Market structure and economic sanctions: the 2010 rare earth elements episode as a pathway case of market adjustment

References

• Afesorgbor, S. K. (2019). The impact of economic sanctions on international trade: How do threatened sanctions compare with imposed sanctions? European Journal of Political Economy, 56, 11–26. doi:10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2018.06.002
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Arnold, A. (2016). The true costs of financial sanctions. Survival, 58(3), 77–100. doi:10.1080/00396338.2016.1186981
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Bapat, N. A., Heinrich, T., Kobayashi, Y., & Morgan, T. C. (2013). Determinants of sanctions effectiveness: Sensitivity analysis using new data. International Interactions, 39(1), 79–98. doi:10.1080/03050629.2013.751298
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Bayard, T., & Elliott, K. (1992). Aggressive unilateralism and Section 301: Market opening or market closing? The World Economy, 15(6), 685–706. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9701.1992.tb00545.x
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Binnemans, K., Jones, P. T., Blanpain, B., Van Gerven, T., Yang, Y., Walton, A., & Buchert, M. (2013). Recycling of Rare Earths: A Critical Review. Journal of Cleaner Production, 51, 1–22. doi:10.1016/j.jclepro.2012.12.037
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Bleiwas, D. I., & Gambogi, J. (2013). Preliminary estimates of the quantities of rare-earth elements contained in selected products and in imports of semimanufactured products to the United States, 2010 (U.S. Geological Survey Open-File Report 2013–1072). Reston, VA: U.S. Geological Survey.
   Google Scholar
• Brooks, R. (2002). Sanctions and regime type: What works and when? Security Studies, 11(4), 1–50. doi:10.1080/714005349
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Chen, X., & Garcia, R. J. (2016). Economic sanctions and trade diplomacy: Sanction-busting strategies, market distortion and efficacy of China’s restrictions on Norwegian Salmon imports. China Information, 30(1), 29–57. doi:10.1177/0920203X15625061
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Drezner, D. W. (1999). The sanctions paradox: Economic statecraft and international relations. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Drezner, D. W. (2000). Bargaining, enforcement, and multilateral sanctions: When is cooperation counterproductive? International Organization, 54(1), 73–102. doi:10.1162/002081800551127
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Drezner, D. W. (2003). The hidden hand of economic coercion. International Organization, 57(3), 643–659. doi:10.1017/S0020818303573052
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Drezner, D. W. (2015). Targeted sanctions in a World of Global Finance. International Interactions, 41(4), 755–764. doi:10.1080/03050629.2015.1041297
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Early, B. R. (2015). Busted sanctions: Explaining why economic sanctions fail. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Eaton, J., & Engers, M. (1999). Sanctions: Some simple analytics. American Economic Review, 89(2), 409–414. doi:10.1257/aer.89.2.409
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Elliott, K. A. (1998). The sanctions glass: Half full or completely empty? International Security, 23(1), 50–65. doi:10.2307/2539262
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Elliott, K. A., & David Richardson, J. (1997). Determinants and effectiveness of “aggressively unilateral” U.S. trade actions. In R. C. Feenstra (Ed.), The effects of U.S. trade protection and promotion policies (pp. 215–243). Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
   Google Scholar
• Escribà-Folch, A., & Wright, J. (2010). Dealing with tyranny: International sanctions and the survival of authoritarian rulers. International Studies Quarterly, 54(2), 335–359. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2478.2010.00590.x
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Farmer, R. D. (2000). Costs of economic sanctions to the sender. The World Economy, 23(1), 93–117. doi:10.1111/1467-9701.00264
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Farrell, H., & Newman, A. L. (2019). Weaponized interdependence: How global economic networks shape state coercion. International Security, 44(1), 42–79. doi:10.1162/isec_a_00351
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Gerring, J. (2007). Is there a (viable) crucial-case method? Comparative Political Studies, 40(3), 231–253. doi:10.1177/0010414006290784
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Gholz, E. (2014). Rare earth elements and national security. New York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations.
   Google Scholar
• Griffin, J. M. (2015). Petro-nationalism: The futile search for oil security. The Energy Journal, 36(SI), 25–41. doi:10.5547/01956574.36.SI1.jgri
   Google Scholar
• Hamermesh, D. S., & Pfann, G. A. (1996). Adjustment costs in factor demand. Journal of Economic Literature, 34(3), 1264–1292.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Hiscox, M. J. (2001). Class versus industry cleavages: Inter-industry factor mobility and the politics of trade. International Organization, 55(1), 1–46. doi:10.1162/002081801551405
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Hufbauer, G. C., Schott, J. J., Elliott, K. A., and Oegg, B. (2007). Economic sanctions reconsidered (3rd ed.). Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics.
   Google Scholar
• Hughes, L. (2014). Globalizing oil: The politics of oil market governance in France, Japan, and the United States. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Hughes, L., & Long, A. (2015). Is there an oil weapon? Security implications of changes in the structure of the international oil market. International Security, 39(3), 152–189. doi:10.1162/ISEC_a_00188
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Humphries, M. (2012). Rare earth elements: The global supply chain (CRS report for congress R41347). Washington, DC: Government Printing Office.
   Google Scholar
• Hurst, C. (2010). China’s rare earth elements industry: What can the West learn? Washington, DC: Institute for the Analysis of Global Security.
