Managing the Eastern Crisis: Preventing War in the Former Soviet Empire

Notes

• On this complex see Kurt M. Campbell , Ashton B. Carter , Steven E. Miller , and Charles A. Zraket , Soviet Nuclear Fission: Control of the Nuclear Arsenal in a Disintegrating Soviet Union , CSIA Studies in International Security no.1 ( Cambridge , Mass. : Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University , Nov. 1991 ), 1 – 34 .
   Google Scholar
• Elaine Sciolino , “ U.S. Report Warns of Risk in Spread of Nuclear Skills ,” New York Times , 1 Jan. 1992 , p. 1 .
   Google Scholar
• On the location of Soviet weapons see Campbell , Carter , Miller , and Zraket , Soviet Nuclear Fission , 19 – 22 ; on the Soviet weapons production complex see ibid., 25–28.
   Google Scholar
• Ibid. , 13 – 16 , 35.
   Google Scholar
• Ibid. , 15 , 35.
   Google Scholar
• The total Soviet stock of plutonium is large enough to produce over 14,000 atomic bombs, and the total Soviet stock of enriched uranium is sufficient to produce 50,000 atomic bombs. Campbell et al.; Soviet Nuclear Fission , 29 – 30 .
   Google Scholar
• Taking a more relaxed view of the situation is Stephen M. Meyer , “ Hyping the Soviet Nuclear Peril ,” New York Times , 12 Dec. 1991 , p. A31 . Meyer asserts that “the hyping of a new Soviet nuclear threat has gotten out of hand.” However, even he concedes the possibility that tactical nuclear weapons will proliferate or that weapons components will be sold internationally. Also taking a relaxed view is Mark Kramer, “Warheads and Chaos: The Soviet Nuclear Threat in Perspective,” The National Interest, no.25 (Fall 1991): 94–97. Kramer estimates the likelihood that even one nuclear weapon could pass to separatist control at “virtually zero” (p.95).
   Google Scholar
• The Commonwealth of Independent States was formed on 21 Dec. 1991, at Alma-Ata, Kazakhstan. Commonwealth members include eleven of the fifteen former Soviet republics - all except Georgia and the three Baltic states. The members resolved to maintain “a single control over nuclear weapons,” under the control of Russian president Boris Yeltsin . “ Text of Accords by Former Soviet Republics Setting Up a Commonwealth ,” New York Times , 23 Dec. 1991 , p. A10 . Yeltsin later stated that his authority to use weapons required approval by the leaders of Ukraine, Belorussia, and Kazakhstan. Francis X. Clines, “Gorbachev Resigns As Last Soviet Leader; U.S. Recognizes Republics' Independence,” New York Times, 26 Dec. 1991, p.1.
   Google Scholar
• A program for accomplishing these and related goals is found in Campbell et al., Soviet Nuclear Fission , 117 – 127 . The Bush administration's current plan, which follows the Campbell et al. proposal, is sketched in Thomas L. Friedman, “Hurdles, Big and Small, for Baker's Trip,” New York Times, 14 Dec. 1991, p.6.
   Google Scholar
• Congress deserves most of the credit for action taken so far. See Representative Les Aspin , “ The Bush Foreign Policy: Winning the War But … Forgetting the Peace ,” A White Paper, 19 Dec. 1991 , text available from Rep. Aspin. During the period late Aug.-early Nov. 1991 the administration refused to support a Democratic Congressional proposal that authorized Pentagon funds for the dismantling of Soviet nuclear weapons (pp. 7 – 9 ); and it played no role in Congress's 27 Nov. decision to appropriate $400 million for this purpose.
   Google Scholar
• Eric Schmitt , “ U.S. Gains Pledge on Ex-Soviet Arms ,” New York Times , 1 April 1992 . p. A9 .
   Google Scholar
• Graham Allison , Ashton B. Carter , and Philip Zelikow , “ The Soviet Arsenal and the Mistaken Calculus of Caution ,” Washington Post , 29 March 1992 ; and David Binder, “4 New Republics Provide Details on Dismantling Ex-Soviet Arsenal,” New York Times, 7 Feb. 1992, p.A9.
   Google Scholar
• At Alma-Ata, Kazakhstan refused to join other republics in pledging to join the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, implying a desire to retain control of its strategic nuclear weapons. “Text of Accords,” and Francis X. Clines , “ 11 Soviet States Form Commonwealthh Without Clearly Defining Its Powers ,” New York Times , 22 Dec. 1991 , p. 1 . The Ukrainian government later expressed reluctance to transfer its strategic weapons to Russia without joint supervision of their destruction, or international guarantees for Ukrainian security. Serge Schmemann, “Ukraine Halting A-Arms Shift to Russia,” New York Times, 13 March 1992, p.A3; Mary Curtius, “Alarm on weapons in ex-USSR grows,” Boston Globe, 25 March 1992, p.10; “4 Ex-Soviet Publics Agree on Atom Arms,” New York Times, 29 April 1992, p.A9; “Nuclear Backsliding in Ukraine,” New York Times, 4 May 1992, p.A16.
   Google Scholar
• U.S. intelligence agencies reportedly believe that the devolution of Soviet nuclear technicians to new employers poses a greater danger than the possible loss of control over the weapons themselves. Sciolino, “U.S. Report Warns of Risk.” The Bush administration has addressed this problem by moving to create a Western-financed clearing house for Soviet nuclear scientists; see Thomas L. Friedman , “ U.S. To Offer Plan To Keep Scientists At Work In Russia ,” New York Times , 8 Feb. 1992 , p. 1 . However, this project has been criticized as inadequate; see William J. Broad, “Panel Calls for Wider Help For Ex-Soviet Arms Experts,” New York Times, 14 March 1992, p.5; and “Soviet ‘Brain Drain’ Fears Ignore Technicians, Senate Panel Is Told,” New York Times, 18 March 1992, p.A6.
   Google Scholar
• Disputes arising from the collapse of the Ottoman empire spawned the great European crises of 1832–33, 1839–40, 1875–78, and 1908; the Crimean and First World Wars; and the Balkan wars of 1885 and 1912–13. A general account is M. S. Anderson , The Eastern Question 1774–1923 ( New York : Macmillan , 1966 ). A summary is Rene Albrecht-Carrie, A Diplomatic History of Europe Since the Congress of Vienna (New York: Harper and Row, 1958), 40–55, 84–92, 167–177, 196–197, 259–272, 280–286, 321–334.
   Google Scholar
• During the post-1945 era five newly-independent places saw more than a million killed in local warfare (Cambodia, India-Pakistan-Bangladesh, Nigeria, Sudan, and Vietnam) and eight other places saw at least 100,000 killed (Angola, Burundi, Indonesia, Lebanon, Mozambique, Rwanda, Uganda, and Zaire). Casualty data on these wars is from William Eckhardt , “ Wars and War-Related Deaths, 1945–1989 ,” in Ruth Leger Sivard , World Military and Social Expenditure 1989, , 13th ed. ( Washington , D.C. : World Priorities , 1989 ), 22 .
   Google Scholar
• Analysts differ on the gravity of the risks these conditions create. Taking a far more optimistic view than this author is Stephen Sestanovich , “ The Revolution: A Case for Optimism ,” New York Times , 23 Dec. 1991 , p. A17 . Sestanovich dismisses the risks posed by border and nationality conflicts, and by the possible rise of demagogues. Another optimistic assessment is George Melloan, “Breaking Up Is Hard, But Let's Not Freak Out,” Wall Street Journal, 18 Dec. 1991, p.A15, who dismissed CIA director Robert Gates's 10 Dec. forecast of possible civil disorder in the former Soviet Union as “hyperbole” of a “fevered” variety. Gates's forecast is summarized in Elaine Sciolino, “Chaos Looms Over Soviets, Gates Says,” New York Times, 11 Dec. 1991, p.A18.
