Neorealism, Neoliberal Institutionalism, and the Future of NATO

Notes

• This is the dominant view among officials of Western governments and analysts. For a sample of official statements, see “Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation,” issued by the heads of state and government at the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Rome, 7–8 November 1991, NATO Review 39, no. 6 (December 1991): 19–22; Speech by President Bush at the NATO summit, 7 November 1991, U.S. Policy Information and Texts, no. 150, 8 November 1991, pp. 21–24; “Erklärung der Bundesregierung,” Bulletin, Presseund Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, no. 124, 7 November 1991, pp. 985–87; John R. Galvin , “From Immediate Defence Towards Long-term Stability,” NATO Review 39 , no. 6 ( December 1991 ): 14 – 18 ; Klaus Kinkel, “NATO'S Enduring Role in European Security,” NATO Review 40, no. 5 (October 1992): 3–7; Manfred Wörner, “A Vigorous Alliance-A Motor for Peaceful Change in Europe,” NATO Review 40, no. 6 (December 1992): 3–9; speech by the secretary-general of NATO Manfred Wörner at the Munich Conference for Security, 7 February 1993, in which Wörner characterized the alliance as “a source of stability, if not the major source of stability” in Europe and “even globally” (NATO Press Service). For a sample of views among members of the strategic studies community see Paul H. Nitze, “America: An Honest Broker,” Foreign Affairs 69, no. 4 (Fall 1990): 9; Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Kurt Biedenkopf, Motoo Shiina, Global Cooperation After the Cold War. A Reassessment of Trilateralism (New York: Trilateral Commission, 1991), 36–38, 45; The United States and NATO in an Undivided Europe. A Report by the Wording Group on Changing Roles and Shifting Burdens in the Atlantic Alliance (Washington, D.C.: Johns Hopkins Foreign Policy Institute, 1991); Robert A. Levine, “Introduction,” in Robert A. Levine, ed., Transition and Turmoil in the Atlantic Alliance (New York: Crane Russak, 1992), 11; Stanley R. Sloan, “U.S. Needs New NATO Vision,” Defense News, 6–12 April 1992, p. 28; Steve Weber, “Does NATO Have a Future?” in Beverly Crawford, ed., The Future of European Security (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), 360-95. Public opinion data generally seem to support this view. For a summary of pre-1990 patterns of American attitudes toward NATO see Thomas W. Graham, “Mass Publics and Elite Politics: American Attitudes on NATO and European Security,” in Wolfgang F. Dannspeckgruber, ed., Emerging Dimensions of European Security Policy (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1991), 303–16. For more recent data see the appendix in Stanley R. Sloan and Catherine Guicherd, “NATO'S Future: A Congressional-Executive Dialogue,” Congressional Research Service, 23 January 1992, for Western European attitude toward NATO in the late 1980s see Philip A. G. Sabin, “Western European Public Opinion and ‘Defense Without the Threat’,” in Dannspeckgruber, Emerging Dimensions of European Security Policy, 290–302; for a more recent survey see Steven K. Smith and Douglas A. Wertman, “Redefining us-West European Relations in the 1990s: West European Public Opinion in the Post-Cold War Era,” PS Political Science and Politics 25, no.2 (June 1992): 188–95; for evidence that public support for NATO is slightly decreasing in some countries see Erika v. C. Bruce, “NATO's Public Opinion Seminar Indicates Continuing, but Not Unshakable, Support,” NATO Review 40, no. 2 (April 1992): 3–8; and “French Support Is Eroding for NATO Alliance,” International Herald Tribune, 16 October 1992, p.2. Recent developments in German attitudes toward NATO (which represent a special case because of the incorporation in NATO of a former Warsaw Pact member state) is presented in Ronald D. Asmus, Germany in Transition: National Self-Confidence and International Reticence, RAND Note N-3522-AF (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1992); and for an update, Ronald D. Asmus, “Germany's Geopolitical Maturation. Strategy and Public Opinion after the Wall,” RAND Issue Paper (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, February 1993).