   Google Scholar
• Johnston, A. I. (2014). How new and assertive is China’s new assertiveness? International Security, 37(4), 7–48. doi:10.1162/ISEC_a_00115
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Kaempfer, W. H., & Lowenberg, A. D. (1988). The theory of International Economic Sanctions: A public choice approach. American Economic Review, 78(4), 786–793.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Kirshner, J. (1997). The microfoundations of economic sanctions. Security Studies, 6(3), 32–64. doi:10.1080/09636419708429314
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Krueger, A. O. (1997). Problems with overlapping free trade areas. In T. Ito and A. O. Krueger (Eds.), Regional versus multilateral trade arrangements (pp. 9–23). Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
   Google Scholar
• Lee, J.-W., & Gray, K. (2017). Cause for optimism? Financial sanctions and the rise of the Sino-North Korean border economy. Review of International Political Economy, 24(3), 424–453. doi:10.1080/09692290.2017.1301977
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Major, S. (2012). Timing is everything: Economic sanctions, regime type, and domestic instability. International Interactions, 38(1), 79–110. doi:10.1080/03050629.2012.640253
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Mancheri, N. A., & Marukawa, T. (2016). Rare earth elements: China and Japan in industry, trade, and value chain. Tokyo: University of Tokyo.
   Google Scholar
• Martin, L. L. (1993). Credibility, costs, and institutions: Cooperation on economic sanctions. World Politics, 45(3), 406–432. doi:10.2307/2950724
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• McLean, E. V., & Radtke, M. T. (2018). Political relations, leader stability, and economic coercion. International Studies Quarterly, 62(2), 357–370. doi:10.1093/isq/sqy008
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Morgan, T. C., Bapat, N., & Krustev, V. (2009). The threat and imposition of economic sanctions, 1971–2000. Conflict Management and Peace Science, 26(1), 92–110. doi:10.1177/0738894208097668
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Morgan, T. C., Bapat, N., & Kobayashi, Y. (2014). Threat and imposition of economic sanctions 1945–2005: Updating the TIES dataset. Conflict Management and Peace Science, 31(5), 541–518. doi:10.1177/0738894213520379
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Nooruddin, I. (2002). Modeling selection bias in studies of sanctions efficacy. International Interactions, 28(1), 59–75. doi:10.1080/03050620210394
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Nooruddin, I., & Payton, A. L. (2010). Dynamics of influence in international politics: The ICC, BIAs, and economic sanctions. Journal of Peace Research, 47(6), 711–721. doi:10.1177/0022343310381854
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Odell, J. S. (2001). Case study methods in international political economy. International Studies Perspectives, 2(2), 161–176. doi:10.1111/1528-3577.00047
   Google Scholar
• Packey, D. J., & Kingsnorth, D. (2016). The impact of unregulated ionic clay rare earth mining in China. Resources Policy, 48, 112–116. doi:10.1016/j.resourpol.2016.03.003
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Pape, R. A. (1997). Why economic sanctions do not work. International Security, 22(2), 90–136. doi:10.1162/isec.22.2.90
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Peksen, D., & Peterson, T. M. (2016). Sanctions and alternate markets: How trade and alliances affect the onset of economic coercion. Political Research Quarterly, 69(1), 4–16. doi:10.1177/1065912915620049
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Plümper, T., Troeger, V., & Neumayer, E. (2016). Case selection and the validity of causal inferences in qualitative comparative research. Unpublished manuscript. Vienna, Austria: Department of Socioeconomics, Vienna University of Economics and Business.
   Google Scholar
• Samuels, R. J. (2013). 3.11: Disaster and change in Japan. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Seaman, J. (2012). Rare earths and the East China Sea: Why hasn’t China embargoed shipments to Japan? (Op-ed Series). Paris and Tokyo: Institut Français Des Relations Internationales and Canon Institute for Global Studies.
   Google Scholar
• Silberglitt, R., Bartis, J. T., Chow, B. G., An, D. L., & Brady, K. (2013). Critical materials: Present danger to U.S. manufacturing. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation.
   Google Scholar
• Slavov, S. T. (2007). Innocent or not-so-innocent bystanders: Evidence from the gravity model of international trade about the effects of UN sanctions on neighbour countries. The World Economy, 30(11), 1701–1725. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9701.2007.01026.x
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Smith, A. (1995). The success and use of economic sanctions. International Interactions, 21(3), 229–245. doi:10.1080/03050629508434867
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Sprecher, B. (2016). When materials become critical: Lessons from the 2010 rare earth crisis (Doctoral dissertation). University of Leiden, The Netherlands.
   Google Scholar
• Sprecher, B., Daigo, I., Murakami, S., Kleijn, R., Vos, M., & Kramer, G. J. (2015). Framework for resilience in material supply chains, with a case study from the 2010 rare earth crisis. Environmental Science & Technology, 49(11), 6740–6750. doi:10.1021/acs.est.5b00206
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Tostensen, A., & Bull, B. (2002). Are smart sanctions feasible? World Politics, 54(3), 373–403. doi:10.1353/wp.2002.0010
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• U.S. Department of Energy. (2011). Critical materials strategy. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Energy. doi:10.2172/1000846
   Google Scholar
• Van Bergeijk, P. A. G., & Siddiquee, M. S. H. (2017). Methodological change and bias in economic sanctions reconsidered. International Interactions, 43(5), 879–893. doi:10.1080/03050629.2016.1242584
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• van Bergeijk, P. A. G., & van Marrewijk, C. (1995). Why do sanctions need time to work? Adjustment, learning, and anticipation. Economic Modelling, 12(2), 75–86. doi:10.1016/0264-9993(94)00003-N
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Van Evera, S. (1997). Guide to methods for students of political science. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Wilson, J. D. (2018). Whatever happened to the rare earths weapon? Critical materials and international security in Asia. Asian Security, 14(3), 358–373. doi:10.1080/14799855.2017.1397977
   Google Scholar
• Zeng, K. (2002). Trade structure and the effectiveness of America’s “Aggressively Unilateral” trade policy. International Studies Quarterly, 46(1), 93–115. doi:10.1111/1468-2478.00224
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar