Informal economic sanctions: the political economy of Chinese coercion during the THAAD dispute

References

• Albert, E. (2018, May 4). South Korea’s chaebol challenge. Council on Foreign Relations. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/south-koreas-chaebol-challenge.
   Google Scholar
• Baldwin, D. A. (1979). Power analysis and world politics: New trends versus old tendencies. World Politics, 31(2), 161–194. https://doi.org/10.2307/2009941
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Baldwin, D. A. (1985). Economic statecraft. Princeton University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Bapat, N. A., & Kwon, B. R. (2015). When are sanctions effective? A bargaining and enforcement framework. International Organization, 69(1), 131–162. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818314000290
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Barwick, P. J., Li, S., Wallace, J., & Weiss, J. C. (2019, April 5). Commercial casualties: Political boycotts and international disputes. Working Paper. https://ssrn.com/abstract=3417194.
   Google Scholar
• Blanchard, J.-M F., & Ripsman, N. M. (2013). Economic statecraft and foreign policy: Sanctions, incentives and target state calculations. Routledge.
   Google Scholar
• Blanchard, J.-M., & Ripsman, N. (1999). Asking the right question: When do economic sanctions work best? Security Studies, 9(1–2), 219–253. https://doi.org/10.1080/09636419908429400
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Chen, X., & Garcia, R. J. (2016). Economic sanctions and trade diplomacy: Sanction-busting strategies, market distortion and efficacy of China’s restrictions on Norwegian salmon imports. China Information, 30(1), 29–57. https://doi.org/10.1177/0920203X15625061
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Choi, K. (2017, May 2). S. Korea mid-sized firms expect no improvements in exports. Yonhap. https://web.archive.org/web/https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20170502005200320.
   Google Scholar
• Cortright, D., & Lopez, G. (2002). Smart sanctions: Targeting economic statecraft. Rowman and Little.
   Google Scholar
• Davis, C. L., & Meunier, S. (2011). Business as usual? Economic responses to political tensions. American Journal of Political Science, 55(3), 628–646. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2010.00507.x
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Doraev, M. (2015). The “memory effect” of economic sanctions against Russia: Opposing approaches to the legality of unilateral sanctions clash again. University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law, 37(1), 355–419.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Doxey, M. (1980). Economic sanctions and international enforcement (2nd ed.). Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Drezner, D. W. (2000). Bargaining, enforcement, and multilateral sanctions: When is cooperation counterproductive? International Organization, 54(1), 73–102. https://doi.org/10.1162/002081800551127
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Drezner, D. W. (2011). Sanctions sometimes smart: Targeted sanctions in theory and practice. International Studies Review, 13(1), 96–108. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2486.2010.01001.x
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Drury, A. C. (1998). Revisiting economic sanctions reconsidered. Journal of Peace Research, 35(4), 497–509. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343398035004006
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Drury, A. C. (2001). Sanctions as coercive diplomacy: The US President’s decision to initiate economic sanctions. Political Research Quarterly, 54(3), 485–508. https://doi.org/10.2307/449267
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Early, B. R. (2009). Sleeping with your friends’ enemies: An explanation of sanctions-busting trade. International Studies Quarterly, 53(1), 49–71. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2008.01523.x
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Early, B. R., & Cilizoglu, M. (2020). Economic sanctions in flux: Enduring challenges, new policies, and defining the future research agenda. International Studies Perspectives, 21(4), 438–440. https://doi.org/10.1093/isp/ekaa002
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Eggenberger, K. (2018). When is blacklisting effective? Stigma, sanctions and legitimacy: The reputational and financial costs of being blacklisted. Review of International Political Economy, 25(4), 483–504. https://doi.org/10.1080/09692290.2018.1469529
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Elman, C., & Kapiszewski, D. (2014). Data access and research transparency in the qualitative tradition. PS: Political Science & Politics, 47(1), 43–47.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Farmer, R. D. (2000). Costs of economic sanctions to the sender. The World Economy, 23(1), 93–117. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9701.00264
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Farrell, H., & Newman, A. (2019). Weaponized interdependence: How global economic networks shape state coercion. International Security, 44(1), 42–79. https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00351
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Ferguson, V., & Lim, D. J. (2021). Economic power and vulnerability in Sino-Australian relations. In L. Jaivin, J. Golley, & S. Strange (Eds.), China story yearbook: Crisis (pp. 258–275). ANU Press. https://doi.org/10.22459/CSY.2021.09
   Google Scholar
• Ferguson, V. (2021). Economic lawfare: The strategic use of law to exercise economic power. Working Paper. Australian National University.
   Google Scholar
• Financial Times. (2018, January 25). Diplomatic breakthrough fails to lift Korean brands in China. https://web.archive.org/web/https://www.ft.com/content/513e9004-0047-11e8-9650-9c0ad2d7c5b5
   Google Scholar
• Fuchs, A., & Klann, N. (2013). Paying a visit: The dalai lama effect on international trade. Journal of International Economics, 91(1).