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• See Robert Hunter , “Europe, the United States and the End of the Cold War,” International Spectator 26 , no. 1 ( January-March 1991 ): 40 – 41 ; Ernst-Otto Czempiel, Weltpolitik im Umbruch. Das Internationale System nach dem Ende des Ost-West-Konflikts (München: Beck, 1991), 62; James Goodby, “Commonwealth and Concert: Organizing Principles of Post-Containment Order in Europe,” Washington Quarterly 14, no. 2 (Summer 1991): 80; Hans Binnendijk, “The Emerging European Security Order,” Washington Quarterly 14, no. 2 (Autumn 1991): 73; Zbigniew Brzezinski, “Selective Global Commitment,” Foreign Affairs 70, no. 4 (Fall 1991): 9; Gregory Vistica, “Military Chairman of NATO Sure the Alliance Will Survive,” San Diego Union, 18 September 1991, p. 3.
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• Those who argue that NATO should be dissolved are still a minority. See Michael Vlahos , “The Atlantic Community: A Grand Illusion,” in Nils H. Wessel , ed., The New Europe, Proceedings of the American Academy of Political Science 88 , no. 1 ( Toronto 1991 ): 187 – 201 ; Doug Bandow, “NATO: Who Needs It?” Defense and Diplomacy 9, nos. 9-10 (August-September 1991): 22-23; Daniel T. Plesch and David Shorr, “NATO: A Dinosaur in Tomorrow's Europe?” International Herald Tribune, 25/26 July 1992, p. 8; see also Robert Keatley “Mission Unknown. As NATO Struggles with Identity, Some Ask, Who Needs It?” Wall Street Journalmr, 2 June 1992. The number of those who think that NATO survival is in doubt or even unlikely is much larger than that, even though many of the analysts who are either sceptical or pessimistic disagree as to the reasons for their assessments; for a sample see Henry Kissinger, “The End of NATO?” Washington Post, 24 July 1990, p. A23; Kissinger, “The Atlantic Alliance Needs Renewal in a Changed World,” International Herald Tribune, 2 March 1992, p. 5; John J. Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War,” International Security 15, no. 1 (Summer 1990): 5–6; Hugh de Santis, “The Graying of NATO,” Washington Quarterly 14, no. 4 (Autumn 1991): 51–65; Pierre Hassner, “Europe Beyond Partition and Unity: Disintegration or Reconstitution?” International Affairs 66, no. 3 (July 1990): 461–75; Josef Joffe, “Collective Security and the Future of Europe,” Survival 34, no. 1 (Spring 1992): 47; Richard Ullman, Securing Europe (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), 54; Stephen D. Krasner, “Power, Polarity, and the Challenge of Disintegration,” in Helga Haftendorn and Christian Tuschhoff, eds., America and Europe in an Era of Change (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1993); Barry Buzan, “New Patterns of Global Security,” International Affairs 67, no. 3 (July 1991): 436. Buzan's argument is particularly interesting because he sees “the traditional alliance structures of the Cold War (to) dissolve into irrelevance” while the OECD countries will at the same time form a “capitalist security community.”
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• We avoid using the term ‘paradigm’ in addressing neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism as theoretical perspectives. Because both perspectives agree on the basic concepts such as “state,” “power,” and “institutions,” and because they also agree on the major methodological issues, we consider the two approaches based on a shared paradigm.
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• Robert O. Keohane , International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory ( Boulder , Colo. : Westview , 1989 ), 7 – 9 ; and Joseph M. Grieco, Cooperation among Nations: Europe, America, and Non-Tariff Barriers to Trade (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990), 3–11. Two of the best recent overviews of agreements and differences in the debate between neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism are provided by Robert O. Keohane, “Institutionalist Theory and the Realist Challenge After the Cold War,” Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, Working Paper no. 92–7; and Joseph M. Grieco, “Understanding the Problem of International Cooperation: The Limits of Neoliberal Institutionalism and the Future of Realist Theory” (Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, 3–6 September 1992). Both papers will appear in David Baldwin, ed., Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993).