   Google Scholar
• For a map of border conflicts in the former USSR, see Graham Smith , ed., The Nationalities Question in the Soviet Union ( New York : Longman , 1990 ), appendix 1.
   Google Scholar
• Frontiers that may be disputed include the Romanian-Moldovan-Ukrainian, Romanian-Hungarian, Polish-Lithuanian, Polish-Ukrainian, Polish-Belorussian, Polish-Czechoslovak, Hungarian-Czechoslovak, Hungarian-Yugoslav (Serbian), Yugoslav (Serbian)-Albanian, Greek-Albanian, Greek-Turkish, and Greek-Yugoslav (Macedonian-Bulgarian. Pockets of ethnic groups that have a nation state but live outside it include Hungarians in Romania and Czechoslovakia; Poles in Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine and Czechoslovakia; Germans in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Romania; Turks in Bulgaria; Greeks in Albania; and Albanians in Yugoslavia (Serbia). Summaries include F. Stephen Larrabee , “ Long Memories and Short Fuses: Change and Instability in the Balkans ,” International Security 15 , no. 3 ( Winter 1990/91 ): 58 – 91 ; Istvan Deak, “Uncovering Eastern Europe's Dark History,” Orbis 34, 1 (Winter 1989): 51–65; Myron Weiner, “The Macedonian Syndrome: An Historical Model of International Relations and Political Development,” World Politics 23, no.4 (July 1971): 665–83; and Barry James, “Central Europe Tinderboxes: Old Border Disputes,” International Herald Tribune, 1 Jan. 1990, p.5.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• All demographic figures are for 1979, and are calculated form John L. Scherer , ed. , USSR Facts and Figures Annual , vol. 5 ( Gulf Breeze , Fla. : Academic International Press , 1981 ), 49 – 51 .
   Google Scholar
• This excludes the Kazakh residents of Kazakhstan, although a strict accounting based on the 1979 census should include them, because that census showed the Russians outnumbering them in Kazakhstan by 41 percent to 36 percent. However, data from 1989 indicates that Kazakhs again outnumber Russians in Kazakhstan, by 40 percent to 38 percent. See Alan P. Pollard , ed., USSR Facts & Figures Annual , vol. 15 , 1991 ( Gulf Breeze , Fla. : Academic International Press , 1991 ), 501 . In all other former Soviet republics the nationality after whom the republic is named was the majority or (in Kirghizia) a plurality in 1979, and all were a majority in 1989.
   Google Scholar
• By mid-1990 the Soviet Union already had over 600,000 internal refugees who had fled from such oppression, and hundreds had died in communal violence. Francis X. Clines , “ 40 Reported Dead in Soviet Clashes ,” New York Times , 9 June 1990 , p. 1 . By late 1991 that toll had risen to 3,000–4,000 deaths and nearly 2,000,000 refugees, according to U.S. State Department officials.
   Google Scholar
• For example, it seems quite possible that millions of Russians will be expelled from non-Russian republics; if so, these expellees could from the core of a Russian nationalist movement that poisons Russian politics, just as the pieds noire poisoned French politics after the Algerian war.
   Google Scholar
• In contrast, Western Europe is largely free of such problems; its borders are well-settled, and its populations are not significantly intermingled. The Polish-German boundary is the only Western frontier that has been seriously disputed, but this dispute was resolved by German acceptance of the current border during 1990. See Serge Schmemann , “ Two Germanys Adopt Unity Treaty and Guarantee Poland's Borders ,” New York Times , 22 June 1990 , p. 1 ; and Thomas L. Friedman, “Two Germanys Vow to Accept Border With The Poles,” New York Times, 18 July 1990, p.1.
   Google Scholar
• The ability of Croatian pressure groups in Germany to influence German policy toward the Serbo-Croat conflict during late 1991 is a chilling reminder of this possibility. Noting the influence of a “highly vocal and effective” Croatian lobby on German policy is Stephen Kinzer , “ Europe, Backing Germans, Accepts Yugoslav Breakup ,” New York Times , 16 Jan. 1992 .
