Bases for the Future: U.S. Military Interests in the Post-Cold War Third World

Notes

• Grand strategy refers to the matching of military means with political ends. This definition follows Barry R. Posen , The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the Wars ( Ithaca : Cornell University Press , 1984 ), 13 . Also see Paul Kennedy, “Grand Strategy in War and Peace: Toward a Broader Definition,” in Paul Kennedy, ed., Grand Strategies in War and Peace (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991), 1–7.
   Google Scholar
• Recent contributions include: Fred C. Iklé and Albert Wohlstetter , Discriminate Deterrence: The Report of the Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy ( Washington , D.C. : Government Printing Office , January 1988 ); George B. Crist, “A U.S. Military Strategy for a Changing World,” Strategic Review 18, no.1 (Winter 1990): 16–24; Robert J. Art, “A Defensible Defense: America's Grand Strategy After the Cold War,” International Security 15, no.4 (Spring 1991): 5–53; Samuel P. Huntington, “America's Changing Strategic Interests,” Survival 23, no.1 (January/February 1991): 1–17; James Schlesinger, “New Instabilities, New Priorities,” Foreign Policy, no.85 (Winter 1991/92): 3–24; James J. Tritten, “America Promises to Come Back: A New National Strategy,” Security Studies 1, no.2 (Winter 1991): 173–234; and Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategy - 1992 (Washington, D.C.: JCS, 1992). For a general discussion of the new international system, see Robert Jervis, “The Future of World Politics: Will It Resemble the Past?” International Security 16, no.3 (Winter 1991/92): 39–73.
   Google Scholar
• On this debate , see Stephen M. Walt , “ The Case for Finite Containment: Analyzing U.S. Grand Strategy ,” International Security 14 , no. 1 ( Summer 1989 ): 5 – 49 ; Steven R. David, “Why the Third World Matters,” International Security 14, no.1 (Summer 1989): 50–85; Michael C. Desch, “The Keys that Lock Up the World: Identifying American Interests in the Periphery,” International Security 14, no.1 (Summer 1989): 86–121; Stephen Van Evera, “Why Europe Matters, Why the Third World Doesn't; America's Grand Strategy After the Cold War,” Journal of Strategic Studies 13, no.2 (June 1990): 1–51; and Van Evera, “American Intervention in the Third World: Less Would Be Better,” Security Studies 1, no.1 (Autumn 1991): 1–24.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• See John Lewis Gaddis , “ Hanging Tough Paid Off ,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 45 , no. 1 ( January 1989 ): 11 – 14 ; Thomas Risse-Kappen, “Did ‘Peace Through Strength’ End the Cold War?” International Security 16, no.1 (Summer 1991): 162–88: and Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry, “The International Sources of Soviet Change,” International Security 16, no.3 (Winter 1991/92): 74–118.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• One early skeptic was Caspar W. Weinberger , “ Too Soon to Slash Defense ,” New York Times , 28 November 1989 , p. 25 .
   Google Scholar
• For evidence that the U.S. Government has largely conceded this development see: Michael R. Gordon , “ Discount Soviet Peril to Iran, Cheny Tells His Strategists ,” New York Times , 2 July 1990 , p. 13 ; Eric Schmitt, “Pentagon Curtails 24-Hour Vigil for Its Airborne Command Post,” New York Times, 28 July 1990, pp. 1,5; and Andrew Rosenthal, “Farewell, Red Menace,” New York Times, 1 September 1991, pp.1, 8.
   Google Scholar
• The length of time seemed to vary between two and ten years. For the former see Michael R. Gordon , “ Pentagon Drafts New Battle Plan ,” New York Times , 2 August 1990 , pp. 1 , 9. For the latter see the statements attributed to General John Galvin, SACUER, in Gordon “NATO Ponders Troop Mix in Europe,” New York Times, 1 December 1989, p.24.
   Google Scholar
• Elain Sciolino , “ C.I.A. Chief Says Threat By Ex-Soviets Is Small ,” New York Times , 23 January 1992 , p. 4 .
   Google Scholar
• On increasing U.S. concerns about the Ukraine , see Thomas L. Friedman , “ The U.S. Takes a Serious Look at Ukraine ,” New York Times , 19 April 1992 , p. E5 .
   PubMedGoogle Scholar
• The best discussion of the weakness of the Russian Army due to internal disunity is Stephen M. Meyer , “ How the Threat (and the Coup) Collapsed: The Politicization of the Soviet Military ,” International Security 16 , no. 3 ( Winter 1991/92 ): 5 – 38 .
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• See Susan F. Rasky , “ New Deployment in Gulf May Slow Drive for Deep Cuts in Military Budget ,” New York Times , 12 August 1990 , p. 6 .
   PubMedGoogle Scholar
• See Stephen Engleberg , “ In Search of Missions to Justify Outlays ,” New York Times , 9 January 1990 , p. 14 . For an alternative argument suggesting that Congress will be an important obstacle to reductions in defense spending, see Eric Schmitt, “Lawmakers Resist Pentagon's Cuts,” New York Times, 12 February 1992, p.10.
   Google Scholar
• For an account suggesting that these cuts are coming slowly see Eric Schmitt , “ Soviet Upheaval Has Limited Impact on Military Spending Compromise ,” New York Times , 2 November 1991 , pp. 1 , 7 .
   Google Scholar
• See Eric Schmitt , “ New Battle Ahead for Powell: Budget In Congress ,” New York Times , 17 January 1992 , p. 11 .
   Google Scholar
• For discussion of the relationship between defense spending and economic performance , see Leonard Silk , “ Economic Scene: Getting the Benefits of Military Cuts ,” New York Times , 20 September 1991 , p. c2 ; Edward Luttwak, “America's Setting Sun,” New York Times, 23 September 1991, p.15; Silk, “Economic Scene: How Much to Cut Arms spending,” New York Times, 4 October 1991, p.c2; and Silk, “Economic Scene: Army of Veterns Will Need Jobs,” New York Times, 11 October 1991, p.c2. For a general discussion of the defense budget debate, see Gordon Adams and Stephen Alexis Cain, “Defense Dilemmas in the 1990s,” International Security 13, no.4 (Spring 1989): 5–15; Robert F. Ellsworth, “Maintaing U.S. Security in an Era of Fiscal pressure,” International Security 13, no.4 (Spring 1989): 16–24; and Cindy Williams, “Strategic Spending Choices,” International Security 13, no.4 (Spring 1989): 25–35.
   Google Scholar
• See Susan F. Rasky , “ Administration to Weigh Plan for Military Cut ,” New York Times , 7 June 1990 , pp. 1 , 18; Michael R. Gordon, “Cheney Gives Plan to Reduce Forces By 25% in 5 Years,” New York Times, 20 June 1990, pp.1, 18; and Maureen Dowd, “Bush Says Military Can Be Cut 25% in 5 Years,” New York Times, 30 August 1990, p.9.
   Google Scholar
• See Michael R. Gordon , “ Military Services Propose Slashes in Existing Forces ,” New York Times , 12 May 1990 , pp. 1 , 9; and Eric Eckholm, “In Detente and Cutbacks, Navy Has Powerful Foes,” New York Times, 22 May 1990, pp.1, B8.
   Google Scholar
• See Michael R. Gordon and Eric Eckholm , “ Global Change and Budget Cuts Test Pentagon ,” New York Times , 20 May 1990 , p. 28 .
   Google Scholar
• See Eric Schmitt , “ Pentagon Making a list of Choices for Spending Cuts ,” New York Times , 24 November 1991 , pp. 1 , 16 .
   Google Scholar
• These deployments and figures came from Michael R. Gordon , “ Pentagon Drafts New Battle Plan ,” New York Times , 20 August 1990 , p. 9 .
   Google Scholar
• See Gordon , “ Pentagon Drafts New Battle Plan ,” 14 ; and Engeleberg, “In Search of Missions to Justify Outlays,” 9.
   Google Scholar
• See Patrick E. Tyler , “ As Fear of Big War Fades, Military Plans for Little Ones ,” New York Times , 3 February 1992 , pp. 1 , 6 .
   Google Scholar
• See R. W. Apple , “ Another Gulf War? ” New York Times , 10 March 1991 , p. 11 ; and John H. Cushman, Jr., “Kuwait Still Perceives Iraqis as a Threat,” New York Times, 7 July 1991, p.3.