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• Keohane , International Institutions and State Power , 16 ; Grieco, Cooperation among Nations, 227–32.
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• Kenneth N. Waltz , Theory of International Politics ( Reading , Mass. : Addison-Wesley , 1979 ), 15 – 16 ; Waltz, “Reflections on Theory of International Politics: A Response to My Critics,” in Robert O. Keohane, ed., Neorealism and its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 335–36; Keohane, International Institutions and State Power, 8 and 167; Grieco, Cooperation among Nations, 2; Oran R. Young, “The Effectiveness of International Institutions,” in Ernst-Otto Czempiel and James N. Rosenau, eds., Governance Without Government: Order and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 165–66.
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• For neorealism a harder-than-average test may be found in the field of political economy. If neorealists could provide a better explanation for the success and failure of cooperation in the GATT talks (what Grieco claims to have accomplished), then their case would be strengthened. Because NATO is a military alliance and because security issues have traditionally been the most favorable issues for neorealism, it should be at an advantage relative to neoliberal institutionalism. This advantage is balanced by the fact that NATO is not a “normal” alliance. It is highly institutionalized, which should confer an advantage to neoliberal institutionalists. For neoliberal institutionalists a harder-than-average test would be in the field of security relations, particularly with regard to security issues where institutionalization can be observed at a low level. Neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism thus appear to have different though equally strong advantages and disadvantages when put to the test of predicting NATO future.
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• The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact may also be a good test for both theories because this alliance was highly institutionalized too. See Stephen M. Walt , “Alliances in Theory and Practice. What Lies Ahead?” Journal of International Affairs 43 , no. 1 ( Summer/Fall 1989 ): 11 . In comparison to NATO and other alliances, however, the Warsaw Pact was special as it was primarily a device for Soviet dominance over its satellites. Its disintegration was caused by changes in the domestic structure of the member states. Neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism do not offer testable hypotheses in which change in domestic regime figures as an independent variable.
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• For recent exceptions see Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future” Stephen Van Evera , “Primed for Peace: Europe After the Cold War,” International Security 15 , no. 3 ( Winter 1990/91 ): 7 – 57 ; and Keohane, “Institutionalist Theory and the Realist Challenge.” Even though we use the terms “prediction” and “forecasting” interchangeably, we attach to both the specific meaning which John Freedman and Brian Job reserved for the latter: “a forecast is a statement about unknown phenomena based upon known or accepted generalizations and uncertain conditions (‘partial unknowns’), whereas a prediction involves the linkage of known or accepted generalizations with certain conditions (knowns) to yield a statement about unknown phenomena.” John R. Freedman and Brian L. Job, “Scientific Forecasts in International Relations: Problems of Definition and Epistemology,” International Studies Quarterly, 23, no. 1 (March 1979): 117-18, cited John Lewis Gaddis, “International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War,” International Security 17, no. 3 (Winter 1992/93): 6, n. 2. Emphasis in original. In his criticism of the failure of international relations theories to forecast the end of the cold war, Gaddis focuses only on forecasting, because few international relations scholars would make predictions according to the definition outlined above. See Gaddis, “International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War,” 10, n. 23.
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• For recent overviews of the literature and discussions of the difficulties of forecasting on the basis of theories in international relations see Robert Jervis , “The Future of World Politics: Will It Resemble the Past?” International Security 16 , no. 3 ( Winter 1991/92 ): 39 – 73 ; and Gaddis, “International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War,” 5–58. Mearsheimer argues for using “the world as laboratory to decide which theories best explain international politics.” See Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future,” 8–10, 9. For a discussion of fundamental problems see Gerhard Bruckmann, ed., Langfristige Prognosen. Möglichkeiten und Methoden der Langfristprognostik komplexer Systeme (Würzburg, Wien: Physica Verlag, 1977); Nazli Choucri and Thomas W. Robinson, eds., Forecasting in International Relations. Theory, Methods, Problems, Prospects (San Fransisco: W. H. Freeman, 1978), esp. Nazli Choucri, “Key Issues in International Relations Forecasting,” 3–22; and Thomas W. Milburn, “Successful and Unsuccessful Forecasting in International Relations,” 79–91; Hans Lenk, “Keine allgemeine logische Strukturgleichheit von Erklarung und Voraussage,” in Hans Lenk, Zwischen Wissenschaftstheorie und Sozialwissenschaft (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1986), 40–51.
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• These are the often cited substantive reasons why social scientists should refrain from making predictions. There are other reasons. Being proven wrong is often considered synonymous with failure. We agree with Gaddis that “that is why so many theorists-however confident they may be about the validity of their theories-avoid that exercise altogether. It is also the case that failed forecasts can provide insights into the causes of failure: in that sense, they can be just as valuable as forecasts that succeed.” Gaddis , “International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War,” 37 .
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• See, for instance, Jervis , “The Future of World Politics,” 46 – 61 . Even Gaddis tries to preempt the charge of pharisaism by pointing to some failed forecasts of his own. See Gaddis, “International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War,” 51, n. 192; and 56, n. 213. For a recent contribution of his to the post-cold war wave of forecasting, see his “Toward the Post-Cold War World,” Foreign Affairs 70, no. 2 (Spring 1991): 102–22.
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• In his critique of international relations theories, Gaddis emphasizes the modesty of “novelists and historians” for “never advertis(ing) their forecasting abilities with the frequency and self-confidence once common among political scientists.” He suggests that George Kennan's and James Billington's observations about the future of the Soviet Union-made in the 1940s and 1960s respectively-may be as valuable as explicit theorizing and forecasting, even though he admits that the specific examples he cites “hardly qualify as forecasts” because they were “vague, impressionistic, and would certainly have been maddeningly elusive for anyone trying to pin down exactly what they were anticipating or when it would occur.” It is difficult to guess how scholars preferring “admittedly imprecise and necessarily intuitive” approaches would fare if their forecasts were subject to the test Gaddis proposes for international relations theories. See Gaddis, “International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War,” 18, for the test criteria. Many historians fall prey to the many fallacies Gaddis complained about in an earlier article. See Gaddis , “Expanding the Data Base. Historians, Political Scientists, and the Enrichment of Security Studies,” International Security 12 , no. 1 ( Summer 1987 ): 3 – 21 . Gaddis says that to anticipate the future we should include “not just theory, observation, and rigorous calculation, but also narrative, analogy, paradox, irony, intuition, imagination, and-not least in importance-style.” Gaddis, “International Relations Theories and the End of the Cold War,” 57, 58. His criticism is valid, but his alternative is unconvincing.
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• One requirement is that to be policy-relevant, these predictions have to be stated free of jargon.
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• Mearsheimer , “ Back to the Future ,” 9 .
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• Waltz , Theory of International Politics; Grieco, Cooperation among Nations, 4, 32; Mearsheimer, “Correspondence: Back to the Future, Part n: International Relations Theory and Post-Cold War Europe” International Security 15, no. 2 (Fall 1990): 198.
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• Keohane , After Hegemony , 89 – 90 .
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• Ibid. , 92 – 100 .
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• Grieco , Cooperation among Nations , 35 , 41.
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• Ibid. , 44 .
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• Ibid. , 10 – 11 .
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• Mearsheimer , “ Correspondence: Back to the Future, Part n ,” 197 – 98 .
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• Kenneth N. Waltz , Man, the State and War. A Theoretical Analysis ( New York : Columbia University Press , 1954 ), 210 .
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• Waltz , Theory of International Politics , 116 – 28 ; Glenn H. Snyder, “Alliance Theory: A Neorealist First Cut,” Journal of International Affairs 44, no. 1 (Spring/Summer 1990): 104–5; Glenn H. Snyder, “Alliances, Balance, and Stability,” International Organization 45, no. 1 (Winter 1991): 123–25.
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• Grieco , Cooperation among Nations , 47 ; also Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 167.
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• Grieco , Cooperation among Nations , 29 .
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• Keohane , “ Correspondence: Back to the Future, Part II ,” 193 .
