Mandatory clearing: the infrastructural authority of central counterparty clearing houses in the OTC derivatives market

References

• Aoyama, Y., & Parthasarathy, B. (2016). The rise of the hybrid domain: Collaborative governance for social innovation. London: Edward Elgar.
   Google Scholar
• Banque de France. (2010). Derivatives: Financial innovation and stability. Financial Stability Review, No. 14.
   Google Scholar
• Barnett, M., & Finnemore, M. (2004). Rules for the world: International organizations in global politics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Bennett, J. (2010). Vibrant matter: A political ecology of things. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Bernanke, B. S. (1990). Clearing and settlement during the crash. Review of Financial Studies, 3(1), 133–151. doi: 10.1093/rfs/3.1.133
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Bernards, N., & Campbell-Verduyn, M. (2019) Introduction to review of international political economy special issue “the changing technological infrastructures of global finance”. Review of International Political Economy. doi: 10.1080/09692290.2019.1625420
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Bignon, V., & Vuillemey, G. (2017). The failure of a clearinghouse: Empirical evidence. European Capital Market Institute Working Paper, No. 6.
   Google Scholar
• BIS. (2015). Margin requirements for non-centrally cleared derivatives. Retrieved from https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d317.htm
   Google Scholar
• BIS. (2016). Statistical release: OTC derivatives statistics at end-June 2016. Retrieved from https://www.bis.org/publ/otc_hy1611.htm
   Google Scholar
• Bowker, G. C., & Star, S. L. (1996). ‘How things (actor-net) work: Classification, magic, and the ubiquity of standards’. Philosophia, 25(3/4), 195–220.
   Google Scholar
• Braun, B. (2016). ‘From performativity to political economy: Index investing, ETFs, and asset manager capitalism’. New Political Economy, 21(3), 257–273. doi: 10.1080/13563467.2016.1094045
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Burke, J. (2011). ‘LCH. Clearnet margining approach’, Presentation to: ECB Money Market Contact Group, 1 June. Retrieved from https://www.ecb.europa.eu/paym/groups/pdf/mmcg/Item_1_LCH_Margining.pdf?08c651031034a0ba9d02cc82b637d49e.
   Google Scholar
• Callon, M., & Latour, B. (1981). Unscrewing the big leviathan: how actors macro-structure reality and how sociologists help them to do so. In K. Knorr-Cetina & A. V. Cicourel (Eds.) Advances in social theory and methodology: Toward an integration of micro- and macro-sociologies (pp. 277–303). Boston, MA: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
   Google Scholar
• Campbell-Verduyn, M. (2016). Merely TINCering around: The shifting private authority of technology, information and news corporations. Business and Politics, 18(2), 143–170. doi: 10.1515/bap-2015-0026
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Carter, L., & Cole, D. (2017). Central counterparty margin frameworks. Reserve Bank of Australia’s December Quarterly Bulletin.
   Google Scholar
• Chamorro-Courtland, C. (2010). Counterparty substitution in central counterparty (CCP) systems. Banking and Finance Law Review, 26(3), 519–542.
   Google Scholar
• Clift, B., & Tomlinson, J. (2012). When rules started to rule: The IMF, neo-liberal economic ideas, and economic policy change in Britain. Review of International Political Economy, 19(3), 477–500. doi: 10.1080/09692290.2011.561124
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Coeuré, B. (2014). Session 4 – policy panel risks in (and of) CCPs. Presentation to the OFR and FSOC co-host third annual conference, 23 January, Washington, DC. Retrieved from https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2014/html/sp140123_1.en.pdf.
   Google Scholar
• Coeuré, B. (2018). A cooperative approach to CCP recovery and resolution (Panel intervention at the conference on “Resolution in Europe: The unresolved questions”, Frankfurt am Main. Retrieved from https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2018/html/ecb.sp180423.en.html.
   Google Scholar
• Cont, R. (2017). Central clearing and risk transformation. Norges Bank Research No. 3.
   Google Scholar
• CPSS and IOSCO. (2012). Principles for financial market infrastructures. Retrieved from http://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d101a.pdf.
