The Causes of Nuclear Proliferation and the Utility of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime

Notes

• A substantial literature has been published on the NPT Review Conference. See George Bunn , “The NPT and Options for its Extension,” Nonproliferation Review , 1 , no. 2 ( Winter 1994 ): 52 – 60 ; Lewis A. Dunn, “NPT 1995: Time to Shift Gears,” Arms Control Today 23, no. 9 (November 1993): 14–19; David Fischer, Towards 1995: The Prospects for Ending the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Aldershot, U.K.: Dartmouth Publishers for the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 1993); Darryl Howlett and John Simpson, eds., The Future of the NPT (London: Macmillan, 1994); Alexander T. Lennon, “The 1995 NPT Extension Conference,” Washington Quarterly 17, no. 4 (Autumn 1994): 205–27. Joseph F. Pilat and Robert E. Pendley, eds., Beyond 1995: The Future of the NPT Regime (New York: Plenum, 1990); Mitchell Reiss, “The Last Nuclear Summit?” Washington Quarterly 17, no. 3 (Summer 1994): 5–15; John B. Rhinelander and Adam M. Scheinman, At the Nuclear Crossroads: Choices about Nuclear Weapons and Extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (Lanham: University Press of America, 1995); John Simpson and Darryl Howlett, “The NPT Renewal Conference: Stumbling toward 1995,” International Security 19, no. 1 (Summer 1994): 41–71; and Archelaus R. Turrentine, “The Dynamics of the NPT Extension Decision,” Director's Series on Proliferation No. 2, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, 7 September 1993, pp. 1–28.
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• For a good synopsis of the debate over the period of extension of the NPT , see Lennon , “The 1995 NPT Extension Conference,” 207 – 8 . For important considerations of the nuclear nonproliferation regime see New Threats: Responding to the Proliferation of Nuclear, Chemical, and Delivery Capabilities in the Third World, An Aspen Strategy Group Report (Lanham: Aspen Strategy Group and University Press of America, 1990); Robert M. Lawrence and Joel Larus, “A Historical Review of Nuclear Weapons Proliferation and the Development of the NPT,” in Robert M. Lawrence and Joel Larus, eds., Nuclear Proliferation: Phase II (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1974), 1–29; Joseph S. Nye, “Maintaining a Nonproliferation Regime,” International Organization 35, no. 1 (Winter 1981): 15–38, reprinted in George H. Quester, ed., Nuclear Proliferation: Breaking the Chain (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1981), 15–38; and George H. Quester, The Politics of Nuclear Proliferation (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973).
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• For analysis of the issues surrounding a comprehensive test ban and the utility of a CTBT see Frans Berkhout , Oleg Bukharin , Harold Feiveson , and Marvin Miller , “A Cutoff in the Production of Fissile Material,” International Security 19 , no. 3 ( Winter 1994/95 ): 167 – 202 ; Jozef Goldblat and David Cox, eds., Nuclear Weapon Tests: Prohibition or Limitation? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988); and Steve Fetter, Toward a Comprehensive Test Ban (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1988).
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• On the Israeli nuclear program see Shlomo Aronson with the assistance of Oded Brosh, The Politics and Strategy of Nuclear Weapons in the Middle East: Opacity, Theory and Reality, 1960–1991 An Israeli Perspective ( Albany : State University Press of New York , 1992 ); Frank Barnaby, The Invisible Bomb (London: I. B. Tauris, 1989); Uri Bar Joseph, “The Hidden Debate: The Formation of Nuclear Doctrines in the Middle East,” Journal of Strategy Studies 5, no. 2 (June 1982): 205–27; Alan Dowty, “Nuclear Proliferation: The Israeli Case,” International Studies Quarterly 22, no. 1 (March 1978): 79–120; Yair Evron, Israel's Nuclear Dilemma (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994); Evron, “Opaque Proliferation: The Israeli Case,” Journal of Strategic Studies 13, no. 3 (September 1990): 45–63; Evron, “Israel and the Atom: The Uses and Misuses of Ambiguity, 1957–1967,” Orbis 17, no. 4 (Winter 1974): 1326–43; Shai Feldman, Israeli Nuclear Deterrence: A Strategy for the 1980s (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982); Feldman, “The Bombing of Osiraq—Revisited,” International Security 7, no. 2 (Fall 1982): 114–42; Lawrence Freed-man, ‘Israel’s Nuclear Policy,” Survival 17, no. 3 (May/June 1975): 114–20; Avigdor Haselkorn, “Israel: From an Option to a Bomb in the Basement,” in Lawrence and Larus, Nuclear Proliferation, 149–82; Seymour M. Hersh, The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy (New York: Random House, 1991); Peter Pry, Israel's Nuclear Arsenal (Boulder: Westview, 1984); and Steven J. Rosen, “Nuclearization and Stability in the Middle East,” Jerusalem Journal of International Relations 1, no. 3 (Spring 1976): 1–32.
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• Stephen Krasner defines a regime as is a set “of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations.” Stephen D. Krasner , “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables,” in Stephen D. Krasner , ed., International Regimes ( Ithaca : Cornell University Press , 1983 ): 2 .
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• This study addresses solely the nuclear nonproliferation regime and not the biological, chemical, and missile nonproliferation regimes, although, of course, each of the questions about the nuclear nonproliferation regime addressed by the study may be asked of the other regimes.
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• The danger that nuclear proliferation may cause to the United States itself, its interests, and allies, is demonstrated by Robert J. Art , “A Defensible Defense: America's Grand Strategy After the Cold War,” International Security 15 , no. 4 ( Spring 1991 ): 5 – 53 ; and Steven R. David, “Why the Third World Still Matters,” International Security 17, no. 3 (Winter 1992/93): 127–59.
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• The recent agreement between the United States and North Korea has been widely praised in the United States. However, there are several negative aspects of the agreement that must be emphasized. First, North Korea's agreement to end its gas-graphite reactor program and to close its reprocessing facility may be irrelevant because North Korea may have produced all the plutonium it needs to meet its political goals, such as deterrence of an attack. Second, providing light-water reactors may not stop the North Korean weapons program because light-water reactors can produce weapon-grade plutonium if the reactors are optimized to do so. Third, the agreement does not obligate North Korea to dismantle its reactors and reprocessing facility, and to send its spent fuel abroad until the light-water reactors are almost complete. As a result, North Korea has the ability to add 4 to 5 nuclear weapons to its nuclear arsenal in a short time. This seriously complicates any effort by the United States to punish North Korea for violating the agreement. Additionally, North Korea could construct, without being detected by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) or the United States, a small reprocessing plant that could reprocess the spent fuel in its possession presently, or that from the light-water reactors. See David Albright and Kevin O'Neill , “The Price of Nonproliferation,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists ( January/February 1995 ): 27 – 29 .
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• Reports concerning Japanese considerations to develop nuclear weapons include Jim Mann and Leslie Helm , “Japan Shifts Its Stand on Ruling Out A-Bomb,” Los Angeles Times , 9 July 1993 , p. A9 ; T. R. Reid, “Japan's Shift on A-Pact Raises Concerns Abroad,” Washington Post, 15 July 1993, p. A22; Naoaki Usui, “Japanese Move on NPT Spurs Nuclear Worries,” Defense News, 19–25 July 1993, p. 36; and Clayton Jones, “Korea Prompts Japan to Review No-Nukes Policy,” Christian Science Monitor, 10 August 1993, p. 1.