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• Arthur A. Stein , Why Nations Cooperate. Circumstance and Choice in International Relations ( Ithaca : Cornell University Press , 1990 ), 54 ; see also Keohane, After Hegemony, 257–59.
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• Keohane , After Hegemony , 117 .
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• Snyder , “ Alliance Theory: A Neorealist First Cut ,” 106 .
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• Ibid. , 161 – 76 .
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• Snyder , “ Alliance Theory: A Neorealist First Cut ,” 106 .
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• Glenn H. Snyder , “The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics,” World Politics 36 , no. 4 ( July 1984 ): 465 ; Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), 32; Walt claims that by integrating these additional factors into the traditional balance-of-power theory he has offered a new and improved version of realist alliance theory, which he labels balance-of-threat theory. Walt's approach leads to slightly different predictions about the future of NATO from those of alliance theory based on structural realism. Walt's integration of non-structural factors should be regarded as a variation in emphasis. As Waltz points out, integrating sub-systemic variables “is fully in accord with, rather than a departure of, realist assumptions.” (Waltz, “Reflections on Theory of International Politics,” 331). Therefore, for most of this article we do not distinguish between these two versions. For follow-up research and a debate of Walt's balance-of-threat theory, see Stephen M. Walt, “Testing Theories of Alliance Formation: The Case of Southwest Asia,” International Organization 42, no. 2 (Spring 1988): 275–316; Eric J. Labs, “Do Weak States Bandwagon?” Security Studies 1, no. 3 (Spring 1992): 383–416; Robert G. Kaufman, “To Balance or to Bandwagon? Alignment Decisions in 1930s Europe,” Security Studies 1, no. 3 (Spring 1992): 417–47; Stephen M. Walt, “Alliance, Threats, and U.S. Grand Strategy: A Reply to Kaufman and Labs,” Security Studies 1, no. 3 (Spring 1992): 448–82; Robert G. Kaufman, “The Lessons of the 1930s, Alliance Theory, and U.S. Grand Strategy: A Reply to Stephen Walt,” Security Studies 1, no. 4 (Summer 1992): 690–96; and Joao Resende-Santos, “System and Agent: Comments on Labs and Kaufman,” Security Studies 1, no. 4 (Summer 1992): 697–702.
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• Snyder , “ Alliance Theory: A Neorealist First Cut ,” 110 .
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• Ibid. , 113 .
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• Ibid. , 110 .
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• Ibid. , 116 – 117 .
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• Ibid., 126; Grieco , Cooperation among Nations , 46 .
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• Ibid.; Walt , The Origins of Alliances , 32 .
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• For an interesting first step toward such a theory see Michael Mastanduno , David A. Lake , and G. John Ikenberry , “Toward a Realist Theory of State Action,” International Studies Quarterly 33 , no. 4 ( December 1989 ): 457 – 74 . Waltz sees no need for such an effort as he regards the trade-off between internal and external balancing as an empirical question (correspondence with the authors, 4 September 1992).
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• Waltz , Theory of International Politics , 126 .
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• To understand the dynamics of the rise and fall of alliances increased attention ought to be paid to non-structural factors such as security dilemma variables, perceptions, and domestic variables, in addition to those mentioned by Walt and Snyder. For different approaches along these lines see Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder , “Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity,” International Organization 44 , no. 2 ( Spring 1990 ): 137 – 68 ; Michael N. Barnett and Jack S. Levy, “Domestic Sources of Alliances and Alignments: The Case of Egypt, 1962-73” International Organization 45, no. 3 (Summer 1991): 369–95; Randolph M. Siverson and Juliann Emmons, “Birds of a Feather: Democratic Political Systems and Alliance Choices in the Twentieth Century,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 35, no. 2 (June 1991): 285–306; Thomas Risse-Kappen, “Cooperation Among Democracies: Norms, Transnational Relations, and the European Influence on U.S. Foreign Policy” (Paper presented at the Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, Atlanta, Georgia, 31 March-4 April 1992). For criticism of the weaknesses of both neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism with regard to domestic variables see Helen Milner, “International Theories of Cooperation among Nations. Strengths and Weaknesses,” World Politics 44, no. 3 (April 1992): 481, 488–95.
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• Keohane , International Institutions and State Power , 163 . For an alternative definition of institutions see Oran R. Young, International Cooperation. Building Regimes for Natural Resources and the Environment (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989), 32. The different definitions offered by neoliberal scholars suggest that an alliance such as NATO can at the same time be called a “regime” or an “organization.” Young, defining organizations as “material entities possessing physical locations (or seats), officies, personnel, equipment, and budgets,” explicitly calls NATO an organization (Young, International Cooperation, 32, 33). According to Stephen Krasner's classic definition regimes are “sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decisionmaking procedures around which actors] expectations converge in a given area of international relations” (Stephen D. Krasner, “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences,” in Stephen D. Krasner, ed., International Regimes (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), 2). For an overview of differing concepts of regimes see Stephan Haggard and Beth A. Simmons, “Theories of International Regimes,” International Organization 41, no. 3 (Summer 1987): 493–96; Manfred Efinger, Volker Rittberger, Klaus Dieter Wolf, Michael Zürn, “Internationale Regime und internationale Politik,” in Volker Rittberger, ed., Theorien der International Beziehungen. Bestandsaufnahme und Forschungsperspefyiven (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1990), 264–67; and Otto Keck, “Der neue Institutionalismus in der Theorie der Internationalen Politik,” Politische Vierteljahresschrift 32, no. 4 (December 1991): 637–38. The definition of regime used in Krasner's 1983 volume is still widely shared among regime analysts. See Regimes Summit, Workshop Report of a Conference held at the Minary Center, Dartmouth College, 22–24 November 1991, Hannover: Dartmouth College, 2 December 1991, p. 2. Our definition of alliance falls between what Keohane calls “formal organizations” and “international regimes” (Keohane, International Institutions and State Power, 3–4). Whether an institution resembles a more formal organization or a regime depends on the degree of institutionalization (bureaucratic structure, independent capabilities for monitoring activities, etc.). Definitions, however, are not the crucial issue. Keohane, for example, states that organization and regime “may be distinguishable analytically, but in practice they may seem almost coterminous” (Keohane, International Institutions and State Power, 5). What is more important from a neoliberal perspective is that many of the hypotheses about the formation, persistence, and decline of any specific form of institutions equally apply to organizations and regimes. See Keohane, “The Analysis of International Regimes: Toward a European-American Research Programme,” in Volker Rittberger, ed., Regime Theory and International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993, forthcoming).
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• Robert O. Keohane , “Alliances, Threats, and the Uses of Neorealism,” International Security 13 , no. 1 ( Summer 1988 ): 174 . Emphasis in the original. See also Keohane, International Institutions and State Power, 15–16.
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• For a recent application of regime theory to intra-alliance relations see John S. Duffield , “International Regimes and Alliances Behavior: Explaining NATO Conventional Force Levels,” International Organization 46 , no. 4 ( Autumn 1992 ): 819 – 55 . Elements of institutionalist theory are also present in the work of Steve Weber. See his “Shaping the Postwar Balance of Power: Multilaterlism in NATO,” International Organization 46, no. 3 (Summer 1992): 633–80; and Weber, “Does NATO Have a Future?”
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• Neoliberal institutionalism, it is said , “is not simply an alternative to neorealism, but, in fact, claims to subsume it.” Keohane , International Institutions and State Power , 15 . According to Keohane, “a comparison of neorealist interpretations of alliances with a sophisticated neoliberal alternative would show that neoliberal theory provides richer and more novel insights, without sacrificing the valuable arguments of neorealism.” Ibid. In this sense the verb ‘subsume’ comes close to the triple (Hegelian) meaning of the German verb aufheben: neoliberals claim that they have preserved important neorealist insights, eliminated inadequate assumptions, and thereby improved realist and neorealist theory.