   Google Scholar
• Russia has already indicated a desire eventually to join NATO. Thomas L. Friedman , “ Yeltsin Says Russia Seeks to Join NATO ,” New York Times , 21 Dec. 1991 , p. 5 . And some have suggested that the United States should forge a bilateral alliance with Russia. Fred Charles Ikle, “Comrades in Arms: The Case for a Russian-American Defense Community,” The National Interest, no.26 (Winter 1991/92): 22–32.
   Google Scholar
• NATO also should make no guarantees to states that are unwilling to allow the peaceful secession by national minorities, since such refusal could spark a civil or international war that would entangle NATO. Noting the importance of this and other conditions (and recommending NATO security guarantees for Eastern states that accept them) is Hans Binnendijk , “ NATO Can't Be Vague About Commitment to Eastern Europe ,” International Herald Tribune , 8 Nov. 1991 , p. 6 .
   Google Scholar
• Advocating a trans-European collective security system are Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan , “ Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe ,” International Security 16 , no. 1 ( Summer 1991 ): 114 – 61 .
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• On collective security and its shortcomings see Claude , Power and International Relations , 94 – 204 ; and, on its shortcomings as a peacekeeping tool in contemporary Europe, see Josef Joffe, “Collective Security and the Future of Europe: Failed Dreams and Dead Ends,” Survival 34, no.1 (Spring 1992): 36–50 and Charles L. Glaser, “European Security Structures: Alternatives to Collective Security,” forthcoming in a volume ed. by George W. Downs and Duncan Snidal. I am also grateful to Glaser for sharing his insights on this subject.
   Google Scholar
• NATO also might serve as a Europe-wide consultative forum for security issues. Such a system is already seen in consultations between NATO and some East European states that began in 1990, and now continue in the new 25-nation NATO Consultative Council. See Alan Riding , “ NATO Chiefs Seek To Define Its Role ,” New York Times , 7 Nov. 1991 , p. A7 .
   Google Scholar
• Minority rights should be defined broadly, to include fair minority representation in the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of the central government. The definition of minority rights used in most international human rights agreements is more restrictive: it omits the right to share power in the national government, and includes only the right to political autonomy and the preservation of minority language, culture, and religion. See Edward Lawson , Encyclopedia of Human Rights ( New York : Taylor & Francis , 1991 ), 1070 . Should minority rights be defined to include the right to secession and national independence? Here Western powers face a difficult decision. Some writers recommend that minority rights should sometimes be construed to include a right to secession [Vernon Van Dyke, “Collective Entities and Moral Rights: Problems in Liberal - Democratic Thought,” Journal of Politics 44, no.1 (Feb. 1982): 21–40, at 36–37]. However, universal recognition of this right would require massive redrawing of boundaries in the East, and raise the question of Western recognition of scores of now-unrecognized independence movements worldwide. One solution is to recognize the right to secede when central government is unwilling fully to grant other minority rights, but not recognize the right to secede if all other minority rights are fully recognized and robustly protected. In essence, the West would hold in reserve its possible recognition of a right to secede, to encourage governments to recognize other minority rights.
   Google Scholar
• The argument for the first five conditions is straightforward: wars are fewer if states use less force; states that oppress their minorities may provoke nearby states to intervene to protect these minorities; states without settled borders will have more border conflicts with their neighbors; democratic states generally have relatively peaceful relations with other democratic states, and may have more peaceful relations with all states; and states whose schools teach false self-glorifying history, and whose public discourse is infected with nationalist propaganda, are more prone to aggressive foreign policies. The sixth condition's logic is that the Eastern states must transit from command to market economies sooner or later; they will magnify the economic dislocations of marketization if they procrastinate; these dislocations will be even more severe if the Eastern states fail to adopt cooperative economic policies toward one other; the resulting economic cataclysm risks fascism, dictatorship, and war; and, therefore, early decisions to adopt radical market reforms and cooperative economic policies toward their neighbors will reduce the overall risk of war. On the logic of the seventh condition, see the first section of this article.