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• The risk of nuclear inadvertence is a relatively new issue in the nuclear literature, and many excellent works are beginning to debate this issue. See Bruce G. Blair , The Logic of Accidental Nuclear War ( Washington , D.C. : Brookings , 1993 ); Peter Douglas Feaver, Guarding the Guardians: Civilian Control of Nuclear Weapons in the United States (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992); Scott D. Sagan, The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); Sagan, “The Perils of Proliferation: Organization Theory, Deterrence Theory, and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons,” International Security 18, no. 4 (Spring 1994): 66–107. I term this new debate in the nuclear literature, the debate over the vulnerabdity of states to nuclear inadvertence, the diird great nuclear debate. The first great debate was over the vulnerability of state's nuclear forces; the second great debate was over the vulnerability of a state's command and control to destruction. See Bradley A. Thayer, “The Risk of Nuclear Inadvertence: A Review Essay,” Security Studies 3, no. 3 (Spring 1994): 428–93. 10a. The cost of the obligation of the United States and other nuclear states to disarm is likely to increase because the United States and the others will be criticized by the non-nuclear states at the Review Conference for not having disarmed completely. Although the nuclear states are obligated by the Treaty to disarm, nuclear disarmament in the foreseeable future will only promote instability for a host of reasons, including the elimination of an important obstacle to conventional war between great powers. See Charles L. Glaser, Analyzing Strategic Nuclear Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 166–203.
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• The term “opaque proliferation” was coined by Benjamin Frankel in his “Notes on the Nuclear Underworld,” The National Interest , no. 9 ( Fall 1987 ): 122 – 26 . The concept was further defined and elaborated in Avner Cohen and Benjamin Frankel, “Opaque Nuclear Proliferation,” Journal of Strategic Studies 13, no. 3 (September 1990): 14–44, esp. 21–22. Also see the other essays in this special issue of the Journal of Strategic Studies for discussion of different aspects of the opaque proliferation phenomenon.
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• For an argument that political incentives, like prestige, are a cause of nuclear proliferation see Ted Greenwood , Harold A. Feiveson , Theodore B. Taylor , Nuclear Proliferation: Motivations, Capabilities, and Strategies for Control ( New York : McGraw-Hill , 1977 ), 50 ; and Stephen M. Meyer, The Dynamics of Nuclear Proliferation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), 50–55.
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• On de Gaulle's conception of France as a great power see Philip H. Gordon , A Certain Idea, of France: French Security Policy and the Gaullist Legacy ( Princeton : Princeton University Press , 1993 ). For histories of the French nuclear program see Colette Barbier, “The French Decision to Develop a Military Nuclear Programme in the 1950s,” Diplomacy & Statecraft: 4, no. 1 (March 1993): 103–13; George A. Kelly, “The Political Background of the French A-Bomb,” Orbis 4, no. 3 (Fall 1960): 284–306; Wilfred L. Kohl, French Nuclear Diplomacy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971); Jean Lacouture, De Gaulle: The Ruler 1945–1970, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Norton, 1993), ch. 31, pp. 413–33; Wolf Mendl, Deterrence and Persuasion: French Nuclear Armament in the Context of National Policy, 1945–1969 (New York: Praeger, 1970); Robert S. Norris, Andrew S. Burrows, and Richard W. Fieldhouse, Nuclear Weapons Databook, vol. 5, British, French, and Chinese Nuclear Weapons (Boulder: Westview, 1994), 182–221; Lawrence Scheinman, Atomic Energy Policy in France Under the Fourth Republic (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965); ana Ciro Zoppo, “France as a Nuclear Power,” in Richard Rosecrance, ed., The Dispersion of Nuclear Weapons (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964), 113–56.
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• The first quote is cited in Alexander Werth , De Gaulle ( Baltimore : Penguin , 1967 ), 343 . The second quote is cited in Charles de Gaulle, Discours et messages, 5 vols. (Paris: Plon, 1970), vol. 3, p. 369. Both quotes are cited in Gordon, A Certain Idea of France, 42.
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• On de Gaulle's desire to be a nuclear third force see Michael M. Harrison , The Reluctant Ally: France and Atlantic Security ( Baltimore : Johns Hopkins University Press , 1981 ), 101 – 14 .
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• Michel Debré is quoted in McGeorge Bundy , Danger and Survival Choices About the Bomb in the First Fifty Years ( New York : Random House , 1988 ), 499 .
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• Alfred Goldberg , “The Atomic Origins of the British Nuclear Deterrent,” International Affairs 40 , no. 2 ( July 1964 ): 427 . Cited in Lawrence and Lams, “A Historical review of Nuclear Weapons Proliferation and the Development of the NPT,” in Lawrence and Larus, Nuclear Proliferation, 2–3.
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• On the history of British nuclear program see Margaret Gowing , Britain and Atomic Energy, 1939–1945 ( London : Macmillan , 1964 ); Gowing, assisted by Lorna Arnold, Independence and Deterrence: Britain and Atomic Energy, 2 vols. (London: Macmillan, 1974); Gowing, “Nuclear Weapons and the ‘Special Relationship,’” in William Roger Louis and Hedley Bull, eds., The “Special Relationship”: Anglo-American Relations Since 1945 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), 117–28; Norris, et al., Nuclear Weapons Databook, vol. 5; Andrew J. Pierre, Nuclear Politics: The British Experience with an Independent Strategic Force 1939–1970 (London: Oxford University Press, 1972); Richard Rosecrance, “British Incentives to Become a Nuclear Power,” in Rosecrance, The Dispersion of Nuclear Weapons, 48–65.
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• Bundy , Danger and Survival , 502 .
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• On the Indian development of nuclear weapons see Shyam Bhatia , India's Nuclear Bomb ( New Delhi : Vikas , 1979 ); Brahma Chellaney, “The Challenge of Nuclear Arms Control in South Asia,” Survival 35, no. 3 (Autumn 1993): 121–36; Chellaney, “South Asia's Passage to Nuclear Power,” International Security 16, no. 1 (Summer 1991): 43–72; Ashok Kapur, India's Nuclear Option: Atomic Diplomacy and Decision Making (New York: Praeger, 1976); Onkar Marwah, “India's Nuclear and Space Programs: Intent and Policy,” International Security 2, no. 2 (Fall 1977): 96–121; Ziba Moshaver, Nuclear Weapons Proliferation in the Indian Subcontinent (New York: St. Martin's, 1991); K. Subrah-manyam, “India: Keeping the Option Open,” in Lawrence and Larus, Nuclear Proliferation, 112–48; and Raju G. C. Thomas, “The Strategic Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation in South-west Asia: India's Perspective,” Journal of Strategic Studies 8, no. 4 (December 1985): 67–79; Thomas, “India's Nuclear and Space Programs: Defense or Development?” World Politics 38, no. 2 (January 1986): 315–42.