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• Even proponents of institutionalist theory concede that research has been lacking in this regard. See Peter Mayer, Volker Rittberger, and Michael Zürn, “Regime Theory: State of the Art and Perspectives,” in Rittberger, Regime Theory and International Relations. The difficulties of creating or maintaining security regimes have been addressed in Robert Jervis, “Security Regimes,” in Krasner, International Regimes, 173–94; Jervis , “ From Balance to Concert: A Study of International Security Cooperation” in Kenneth A. Oye , ed., Cooperation under Anarchy ( Princeton : Princeton University Press , 1986 ), 58 – 79 ; Charles Lipson, “International Cooperation in Economic and Security Affairs,” World Politics 37, no. 1 (October 1984): 1–23; Janice Gross Stein, “Detection and Defection: Security ‘Regimes’ and the Management of International Conflict,” International Journal 40 (Autumn 1985): 599-627. These conceptual articles focused explicitly on security cooperation or security regimes, so it is surprising that none examines alliances.
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• Keohane asserts that neoliberal institutionalist theory “implies hypotheses” about the creation or demise of international institutions which can be “submitted to systematic, even quantitative, examination.” Keohane International Institutions and State Power , 167 . We have, therefore, allowed neoliberal institutionlists to speak for themselves whenever possible. However, when, in formulating testable hypotheses, we were not satisfied with the explicitness of neoliberal writings, we stated the hypotheses ourselves.
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• The classical works are Robert O. Keohane and Jospeh S. Nye , Jr. , eds., Transnational Relations and World Politics ( Cambridge : Harvard University Press , 1971 ); and Robert O. Keohane and Jospeh S. Nye, Jr., Power and Interdependence. World Politics in Transition (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977). Explaining the formation of international institutions, scholars place different emphasis on different types of institutions and stress different causal variables. Keohane, for example, argues that international regimes are formed because they fulfil particular functions. This is why in his earlier writings Keohane called his approach a “functional theory of regimes.” Keohane, After Hegemony, 85. Others conceive of regimes more broadly and reject an exclusively contractarian perspective. Oran Young argues that “self-generating” or “spontaneous” arrangements qualify as do “imposed” arrangements. Young, International Cooperation, 84–92, 202.
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• Keohane , After Hegemony , 94 ; Young, International Cooperation, 199.
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• Keohane , After Hegemony , 88 . Emphasis in the original.
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• Keohane , International Institutions and State Power , 167 ; Haggard and Simmons, “Theories of International Regimes,” 496; Efinger et al., “Internationale Regime und internationale Politik,” 281, n. 8.
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• See Haggard and Simmons , “Theories of International Regimes,” 496 , for exceptions. Regarding the recent surge in studying regime effectiveness and regime robustness, see especially Young, “The Effectiveness of International Institutions'; and Harald Müller, “The Internalization of Principles, Norms, and Rules by Governments: The Case of Security Regimes,” in Rittberger, Regime Theory and International Relations.
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• This is similar to, but not identical with the definition provided by Haggard and Simmons , “Theories of International Regimes,” 496 . They suggested to measure strength “by the degree of compliance with regime injunctions, particularly in instances where short-term or ‘myopic’ self-interests collide with regime rules.” See also Krasner, “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences,” 5, where he suggests that a regime should be considered to have weakened if the principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures of the regime “become less coherent, or if actual practice is increasingly inconsistent with principles, norms, rules, and procedures.
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• On the internalization of institutional norms see Axelrod , “An Evolutionary Approach to Norms,” 1104 and Müller, “The Internalization of Principles, Norms, and Rules by Governments.”
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• Adaptation (or “evolution,” as Keohane states) can mean different things. With regard to the strengthening or weakening of the degree of institutionalization it can mean both. However, the thrust of neoliberal institutionalism implies that whether or not the degree of institutionalization is increased or reduced, this will be a process perceived to be in the interests of most states concerned, especially the major powers.
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• The pullout was proclaimed by the Canadian finance minister. See John Best and Michael Evans , “Canada to Withdraw All Troops from Europe,” Times ( London ), 24 February 1992 ; see also Hella Pick and David Fairhall, “NATO Dismay at Canada's Pullout from Europe,” Guardian, 27 February 1992.
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