   Google Scholar
• See Seymour M. Hersh , “ U.S. Secretly Gave Aid to Iraq Early In Its War Against Iraq ,” New York Times , 26 January 1992 , pp. 1 , 4; and Thomas L. Friedman, “U.S. Counters Iran in Central Asia,” New York Times, 6 February 1992, p.3.
   Google Scholar
• On North Korea as a potential adversary see David E. Sanger , “ Jittery Asia Has Visions of a Nuclear North Korea ,” New York Times, 7 April 1991 , Week in Review section, p.2; and Leslie H. Gelb, “The Next Renegade State,” New York Times, 10 April 1991, p. 19. India is admittedly a far less likely adversary but should not be discounted for two reasons: First, it has extremely poor relations with Pakistan, an important U.S. ally in the region. For a recent episode in this long-standing conflict, see “India Sends Soldiers to the Pakistani Border,” New York Times, 22 August 1990, p.5. Second, it is an aspiring regional hegemon and naval power in the Indian Ocean. For a general discussion of U.S. and Indian strategic interests in the Indian Ocean, see Selig S. Harrison, “India, the United States, and Superpower Rivalry in the Indian Ocean,” in Selig S. Harrison and K. Subrahmanyam, eds., Superpower Rivalry in the Indian Ocean - Indian and American Perspectives (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 246–86.
   Google Scholar
• See Rep. Les Aspin , “ An Approach to Sizing American Conventional Forces For the Post-Soviet Era ,” Statement before the House Armed Services Committee , 24 January 1992 , p. 10 .
   Google Scholar
• See Michael R. Gordon with Bernard E. Trainor , “ Army, Facing Cuts, Reported Seeking to Reshape Itself ,” New York Times , 12 December 1989 , pp. 1 , 5; and Gordon, “Split Between Army and Marines Surfaces in Debate About 3d World,” New York Times, 15 March 1990, p. 18.
   Google Scholar
• See Thomas L. McNaugher , “ Ballistic Missiles and Chemical Weapons: The Legacy of the Iran-Iraq War ,” International Security 15 , no. 2 ( Fall 1990 ): 5 – 34 ; and Steve Fetter, “Ballistic Missiles and Weapons of Mass Destruction: What Is the Threat? What Should Be Done,” International Security 16, no.1 (Summer 1991): 5–42.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• The classic discussion of nuclear proliferation is Kenneth N. Waltz , The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better , Adelphi Papers no.171 ( London : IISS , 1981 ). More recent discussions include Tom Clancy and Russell Seitz, “Five Minutes Past Midnight - And Welcome to the Age of Proliferation,” The National Interest, no.26 (Winter 1991/92): 3–12; and Brahma Chellaney, “South Asia's Passage to Nuclear Power,” International Security 16, no.1 (Summer 1991): 43–72.
   Google Scholar
• See Patrick E. Tyler , “ Pentagon Imagines New Enemies to Fight in Post-Cold-War Era ,” New York Times , 17 February 1992 , pp. 1 , 5; and the citations in n. 7.
   Google Scholar
• Meyer , “ How the Threat (and the Coup) Collapsed ,” 31 – 5 .
   Google Scholar
• This does not, however, necessarily bode well for domestic political stability and especially the maintenance of civilian control of the Commonwealth or Republic's militaries. For an argument about why civil-military relations might be deteriorating in the former Soviet Union , see Michael C. Desch , “ Transitions to Democracy: The Role of Militaries ,” Discussion Paper ( Los Angeles : Center for International Studies, University of Southern California , December 1990 ), 47 – 51 .
   Google Scholar
• See Serge Schmemann , “ Former German Front Line Seems Disoriented by Peace ,” New York Times , 22 October 1990 ; and Thomas L. Friedman, “NATO's Difficult Career Change,” New York Times, 9 June 1991, Week in Review, 3.
   PubMedGoogle Scholar
• The reasoning here is that if NATO had this capacity against the much more cohesive Soviet military during the Cold War, it will certainly have it today. On the Cold War conventional balance see the articles by Joshua M. Epstein , Kim R. Holmes , John J. Mearsheimer , and Barry R. Posen in “ Policy Focus: The European Conventional Balance ,” International Security 12 , no. 4 ( Spring 1988 ): 152 – 202 . So far, no one has provided this sort of detailed net assessment for the post-Cold War balance. I suspect, despite U.S. withdrawals and other NATO reductions, that it would turn out to be even more favorable for NATO. For a rough “bean count” of the military forces of the new republics, see “Spoils of Peace,” The Economist, 21 March 1992, p.53.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Aspin , “An Approach to Sizing American Conventional Forces,” 8. Also see Les Aspin, et al. , Defense for a New Era: Lessons of the Persian Gulf War ( Washington , D.C. : Government Printing Office , 1992 ).