   Google Scholar
• Deloitte. (2014). OTC Derivatives. The new cost of trading. Retrieved from https://www.deloitte.com/assets/Dcom-UnitedKingdom/Local%20Assets/Documents/Industries/Financial%20Services/uk-fs-OTC-Derivatives.pdf.
   Google Scholar
• DeNardis, L., & Musiani, F. (2016). Governance by infrastructure. In F. Musiani, D. L. Cogburn, L. DeNardis, & N.S. Levinson (Eds.), The turn to infrastructure in internet governance (pp. 3–21). New York, NY: Springer.
   Google Scholar
• Domanski, D., Gambacorta, L., & Picillo, C. (2015). Central clearing: Trends and current issues. BIS Quarterly Review, December, 59–76.
   Google Scholar
• Duffie, D., & Zhu, H. (2011). Does a central clearing counterparty reduce counterparty risk? Review of Asset Pricing Studies, 1(1), 74–95. doi: 10.1093/rapstu/rar001
   Google Scholar
• EC. (2016). Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on a framework for the recovery and resolution of central counterparties, 2016/0365 (COD).
   Google Scholar
• ECB and FED Chicago. (2007). The role of central counterparties. Issues Related to Central Counterparty Clearing (pp. 3–4). ECB-FED Chicago Conference.
   Google Scholar
• Edwards, P. (2003). Infrastructure and modernity: Force, time, and social organization. In T.J. Misa, P. Brey, & A. Feenberg (Eds.), The history of sociotechnical systems: Modernity and technology (pp. 185–226). Cambridge: MIT Press.
   Google Scholar
• Erturk, I., Froud, J., Johal, S., Leaver, A., & Williams, K. (2013). (How) do devices matter in finance? Journal of Cultural Economy, 6(3), 336–352. doi: 10.1080/17530350.2013.802987
   Google Scholar
• ESMA. (2016). Final Report: Possible systemic risk and cost implications of interoperability agreements. ESMA. Retrieved from https://www.esma.europa.eu/document/possible-systemic-risk-and-cost-implications-interoperability-arrangements
   Google Scholar
• ESRB. (2017). The macroprudential use of margins and haircuts. Retrieved from https://www.esrb.europa.eu.
   Google Scholar
• EuroCCP. (2018). Perspectives. Retrieved from https://euroccp.com/home/news-perspectives/perspectives.
   Google Scholar
• FIA-ISDA. (2012). FIA-ISDA cleared derivatives execution agreement. Retrieved from https://fia.org.
   Google Scholar
• FSB. (2015). OTC derivatives market reforms. Ninth progress report on implementation. Retrieved from https://www.fsb.org/2015/07/ninth-progress-report-on-implementation-of-otc-derivatives-market-reforms/
   Google Scholar
• FSB. (2017). Analysis of Central Clearing Interdependencies. Retrieved from http://www.fsb.org/2017/07/analysis-of-central-clearing-interdependencies.
   Google Scholar
• G20 Leaders Statement. (2008). Declaration of the Summit on Financial Markets and the World Economy. Retrieved from http://www.un.org/ga/president/63/commission/declarationG20.pdf.
   Google Scholar
• G20 Leaders Statement. (2009). Leaders Statement: The Pittsburgh Summit. Retrieved from http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2009/2009communique0925.html.
   Google Scholar
• G30. (1993). Derivatives: Practices and principles. Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.dutr.1840002.
   Google Scholar
• GAO. (1990). Clearance and settlement reform. the stock, options, and futures markets are still at risk. Report to Congressional Committees.
   Google Scholar
• Geithner, T. (2014). Stress Test: Reflections on Financial Crises. London, UK: Business Books.
   Google Scholar
• Gracie, A. (2015). CCP resolution and the ending Too Big to Fail agenda. Speech given by Executive Director, Resolution, Bank of England. Retrieved from www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/default.aspx.
   Google Scholar
• Graz, J. C., & Nölke, A. (2007). Transnational Private Governance and its Limits. New York: Routledge.
   Google Scholar
• Gregory, J. (2014). Central Counterparties: Mandatory Clearing and Bilateral Margin Requirements for OTC Derivatives. Chichester, UK: Wiley.
