Translating central bank independence into Norwegian: central bankers and the diffusion of central bank independence to Norway in the 1990s

References

• Alesina, A. (1998) ‘Macroeconomics and politics’, NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1998: 13–52.
   Google Scholar
• Andrews, D. M. (2003) ‘The committee of central bank governors as a source of rules’, Journal of European Public Policy 10: 956–73.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Arestis, P. and Sawyer, M. (2004) Re-examining Monetary and Fiscal Policy for the 21st Century, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
   Google Scholar
• Ban, C. (2016) Ruling Ideas: How Global Neoliberalism goes Local, New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Béland, D. (2009) ‘Ideas, institutions, and policy change’, Journal of European Public Policy 16(6): 701–18.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Berggren, N., Daunfeldt, S.-O. and Hellström, J. (2016) ‘Does social trust speed up reforms? The case of central bank independence’, Journal of Institutional Economics 12(2): 395–415.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Campbell, J. L. (2004) Institutional Change and Globalization, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Christiansen, A. B. and Qvigstad, J. F. (1997) Choosing a Monetary Policy Target, Oslo: Scandinavian University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Cox, R. H. (2001) ‘The social construction of an imperative: why welfare reform happened in Denmark and the Netherlands but not in Germany’, World Politics 53(3): 463–98.
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Dyson, K., Featherstone, D. and Michalopoulos, G. (1995) ‘Strapped to the mast: EC central bankers between global financial markets and regional integration’, Journal of European Public Policy 2(3): 465–87.
   Google Scholar
• Epstein, R. (2008) In Pursuit if Liberalism: International Institutions in Post-communist Europe, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Forder, J. (2005) ‘Why is central bank independence so widely approved?’ Journal of Economic Issues 39(4): 843–65.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Goldstein, J. and Keohane, R. (1993) ‘Ideas and foreign policy: an analytical framework’, in J. Goldstein and R. Keohane ( eds) Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, institutions and Policy Change, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, pp. 3–29.
   Google Scholar
• Goodman, J. B. (1991) ‘The politics of central bank independence’, Comparative Politics 23(3): 329–49.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Grabel, I. (2003) ‘Ideology, power and the rise of independent monetary institutions in emerging economies’, in J. Kirshner ( ed) Monetary Orders: Ambiguous Economics, Ubiquitious Politics, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, pp. 25–53.
   Google Scholar
• Grilli, V., Masciarando, D. and Tabellini, G. (1991) ‘Political and monetary institutions and public financial policiesin the industrial countries’, Economic Policy 13: 342–92 .
   Google Scholar
• Haas, P. M. (1992) ‘Epistemic communities and international policy coordination’, International Organization 46(1): 1–35.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Helleiner, E. (1994) States and the Reemergence of Global Finance, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
   Google Scholar
• James, H. (2012) Making the European Monetary Union: The Role of the Committee of Central Bank Governors and the Origins of the European Central Bank, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Johnson, J. (2006) ‘Two-track diffusion and central bank embeddedness: the politics of Euro adaption in Hungary and the Czech Republic’, Review of International Political Economy 13(3): 361–86.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Johnson, J. (2016) Priests of Prosperity: How Central Bankers Transformed the Postcommunist World, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Kaelberer, M. (2003) ‘Knowledge, power and monetary bargaining: central bankers and the creation of monetary union in Europe’, Journal of European Public Policy 10(3): 365–79.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Kapstein, E. B. (1992) ‘Between power and purpose: central bankers and the politics of regulatory convergence’, International Organization 48(1): 265–87.
   Google Scholar
• King, M. R. (2001) ‘Distributional politics and central bank independence: monetary reform in the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and New Zealand’, unpublished PhD. Dissertation, London School of Economics and Political Science, accessed at http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/2275/, 23 May 2017.
   Google Scholar
• King, M. (2005) ‘Epstemic communities and the diffusion of ideas: central bank reform in the United Kingdom’, West European Politics 28(1): 94–123.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Kirshner, J. (2003) ‘The inescapable politics of money’, in J. Kirshner ( ed) Monetary Orders: Ambiguous Economics, Ubiquitious Politics, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, pp. 3–24.
   Google Scholar
• Kleivset, C. (2012a) ‘Fra fast valutakurs til inflasjonsmål: Et dokumentasjonsnotat om Norges Bank og pengepolitikken 1992–2002’ [A documentation memo on Norges Bank and monetary policy 1992–2002], Norges Bank Staff Memo 30.
   Google Scholar
• Kleivset, C. (2012b) ‘Fra fast valutakurs til inflasjonsmål: Et dokumentasjonsnotat om Norges Bank og pengepolitikken 1992–2001’ [A documentation memo on Norges Bank and monetary policy 1992–2001], Staff Memo, Norges Bank.
   Google Scholar
• Kleivset, C. and Berg, T. N. (2014) ‘Inflasjonsstyring: Et dokumentasjonsnotat om enkelte metodeendringer som har funnet sted i Norges Bank I perioden 2001–2013’ [A documentation memo on some changes in inflation targeting methods in Norges Bank 2001–2013], Norges Bank Staff Memo 5.
   Google Scholar
• Lebaron, F. (2008) ‘Central bankers in the contemporary global field of power: a ‘social space’ approach’, The Sociological Review 56(1): 121–44.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Lie, E. (1995) Ambisjon og tradisjon: Finansdepartementet 1945–1965 [Ambition and tradition: Ministry of Finance 1945–1965], Oslo: Pax.
   Google Scholar
• Lie, E. and Venneslan, C. (2010) Over evne: Finansdepartementet 1965–1992 [The Ministry of Finance 1945–1965], Oslo: Pax.
   Google Scholar
• Lie, E. and Thomassen, E. (2016) ‘A Norwegian fixation: explaining cheap money in Norway 1945–1986’, Scandinavian Economic History Review 64(2): 160–74.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Lie, E., Kobberrød, J. T. Thomassen, E. and Rongved, G. F. (2016) Norges Bank 1816–2016, Oslo: Fagbokforlaget.
   Google Scholar
• Marcussen, M. (2005) ‘Central banks on the move’, Journal of European Public Policy 12(5): 903–23.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Marcussen, M. (2007) ‘Central bank reform across the world: only by night are all cats grey’, in P. Lægreid and T. Christensen ( eds) Transcending New Public Management: The Transformation of Public Sector Reform, Aldershot: Ashgate, pp. 135–53.
   Google Scholar
• Maxfield, S. (1997) Gatekeepers of Growth: The International Political Economy of Central Banking in Developing Countries, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
   Google Scholar
• McNamara, K. (1998) The Currency of Ideas: Monetary Politics in the European Union, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
   Google Scholar
• McNamara, K. (2002) ‘Rational fictions: central bank independence and the social logic of delegation’, West European Politics 25(1): 47–76.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Mukherjee, B. and Singer, D. A. (2008) ‘Monetary institutions, partisanship, and inflation targeting’, International Organization 62(2s): 323–58.
   Google Scholar
• Polillo, S. and Guillén, M. (2005) ‘The worldwide spread of central bank independence’, American Journal of Sociology 110(6): 1764–1802.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Sejersted, F. (2003) ‘Norges bank mellom avhengighet og uavhengighet’ [Norges Bank between dependence and independence], in F. Sejersted ( ed) Norsk idyll?, Oslo: Pax.
   Google Scholar
• Singleton, J. (2011) Central Banking in the Twentieth Century, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Skånland, H. (1979) ‘Alternativer i stabiliseringspolitikken’ [Alternatives in the stabilisation policy], Penger og kreditt 4: 274–85.
   Google Scholar
• Skånland, H. (1993) Økonomiske perspektiver [Economic perspectives], Norges Banks årsmelding [Annual report].
   Google Scholar
• Skånland, H. (1998) ‘En pengepolitikk for Norge - etter Solidaritetsalternativet’ [A monetary policy for Norway - after the Solidarity alternative], CME Report.
   Google Scholar
• Skånland, H. (2004) Doktriner og økonomisk styring: Et tilbakeblikk [Doctrines and economic governance: A retrospect], Oslo: Norges Bank.
   Google Scholar
• Sørensen, A. (2015) ‘Banking on the nation: how four Danish central bank governors used and reproduced the logics of national identity’, International Journal of Politics, Culture & Society 28(4): 325–47.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Stockdale, S. E. (1999) ‘Mediating the boundaries between state and society: explaining shifts in central bank independence’, Political Power and Social Theory 13: 3–35.
   Google Scholar
• Straumann, T. (2010) Fixed Ideas of Money: Small States and Exchange Rate Rehimes in Twentieth Century Europe, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Thomassen, E. (2014) ‘Pengemakt - folkemakt: Arbeiderpartiet og kravet om demokratisering av Norges Bank’ [Money power - popular power: The Labour party and the demand for democratisation of Norges Bank], Arbeiderhistorie 101–23.
   Google Scholar
• Thomassen, E. and Øksendal, L. F. (2017) Modellbyggere: Det tekniske beregningsutvalg for inntektsoppgjørene og den koordinerte lønnsdannelsen 1967–2017 [Model builders: The technical calculations committee and coordinated wage formation 1967–2017], Oslo: Pax.
   Google Scholar
• Tognato, C. (2014) Central Bank Independence: Cultural Codes and Symbolic Performance, New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.
   Google Scholar
• Toniolo, G. ( ed) (1988) Central Bank Independence in Historical Perspective, New York, NY: Walter de Gruyter.
   Google Scholar
• Toniolo, G. (2005) Central Bank Cooperation at the Bank for International Settlements, 1930–1973, New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Vaubel, R. (1997) ‘The bureaucratic and partisan behavior of independent central banks: German and international evidence’, European Journal of Political Economy 13(2): 201–24.
   Google Scholar
• Verdun, A. (1999) ‘The role of the Delors committee in the creation of EMU: an epistemic community?’, Journal of European Public Policy 6(2): 305–28.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar