The ordinary and the experimental: Cook Wilson and Austin on method in philosophy

Bibliography

• Austin, J. L. ‘The Meaning of a Word’ (1940). In Austin 1979, 55–75.
   Google Scholar
• Austin, J. L. ‘Other Minds’. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 20 (1946): 148–87. References to the reprint in his 1979, 76–116.
   Google Scholar
• Austin, J. L. ‘How to Talk: Some Simple Ways’. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (1952–3). References to the reprint in his 1979, 134–53.
   Google Scholar
• Austin, J. L. ‘Ifs and Cans’. Proceedings of the British Academy (1956). References to the reprint in his 1979, 205–32.
   Google Scholar
• Austin, J. L. ‘A Plea for Excuses’. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (1956–7). References to the reprint in his 1979, 175–204.
   Google Scholar
• Austin, J. L. How to Do Things with Words. 2nd ed. Edited by J. O. Urmson and Marina Sbisa. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962.
   Google Scholar
• Austin, J. L. Sense and Sensibilia. Reconstructed from the manuscript notes by G. J. Warnock. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962.
   Google Scholar
• Austin, J. L. ‘Three Ways of Spilling Ink.’, edited by L. W. Forguson. The Philosophical Review 75, no. 4 (1966): 427–440. References to the reprint in his 1979.
   Google Scholar
• Austin, J. L. Philosophical Papers. 3rd ed. Edited by J. O. Urmson and G. J. Warnock. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979.
   Google Scholar
• Austin, J. L., and A. Naess. ‘On Herman Tennessen’s ‘What Should We Say’’. In Eighteen Papers on Language Analysis and Empirical Semantics, edited by H. Tennessen, 143–50. Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 1964.
   Google Scholar
• Baker, A. ‘Experimental Mathematics’. Erkenntnis 68 (2008): 331–44. doi: 10.1007/s10670-008-9109-y
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Beaney, M., ed. The Oxford Handbook of the History of Analytic Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.
   Google Scholar
• Berlin, I., ed. Essays on J. L. Austin. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973.
   Google Scholar
• Birken-Bertsch, H. ‘Austin’s Method’. In J. L. Austin on Language, edited by B. Garvey, 89–107. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014.
   Google Scholar
• Borwein, J., and D. Bailey. Mathematics by Experiment: Plausible Reasoning for the 21st Century. Natick, MA: AK Peters, 2004.
   Google Scholar
• Burge, T. ‘Individualism and the Mental’. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4 (1979): 73–121. doi: 10.1111/j.1475-4975.1979.tb00374.x
   Google Scholar
• Chalmers, D. ‘Why Isn’t There More Progress in Philosophy?’ Philosophy (London, England) 90, no. 1 (2015): 3–31.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Chapman, S. ‘Arne Naess and Empirical Semantics’. Inquiry 54, no. 1 (2011): 18–30. doi: 10.1080/0020174X.2011.542946
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Chapman, S. ‘The Experimental and the Empirical: Arne Naess’s Statistical Approach to Philosophy’. British Journal for the History of Philosophy (2017), doi:10.1080/09608788.2017.1336075.
   Google Scholar
• Clarke-Doane, J. ‘Moral Epistemology: The Mathematics Analogy’. Noûs 48, no. 2 (2014): 238–55. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0068.2012.00875.x
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Cook Wilson, J. Statement and Inference. Edited by A. S. L. Farquharson. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1926.
   Google Scholar
• Dear, P. ‘The Meanings of Experience’. In The Cambridge History of Science. Volume 3: Early Modern Science, edited by K. Park and L. Daston, 106–31. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
   Google Scholar
• Fann, K. T., ed. Symposium on J.L. Austin. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969.
   Google Scholar
• Field, A., and G. Hole. How to Design and Report Experiments. London: Sage, 2003.
   Google Scholar
• Fischer, E. ‘Verbal Fallacies and Philosophical Intuitions: The Continuing Relevance of Ordinary Language Analysis’. In J. L. Austin on Language, edited by B. Garvey, 124–40, 2014.
   Google Scholar
• Garvey, B., ed. J. L. Austin on Language. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014.
   Google Scholar
• Gustafsson, M. ‘Perfect Pitch and Austinian Examples: Cavell, McDowell, Wittgenstein, and the Philosophical Significance of Ordinary Language’. Inquiry 48, no. 4 (2005): 356–89. doi: 10.1080/00201750510022853
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Hacker, P. ‘The Linguistic Turn in Analytic Philosophy’. In The Oxford Handbook of the History of Analytic Philosophy, edited by M. Beaney, 926–47. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.
   Google Scholar
• Hanfling, O. Philosophy and Ordinary Language: The Bent and Genius of our Tongue. London: Routledge, 2000.
   Google Scholar
• Hansen, N. ‘Contemporary Ordinary Language Philosophy’. Philosophy Compass 9, no. 8 (2014): 556–69. doi: 10.1111/phc3.12152
   Google Scholar
• Hansen, N., and E. Chemla. ‘Linguistic Experiments and Ordinary Language Philosophy’. Ratio 28 (2015): 422–45. doi: 10.1111/rati.12112
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Hinton, J. M. Experiences: An Inquiry Into Some Ambiguities. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973.
   Google Scholar
• Hinton, J. M. ‘Linguistic Philosophy, Empiricism, and the Left’. Philosophy (London, England) 48 (1973): 381–85.
   Google Scholar
• Horvath, J., and A. Wiegmann. ‘Intuitive Expertise and Intuitions About Knowledge’. Philosophical Studies 173 (2016): 2701–26. doi: 10.1007/s11098-016-0627-1
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Kauppinen, A. ‘The Rise and Fall of Experimental Philosophy’. Philosophical Explorations 10, no. 2 (2007): 95–118. doi: 10.1080/13869790701305871
   Google Scholar
• Kuhn, T. S. ‘Mathematical vs. Experimental Traditions in the Development of Physical Science’. Journal of Interdisciplinary History 7 (1976): 1–31. doi: 10.2307/202372
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Lasnik, H., and N. Sobin. ‘The Who/Whom Puzzle: On the Preservation of an Archaic Feature’. Natural Language & Linguistic Theory 18, no. 2 (2000): 343–71. doi: 10.1023/A:1006322600501
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Longworth, G. ‘John Langshaw Austin’. In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2017 Edition), edited by Edward N. Zalta, 2012. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/austin-jl/
   Google Scholar
• Lyas, C., ed. Philosophy and Linguistics. London: Macmillan, 1971.
   Google Scholar
• Marion, M. ‘Oxford Realism: Knowledge and Perception I’. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 8, no. 2 (2000): 299–338. doi: 10.1080/09608780050043235
   Google Scholar
• Marion, M. ‘Oxford Realism: Knowledge and Perception II’. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 8, no. 3 (2000): 485–519. doi: 10.1080/096087800442156
   Google Scholar
• Murphy, T. S. ‘Experimental Philosophy 1935–1965’. In Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy. Volume 1, edited by T. Lombrozo, J. Knobe, and S. Nichols, 325–68. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014.
   Google Scholar
• Nehamas, A. ‘Socratic Intellectualism’. In Proceedings of the Greater Boston Area Ancient Philosophy Colloquium, edited by J. J. Cleary, vol. II, 275–316. Washington, DC: University Press of America, 1986. Reprinted in his 1999 Virtues of Authenticity, 24–58. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Oliver, A., and T. Smiley. Plural Logic. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.
   Google Scholar
• Pitcher, G. ‘Austin: A Personal Memoir’. In Essays on J. L. Austin, edited by I. Berlin, 17–30. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973.
   Google Scholar
• Prichard, H. A. ‘Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?’ Mind; A Quarterly Review of Psychology and Philosophy 21, no. 81 (1912): 21–37. doi: 10.1093/mind/XXI.81.21
   Google Scholar
• Putnam, H. ‘The Meaning of ‘Meaning’’. In Language, Mind and Knowledge. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science VII, edited by K. Gunderson, 131–93. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1975.
   Google Scholar
• Sorensen, R. A. Thought Experiments. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992.
   Google Scholar
• Tiles, J. E. ‘Experiment as Intervention’. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44, no. 3 (1993): 463–75. doi: 10.1093/bjps/44.3.463
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Travis, C. ‘On What Is Strictly Speaking True’. The Canadian Journal of Philosophy 15, no. 2 (1985): 187–229. doi: 10.1080/00455091.1985.10716416
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Travis, C., and M. E. Kalderon. ‘Oxford Realism’. In The Oxford Handbook of the History of Analytic Philosophy, edited by M. Beaney, 489–517. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.
   Google Scholar
• Urmson, J. O. ‘Austin, John Langshaw’. In The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by P. Edwards, 211–15. New York: Random House, Inc., 1967; reprinted as ‘Austin’s Philosophy’. In Symposium on J.L. Austin, edited by K. T. Fann, 1969, 22–32. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969.
   Google Scholar
• Urmson, J. O. ‘A Symposium on Austin’s Methods I’. In Symposium on J. L. Austin, edited by K. T. Fann, 1969, 76–86. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969.
   Google Scholar
• Warnock, G. ‘ John Langshaw Austin, a Biographical Sketch’. Proceedings of the British Academy. References to the reprint in Fann ed. 1969, 3–21, 1963.
   Google Scholar
• Warnock, G. ‘Saturday Mornings’. In Essays on J. L. Austin, edited by I. Berlin, 31–45. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973.
   Google Scholar
• Warnock, G. J. L. Austin. London: Routledge, 1989.
   Google Scholar
• Wason, P. C. ‘Reasoning about a Rule’. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology 20, no. 3 (1968): 273–81. doi: 10.1080/14640746808400161
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Weinberg, J. M. ‘Humans as Instruments: Or, the Inevitability of Experimental Philosophy’. In Experimental Philosophy, Rationalism, and Naturalism, edited by E. Fischer and J. Collins, 171–87. London: Routledge, 2015.
   Google Scholar
• Weinberg, J. M., S. Nichols, and S. Stich. ‘Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions’. Philosophical Topics 29, no. 1 (2001): 429–60. doi: 10.5840/philtopics2001291/217
   Google Scholar
• White, A. R. ‘Mentioning the Unmentionable’. Analysis 27, no. 4 (1967): 113–18. doi: 10.1093/analys/27.4.113
   Google Scholar
• Wiggins, D. ‘Natural Languages as Social Objects’. Philosophy (London, England) 72 (1997): 499–524.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Wiggins, D. Sameness and Substance Renewed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.
   Google Scholar
• Williams, B. ‘What Does Intuitionism Imply?’ In Human Agency: Language, Duty, and Value: Philosophical Essays in Honour of J. O. Urmson, edited by J. Dancy, J. M. E. Moravcsik, and C. C. W. Taylor, 189–98. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1988.
   Google Scholar
• Williamson, T. ‘Philosophical ‘Intuitions’ and Scepticism about Judgement’. Dialectica 58, no. 1 (2004): 109–53. doi: 10.1111/j.1746-8361.2004.tb00294.x
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Williamson, Y. The Philosophy of Philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell, 2007.
   Google Scholar
• Williamson, T. ‘Philosophical Expertise and the Burden of Proof’. Metaphilosophy 42, no. 3 (2011): 215–29. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9973.2011.01685.x
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Wootton, D. The Invention of Science: A New History of the Scientific Revolution. London: Penguin, 2015.
   Google Scholar