   Google Scholar
• Of course, some Eastern states will embrace many of these standards without Western pressure. E.g., the Yeltsin government decided to implement its Jan. 1992 market reforms with little prodding from the West. On Yeltsin's decision see Francis X. Glines , “ Yeltsin Plan Wins a Quick Approval ,” New York Times , 2 Nov. 1991 , p. 7 .
   Google Scholar
• The Western powers should also offer to help the Eastern powers devise specific policies to implement these seven principles, and offer active assistance with peacemaking if conflicts nevertheless emerge. Specifically, Western governments and institutions should offer to share Western ideas and experience in building democratic institutions; development of political and legal institutions that protect and empower minorities; development of market economic institutions; and the best way of controlling nationalism in education. On this last point, accounts of West European experience include Paul M. Kennedy , “ The Decline of Nationalistic History in the West, 1900–1970 ,” Journal of Contemporary History 8 , no. 1 ( Jan. 1973 ): 77 – 100 ; and E. H. Dance, History the Betrayer (London: Hutchinson, 1960), 126–50. Finally, if serious conflicts emerge despite the West's preventive efforts, the West should offer active mediation, of the sort several U.S. administrations have contributed in their efforts to catalyze the Arab-Israeli peace process.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• In speeches on 4 Sept. and 13 Dec. 1991, Secretary of State James Baker outlined a similar set of five principles, and indicated that American policy toward the Eastern states would be conditioned on their acceptance of these standards. “ Baker's Remarks: Policy on Soviets ,” New York Times , 5 Sept. 1991 , p. A12 ; and “Baker Sees Opportunities and Risks as Soviet Republics Grope for Stability,” New York Times, 13 Dec. 1991, p.A24. Baker later conditioned American recognition of the new Eastern governments on their acceptance of these standards. Michael Wines, “Ex-Soviet Leader Is Lauded By Bush,” New York Times, 26 Dec. 1991, p.1. Then, in spring 1992 the Bush administration proposed a substantial Western economic aid package for the states of the former Soviet Union; this package may total $44 billion in 1992. Andrew Rosenthal, “Bush and Kohl Unveil Plan For 7 Nations To Contribute $24 Billion In Aid For Russia,” New York Times, 2 April 1992, p.l; Steven Greenhouse, “$44 Billion Needed to Aid Ex-Soviets in 1992, I.M.F. Says,” New York Times, 16 April 1992, p.1; and Steven Greenhouse, “World's Lenders Offer Membership To Ex-Soviet Lands,” New York Times, 28 April 1992, p.1. Thus the overall approach of the Bush administration has closely resembled the Option #5 approach. However, the administration approach is weaker than the one I recommend in five respects: (1) Baker's list of five principles omits my condition #5 (the renunciation of nationalist propaganda); (2) Baker's list of principles does not include a definition of minority rights, leaving Eastern governments free to adopt a restrictive definition that omits the right to fair representation in the national government; (3) the administration has not moved to forge a common agreement among major Western governments to enforce Baker's principles; (4) the administration has sometimes spoken as if its 1992 aid package were conditioned on Eastern economic policies alone, omitting to link the aid to Eastern compliance with the other Baker principles; (5) the administration has sometimes failed to apply Baker's principles with enough firmness to Eastern governments in other ways as well. For example, during early 1992 Secretary Baker agreed to recognize the government of Azerbaijan despite Azeri atrocities against Azerbaijan's Armenian minority, and Azeri unwillingness to offer more than lip service to Baker's principles. See “Winking at Aggression in Baku,” New York Times, (editorial), 14 Feb. 1992, p.A28.