   Google Scholar
• See Richard L. Armitage , “ U.S. Security in the Pacific in the 21st Century ,” Strategic Review 18 , no. 3 ( Summer 1990 ): 10 .
   Google Scholar
• See the discussion in Seymour M. Hersh , The Samson Option ( New York : Random House , 1991 ), 8 – 16 . For an account of what might have become the first operation along these lines by the United States, see Patrick E. Tyler, “U.S. Weighs Boarding Korea Arms Ship,” New York Times, 6 March 1992, p.6.
   Google Scholar
• The best articulation of this argument is Josef Joffe , “ Europe's American Pacifier ,” Foreign Policy , no.54 ( Spring 1984 ): 66 – 84 .
   Google Scholar
• For evidence that all concerned basically accept this reasoning , see Michael R. Gordon , “ Nunn Proposes Sharp U.S. Military Cuts in Europe ,” New York Times , 20 April 1990 ; and “For NATO Concerns Stay,” New York Times, 4 September 1991, p.7. For a general discussion, see Daniel N. Nelson, “Europe's Unstable East,” Foreign Policy, no.82 (Spring 1991): 137–58.
   PubMedGoogle Scholar
• See Martin L. Lasater , “ U.S. Maritime Strategy in the Western Pacific in the 1990s ,” Strategic Review 18 , no. 3 ( Summer 1990 ): 22 .
   Google Scholar
• For discussion of the 50 percent increase in Chinese military spending , see Nicholas D. Kristof , “ As China Looks at World Order, It Detects New Struggles Emerging ,” New York Times , 21 April 1992 , pp. 1 , 4 .
   Google Scholar
• What remains unclear is exactly what sort of American military presence is necessary to perform this function. Is a token deployment sufficient or do U.S. forces need to do more than literally show the flag in order to perform this stabilizing role? Further research along these lines is necessary. I am inclined to think that an adequate stabilizing presence is one which can credibly deter a potential aggressor militarily. If so, then military forces capable of doing more than showing the flag are necessary.
   Google Scholar
• See Tyler , “ 7 Hypothetical Conflicts Foreseen by the Pentagon ,” New York Times , 17 February 1992 , p. 5 , esp. the Panama and Philippines scenarios.
   Google Scholar
• Andrew Rosenthal , “ U.S. to Unveil Drug Plan With Wide Military Role ,” New York Times , 9 March 1990 , p. 5 .
   Google Scholar
• See Charles William Maynes , “ America's Third World Hang-ups ,” Foreign Policy , no.71 ( Summer 1988 ): 117 – 18 .
   Google Scholar
• I basically agree with Van Evera , “ American Intervention ,” 4 – 8 , on the practical difficulties of establishing democracy in the Third World but find his argument that U.S. attempts to do so have made things worse to be overblown. The main point is that stable democracy requires certain social, political, and economic prerequisites and a concerted U.S. effort. On the former see Samuel P. Huntington, “Will More Countries Become Democratic?” Political Science Quarterly 99, no.2 (Summer 1984): 198–209; and Seymor Martin Lipset, “Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy,” American Political Science Review 53, no.1 (March 1959): 1–34. On the latter see the discussion of the role of the U.S. military occupation in the re-establishment of democracy in Western Europe in John Herz, ed., From Dictatorship to Democracy: Coping With the Legacies of Authoritarianism and Totalitarianism (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1982).
   Google Scholar
• In addition, the military has never been enthusiastic about this mission. On this , see Richard Halloran , “ Top Navy Officer Opposes Drug Role ,” New York Times , 23 July 1988 , p. 8 .
   Google Scholar
• See Nicholas J. Spykman , America's Strategy in the World: The United States and the Balance of Power ( New York : Harcourt, Brace , 1942 ), 165 , 393–94, and 448.
   Google Scholar
• For more detailed historical discussion , see Desch , “ The Keys That Lock Up the World ,” 100 – 120 .
