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2019.01.006
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Wegner, D. M., Coulton, G. F., & Wenzlaff, R. (1985). The transparency of denial: Briefing in the debriefing paradigm. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 49(2), 338. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.49.2.338
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Wendling, M. (2018). Alt-right: From 4chan to the White House. Fernwood Publishing.
   Google Scholar
• Williams, D. (2021). Socially adaptive belief. Mind & Language, 36(3), 333–354. https://doi.org/10.1111/mila.12294
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar