324
Views
0
CrossRef citations to date
0
Altmetric
Research Article

Overcoming contract incompleteness: evidence from long-term supply relationships

ORCID Icon & ORCID Icon
Received 10 Mar 2023, Accepted 21 Apr 2024, Published online: 07 May 2024

References

  • Aben, T. A., W. van der Valk, J. K. Roehrich, and K. Selviaridis. 2021. “Managing Information Asymmetry in Public–Private Relationships Undergoing a Digital Transformation: The Role of Contractual and Relational Governance.” International Journal of Operations & Production Management 41 (7): 1145–1191. https://doi.org/10.1108/IJOPM-09-2020-0675.
  • Agriculture Census Division. 2018. Agriculture Census 2015-16 (Phase-I) Provisional Results: All India Report on Number and Area of Operational Holdings. New Delhi: Ministry of Agriculture & Farmers Welfare.
  • Albano, G. L., and C. Nicholas. 2016. The Law and Economics of Framework Agreements: Designing Flexible Solutions for Public Procurement. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  • Anderlini, L., and L. Felli. 1994. “Incomplete Written Contracts: Indescribable States of Nature.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 109 (4): 1085–1124. https://doi.org/10.2307/2118357.
  • Anderson, S. W., and H. C. Dekker. 2005. “Management Control for Market Transactions: The Relation between Transaction Characteristics, Incomplete Contract Design, and Subsequent Performance.” Management Science 51 (12): 1734–1752. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1050.0456.
  • Argyres, N., and K. J. Mayer. 2007. “Contract Design as a Firm Capability: An Integration of Learning and Transaction Cost Perspectives.” Academy of Management Review 32 (4): 1060–1077. https://doi.org/10.5465/amr.2007.26585739.
  • Argyres, N., J. Bercovitz, and G. Zanarone. 2020. “The Role of Relationship Scope in Sustaining Relational Contracts in Interfirm Networks.” Strategic Management Journal 41 (2): 222–245. https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.3095.
  • Arranz, N., and J. C. F. d Arroyabe. 2012. “Effect of Formal Contracts, Relational Norms and Trust on Performance of Joint Research and Development Projects.” British Journal of Management 23 (4): 575–588. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8551.2011.00791.x.
  • Asokan, S. R. 2007. "An Enquiry into Contract Farming in India with Respect to Hold up and Asset Specificity." Paper presented at International Conference on Agribusiness and Food Industry, Lucknow, India, August 2017.
  • Barnett, R. E. 1986. “A Consent Theory of Contract.” Columbia Law Review 86 (2): 269–321. https://doi.org/10.2307/1122705.
  • Barratt, M., T. Y. Choi, and M. Li. 2011. “Qualitative Case Studies in Operations Management: trends, Research Outcomes, and Future Research Implications.” Journal of Operations Management 29 (4): 329–342. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jom.2010.06.002.
  • Bernstein, L. 1992. “Opting out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry.” The Journal of Legal Studies 21 (1): 115–157. https://doi.org/10.1086/467902.
  • Bernstein, L. 2015. “Beyond Relational Contracts: Social Capital and Network Governance in Procurement Contracts.” Journal of Legal Analysis 7 (2): 561–621. https://doi.org/10.1093/jla/law001.
  • Bertomeu, J., and D. Cianciaruso. 2018. “Verifiable Disclosure.” Economic Theory 65 (4): 1011–1044. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-017-1048-x.
  • Brown, M., A. Falk, and E. Fehr. 2004. “Relational Contracts and the Nature of Market Interactions.” Econometrica 72 (3): 747–780. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2004.00511.x.
  • Brown, R. B. 1998. “The Case Method as a Research Vehicle.” Accounting Education 7: S79–S95.
  • Cadden, T., D. Marshall, P. Humphreys, and Y. Yang. 2015. “Old Habits Die Hard: exploring the Effect of Supply Chain Dependency and Culture on Performance Outcomes and Relationship Satisfaction.” Production Planning & Control 26 (1): 53–77. https://doi.org/10.1080/09537287.2013.848478.
  • Cao, Z., and F. Lumineau. 2015. “Revisiting the Interplay between Contractual and Relational Governance: A Qualitative and Meta-Analytic Investigation.” Journal of Operations Management 33-34 (1): 15–42. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jom.2014.09.009.
  • Charny, D. 1990. “Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial Relationships.” Harvard Law Review 104 (2): 373–467. https://doi.org/10.2307/1341583.
  • Chen, F. 2003. “Information Sharing and Supply Chain Coordination.” Handbooks in Operations Research and Management Science 11: 341–421.
  • Chen, J. V., Chen-Lin Wang, and D. C. Yen. 2014. “A Causal Model for Supply Chain Partner’s Commitment.” Production Planning & Control 25 (9): 800–813. https://doi.org/10.1080/09537287.2013.764578.
  • Coase, R. H. 1937. “The Nature of the Firm.” Economica 4 (16): 386–405. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0335.1937.tb00002.x.
  • Crosno, J., R. Dahlstrom, Y. Liu, and P. Y. Tong. 2021. “Effectiveness of Contracts in Marketing Exchange Relationships: A Meta-Analytic Review.” Industrial Marketing Management 92: 122–139. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.indmarman.2020.11.007.
  • Dastagiri, M. B. 2010. Estimation of Marketing Efficiency of Horticultural Commodities under Different Supply Chains in India. New Delhi: National Centre for Agricultural Economics and Policy Research.
  • Department of Agriculture and Co-operation. 2013. Final Report of Committee of State Ministers, in-Charge of Agriculture Marketing to Promote Reforms. New Delhi: Ministry of Agriculture & Farmers Welfare.
  • Department of Economic Affairs. 2018. Economic Survey 2017-18. New Delhi: Department of Economic Affairs.
  • Duplat, V., E. Klijn, J. Reuer, and H. Dekker. 2020. “Renegotiation of Joint Venture Contracts: The Influence of Boards of Directors and Prior Ties as Alternative Governance Mechanisms.” Long Range Planning 53 (2): 101856. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.lrp.2018.10.006.
  • Foss, N. J. 2003. “Bounded Rationality in the Economics of Organization: “Much Cited and Little Used.” Journal of Economic Psychology 24 (2): 245–264. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0167-4870(02)00206-4.
  • Frydlinger, D., and O. Hart. 2023. “Overcoming Contractual Incompleteness: The Role of Guiding Principles.” Journal of Law, Economics and Organization ewac027. https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewac027.
  • Frydlinger, D., O. Hart, and K. Vitasek. 2019. “A New Approach to Contracts: how to Build Better Long-Term Strategic Partnerships.” Harvard Business Review 97 (5): 116–126.
  • Fu, S., Y. Zhan, J. Ouyang, Y. Ding, K. H. Tan, and L. Fu. 2021. “Power, Supply Chain Integration and Quality Performance of Agricultural Products: evidence from Contract Farming in China.” Production Planning & Control 32 (13): 1119–1135. https://doi.org/10.1080/09537287.2020.1794074.
  • Gibbons, R., and R. Henderson. 2012. “Relational Contracts and Organizational Capabilities.” Organization Science 23 (5): 1350–1364. https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.1110.0715.
  • Gibbons, R., M. Grieder, H. Herz, and C. Zehnder. 2021. “Building an Equilibrium: Rules vs. principles in Relational Contracts.” Organization Science 34 (6): 2231–2249. https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.2021.1503.
  • Gray, B., J. M. Purdy, and S. Ansari. 2015. “From Interactions to Institutions: Microprocesses of Framing and Mechanisms for the Structuring of Institutional Fields.” Academy of Management Review 40 (1): 115–143. https://doi.org/10.5465/amr.2013.0299.
  • Grossman, S. J., and O. Hart. 1986. “The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration.” Journal of Political Economy 94 (4): 691–719. https://doi.org/10.1086/261404.
  • Guo, H., R. W. Jolly, and J. Zhu. 2007. “Contract Farming in China: Perspective of Farm Households and Agribusiness Firms.” Comparative Economic Studies 49 (2): 285–312. https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.ces.8100202.
  • Hadfield, G. K., and I. Bozovic. 2016. “Scaffolding: Using Formal Contracts to Support Informal Relations in Support of Innovation.” Wisconsin Law Review 5: 981–1032.
  • Hagedoorn, J., and G. Hesen. 2007. “Contract Law and the Governance of Inter‐Firm Technology Partnerships – an Analysis of Different Modes of Partnering and Their Contractual Implications.” Journal of Management Studies 44 (3): 342–366. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6486.2006.00679.x.