   Google Scholar
• The United States Navy has recently changed some of the assumptions, but not the methodology, for figuring the force multiplier effects of forward basing. First, for personnel reasons, they put a limit on how much time (50 percent) a sailor could spend away from homeport. This raised the number of ships necessary to keep one on station at all times from 3 to 4.5. Second, they now count forces forward deployed in Japan and the Mediterranean as on station even when they are in port. This in essence reduces the number of ships necessary to have one on station from 3 to 1. The net result of these changes is to further increase the “station-keeping multiplier” of forward bases. I am indebted to Ronald O'Rourke of the Congressional Research Service for discussion on this point. Also see his “ Aircraft Carrier Force Levels and Deployment Patterns: Issues and Options ,” CRS Report for Congress , 91 – 516F ( Washington , D.C .: Congressional Research Service , 28 June 1991 ).
   Google Scholar
• This example comes from U.S. Navy Historical Center/Operational Archive, ASW Operations Research Group - Tenth Fleet, “Aircraft Requirements for Anti-Submarine Air Coverage of Shipping in the Eastern Gulf and Caribbean Sea Frontiers,” Memorandum no.45 CONFIDENTIAL (1 February 1944), 4–5. These figures were derived from the following formulas: P=720×T/N(T−L) L=2D+100/V Where P is the number of planes required to keep one over the lane; N is the number of hours/plane/month flown; T is the length of the mission in hours; L is the transit time to zone in hours; V is the speed of the plane in knots; and D is the distance to the inner edge of the zone in miles. This example is discussed in greater detail in Michael C. Desch , When the Third World Matters: Latin America and U.S. Grand Strategy ( Baltimore : The Johns Hopkins University Press , 1993 ), ch. 3.
   Google Scholar
• D. C. Watt , “ American Strategic Interests and Anxieties in the West Indies: An Historical Examination ,” Journal of the Royal United Service Institution 108 , no. 631 ( August 1963 ): 227 .
   Google Scholar
• For extended discussion , see: P. M. Dudant , “ Shrinking International Airspace as a Problem for Future Air Movements- A Briefing ,” RAND Report R-2178-AF ( Santa Monica , Calif. .: RAND , January 1978 ), 19 – 22 .
   Google Scholar
• For a more detailed discussion of this case , see Desch , ‘“ That Deep Mud in Cuba:’ The Strategic Threat and U.S. Planning for a Conventional Response During the Missile Crisis ,” Security Studies 1 , no. 2 ( Winter 1991 ): 322 – 28 .
   Google Scholar
• For other discussions of the continuing relevance of bases see Barry M. Blechman and Robert G. Weinland , “ Why Coaling Stations Are Necessary in the Nuclear Age ,” International Security 2 , no. 1 ( Summer 1977 ): 88 – 99 ; Robert E. Harkavy, Great Power Competition for Overseas Bases: The Geopolitics of Access Diplomacy (New York: Pergamon, 1982); and Harkavy, Bases Abroad: The Global Foreign Military Presence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989).
   Google Scholar
• Van Evera , “ Why Europe Matters ,” 24 . Robert Jervis has made this general argument most consistently. See his The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Pospect of Armageddon (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989); and The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984). Also see Kenneth N. Waltz, “Nuclear Myths and Political Realities,” American Political Science Review 84, no.3 (September 1990): 731–45.
   Google Scholar
• Van Evera , “ Why Europe Matters ,” 24 .
   Google Scholar
• This argument about the increased potential for serious crises and conflicts as the bipolar international system becomes multipolar parallels that of John Mearsheimer in his “ Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War ,” International Security 15 , no. 1 ( Summer 1990 ): 5 – 56 . Also see his “Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War,” Atlantic Monthly, August 1990, pp.35–50. This argument finds its theoretical origins in Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Stability of a Bipolar World,” Daedalus 93, no.3 (Summer 1964): 887–91. Important critiques of Mearsheimer and Waltz include Ted Hopf, “Polarity, The Offense-Defense Balance and War,” American Political Science Review 85, no.2 (June 1991): 475–93; and Stephen Van Evera, “Primed for Peace: Europe After the Cold War,” International Security 15, no.3 (Winter 1990/91): 7–57.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• See John Lewis Gaddis , “ The Long Peace: Element of Stability in the Postwar International System ,” International Security 10 , no. 4 ( Spring 1986 ): 99 – 142 ; and John Mueller, Retreat From Doomsday: The Obsolesence of Major War (New York: Basic Books, 1989), 81–216. Alternative explanations might include (1) universal war-weariness; (2) conventional deterrence; (3) bipolarity; and (4) no aggressive intent on the part of the Soviet Union.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• This is the position of adherents of the “Stability Instability Paradox” of which Glenn Snyder is the foremost proponement. See his Deterrence and Defense: Toward A Theory of National Security ( Princeton : Princeton University Press , 1961 ), 120ff .