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• Histories of the Chinese nuclear program include Morton Halperin , China and the Bomb ( New York : Praeger , 1965 ); Alice Laneley Hsieh, “Communist China and Nuclear Force,” in Rosecrance, The Dispersion of Nuclear Weapons, 157–85; John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, China Builds the Bomb (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988); and Norris, et al., Nuclear Weapons Databook, vol. 5, pp. 324–56.
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• Anonymous editorial, Organizer, 28 December 1964 , cited in Peter R. Lavov “Nuclear Myths and the Causes of Nuclear Proliferation,” Security Studies , 2 nos. 3/4 ( Spring/Summer 1993 ): 192 – 212 . Quote is from p. 198.
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• R. W. Apple , “Ukraine Gives in on Surrendering Its Nuclear Arms,” New York Times, 11 January 1994 , p. A1 ; and Jane Perlez, “Economic Collapse Leaves Ukraine With Little to Trade but Its Weapons,” New York Times 13 January 1994, p. A5. On the Ukrainian fear of decreasing relevance for the United States were it to become a non-nuclear state see Theresa Hitchens and George Leopold, “U.S. Initiates Thaw in Ukrainian Relations,” Defense News 17–23 May 1993, p. 6.
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• In fact, the possession of nuclear capabilities may threaten the independence and survival of an emerging nuclear state because it becomes a threat to the interests of the great powers or other states, and so they may be willing to use force against it, that is, to wage a preventive war, before it becomes a nuclear state. The Israeli attack on Iraq's Osirak reactor facility illustrates the danger of a preventive strike faced by emerging nuclear states. While it is not clear that the United States intervened in the Gulf in 1990 principally to arrest Iraqi nuclear development, Israel certainly struck Osirak to prevent Iraq from becoming a nuclear state. The dangerous circumstances faced by emerging nuclear states due to potential vulnerability of their nuclear forces, their nuclear command and control systems, and to the risk of nuclear inadvertence, may result in what Stephen Van Evera has termed the “survival dilemma.” The survival dilemma obtains when states can be destroyed but cannot deter destruction. This condition can occur when the capacity to inflict damage is not mutual, and the pressure to preempt or wage preventive war is great. Stephen William Van Evera, “Causes of War” (Ph.D. diss., University of California at Berkeley, 1984), 172–79. Also see Thayer , “The Risk of Nuclear Inadvertence,” 469 – 79 .
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• Kenneth N. Waltz , Theory of International Politics ( Reading , Mass. : Addison-Wesley , 1979 ), 131 ; and Waltz, “The Emerging Structure of International Politics,” International Security 18, no. 2 (Fall 1993): 50–61. Jack Levy provides a similar definition, great powers are distinguished from other states in the international system by three criteria: first, great powers have a high level of military capability that makes them relatively self-sufficient strategically and capable of projecting power beyond their borders; second, they possess a broad concept of security diat embraces a concern with regional and/or global power balances; and third, they have a greater assertiveness than lesser powers in defining and defending their interests. Jack Levy, War and the Modem Great Power System, 1495–1975 (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1983), pp. 10–19.
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• On the history of the Soviet decision to acquire nuclear weapons see Ulrich Al-brecht , “The Development of the First Atomic Bomb in the USSR” , in Everett Mendelsohn , Merritt Roe Smith , and Peter Weingart , eds., Science, Technology, and the Military , vol. 2 ( Dordrecht , Netherlands : Kluwer , 1988 ), 349 – 78 ; Thomas B. Cochran, William M. Arkin, Robert S. Norris, and Jeffrey I. Sands, Nuclear Weapons Databook, vol. 4, Soviet Nuclear Weapons (New York: Harper & Row, 1989), 2–19; David Holloway, “Entering the Nuclear Arms Race: The Soviet Decision to Build the Atomic Bomb, 1939–45,” Social Studies of Science 11, no. 2 (May 1981): 159–97; Holloway, The Soviet Union and the Arms Race (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983); Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1936–1956 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994); Arnold Kramish, Atomic Energy in the Soviet Union (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959); and George Modelski, Atomic Energy in the Communist Bloc (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1959).
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• Among the best sources on the Pakistani program are Akhtar Ali , Pakistan's Nuclear Dilemma ( Karachi : Pakistan Economist Research Unit , 1984 ); Chellaney, “The Challenge of Nuclear Arms Control in South Asia,” 122–24, 127–29; Neil Joeck, “Pakistani Security and Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia,” Journal of Strategic Studies 8, no. 4 (December 1985): 80–98; Rodney W. Jones, Nuclear Proliferation: Islam, the Bomb, and South Asia, Washington Papers no. 82 (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1981); Ashok Kapur, Pakistan's Nuclear Development (London: Croom Helm, 1987); Zalmay M. Khalilzad, “Pakistan,” in Jozef Goldblat, ed., Non-Proliferation: The Why and the Wherefore (London: Taylor and Francis, 1985), 131–49; Moshaver, Nuclear Weapons Proliferation in the Indian Subcontinent; George H. Quester, “Some Pakistani Problems and a Nuclear Non-Solution,” Journal of Strategic Studies 8, no. 4 (December 1985): 99–109.
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• There are few detailed histories of the South African program. See Richard K. Betts , “A Diplomatic Bomb for South Africa,” International Security 4 , no. 2 ( Fall 1979 ): 91 – 115 ; Robert S. Jaster, “Politics and the ‘Afrikaner Bomb,’” Orbis 27, no. 4 (Winter 1984): 825–51; A. R. Newby-Fraser, Chain Reaction: Twenty Year of Nuclear Research and Development in South Asia, (Pretoria: Atomic Energy Board, 1979); Mitchell Reiss, Without the Bomb: The Politics of Nuclear Nonproliferation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), ch. 6, pp. 173–203; Leonard S. Spector, Going Nuclear: The Spread of Nuclear Weapons 1986–1987 (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1987), 220–39; T. E. Spence, “The Republic of South Africa: Proliferation and the Politics of ‘Outward Movement’,” in Lawrence and Larus, Nuclear Proliferation, 209–38. Also see David Albright, “South Africa and the Affordable Bomb,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (July/August 1994): 37–47; and J. W. de Villiers, Roger Jardine, Mitchell Reiss, “Why South Africa Gave Up the Bomb,” Foreign Affairs 72, no. 5 (November/December 1993): 98–109. How South Africa developed its nuclear weapons and why the de Klerk government abandoned the program are important Questions that may reveal important lessons for nonproliferation efforts and thus need to be addressed in detail by scholars.
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• Indeed, there is a considerable literature on India's attempt to obtain a security guarantee from a nuclear state such as Britain or the United States after the Chinese nuclear detonation of 1964. This behavior is not indicative of a state seeking to acquire nuclear weapons for prestige. See Benjamin Frankel , “The Brooding Shadow: Systemic Incentives and Nuclear Weapons Proliferation,” Security Studies 2 , nos. 3/4 ( Spring/Summer 1993 ): 53 – 54 ; Raj Krishna, “India and the Bomb,” India Quarterly 21, no. 2 (April-June 1965): 119–37; M. R. Masani, “the Challenge of the Chinese Bomb-H,” India Quarterly 21, no. 1 (January-March 1965): 26–27; A. G. Noorani, “India's Quest for a Nuclear Guarantee,” Asian Survey 7, no. 7 0uly 1967): 490–502.