   Google Scholar
• The strength of Western leverage is already reflected in the respectful attention given to Secretary Baker's principles by the new governments of the Commonwealth of Independent States. The Alma-Ata accord that established the Commonwealth recognized minority rights, nonuse of force, respect for existing borders, peaceful settlement of disputes, democratic principles, and the need to form a “common economic space.” “Text of Accords.” Republic leaders, including Kirghizian President Askar Akayev and Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev, have also endorsed Baker's principles: Nazarbayev stated that he keeps them in the top drawer of his desk. A Baker aide claimed that these principles have become the “new bible” for the republics. Thomas L. Friedman , “ Baker Doubtful Commonwealth Will Last Long ,” New York Times , 22 Dec. 1991 , p. 1 .
   Google Scholar
• To put the matter in Kuhnian terms: the East's dominant political paradigm has been shattered, leaving it for the moment highly receptive to Western paradigms. See Thomas S. Kuhn , The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, , 2nd ed. , enl. ( Chicago : University of Chicago Press , 1970 ).
   Google Scholar
• On the war's origins, including the important Croatian pre-war threats against Croatia's Serb minority , see Misha Glenny , “ The Massacre of Yugoslavia ,” New York Review of Books , 30 Jan. 1992 , pp. 30 – 35 , at 30–31. The human rights group Helsinki Watch accused the Croatian government of civil war crimes and atrocities against ethnic Serbs. See Blaine Harden, “Croatia Accused of Rights Violations,” Washington Post, 15 Feb. 1992, pp.A29, A36.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• A recent survey of 115 twentieth-century sanctions efforts found sanctions successful in 34 percent of cases. Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Jeffrey J. Schott , assisted by Kimberly Ann Elliott , Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: History and Current Policy ( Washington , D.C. : Inst, for International Economics , ( 1985 ), 93 . See also David A. Baldwin, Economic Statecraft (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), 4, 145–289, who refutes arguments that economic sanctions have regularly proved ineffective in the past.
   Google Scholar
• Western political thinkers have generally neglected the problem of minority group rights. See Vernon Van Dyke , “ The Individual, the State, and Ethnic Communities in Political Theory ,” World Politics 29 , no. 3 ( April 1977 ): 343 – 69 . However, many Western governments have recognized such rights, and institutionalized their protection. For a summary see idem, “Human Rights and the Rights of Groups” American Journal of Political Science 18, no.4 (Nov. 1974): 725–41, at 730–40; and, specifically on Western efforts to design democracies that empower minorities, Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration (New Haven, Conn: Yale University Press, 1977); and idem, Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984). See also Van Dyke, “Collection Entities and Moral Rights,” 31–33, who suggests criteria for identifying minorities that could claim minority rights.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Discussing these models are Lijphart , Democracy in Plural Societies ; Lijphart, Democracies; and Van Dyke, “Human Rights and the Rights of Groups,” 730–40.
   Google Scholar
• Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger currently coordinates all American assistance programs to Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Thomas L. Friedman , “ Baker Presents Steps to Aid Transition by Soviets ,” New York Times , 13 Dec. 1991 , p. 1 . However, Eagleburger has other pressing responsibilities; hence it may be appropriate to designate another coordinator to give the problem undivided attention.
   Google Scholar
• Greenhouse , “ $44 Billion Needed. ”
   Google Scholar
• One observer estimates the American share of the 1992 aid package to Russia will be roughly $3-$4 billion. Thomas L. Friedman , “ Bush and Baker Press Aid to Russia but Meet Worries About Costs ,” New York Times , 10 April 1992 . If so, the total American share might be $6-$8 billion for an aid package enlarged to include other republics.
   PubMedGoogle Scholar
• Steven Greenhouse , “ Wider U.S. Deficits Are Now Forecast for the Mid-1990s ,” New York Times , 23 March 1992 , p. 1 .
   Google Scholar
• I discuss other reasons in Stephen Van Evera , “ Why Europe Matters, Why the Third World Doesn't: American Grand Strategy After the Cold War ,” Journal of Strategic Studies 13 , no. 3 ( June 1990 ): 1 – 51 , at 8–12.
   Google Scholar