   Google Scholar
• The strongest case is the failure of the Israeli nuclear force to deter Arab attacks on Israeli controlled territory during the 1973 Yom Kippur War. On this see Hersh , The Samson Option , 209 – 40 ; Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution, 28–29; and Barry Blechman and Douglas Hart, “The Political Utility of Nuclear Weapons: The 1973 Middle East Crisis,” in Steven E. Miller, ed., Strategy and Nuclear Deterrence (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 273–97. One might also consider the surprisingly small role of nuclear weapons during the Korean War. On this, see Roger Dingman, “Atomic Diplomacy During the Korean War,” International Security 13, no.3 (Winter 1988/89): 50–91; and Rosemary J. Foot, “Nuclear Coercion and the Ending of the Korean Conflict,” International Security 13, no.3 (Winter 1988/89): 92–112.
   Google Scholar
• On the interrelationship between conventional and nuclear deterrence , see John J. Mearsheimer , “ Nuclear Weapons and Deterrence in Europe ,” International Security 9 , no. 3 ( Winter 1984/85 ): 19 – 47 . For a general discussion of conventional weapons and deterrence, see his Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983).
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• See Desch , “ The Keys That Lock Up the World ,” 108 – 20 .
   Google Scholar
• The Military Balance 1990–1991 ( London : Brassey's for IISS , 1990 ), 14 .
   Google Scholar
• For this argument see Michael C. Desch , “ Turning the Caribbean Flank: Sea-lane Vulnerability During a European War ,” Survival 29 , no. 6 ( November/December 1987 ): 528 – 51 .
   Google Scholar
• John Major , “ Wasting Asset: The U.S. Reassessment of the Panama Canal, 1945–1949 ,” Journal of Strategic Studies 3 , no. 2 ( September 1980 ): 123 – 46 .
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Edwin C. Meyer and Paul H. Kreisberg , “ Overhaul U.S. Security Policy in Asia ,” New York Times , 19 May 1989 , p. 35 .
   Google Scholar
• U.S. Department of Defense , A Strategic Framework for the Asia Pacific Rim: Looking Toward the 21st Century ( Washington , DC : DoD , April 1990 ), 8 .
   Google Scholar
• See David E. Sanger , “ Philippines Orders U.S. to Leave Strategic Navy Base at Subic Bay ,” New York Times , 28 December 1991 , pp. 1 , 2 .
   Google Scholar
• U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance , “ United States-Philippines Relations ,” ( Washington , D.C. : U.S. Government Printing Office , 1977 ), 18 ; and Foreign Policy Institute, “U.S. and Philippine Bases,” Foreign Policy Briefs (Washington, D.C.: SAIS, August 1987), 13.
   Google Scholar
• See Philip Shenon , “ Air Force to Cut Philippines Units ,” New York Times , 21 June 1991 , p. 3 ; Shenon, “20,000 Ordered Back to the U.S. Fleeing Volcano,” New York Times, 17 June 1991, pp.1, 7; and Shenon, “Volcano in Philippines Imperils Base,” New York Times, 13 June 1991, p.3.
   Google Scholar
• See Shenon , “ U.S. and Manila Agree on Naval Lease ,” New York Times , 18 July 1991 , p. 3 ; “U.S. Fighters to Leave Philippines Base in '91,” New York Times, 8 November 1991; and Clifford Krauss, “Volcano is Unpredictable Third Party in Talks on U.S. Bases in Philippines,” New York Times, 11 July 1991.
   Google Scholar
• See “ Philippines Close to Rejecting Treaty on U.S. Bases ,” New York Times , 8 September 1991 , p. 6 ; and “Philippines Agree to 3-year U.S. Pullout,” New York Times, 3 October 1991, p.3.