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• Richard K. Betts , “Incentives for Nuclear Weapons: India, Pakistan, Iran,” Asian Survey 19 , no. 11 ( November 1979 ): 1053 – 72 . Emphasis original.
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• The locus classicus of the bureaucratic politics explanation of state decisionmaking is Graham T. Allison , The Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis ( Boston : Little, Brown , 1971 ), 144 – 84 . Also see Graham T. Allison and Morton H. Halperin, “Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy Explanations,” World Politics 24, no. 3 (April 1972): 40–79; Allison and Frederic A. Morris, “Armaments and Arms Control: Exploring the Determinants of Military Weapons,” Daedalus 104, no. 3 (Summer 1975): 99–127; Morton H. Halperin, “The Decision to Deploy the ABM: Bureaucratic and Domestic Politics in the Johnson Administration,” World Politics 25, no. 1 (October 1972): 62–95; Halperin widi the assistance of Priscilla Clapp and Arnold Kanter, Bureaucratic Politics ana Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1974); and Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the World Wars (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984), 44–59. Posen's analysis incorporates elements of bureaucratic politics and organization theory. For some important critiques of the bureaucratic politics approach to the analysis of international politics see Robert J. Art, “Bureaucratic Politics and American Foreign Policy: A Critique of the Bureaucratic Politics Theory,” Policy Sciences 4, no. 4 (December 1973): 467–90; Desmond J. Ball, “The Blind Men and the Elephant: A Critique of Bureaucratic Politics Theory,” Australian Outlook 28, no.l (Aprd 1974): 71–92; Stephen D. Krasner, “Are Bureaucracies Important? (Or Allison's Wonderland),” Foreign Policy, no. 7 (Summer 1972): 159–79; Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine, 220–41; and Edward Rhodes, “Do Bureaucratic Politics Matter? Some Disconfirming Findings from the Case of the U.S. Navy,” World Politics 47, no. 1 (October 1994): 1–41. For an excellent analysis of the bureaucratic politics approach see David A. Welch, “The Organizational Process and Bureaucratic Politics Paradigms: Retrospect and Prospect,” International Security 17, no. 2 (Fall 1992): 112–46.
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• Allison , Essence of Decision ; and Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy.
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• Allison , Essence of Decision , 145 .
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• Ibid. , 145 .
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• Halperin , Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy , 28 , 39.
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• Ibid. , 39 .
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• Ibid. , 27 .
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• The CEA, founded on 18 October 1945, is the organization charged with developing atomic weapons, as well conducting most civil and military nuclear research m France. On the development of the CEA see Mendl , Deterrence and Persuasion , 18 – 19 , 27–28; and Scheinman, Atomic Energy Policy in France Under the Fourth Republic, 3–19.
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• Reiss , Without the Bomb , 217 .
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• Ibid. , 217 – 22 .
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• Lavoy , “Nuclear Myths and the Causes of Proliferation,” 202 .
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• Ralph E. Lapp , Arms Beyond Doubt- The Tyranny of Weapons Technology ( New York : Cowles , 1970 ), 177 – 78 .
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• Cited in Deborah Shapley , “Nuclear Weapons History: Japan's Wartime Bomb Project Revealed,” Science 199 (13 January 1978 ): 152 – 57 , quote from p. 155.
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• On the political impact of television see Shanto Iyengar , Is Anyone Responsible? How Television Frames Political Issues ( Chicago : University of Chicago Press , 1991 ). The power of television to compel U.S. intervention has been called the “CNN factor”. “CNN pushed the boundaries of world news: no longer did the network merely report news, but through its immediate reportage, CNN actually shaped the events and became part of them. Lewis Friedland, Covering the World: International Television News Services (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1992), 2. Quoted in Frank J. Stech, “Winning CNN Wars,” Parameters 24, no. 3 (Autumn 1994): 37–56.
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• For an excellent summary of technology as a cause of proliferation see Peter Lavoy “Nuclear Myths and the Causes of Nuclear Proliferation” , 194 – 95 . For advocates of technological pull in the nuclear weapons context see Hans Bethe, “The Technological Imperative,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (August 1985): 34–36; Lapp, Arms Beyond Doubt; Thetrich Schroeer, Science, Technology, and the Nuclear Arms Race (New York: Wiley, 1984); Deborah Shapley, “Technology Creep and the Arms Race: ICBM Problem a Sleeper,” Science 201 (22 September 1978): 1102–5; Marek Thee, Military Technology, Military Strategy and the Arms Race (London: Croom Helm, 1986); Herbert York, “Multiple-Warhead Missiles,” in Bruce M. Russett and Bruce G. Blair, eds., Progress in Arms Control? Readings from Scientific American (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1979), 122–31; and Lord Zuckerman, Science Advisers and Scientific Advisers,” Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 124 (1980): 241–55. Insightful critiques of technological determinism are found in the work of Donald MacKenzie. See MacKenzie, “Stellar-Inertial Guidance: A Study in the Sociology of Military Technology,” in Mendelsohn, et al., eds., Science, Technology and the Military, 187–241; MacKenzie, “The Soviet Union and Strategic Missile Guidance,” International Security 13, no. 2 (Fall 1988): 5–54; MacKenzie, Inventing Accuracy: A Historical Sociology of Nuclear Missile Guidance (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1990), ch. 8, 382–423. MacKenzie argues that technological determinism is not deterministic but is dependent upon social phenomenon. Also see Langdon Winner, Autonomous Technology: Technics-out-of-Control as a Theme in Political Thought (Cambridge: MTT Press, 1977). Steven Flank presents an intriguing argument concerning the processes of nuclear proliferation. By utilizing the social construction of technology, Flank argues that a heterogeneous alliance occurs among a society of scientists, politicians, technologies, and interests, which unite to support large technical systems. He thus offers important insights into the evolution of the nuclear programs of states. See Steven Flank, “Exploding the Black Box: The Historical Sociology of Nuclear Proliferation,” Security Studies 3, no. 2 (Winter 1993/94): 259–94.
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• In the Matter of J. Robert Oppenheimer: Transcripts of Hearings before Personnel Security Review Board and Texts of Principal Documents and Letters ( Cambridge : MTT Press , 1971 ), 251 . Cited in Lavoy, “Nuclear Myths and the Causes of Nuclear Proliferation,” 195. Emphasis added.
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• Advocates of technological pull must address the arguments of Donald MacKenzie, who argues that technological invention, in MacKenzie's particular case, the invention of missile accuracy, is a social process and a process that permits technologies to be “uninvented.” The logic of MacKenzie's arguments applies to nuclear proliferation as well as to missile accuracy. See MacKenzie, Inventing Accuracy; and MacKenzie , “Towards an Historical Sociology of Nuclear Weapons Technologies,” in Nils Petter Gleditsch and Olav Njalstad , eds., Arms Races: Technological and Political Dynamics ( London : Sage , 1990 ), ch. 8 , 121 – 39 . Also see Graham Spinardi, “Why the U.S. Navy Went for Hard-Target Counterforce in Trident n (And Why It Didn't Get There Sooner),” International Security 15, no. 2 (Fall 1990): 147–90. For another argument critically discussing the relationship between science and society see Yaron Ezrahi, The Descent of Icarus: Science and the Transformation of Contemporary Democracy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990).
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• Mitchell Reiss notes that by the end of the 1970s nuclear research or power programs existed in over forty-five nonnuclear weapons states. Without the Bomb, 23. Joseph Nye estimates “forty odd states that possess nuclear technology.” Joseph S. Nye , Jr. , “NPT: The Logic of Inequality,” Foreign Policy , no. 59 ( Summer 1985 ): 126 . Also see Frankel, “The Brooding Shadow,” 45, n.41.
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• The principal works of realism include Raymond Aron , Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations , trans. Richard Howard and Annette Baker Fox ( Garden City : Doubleday , 1966 ); Edward Hallett Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919–1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations, 2nd ed. (London: Macmillan, 1946); Robert Gilpin, U.S. Power and the Multinational Corporation: The Political Economy of Foreign Direct Investment (New York: Basic Books, 1975); Hans J. Morgenthau, Scientific Man vs. Power Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1946); Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 5th ed. rev. (New York: Knopf, 1978); Nicholas John Spykman, America's Strategy in World Politics: The United States and the Balance of Power (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1942); Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959); Martin Wight, Power Politics, “Looking Forward” Pamphlet no. 8 (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1946) and Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962). Realism should not be confused with the homonymous ontological school of thought in philosophy. Important neorealist works are Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Joseph M. Grieco, Cooperation Among Nations: Europe, America, and Non-Tariff Barriers to Trade (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990); Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987); Waltz, Theory of International Politics. On the distinction between realism and neorealism see Gilpin, “The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism,” in Robert O. Keohane, ed., Neorealism and Its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 301–21; and Waltz, “Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory,” Journal of International Affairs 44, no. 1 (Spring/Summer 1990): 21–37.
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• Waltz , Theory of International Politics , 88 – 93 .
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• The central ideas of realism are drawn from John J. Mearsheimer , “The False Promise of International Institutions,” International Security 19 , no. 3 ( Winter 1994/95 ): 9 – 12 .
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• The work of Paul Kennedy provides some of the most thoughtful historical analysis of the importance of relative power. See Paul M. Kennedy , The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery ( London : Allen Lane , 1976 ) chaps. 7 and 10; Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (New York: Random House, 1987); Kennedy, “The Tradition of Appeasement in British Foreign Policy, 1865–1939,” British Journal of International Studies 2, no. 3 (October 1976): 195–215; Kennedy, “Strategy versus Finance in Twentieth-century Britain,” in Kennedy, Strategy and Diplomacy, 1870–1945 (London: Fontana Press, 1983), 89–106.
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• The predictions of state behavior stemming from the conditions of realism are drawn from Mearsheimer , “The False Promise of International Institutions,” pp. 10 – 12 .
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• Waltz , Theory of International Politics , 91 , 105–7.
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• Ibid. , 168 .
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• Waltz, among other realists and neorealists, makes this argument. See Waltz , Theory of International Politics , 168 – 70 . For arguments concerning when states should arm or form alliances see James D. Morrow, “Arms Versus Allies: Trade-offs in the Search for Security,” International Organization 47, no. 2 (Spring 1993): 207–33; and Benjamin A. Most and Randolph M. Siverson, “Substituting Arms and Alliances, 1870–1914: An Exploration in Comparative Foreign Policy,” in Charles F. Hermann, Charles W. Kegley, r., and James N. Rosenau, New Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1987), 131–57.
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• Waltz , Theory of International Politics , 168 .
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• The problems that buckpassine and chain ganging pose in alliances are discussed in Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder , “Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity,” International Organization 44 , no. 2 ( Spring 1990 ): 137 – 68 .
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• Not all realists agree that this is a central idea of realism. As John Mearsheimer notes, “defensive realists” argue that states are interested primarily in maintaining the balance of power, not in maximizing their relative power, as “offensive realists” argue. See Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions.” For examples of defensive realism see Joseph M. Grieco , “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation” , International Organization 42 , no. 3 ( Summer 1988 ): 498 – 500 ; Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), 10–13 — Snyder calls offensive realism, “aggressive realism”; and Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 126–27. Also see Fareed Zakaria, “Realism and Domestic Politics: A Review Essay,” International Security 17, no. 1 (Summer 1992): 190–96. Examples of offensive realist arguments are found in Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions”; Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 29–47; and Morgenthau, Scientific Man vs. Power Politics, 42–46. With respect to the causes of proliferation, offensive and defensive realists offer differing views. The offensive realist argument submits that states maximize offensive power in order to gain security, including developing nuclear weapons if the state has the capabilities to support the development. The defensive realist argument is that states proliferate in order to gain security from external attack. For the purposes of this essay, these differences are not relevant.
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• Rhodes , The Making of the Atomic Bomb , 314 . Also Bundy, Danger and Survival, 45–48. Holloway notes that the conclusion of Britain's Maud Committee report in September 1941, which argued that the atomic bomb could be built before the war was over, was instrumental in persuading Roosevelt to accelerate the U.S. program. At a meeting with Vannevar Bush, the director of the Office of Scientific Research and Development, on 9 October 1941, two days before the meeting with Sachs, Roosevelt gave Bush authority to speed up the American effort in order to determine whether a bomb could be made. Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, 80. On the Maud Commission see Gowing, Britain and Atomic Energy, 1939–1945, pp. 105–6. The Maud Reports, one focuses on the use of uranium as a weapon, the other on the use of uranium as a source of power, are reprinted in Gowing, Britain and Atomic Energy, 1939–1945, pp. 394–436.
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• Holloway , The Soviet Union and the Arms Race , 18 – 19 .
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• A. Lavrent‘yeva in “Stroiteli novogo mira,’ Vmire knig , no. 9 ( 1970 ): 4 . Quoted in Holloway, The Soviet Union and the Arms Race, 20.
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• On Truman's comment to Stalin see Winston S. Churchill , The Second World War: Triumph and Tragedy ( Boston : Houghton Mifflin , 1953 ), 640 , 669–70; Harry S Truman, Memoirs: Year of Decisions (Garden City: Doubleday, 1955), 416. Also see John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941–1947 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), 244–45.
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• Holloway , The Soviet Union and the Arms Race , 20 .
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• Lawrence and Larus , “A Historical Review of Nuclear Weapons Proliferation and the Development of the NPT,” 3 .
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• Lacouture , De Gaulle: The Ruler 1945–1970 , 421 .
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• Ibid. , 421 .
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• Ibid. , 422 .
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• Lewis and Xue , China Builds the Bomb , 13 – 14 .
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• Ibid. , 16 – 34 . Also see Shu Guang Zhang, Deterrence and Strategic Culture: Chinese-American Confrontations, 1949–1958 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992).
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• Lewis and Xue , China Builds the Bomb , 142 .
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• Quoted in Lewis and Xue , China Builds the Bomb , 130 . Chen was a staunch advocate of Chinese nuclear weapons, arguing that China should develop nuclear weapons, “even if the Chinese had to pawn their trousers for this purpose.” Quoted in Lewis and Xue, China Builds the Bomb, 130.
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• Frankel , “The Brooding Shadow,” 52 .
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• Ibid. , 52 .
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• Ibid. , 53 .
