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Articles

The underlying causes of strategic surprise in EU foreign policy: a post-mortem investigation of the Arab uprisings and the Ukraine–Russia crisis of 2013/14

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Pages 270-293 | Received 23 Aug 2022, Accepted 21 Oct 2022, Published online: 11 Nov 2022

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