  • Hakansson, Hakan, and Alexandra Waluszewski. 2020. “Thick or Thin”? Policy and the Different Conceptualisations of Business Interaction Patterns.” Journal of Business & Industrial Marketing 35 (11): 1849–1859. https://doi.org/10.1108/JBIM-04-2019-0136.
  • Harrison, D. 2004. “Is a Long-Term Business Relationship an Implied Contract? Two Views of Relationship Disengagement.” Journal of Management Studies 41 (1): 107–125. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6486.2004.00423.x.
  • Hart, O. 1990. “Is "Bounded Rationality" an Important Element of a Theory of Institutions?” Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 146 (4): 696–702.
  • Hart, O. 2008. “Economica Coase Lecture: Reference Points and the Theory of the Firm.” Economica 75 (299): 404–411. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0335.2007.00659.x.
  • Hart, O. 2017. “Incomplete Contracts and Control.” American Economic Review 107 (7): 1731–1752. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.107.7.1731.
  • Hart, O., and J. Moore. 1998. “Default and Renegotiation: A Dynamic Model of Debt.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 113 (1): 1–41. https://doi.org/10.1162/003355398555496.
  • Hart, O., and J. Moore. 2007. “Incomplete Contracts and Ownership: Some New Thoughts.” American Economic Review 97 (2): 182–186. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.97.2.182.
  • Hart, O., and J. Moore. 2008. “Contracts as Reference Points.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 123 (1): 1–48. https://doi.org/10.1162/qjec.2008.123.1.1.
  • Hayami, Y., and K. Otsuka. 1993. The Economics of Contract Choice: An Agrarian Perspective. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
  • Holmström, B. 1979. “Moral Hazard and Observability.” The Bell Journal of Economics 10 (1): 74–91.
  • Howard, M., J. K. Roehrich, M. A. Lewis, and B. Squire. 2019. “Converging and Diverging Governance Mechanisms: The Role of (Dys) Function in Long-Term Inter-Organizational Relationships.” British Journal of Management 30 (3): 624–644. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8551.12254.
  • Imbruce, V. 2008. “The Production Relations of Contract Farming in Honduras.” GeoJournal 73 (1): 67–82. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10708-008-9179-z.
  • Jaffee, S. 1994. “Contract Farming in the Shadow of Competitive Markets: The Experience of Kenyan Horticulture.” In Living under Contract. Contract Farming and Agrarian Transformation in Sub-Saharan Africa, edited by Peter D. Little and Michael J. Watts, 97–139. Madison, Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press.
  • Kalra, J., M. Lewis, and J. K. Roehrich. 2021. “The Manifestation of Coordination Failures in Service Triads.” Supply Chain Management: An International Journal 26 (3): 341–358. https://doi.org/10.1108/SCM-03-2019-0115.
  • Kapsali, M., J. K. Roehrich, and P. Akhtar. 2019. “Effective Contracting for High Operational Performance in Projects.” International Journal of Operations & Production Management 39 (2): 294–325. https://doi.org/10.1108/IJOPM-10-2017-0604.
  • Keller, A., F. Lumineau, T. Mellewigt, and A. Ariño. 2021. “Alliance Governance Mechanisms in the Face of Disruption.” Organization Science 32 (6): 1542–1570. https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.2021.1437.
  • Key, N., and D. Runsten. 1999. “Contract Farming, Smallholders, and Rural Development in Latin America: The Organization of Agroprocessing Firms and the Scale of Outgrower Production.” World Development 27 (2): 381–401. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0305-750X(98)00144-2.
  • Kim, S. K., and A. Tiwana. 2022. “Franchising Contracts as Routines: Untangling the Adaptive Value of Incomplete Contracts.” Journal of Business Research 152: 177–190. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusres.2022.07.046.
  • Klein, B., R. G. Crawford, and A. Alchian. 1978. “Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process.” The Journal of Law and Economics 21 (2): 297–326. https://doi.org/10.1086/466922.
  • Korobkin, R. 2003. “Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability.” The University of Chicago Law Review 70 (4): 1203–1295. https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/uclrev/vol70/iss4/2. https://doi.org/10.2307/1600574.