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• On the October 1962 Sino-Indian war from the Indian perspective see Brigadier John S. Dalvi , Himalayan Blunder: The Curtain Raiser to the Sino- Indian War of 1962 ( Bombay : Thacker , 1969 ); Lome J. Kavic, India's Quest for Security: Defense Policies, 1947–1965 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), ch. 10, 169–91; Neville Maxwell, India's China War (Garden City: Doubleday, 1972). From the Chinese perspective see Steve Chan, “Chinese Conflicts Calculus and Behavior: Assessment from a Perspective of Conflict Management,” World Politics, 30, no. 3 (April 1978): 391–410; and Allen S. Whiting, The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence: India and Indochina (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1975).
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• Reiss, Without the Bomb, 206.
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• Ibid., 207. Devin Hagerty also notes that the threat from the Chinese was an important consideration in Indian thinking before 1962, “During the 1950s, a confidential consensus emerged among a small core of India leaders that New Delhi should reserve its right to develop nuclear weapons if threatened by a future Chinese nuclear weapon capability.” Devin T. Hagerty , “The Power of Suggestion: Opaque Proliferation, Existential Deterrence, and the South Asian Nuclear Arms Competition,” Security Studies 2 , nos. 3/4 ( Spring/Summer 1993 ): 256 – 83 , 261. Even before the 1950s, the possibility of the development of nuclear weapons was considered by Nehru. In 1946, in response to a question about the potential development of Indian nuclear weapons, Nehru, “stated his hope that India would develop atomic power for peaceful uses but warned that, so long as the world was constituted as it was, every country would have to develop and use the latest scientific devices for its protection.” Kavic, India's Quest for Security, 27–28, n. 19.
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• Reiss , Without the Bomb , 212 .
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• On the 1971 war see Richard Sisson and Leo E. Rose , War and Secession: Pakistan, India, and the Creation of Bangladesh ( Berkeley : University of California Press , 1990 ).
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• Ashok Kapur has suggested a third potential motivation for Pakistani nuclear capability. Nuclear capability would allow Pakistan to reopen the Kashmir question and negotiate with India from a position of military equality. However, while a robust nuclear capability might allow Pakistan to do this, such a policy would be injudicious because it would incur the risks of any game of Chicken, such as the great difficulties of crisis management and the palpable risks inadvertent escalation. See Ashok Kapur , “Pakistan,” in Goldblat , Non-Proliferation , 142 . On crisis management see Richard Ned Lebow, Nuclear Crisis Management: A Dangerous Illusion (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987); Scott D. Sagan, “Nuclear Alerts and Crisis Management,” International Security 9, no. 4 (Spring 1985): 99–139; and Sagan, Moving Targets: Nuclear Strategy and National Security (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), ch. 4, pp. 135–75. On the danger of inadvertent escalation see, inter alia, Barry R. Posen, Inadvertent Escalation: Conventional War and Nuclear Risks (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991).
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• Zulfikar Ali Bhutto , The Myth of Independence ( Karachi : Oxford University Press , 1969 ). Quoted in Khalilzad, “Pakistan,” 133.
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• Raju G. C. Thomas , South Asian Security in the 1990s , Adelphi Paper no. 278 , ( London : International Institute of Strategic Studies , 1993 ), 58 .
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• It is an unfortunate condition of international politics, one that realism acknowledges, that the intentions of other states cannot be known with certainty. Thus, Pakistani fears may be misplaced if India is a status-quo state and the Pakistani attempts to match Indian capabilities, such as by acquiring nuclear weapons, only exacerbate Indian fears. Robert Jervis' spiral model obtains in this situation. However, India may be aggressive. In which case, Jervis' deterrence model would obtain and Pakistan's decision to acquire nuclear weapons may be good for the stability of South Asia. Obviously, because Pakistan and India do not know the intentions of the other, it is difficult to know which model applies to the situation in South Asia and whether India and Pakistan are following the proper model or if they are not and exacerbating conflict. On the spiral and deterrence models , see Robert Jervis , Perception and Misperception in International Politics ( Princeton : Princeton University Press , 1976 ), ch. 3 , pp. 58 – 113 .
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• Thomas quotes the concerns of Air Commodore Aliuddin, Pakistani Air Force: “Several South Asian nations and Pakistan in particular are, therefore, wary of the fact that India is not only developing fast as the eminent regional power in South Asia but also views itself as a power destined to influence global affairs…It is this growing Indian militarism and ambition which is a serious concern for Pakistan. The three India-Pakistan wars, the India annexation of Sikkim and Goa, invasion of the Maldives, economic blockage of Nepal, and refusal to withdraw troops from Sri Lanka in 1989 are all viewed as clear manifestations of India's hegemonistic designs.” Air Commodore Aliuddin , “Pakistan's Nuclear Dilemma,” Seaford House Papers ( London : Royal College of Defence Studies , 1990 ), 7 . Quoted in Thomas, South Asian Security in the 1990s, 84, n. 19.
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• For an excellent exposition on the possibility and utility of nuclear blackmail, or coercion , see Richard K. Betts , Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance ( Washington , D.C. : Brookings , 1987 ), 212 – 33 .
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• Mark Hibbs , “South Africa's Secret Nuclear Program: The Dismantling,” Nuclear Fuel , 24 May 1993 , p. 9 .
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• Mark Hibbs , “South Africa's Secret Nuclear Program: From a PNE to a Deterrent,” Nuclear Fuel , 10 May 1993 , p. 4 .
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• The causes of the North Korea nuclear program and possible U.S. responses to it are analyzed in Kathleen C. Bailey , “North Korea: Enough Carrots, Time for the Stick,” Comparative Strategy 13 , no. 3 ( July-September 1994 ): 277 – 82 ; Paul Bracken, “Nuclear Weapons and State Survival in North Korea,” Survival 35, no. 3 (Autumn 1993): 137–53; Peter Hayes, “International Missile Trade and the Two Koreas,” Korean Journal of Defense Analysis 5, no. 1 (Summer 1993): 207–39; Young Jeh Kim, “North Korea's Nuclear Program and Its Impact on Neighboring Countries, Korea and World Affairs 17, no. 3 (Fall 1993): 478–96; Andrew Mack, “The Nuclear Crisis on the Korean Peninsula,” Asian Survey 33, no. 4 (April 1993): 339–59; Kongdan Oh and Ralph C. Hassig, “North Korea's Nuclear Program,” in Young Whan Kihl, ed., Korea and the World: Beyond the Cold War (Boulder: Westview, 1994), 233–50.
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• The Argentine army has approximately 35,000 active and 250,000 reserve troops. The Brazilian army has approximately 196,000 active and 1,115,000 first-line reserve troops. Following the 3:1 rule (three attacking units are necessary of overcome one defensive unit) for conventional deterrence, it is likely that both states can conventionally deter the other because while Brazil has superiority in manpower, Argentina has superiority in mobile forces (Main Battle Tanks, Armored Personnel Carriers, Self-Propelled Artillery, Close Air Support Aircraft) that greatly would strengthen the defense in a war. In addition, the geography of the border between Argentina and Brazil permits few avenues of attack, making attack harder and further ameliorating the defender's burden because any attack will be canalized at the points of attack permitted by geography. On Argentine and Brazilian forces see The Military Balance 1992–1993 ( London : International Institute of Strategic Studies , 1992 ), 167 – 68 , 170–72. On the 3:1 rule see John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), 51–52,167–82.
