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International Journal of Philosophical Studies Volume 31, 2023 - Issue 3: The Ethics and Politics of Disagreement
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Research Article

Hidden Depths: Testimonial Injustice, Deep Disagreement, and Democratic Deliberation

Aidan McGlynnPhilosophy Department, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, UKCorrespondence[email protected]
ORCID Iconhttps://orcid.org/0000-0003-0386-2039
ORCID Icon
Pages 361-381 | Published online: 10 Oct 2023

References

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  • McGlynn, A. Forthcoming. “Epistemic Injustice: Phenomena and Theories.” In The Oxford Handbook of Social Epistemology, edited by J. Lackey and A. McGlynn. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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