   Google Scholar
• Hall, R. B., & Biersteker, T. J. (2004). The emergence of private authority in the international system. IN In R. B. Hall, & IN T. J. Biersteker (Eds.), The Emergence of Private Authority in Global Governance (pp. 3–22). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Hansen, H. (2008). Investigating the Disaggregation, Innovation, and Mediation of Authority in Global Politics. IN In H. Hansen, & IN D. Salskov-Iversen (Eds.), Critical Perspectives on Private Authority in Global Politics (pp. 1–23). Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.
   Google Scholar
• Harmes, A. (2002). The Trouble with Hedge Funds. The Review of Policy Research, 19(1), 156–176. doi: 10.1111/j.1541-1338.2002.tb00233.x
   Google Scholar
• Helleiner, E. (2011). Understanding the 2007 – 2008 Global Financial Crisis: Lessons for Scholars of International Political Economy. Annual Review of Political Science, 14(1), 67–87. doi: 10.1146/annurev-polisci-050409-112539
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Helleiner, E. (2014). Out from the Shadows: Governing OTC Derivatives After the 2007-08 Financial Crisis. IN In J. Best, & IN A. Gheciu (Eds.), The Return of the Public in Global Governance (pp. 70–94). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Helleiner, E., Pagliari, S., & Spagna, I. (2018). Governing the World’s Biggest Market: The Politics of Derivatives Regulation After the 2008 Crisis. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Heller, D., & Vause, N. (2012). Collateral Requirements for mandatory central clearing of over-the-counter derivatives. BIS Working Papers No. 373.
   Google Scholar
• Higgott, R. A., Underhill, G., & Bieler, A. (2000). Introduction: Globalisation and non-state actors. IN In R. A. Higgott, IN G. Underhill, & IN A. Bieler (Eds.), Non-State Actors and Authority in the Global System (pp. 1–12). London, UK: Routledge.
   Google Scholar
• Hills, B., Rule, D., Parkinson, S., & Young, C. (1999). Central counterparty clearing houses and financial stability. Bank of England Financial Stability Review.
   Google Scholar
• Howarth, D., & Quaglia, L. (2013). Banking on stability: The Political Economy of New Capital Requirements in the European Union. Journal of European Integration, 35(3), 333–346. doi: 10.1080/07036337.2013.774780
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• IMF. (2003). Global financial stability report, chapter III: Financial Asset Price Volatility: A Source of Instability? pp. 62–88. Retrieved from www.imf.org.
   Google Scholar
• ISDA. (2005). ISDA collateral guidelines. Retrieved from https://www.isda.org.
   Google Scholar
• ISDA. (2013). Non-Cleared OTC Derivatives: Their Importance to the Global Economy. Retrieved from https://www.isda.org.
   Google Scholar
• ISDA. (2017). SwapsInfo Second Quarter 2017 Review. Retrieved from https://www.isda.org.
   Google Scholar
• Jones, C. (2010). Management of Sovereign Credit Risk for RepoClear Service. LCH.Clearnet Ltd Circular No. 2718. Retrieved from http://secure-area.lchclearnet.com/risk_management/ltd/margin_rate_circulars/repoclear/2010-11-10.asp.
   Google Scholar
• Jones, C. (2011). Management of Sovereign Credit Risk for RepoClear Service. LCH.Clearnet Ltd Circular No. 2889. Retrieved from http://secure-area.lchclearnet.com/risk_management/ltd/margin_rate_circulars/repoclear/2011-06-28.asp.
   Google Scholar
• Jones, C., & Chapam, J. (2010). Management of Sovereign Credit Risk for RepoClear Service. LCH.Clearnet Ltd Circular No. 2692. Retrieved from http://secure-area.lchclearnet.com/member_notices/circulars/2010-10-05.asp.
   Google Scholar
• Jones, S., Oakley, D., & Goff, S. (2010, 10 November). Irish bond yields leap after selling wave. Financial Times.
   Google Scholar
• Kane, D. O. (2016). Initial margin for non-centrally cleared OTC: Overview, modelling and calibration. EDHEC-Risk Institute. Retrieved from https://risk.edhec.edu.