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• The Falkland/Malvinas Island war was precisely a war over the Falkland/Malvinas Islands and posed no existential threat to either Great Britain or Argentina. On the Falkland/Malvinas Island war see Anthony H. Cordesman and Abraham R. Wagner , The Lessons of Modern War , vol. 3 , The Afghan and Falklands Conflicts ( Boulder : Westview , 1990 ); and Max Hastings and Simon Jenkins, The Battle for the Falklands (New York: Norton, 1983).
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• The nuclear nonproliferation regime comprises formal treaties, the NPT, the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the Treaty of Rarotonga, which made the South Pacific a nuclear weapons free zone, and Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material; informal agreements and suppliers groups to enforce nuclear nonproliferation, the Zangger Committee, the London Club/Nuclear Suppliers Group; as well as the IAEA, the international organization which is instrumental in policing the regime.
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• Aaron Karp , “Controlling Weapons Proliferation: The Role of Export Controls,” Journal of Strategic Studies 16 , no. 1 ( March 1993 ): 18 – 45 .
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• The reduction in information costs is one of the principal benefits of regimes. See Robert O. Keohane , After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy ( Princeton : Princeton University Press , 1984 ), 244 – 47 ; and Kenneth A. Oye, “Explaining Cooperation under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Explanations,” World Politics 38, no. 1 (October 1985): 1–24.
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• On U.S. assistance to Britain and France see et al. , Nuclear Weapons Data-book , vol. 5 , pp. 43 – 54 , 188–93. On U.S. assistance to France see Richard Ullman, “The Covert French Connection,” Foreign Policy, no. 75 (Summer 1989): 3–33. For Soviet assistance to China see Lewis and Xue, China Builds the Bomb, 39–45 and passim. On French assistance to Israel see Aronson with Brosh The Politics and Strategy of Nuclear Weapons in the Middle East, 86–87, 91, 94–95, 102, 104, and 116–17. Also see Sylvia K. Crosbie, The Tacit Alliance: France and Israel from Suez to the Six Day War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974); and Ann Williams, Britain and France in the Middle East and North Africa, 1914–1967 (London: Macmillan, 1968). On Israeli assistance to South Africa see David Albright, “South Africa: The ANC and the Atomic Bomb,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (April 1993): 32–37; “Israel Supplied Tritium for South Africa's Nuclear Weapons,” Israeli Foreign Affairs, 13 April 1993, p. 3; “Tracking S. Africa's Elusive A-Program,” Washington Post, 18 March 1993, p. A1; “S. Africa Had 6 A-Bombs,” Washington Post, 25 March 1993, p. A1. On China's assistance to Pakistan see David Albright and Mark Hibbs, “Pakistan's Bomb: Out of the Closet,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (July/August 1992): 38–43; and Chellaney, “The Challenge of Nuclear Arms Control in South Asia,” 123–24. Chellaney reports that a secret nuclear test in Xinjiang in May 1983, attended by the then-foreign minister of Pakistan Yaqub Khan, resulted in speculation that China may have detonated a Pakistani nuclear device. On Pakistani assistance to Iran see Warren H. Donnelly and Zachary Davis, “CRS Issue Brief,” 20 May 1992, pp. 1–11.
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• However, without sophisticated technologies, such as high-speed computers, and mastery of advanced chemical, engineering, metalurgical and physical skills, states have a much more complicated task developing thermonuclear weapons. These barriers are also are also impediments to the development of reliable delivery systems, like intercontinental ballistic missiles. However, the Indian, Iraqi, Israeli, North Korean and Pakistani missile programs demonstrate that missiles of less sophistication, are well within the grasp of most nuclear nations. On ballistic missile proliferation see W. Seth Cams , Ballistic Missiles in the Third World: Threat and Response ( New York : Praeeer , 1991 ); Steve Fetter, “Ballistic Missiles and Weapons of Mass Destruction: What Is the Threat? What Should Be Done?” International Security 16, no. 1 (Summer 1991): 5–42; Aaron Karp, “Ballistic Missiles in the Third World,” International Security 9, no. 3 (Winter 1984–85): 166–95; Thomas L. McNaugher, “Ballistic Missiles and Chemical Weapons: The Legacy of the Iran-Iraq War,” International Security 15, no. 2 (Fall 1990): 5–34; Mark D. Mandeles, “Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Implications for the U.S. of Third World Nuclear Weapon and Ballistic Missile Proliferation,” Security Studies 1, no. 2 (Winter 1991): 235–68; and Janne E. Nolan, Trappings of Power: Ballistic Missiles in the Third World (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1991). It is possible, however, that the cruise missile will augment an emerging nuclear state's ballistic missile arsenal or even render its ballistic missile arsenal irrelevant. Through the use Global Positioning System (GPS)-class satellites many states will be able to build relatively easily and cheaply, effective and accurate cruise missiles. See Lisa Burgess and Neil Munro, New Uses For GPS Challenge Pentagon,” Defense News, 29 November-5 December 1993, p. 8. On nuclear weapons safety see McGeorge Bundy, William J. Crowe, Jr., and Sidney D. Drell, Reducing Nuclear Danger: The Road Away from the Brink (New York: Councd on Foreign Relations, 1993); Gerald W. Johnson, “Safety, Security, and Control of Nuclear Weapons,” in Barry M. Blechman, ed., Technology and the Limitation of International Conflict (Washington, D.C.: School for Advanced International Studies, Foreign Policy Institute, 1989); Donald R. Cotter, “Peacetime Operations,” in Ashton B. Carter, John D. Steinbruner, and Charles A. Zraket, Managing Nuclear Operations, (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1987), 17–74.
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• For a detailed discussion of the role of superpower security guarantees in preventing nuclear weapons proliferation see Frankel , “The Brooding Shadow,” 47 – 51 .
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• Kenneth Waltz noted this fact in, “The Stability of a Bipolar World,” Daedalus 93 , no. 3 ( Summer 1964 ): 882 – 83 . Also see Waltz, Theory of International Politics, ch. 8.
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• On the counterproliferation initiative see Les Aspin , “From Deterrence to Denuking: A New Nuclear Policy for the 1990s,” in Shaping Nuclear Policy for the 1990s: A Compendium of Views ( Washington , D.C. : U.S. Government Printing Office , 1993 ), 1 – 26 ; Aspin, Report on the Bottom-Up Review (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 1993), 73–74; Aspin, Annual Report to the President and the Congress (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 1994), 34–41; and Report on Nonproliferation and Counterproliferation Activities and Programs (Washington, D.C.: Office or the Deputy Secretary of Defense, 1994). Also see Robert Holzer and Theresa Hitchens, “Pentagon Slows Counterproliferation Efforts,” Defense News, 29 August-4 September 1994, p. 8; Joseph F. Pilat and Walter L. Kirchner, “The Technological Promise of Counterproliferation, Washington Quarterly 18, no. 1 (Winter 1995): 153–66; Barbara Starr, “Proliferation the New High Ground for USA,” Jane's Defence Weekly, 14 May 1994, p. 1; Starr, “Covert Proliferation Solutions Studied,” fane's Defence Weekly, 9 July 1994, p. 4; “Pentagon Faces Fight at Home Over How It Will Handle WAD,” Jane's Defence Weekly, 10 September 1994, p. 24. However, whatever the merits of the Clinton administration's counterproliferation initiative, Philip Zelikow notes that there is an inverse relationship between the threat the nuclear program poses and the likelihood that other states will attack it. This is because immature programs are not likely to be attacked for political reasons, the limitations of reliable intelligence about the program and the intentional ambiguity that surrounds the program; and mature programs are not likely to be attacked for military reasons, the risk of retaliation. Philip Zelikow, “Offensive Military Options,” in Robert D. Blackwill and Albert Carnesale, New Nuclear Nations: Consequences for U.S. Policy (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993), 162–95. The risk of nuclear retaliation, perhaps against a U.S. ally or even a U.S. city, obviously is a risk that severely complicates attacking an emerging nuclear state.