  • Kreye, M. E., J. K. Roehrich, and M. A. Lewis. 2015. “Servitising Manufacturers: The Impact of Service Complexity and Contractual and Relational Capabilities.” Production Planning & Control 26 (14-15): 1233–1246. https://doi.org/10.1080/09537287.2015.1033489.
  • Kumar, V., and A. Pansari. 2016. “Competitive Advantage through Engagement.” Journal of Marketing Research 53 (4): 497–514. https://doi.org/10.1509/jmr.15.0044.
  • Lewis, M. A., and J. K. Roehrich. 2009. “Contracts, Relationships and Integration: Towards a Model of the Procurement of Complex Performance.” International Journal of Procurement Management 2 (2): 125–142. https://doi.org/10.1504/IJPM.2009.023403.
  • Li, X., and Q. Liu. 2021. “Contract Unobservability and Downstream Competition.” Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 23 (6): 1468–1482. https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2020.0905.
  • Li, X., X. Ren, L. Qian, and C. Su. 2020. “Toward a Social Fitness Perspective on Contract Design: Contract Legitimacy and Influence Strategy.” Industrial Marketing Management 85: 254–268. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.indmarman.2019.09.006.
  • Loasby, B. J. 2022. “Economics after Simon?.” In Models of a Man: Essays in Memory of Herbert A. Simon, edited by M. Augier, and G. M. James, 259–278. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
  • Macaulay, S. 1963. “Non-Contractual Relationships in Business: A Preliminary Study.” American Sociological Review 28 (1): 55–67. https://doi.org/10.2307/2090458.
  • Macaulay, S. 2003. “The Real and the Paper Deal: Empirical Pictures of Relationships, Complexity and the Urge for Transparent Simple Rules.” In Implicit Dimensions of Contract: Discrete, Relational and Network Contracts, edited by D. Campbell, H. Collins, and J. Wightman, 51–102. Oregon: Hart Publishing.
  • Macchiavello, R. 2022. “Relational Contracts and Development.” Annual Review of Economics 14 (1): 337–362. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-economics-051420-110722.
  • Macneil, I. R. 1974. “Restatement (Second) of Contracts and Presentiation.” Virginia Law Review 60 (4): 589–610. https://doi.org/10.2307/1072414.
  • Macneil, I. R. 1980. The New Social Contract: An Inquiry into Modern Contractual Relations. New Haven: Yale University Press.
  • March, J. G., and H. A. Simon. 1958. Organizations. New York: John Wiley and Sons.
  • Maskin, E., and J. Tirole. 1999. “Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts.” Review of Economic Studies 66 (1): 83–114. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937X.00079.
  • Mayer, K. J., and N. S. Argyres. 2004. “Learning to Contract: Evidence from the Personal Computer Industry.” Organization Science 15 (4): 394–410. https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.1040.0074.
  • Michler, J. D., and S. Y. Wu. 2020. “Relational Contracts in Agriculture: Theory and Evidence.” Annual Review of Resource Economics 12 (1): 111–127. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-resource-101719-034514.
  • Miles, M. B., and A. M. Huberman. 1994. Qualitative Data Analysis. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publication.
  • Mouzas, S. 2016. “Performance Based Contracting in Long-Term Supply Relationships.” Industrial Marketing Management 59: 50–62. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.indmarman.2016.05.028.
  • Mouzas, S., and D. Ford. 2006. “Managing Relationships in Showery Weather: The Role of Umbrella Agreements.” Journal of Business Research 59 (12): 1248–1256. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusres.2006.10.001.
  • Mouzas, S., and D. Ford. 2018. “The Mediating Role of Consent in Business Marketing.” Industrial Marketing Management 74 (10): 195–204. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.indmarman.2018.03.011.
  • Mouzas, S., and M. Furmston. 2008. “From Contract to Umbrella Agreement.” The Cambridge Law Journal 67 (1): 37–50. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0008197308000081.
  • National Crime Records Bureau. 2016. Accidental Deaths & Suicides in India 2015. New Delhi: Government of India.
  • National Sample Survey Office [NSSO]. 2016. Income, Expenditure, Productive Assets and Indebtedness of Agricultural Households in India, NSS 70th Round, (January– December 2013). New Delhi: National Sample Survey Office.