   Google Scholar
• Katsikas, D. (2010). Non-state authority and global governance. Review of International Studies, 36(S1), 113–135. doi: 10.1017/S0260210510000793
   Google Scholar
• Kenyon, C., & Green, A. (2013). Why CCPs are the new rating agencies – and pose the same risks. Risk Magazine.
   Google Scholar
• Latour, B. (1987). Science in action: How to follow scientists and engineers through society. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Latour, B. (2005). Reassembling the social: An introduction to actor-network-theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Lee, R. (2010, June 7). Clearing houses are no panacea for market ills. Financial Times.
   Google Scholar
• Levy-Garboua, V. (2016). The organisation of market infrastructures in Europe (Report to the Director-General of the French Ministry of the Treasury).
   Google Scholar
• Lockwood, E. (2018). The Politics and Practices of Central Clearing in OTC Derivatives Markets. In E. Helleiner, S. Pagliari, & I. Spagna (Eds.), Governing the WORLD’S BIGGEST MARKET: THE politics of derivatives regulation after the 2008 crisis (pp. 168–196). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Metcalfe, R., Serocold, J., & Huet, B. (2009). ISDA, SIFMA and LIBA’s response to the European Commission’s proposals on OTC reform.
   Google Scholar
• Moschella, M. (2010). Governing risk: The IMF and Global Financial Crises Basingstoke. Palgrave Macmillan.
   Google Scholar
• Moser, J. T. (1998). Contracting Innovations and Evolution of Clearing and Settlement Methods at Futures Exchanges. Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Working Paper Series No. WP-98-26.
   Google Scholar
• Norman, P. (2011). The Risk Controllers: Central Counterparty Clearing in Globalised Financial Markets. Chichester, UK: Wiley.
   Google Scholar
• O’Malia, S. (2012). The Bilateral vs The Cleared World. Retrieved from https://www.isda.org
   Google Scholar
• Oakley, D., & Jones, S. (2010, 10 November). Bond sell-off takes Ireland closer to tipping point. Financial Times.
   Google Scholar
• Obama, B. (2010). Statement from the president on financial reform. Retrieved from https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/statement-president-financial-reform.
   Google Scholar
• OECD. (2003). Glossary of statistical terms. Retrieved from https://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=972.
   Google Scholar
• OECD. (2011). Regulatory reform of OTC derivatives and its implications for sovereign debt management practices. OECD Working Papers on Sovereign Borrowing and Public Debt No. 1.
   Google Scholar
• Pagliari, S. (2012). Who governs finance? The shifting public–private divide in the regulation of derivatives, rating agencies and hedge funds. European Law Journal, 18(1), 44–61. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0386.2011.00585.x
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Pagliari, S. (2013). Public salience and international financial regulation. Explaining the international regulation of OTC derivatives, rating agencies, and hedge funds (unpublished PhD Dissertation). University of Waterloo, Waterloo, ON.
   Google Scholar
• Parker, E., & McGarry, A. (2009). The ISDA master agreement and CSA: Close-out weaknesses exposed in the banking crisis and suggestions for change Butterworths. Journal of International Banking and Financial Law, 24(1), 16–19.
   Google Scholar
• Paudyn, B. (2013). Credit rating agencies and the sovereign debt crisis: Performing the politics of creditworthiness through risk and uncertainty. Review of International Political Economy, 20(4), 788–818. doi: 10.1080/09692290.2012.720272
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Pauly, L. W. (2004). Global finance, political authority, and the problem of legitimation. In R. B. Hall, & T. J. Biersteker (Eds.), The emergence of private authority in global governance (pp. 75–90). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Porter, T. (2014). Constitutive public practices in a world of changing boundaries. In J. Best, & L. Gheciu (Eds.), The return of the public in global governance (pp. 223–242). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Rahman, A. (2015). Over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives, central clearing and financial stability. Bank of England’s Quarterly Bulletin Q3.