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• Christopher Layne argues that there is a danger that the United States will be perceived as a threat after the cold war if the United States attempts to pursue a grand strategy of preponderance, suppressing the emergence of new powers. Although he does not address nuclear proliferation, the logic of Layne's argument applies to counterproliferation. See Christopher Layne , “The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise,” International Security 17 , no. 4 ( Spring 1993 ): 5 – 51 .
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• Krasner , “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences,” 2 .
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• If great powers, such as Germany or Japan, were to acquire nuclear weapons, they may do so visibly because they possess enough power to violate the norm and incur any sanctions that the other great powers might place upon them. Indeed, other great powers may be reluctant to impose such sanctions and offend the great power because to do so would be to risk alienating an important power.
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• However, the Gulf War demonstrates that opaque states may even deceive the intelligence capabilities of the West: At the time the war broke out, there was very low-grade human intelligence that there was a possible nuclear site at Tarmiya, which m fact was a major site where Iraq's calutron program was going to be assembled. The photo interpreters had looked at it and didn't believe that it was a major site because it had no security fences around it, no anti-aircraft around it, and no electrical power going into it…. Among other things, it turned out the Iraqis had run 150 megawatts of power 25 km underground, because someone had told them that one of the rules a photo interpreter uses is power. There was no guard fence there because there had been a military exclusion zone 50 km around the site. The lesson that we can draw from this is that we should not count on intelligence by itself to give us warning. This is one of the most disturbing lessons of the Iraqi experience. ( Kay , “Iraqi Inspections,” 91 )
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• Peter Feaver demonstrates the effects of opaque proliferation on the management of the state's nuclear operations in his “Proliferation Optimism and Theories of Nuclear Operations,” Security Studies 2 , nos. 3/4 ( Spring/Summer 1993 ): 159 – 91 .
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• Ibid. , 2 .
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• I am indebted to Benjamin Frankel for suggesting this point to me.
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• The importance of open debate as means to correcting the propensity of organizations not to evaluate their own policies and beliefs, and dangers of non-evaluation in the nuclear age, are demonstrated in Van Evera , “Causes of Wars,” 453 – 99 .
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• The value of mobile launchers for ensuring the survivability of an opaque state's retaliatory force was demonstrated during the Gulf war. Despite its intensive effort, there is no evidence that the U.S. destroyed any of the Iraqi mobile SCUD launchers. See U.S. Department of Defense , Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress , ( Washington , D.C. : U.S. Department of Defense , 1992 ), 226 . Thomas A. Keaney and Eliot Cohen argue that “there is no indisputable proof that Scud mobile launchers—as opposed to high-fidelity decoys, trucks or other objects with Scud-like signatures—were destroyed by fixed-wing aircraft.” See, Keaney and Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Survey Summary Report (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993), 89–90. Also see Eric H. Arnett, “The Futile Quest for Autonomy: Long-Range Cruise Missiles and the Future of Strategy,” Security Studies 2, no. 1 (Autumn 1992): 145; and Arnett, “Deterrence After Nuclear Proliferation: Implications for Nuclear Forces and Defense Spending,” Nonproliferation Review 1, no. 2 (Winter 1993): 13. Of Iraq's total mobile launcher inventory of the high twenties to mid-thirties, nineteen mobile launchers are known to have survived the war. Keaney and Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Summary Report, 87. However, the development of the technologies of the third military revolution, the revolution in information processing, advanced conventional munitions (ADM), and low-observable unmanned and manned fighting vehicles, makes possible a condition of “information supremacy” over the battlefield. Under conditions of information supremacy any fighting vehicles, including mobile launchers, would become vulnerable to the potent and lethal combination of reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition (RSTA) systems and ADM.
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• George H. Quester , “Knowing and Believing About Nuclear Proliferation,” Security Studies 1 , no. 2 ( Winter 1991 ): 278 .
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• Neil Joeck , “Tacit Bargaining and Stable Proliferation in South Asia,” Journal of Strategic Studies 13 , no. 3 ( September 1990 ): 78 .
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• Quester, “Knowing and Believing About Nuclear Proliferation,” 278 .
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• Cohen and Frankel also note that Israel's opaque stance benefited the Soviet Union and even the Arab states. The Soviets benefited because a visible nuclear Israel would cause the Arab states to pressure the Soviets to supply them with a similar nuclear capability or at least to supply them with security guarantees. Moderate Arabs prefer to ignore Israeli nuclear capabilities lest their calls for agreement with Israel be attributed to fear of Israeli nuclear strength. Extreme Arabs fear that an acknowledgement of Israeli nuclear capability would force them to renounce the goal of eliminating Israel. See Cohen and Frankel , “Opaque Nuclear Proliferation,” 26 – 27 .
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• A comprehensive analysis of whether opaque nuclear states possess survivable nuclear forces, command and control systems, as well as the susceptibility of the nuclear arsenal of each state to nuclear inadvertance, would be beneficial to the study of the risks and benefits of opaque nuclear proliferation.
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• This question is addressed most prominently by Alain Enthoven and Wayne Smith. See Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith , How Much Is Enough?: Shaping the Defense Program, 1961–1969 ( New York : Harper & Row , 1971 ). Robert McNamara's answer to the question for U.S. deterrence of a premeditated Soviet attack was that at a minimum, U.S. retaliatory forces must be able to destroy 20–25 percent of the Soviet population and 50 percent of Soviet industry. Enthoven and Smith, How Much Is Enough? pp. 175,207.
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• Estimates as to the size of the arsenals of opaque nuclear states may be drawn from David Albright , Frans Berkhout , and William Walker , World Inventory of Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium, 1992 ( New York : Oxford University Press , 1993 ).
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• McGeorge Bundy , “To Cap the Volcano,” Foreign Affairs 48 , no. 1 ( October 1969 ): 9 – 10 , 12. Also see Bundy, The Bishops and the Bomb,” New York Review of Books, 16 June 1983, pp. 3–8; and Bundy, “Existential Deterrence and Its Consequences,” in Douglas MacLean, ed., The Security Gamble: Deterrence Dilemmas in the Nuclear Age (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Allanheld, 1984), 3–13.
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• Marc Trachtenberg , “The Influence of Nuclear Weapons in the Cuban Missile Crisis,” International Security 10 , no. 1 ( Summer 1985 ): 148 .
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