   PubMedGoogle Scholar
• For some evidence of local resistance , see Gwen Ifill , “ Guam, Against the Tide, Wants Air Base Closed ,” New York Times , 20 April 1991 , p. 6 .
   PubMedGoogle Scholar
• Krauss , “ Volcano is Unpredictable ,” 4 ; Edmund J. Gannon, Alternative Sites for U.S. Philippine Bases (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 20 April 1977), 48; and Richard Betts, “Southeast Asia and U.S. Global Strategy: Continuing Interests and Shifting Priorities,” Orbis 29, no.2 (Summer 1985): 356.
   Google Scholar
• Compelling arguments about the continuing intrinsic importance of the Persian Gulf include Matthew L. Wald , “ A Little Oil Means a Lot ,” New York Times , 27 August 1990 , pp. 1 , C11; M. A. Adelman, “Oil Fallacies,” Foreign Policy, no.82 (Spring 1991): 3–16; Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “Why the Gulf War Served the National Interest,” Atlantic Monthly, July 1991, pp.57–58; and Stephen J. Solarz, “A Worthy War,” New York Times, 19 January 1992, p. 19.
   Google Scholar
• Lawrence Freedman , Atlas of Global Strategy ( New York : Facts On File , 1985 ), 65 .
   Google Scholar
• David Eshel , The U.S. Rapid Deployment Forces ( New York : Arco Publishing , 1985 ), 197 ; and Eric Schmitt, “Planning At the Helm for Troops in the Sand,” New York Times, 23 August 1990.
   Google Scholar
• Michael Gordon , “ First American Deployment to Gulf Is ‘Tip of Wedge ,”’ New York Times , 9 August 1990 , p. 10 .
   PubMedGoogle Scholar
• See Lt.Col. Paul S. Graham , “ Maritime Prepositioning Enters the 1990s ,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 117/6/1060 ( June 1990 ): 82 – 4 ; Lt. Col. David Evans, “Desert Shield: From the Gulf,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 117/1/1055 (January 1991): 79; Gordon, “In Saudi Desert: Heat, Sand, and Restlessness,” New York Times, 1 September 1990, p.6; and Schmitt, “M-1 Tanks Arrive,” New York Times, 27 August 1990, p.6.
   Google Scholar
• Capt. Douglas M. Norton , “ Sealift: Keystone of Support ,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 117/5/1059 ( Naval Review 1991 ): 44 .
   Google Scholar
• Brig. Gen. Edwin H. Simmons , “ Getting The Marines to the Gulf ,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 117/5/1059 ( Naval Review 1991 ): 54 .
   Google Scholar
• Ibid. , 53 .
   Google Scholar
• Norton , “ Sealift: Keystone of Support ,” 44 .
   Google Scholar
• Lt. Col. Ky L. Thompson , “ Sealift Testimony Irks Some on the Hill ” Armed Forces Journal International ( April 1991 ): 12; Thompson, “TRANSCOM CinC Supports More Sealift to Meet Army Needs,” Armed Forces Journal International (June 1991): 13; Gordon, “Troops Message to Powell: When Can We Go Home?” New York Times, 14 September 1991, p.8; and Gordon, “Despite War, Pentagon Plans Big Cuts,” New York Times, 3 February 1991, p. 14.
   Google Scholar
• Schmitt , “ U.S. Battle Plan: Massive Air Strikes ,” New York times , 1 October 1990 , p. 7 ; Gordon, “Air War Described As Slow But Effective,” New York Times, 31 January 1991, pp.1, 7; and Craig R. Whitney, “B-52 Crews in England Tell of High Altitude Strikes on Iraqi Targets,” New York Times, 8 March 1991, p.2.
   Google Scholar
• Treaster , “ Giant B-52 Grows Old Virulently ,” New York Times , January 1991 , p. 5 .
   Google Scholar
• “ Baghdad Jolted By Waves of B-52 Attacks ,” New York Times , 7 February 1991 , p. 6 ; and R. J. W. Apple, “Elite Iraqi Forces Hurt By Bombings Allied Aids Insist,” New York Times, 7 February 1991, pp.1, 6.