   Google Scholar
• Rehlon, A., & Nixon, D. (2013). Central counterparties: What are they, why do they matter and how does the bank supervise them? Bank of England’s Quarterly Bulletin Q2. Retrieved from https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/quarterly-bulletin/2013/q2/central-counterparties-what-are-they-why-do-they-matter-and-how-does-the-bank-supervise-them
   Google Scholar
• Rethel, L., & Sinclair, T. J. (2012). The Problem with Banks. London: Zed Books.
   Google Scholar
• Reuters. (2011). LCH.Clearnet raises margin call on Italian debt. Reuters. Retrieved from http://www.reuters.com/article/us-markets-bonds-clearnet-idUSTRE7A82BK20111109.
   Google Scholar
• Reuters. (2012). LCH.Clearnet SA raise margin call on Spanish debt. Retrieved from http://www.reuters.com/article/markets-italy-margins-idUSL5E8GICGC20120518.
   Google Scholar
• Rosenberg, G., Carmen del Urquiza, M., & Miller, D. (2000). What is Netting? How Does Netting Work? Conference on Netting of OTC Financial Contracts in Latin America and the Caribbean, November. Retrieved from https://www.newyorkfed.org.
   Google Scholar
• Schäfer, A., Schnabel, I., & di Mauro, B. W. (2016). Bail-in expectations for European banks: Actions speak louder than words. ESRB Working Paper Series No. 7.
   Google Scholar
• Sinclair, T. J. (2005). The new masters of capital: American bond rating agencies and the politics of credit worthiness. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Singh, M. (2011). Making OTC Derivatives Safe ― A Fresh Look’. IMF Working Papers, 11(66), 1.doi: 10.5089/9781455228041.001
   Google Scholar
• Skarecky, T. (2016). SWAP futures: 2016 progress. Retrieved from https://www.clarusft.com/swap-futures-2016-progress.
   Google Scholar
• Slaughter and May. (2015). EMIR – Gearing up for Clearing – PART III. Retrieved from http://www.slaughterandmay.com.
   Google Scholar
• Stafford, P. (2017, 16 February). Clearing houses saddled with “too-big-to-fail” tag. Financial Times.
   Google Scholar
• Star, S. L. (1999). The Ethnography of Infrastructure. American Behavioural Scientist, 43(3), 377–391. doi: 10.1177/00027649921955326
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Steeg, R. W. K. (2017). OTC derivatives and the ISDA Master Agreement: (how) does it work under Dutch law? (part 1). Retrieved from https://www.stibbe.com.
   Google Scholar
• Steigerwald, R. S. (2015). Central counterparty clearing and systemic risk regulation. In A. G. Malliaris, & W. T. Ziemba (Eds.), The world scientific handbook of futures markets (pp. 181–246). Singapore: World Scientific.
   Google Scholar
• TCH and ISDA. (2016). Considerations for CCP resolution. Retrieved from https://www.isda.org/, .
   Google Scholar
• Tsingou, E. (2003). Transnational policy communities and financial governance: The role of private actors in derivatives regulation. CSGR Working Paper No. 111/03.
   Google Scholar
• Underhill, G. R. D. (2015). The emerging post-crisis financial architecture: The path-dependency of ideational adverse selection. The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 17(3), 461–493. doi: 10.1111/1467-856X.12056
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Van Duyn, A., & Gangahar, A. (2009, 14 May). Exchanges sense bonanza in OTC overhaul. Financial Times.
   Google Scholar
• Van Harten, G. (2005). Private authority and transnational governance: The contours of the international system of investor protection. Review of International Political Economy, 12(4), 600–623. doi: 10.1080/09692290500240305
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Wakita, S. (2001). Efficiency of the Dojima rice futures market in Tokugawa-period Japan. Journal of Banking and Finance, 25(3), 535–554. doi: 10.1016/S0378-4266(00)00087-X
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Wellink, N. (2010). Mitigating systemic risk in OTC derivative markets. Banque de France’s Financial Stability Review, No. 14.
   Google Scholar
• Wendt, F. (2015). Central Counterparties: Addressing their Too Important to Fail Nature. IMF Working Papers, 15(21), 1.doi: 10.5089/9781475572933.001
   Google Scholar
• Yeowart, G., & Parsons, R. (2016). Yeowart and Parsons on the law of financial collateral. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
   Google Scholar