  • Okada, A. 2018. Incomplete Contract and Verifiability. Kyoto: Kyoto Institute of Economic Research. http://hdl.handle.net/2433/228871.
  • Oliveira, N., and F. Lumineau. 2017. “How Coordination Trajectories Influence the Performance of Interorganizational Project Networks.” Organization Science 28 (6): 1029–1060. https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.2017.1151.
  • Radin, M. J. 2012. Boilerplate: The Fine Print, Vanishing Rights, and the Rule of Law. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
  • Radner, R. 1996. “Bounded Rationality, Indeterminacy, and the Theory of the Firm.” The Economic Journal 106 (438): 1360–1373. https://doi.org/10.2307/2235528.
  • Reuer, J. J., and A. Ariño. 2007. “Strategic Alliance Contracts: Dimensions and Determinants of Contractual Provision.” Strategic Management Journal 28 (3): 313–330. https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.581.
  • Rindt, J., and S. Mouzas. 2015. “Exercising Power in Asymmetric Relationships: The Use of Private Rules.” Industrial Marketing Management 48: 202–213. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.indmarman.2015.03.018.
  • Roehrich, J. K., B. B. Tyler, J. Kalra, and B. Squire. 2021. “The Decision Process of Contracting in Supply Chain Management.” In The Oxford Handbook of Supply Chain Management, edited by Y. Thomas Choi, J. J., Li, D. S., Rogers, T. Schoenherr and M. W., Stephan, 563–586. Oxford: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190066727.013.16.
  • Roehrich, J. K., K. Selviaridis, J. Kalra, W. v d Valk, and F. Fang. 2020. “Inter-Organisational Governance: A Review, Conceptualisation and Extension.” Production Planning & Control 31 (6): 453–469. https://doi.org/10.1080/09537287.2019.1647364.
  • Roehrich, J., and M. Lewis. 2014. “Procuring Complex Performance: Implications for Exchange Governance Complexity.” International Journal of Operations & Production Management 34 (2): 221–241. https://doi.org/10.1108/IJOPM-01-2011-0024.
  • Schwartz, A. 1992. “Relational Contracts in Courts: An Analysis of Incomplete Agreements and Judicial Strategies.” The Journal of Legal Studies 21 (2): 271–318. https://doi.org/10.1086/467908.
  • Scott, R. E. 2003. “A Theory of Self-Enforcing Indefinite Agreements.” Columbia Law Review 103 (7): 1641–1699. https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/191. https://doi.org/10.2307/3593401.
  • Segal, I. 1999. “Complexity and Renegotiation: A Foundation for Incomplete Contracts.” Review of Economic Studies 66 (1): 57–82. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937X.00078.
  • Selviaridis, K. 2016. “Contract Functions in Service Exchange Governance: evidence from Logistics Outsourcing.” Production Planning & Control 27 (16): 1373–1388. https://doi.org/10.1080/09537287.2016.1224397.
  • Selviaridis, K., and F. Wynstra. 2015. “Performance-Based Contracting: A Literature Review and Future Research Directions.” International Journal of Production Research 53 (12): 3505–3540. https://doi.org/10.1080/00207543.2014.978031.
  • Selviaridis, K., and W. v d Valk. 2019. “Framing Contractual Performance Incentives: Effects on Supplier Behaviour.” International Journal of Operations & Production Management 39 (2): 190–213. https://doi.org/10.1108/IJOPM-10-2017-0586.
  • Simon, H. A. 1991. “Bounded Rationality and Organizational Learning.” Organization Science 2 (1): 125–134. https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.2.1.125.
  • Singh, S. 2004. “Crisis and Diversification in Punjab Agriculture Role of State and Agribusiness.” Economic and Political Weekly 39 (52): 5583–5589.
  • Singh, S. 2017. “Addressing the Agrarian Crisis in Punjab: Role of Agro-Markets and Policy.” Economic & Political Weekly 52 (3): 37–40.
  • Srinivasan, R., and T. H. Brush. 2006. “Supplier Performance in Vertical Alliances: The Effects of Self-Enforcing Agreements and Enforceable Contracts.” Organization Science 17 (4): 436–452. https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.1060.0194.