   PubMedGoogle Scholar
• Melissa Healy , “ Strategic Air Command Tries to Plot New Course ,” Los Angeles Times , 24 June 1991 , pp. 1 , 4, 16.
   Google Scholar
• Schmitt , “ Why Iraqi Battle Threat Fizziled: Allied Strengths and Enemy Weaknesses ,” New York Times , 4 March 1991 , p. 7 .
   Google Scholar
• Gordon , “ Tank Buildup a Key ,” New York Times , 9 November 1990 , p. 9 ; Gordon, “U.S. Expects Its Force to be in Place in a Month,” New York Times, 10 August 1990, p.6; Whitney, 2; Alan Riding, “France Agrees to Let U.S. B-52s Use Its Airspace,” New York Times, 2 February 1991, p.6; “Spanish Town Is Largely Unmoved By B-52s,” New York Times, 5 February 1991, p.8; and Schmitt, “B-52s Still Carry the Burden of the Bombing,” New York Times, 16 February 1991, p.9.
   Google Scholar
• Gordon , “ New Bases for U.S. ,” New York Times , 1 February 1991 , p. 4 ; and Eshel, The U.S. Rapid Deployment Forces, 151.
   Google Scholar
• Gordon , “ Removing Troops and Equipment Isn't Easy Either ,” New York Times , 28 April 1991 , p. 10 .
   PubMedGoogle Scholar
• Gordon , “ Cheney in Riyadh, Appeals for the Right to Store Arms ,” New York Times , 7 May 1991 , p. 6 ; Gordon, “Cheney Reports Gulf Accepting a U.S. Presence,” New York Times, 10 May 1991, pp.1, 4; and Tyler, “U.S. and Bahrain Near Pact on Permanent Military Base,” New York Times, 25 March 1991, p.6. For a good general discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of sealift during the Gulf War, see Andrew E. Gibson and Commander Jacob L. Shuford, “Desert Shield and Strategic Sealift,” Naval War College Review 44, no.2 (Spring 1991): 6–19.
   PubMedGoogle Scholar
• Gordon , “ Cheney in Riyadh ,” 6 . Also see Rone Tempest, “Talks Held On ‘Prepositioning’ Arms in Saudi Arabia,” Los Angeles Times, 5 August 1991, p.4; Tyler, “Gulf Security Talks Stall Over Plan for Saudi Army,” New York Times, 13 October 1991, pp.1, 5; and Youseff M. Ibrahim, “Gulf Nations Said to be Firm on U.S. Alliance,” New York Times, 25 October 1991, p.4.
   Google Scholar
• For a discussion of the relative costs of fast sealift versus prepositioning, see Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OP-41) “ Navy Strategic Sealift Implementation Plan ,” ( Washington , D.C .: Department of the Navy , 26 August 1991 ). For general discussions of future mobility requirements, see “Executive Summary,” Mobility Requirements Study, vol.1 (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 23 January 1992); and Lt. Cdr. Robin E. Rathbun, “Strategic Mobility of the 1990s: The Mobility Requirements Study” Strategic Review 20, no.3 (Summer 1992): 49–56.
   Google Scholar
• The base at Diego Garcia has cost $323 million dollars since 1966. If one adds to that the cost of 12 prepositioning ships (CSP20) [with 20-knot speeds) at a cost of 183 million dollars each, one gets a total cost of 2,523 billion dollars. These ships have an initial response time from Diego Garcia to the Gulf of four days. They can make a second round trip to the United States and back in thirty-six days. In order to get the same cargo capacity in a 30-knot Fast Sea Lift Ship (FSS30), you need to buy 16 of them [at 203 million each] for a total cost of 3,252 billion dollars. Moreover, their initial response time is 12 days and they cannot make the second round trip any faster than the CSP20s. All figures are in 1982 constant dollars. Costs and capabilities were derived from “ Navy Strategic Sealift Implementation Plan ,” Appendix I.
   Google Scholar
• Marc Trachtenberg , History and Strategy ( Princeton : Princeton University Press , 1991 ), 44 , has a very nice discussion of the “dead-end” in nuclear theory in the early 1960s. A number of alternative theories had been articulated but the early theorists lacked the empirical evidence necessary to test them. I would argue that no one has yet marshalled the evidence we do have from the postwar period to convincingly test the alternative theories through rigorously structured case studies.
   Google Scholar