  • Strauss, A., and J. M. Corbin. 1990. Basics of Qualitative Research: Grounded Theory Procedures and Techniques. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
  • Sutton, R. I., and B. M. Staw. 1995. “What Theory is Not.” Administrative Science Quarterly 40 (3): 371–384. https://doi.org/10.2307/2393788.
  • Tang, Y., Y. Chen, H. Yao, and Y. Chen. 2023. “When Does Control Curb Opportunistic Behaviour: evidence from the Construction Industry.” Production Planning & Control 1–15. https://doi.org/10.1080/09537287.2023.2166882.
  • The World Bank. 2018. “Agriculture, forestry, and fishing, value added (% of GDP).” The World Bank. Accessed June 15, 2018. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NV.AGR.TOTL.ZS.
  • Tirole, J. 1999. “Incomplete Contracts: Where Do we Stand?” Econometrica 67 (4): 741–781. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00052.
  • Tirole, J. 2009. “Cognition and Incomplete Contracts.” American Economic Review 99 (1): 265–294. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.99.1.265.
  • Tsoukas, H. 1989. “The Validity of Idiographic Research Explanations.” The Academy of Management Review 14 (4): 551–561. https://doi.org/10.2307/258558.
  • Valley, K., L. Thompson, R. Gibbons, and M. H. Bazerman. 2002. “How Communication Improves Efficiency in Bargaining Games.” Games and Economic Behavior 38 (1): 127–155. https://doi.org/10.1006/game.2001.0855.
  • Vlaar, P. W. L., F. A. J. V. D. Bosch, and H. W. Volberda. 2007. “Towards a Dialectic Perspective on Formalization in Interorganizational Relationships: How Alliance Managers Capitalize on the Duality Inherent in Contracts, Rules and Procedures.” Organization Studies 28 (4): 437–466. https://doi.org/10.1177/0170840607078.
  • Watts, M. J. 1994. “Life under Contract: Contract Farming, Agrarian Restructuring and Flexible Accumulation.” In Living under Contract. Contract Farming and Agrarian Transformation in Sub-Saharan Africa, edited by Peter D. Little and Michael J. Watts, 21–77. Madison, Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press.
  • Williamson, O. E. 1979. “Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations.” The Journal of Law and Economics 22 (2): 233–261. https://doi.org/10.1086/466942.
  • Williamson, O. E. 2002. “The Theory of the Firm as Governance Structure: From Choice to Contract.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 16 (3): 171–195. https://doi.org/10.1257/089533002760278776.
  • Xie, F., B. Zhang, and W. Zhang. 2022. “Trust, Incomplete Contracting, and Corporate Innovation.” Management Science 68 (5): 3419–3443. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2021.4055.
  • Yao, H., Y. Chen, Y. Zhang, M. Zhang, and Y. Zhang. 2023. “Managing Contract Violations in Construction Projects: A Moderated Mediating Model of Enforcement Decisions.” Production Planning & Control 34 (8): 677–688. https://doi.org/10.1080/09537287.2021.1951390.
  • Yin, R. K. 2009. Case Study Research: design and Methods. 4th ed. Los Angeles: Sage Publications.
  • Zhang, Q., J. L. Jin, and D. Yang. 2020. “How to Enhance Supplier Performance in China: interplay of Contracts, Relational Governance and Legal Development.” International Journal of Operations & Production Management 40 (6): 777–808. https://doi.org/10.1108/IJOPM-02-2020-0093.
  • Zhao, G., S. Liu, Y. Wang, C. Lopez, N. Zubairu, X. Chen, X. Xie, and J. Zhang. 2022. “Modelling Enablers for Building Agri-Food Supply Chain Resilience: Insights from a Comparative Analysis of Argentina and France.” Production Planning & Control 35 (3): 283–307. https://doi.org/10.1080/09537287.2022.2078246.
  • Zhao, S., J. Zhang, and T. C. E. Cheng. 2022. “Coordinating Supply Chains with Uncertain Production Cost by Incomplete Contracts.” International Journal of Production Research 60 (4): 1386–1410. https://doi.org/10.1080/00207543.2020.1856957.
  • Zheng, J., J. Roehrich, and M. Lewis. 2008. “The Dynamics of Contractual and Relational Governance: Evidence from Long-Term Public-Private Procurement Arrangements.” Journal of Purchasing and Supply Management 14 (1): 43–54. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pursup.2008.01.004.