   Google Scholar
• Galtung, J. (1967). On the effects of international economic sanctions: With examples from the case of Rhodesia. World Politics, 19(3), 378–416. https://doi.org/10.2307/2009785
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• George, A., & Bennett, A. (2005). Case studies and theory development in the social sciences. MIT Press.
   Google Scholar
• Gholz, E., & Hughes, L. (2019). Market structure and economic sanctions: The 2010 rare earth elements episode as a pathway case of market adjustment. Review of International Political Economy. https://doi.org/10.1080/09692290.2019.1693411
   Google Scholar
• Green, M., Hicks, K., Cooper, Z., Schaus, J., & Douglas, J. (2017). Countering coercion in maritime Asia: The theory and practice of gray zone deterrence. CSIS/Rowman & Littlefield.
   Google Scholar
• Harris, B. (2018, August 19). South Korea: The fear of China’s shadow. Financial Times. https://www.ft.com/content/c2d6dad0-a13e-11e8-85da-eeb7a9ce36e4.
   Google Scholar
• Hedberg, M. (2018). The target strikes back: Explaining countersanctions and Russia’s strategy of differentiated retaliation. Post-Soviet Affairs, 34(1), 35–54. https://doi.org/10.1080/1060586X.2018.1419623
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Hirschman, A. (1945). National power and the structure of foreign trade. University of California Press.
   Google Scholar
• Hufbauer, G. C., Schott J. J., Elliot K. A., & Oegg, B. (2007). Economic sanctions reconsidered, 3rd ed. Peterson Institute for International Economics.
   Google Scholar
• Jung, S.-Y. (2019, May 13). South Korea and China in direct competition in 37% of their export items: KIET. BusinessKorea. https://web.archive.org/web/http://www.businesskorea.co.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=31742.
   Google Scholar
• Kaempfer, W., & Lowenberg, A. (1988). The theory of international economic sanctions: A public choice approach. The American Economic Review, 78(4), 786–793.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Kaempfer, W., & Lowenberg, A. (1992). International economic sanctions: A public choice perspective. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
   Google Scholar
• Kalyanpur, N., & Newman, A. L. (2019). Mobilizing market power: Jurisdictional expansion as economic statecraft. International Organization, 73(1).
   Google Scholar
• Katz, R. (2013). Mutually assured production: Why trade will limit conflict between China and Japan. Foreign Affairs, 92(4), 18–24.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Keohane, R., & Nye, J. (1977). Power and interdependence: World politics in transition. Little, Brown & Co.
   Google Scholar
• Kim, J.-H. (2018, March 19). KITA bemoans unfair market access in China. Korea JoongAng Daily. https://web.archive.org/web/https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/article/article.aspx?aid=3045845
   Google Scholar
• Kirshner, J. (1997). The microfoundations of economic sanctions. Security Studies, 6(3), 32–64. https://doi.org/10.1080/09636419708429314
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Knorr, K. (1977). International economic leverage and its uses. In K. Knorr & F. N. Trager (Eds.), Economic issues and national security (pp. 99–126). Regents Press of Kansas.
   Google Scholar
• Lai, C. (2018). Acting one way and talking another: China's coercive economic diplomacy in East Asia and beyond. The Pacific Review, 31(2), 169–197. https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2017.1357652
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Lektzian, D., & Souva, M. (2007). An institutional theory of sanctions onset and success. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 51(6), 848–871. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002707306811
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Lim, D. J., Ferguson, V., & Bishop, R. (2020). Chinese outbound tourism as an instrument of economic statecraft. Journal of Contemporary China, 29(126), 916–933. https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2020.1744390
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Lindsay, J. (1986). Trade sanctions as policy instruments: A re-examination. International Studies Quarterly, 30(2), 153–173. https://doi.org/10.2307/2600674
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Mazarr, M. (2015). Mastering the gray zone: Understanding a changing era of conflict. US Army War College Press.
   Google Scholar
• McLean, E., & Whang, T. (2014). Designing foreign policy: Voters, special interest groups, and economic sanctions. Journal of Peace Research, 51(5), 589–602. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343314533811
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• McNish, J. (2019, April 16). Chinese dispute strikes Canada’s canola farmers. Wall Street Journal. https://www.wsj.com/articles/chinese-dispute-strikes-canadas-canola-farmers-11555412400.
   Google Scholar
• Moore, M., & Wu, M. (2015). Antidumping and strategic industrial policy: Tit-for-tat trade remedies and the China–X-ray equipment dispute. World Trade Review, 14(2), 239–286. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1474745615000038
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Moravcsik, A. (2010). Active citation: A precondition for replicable qualitative research. PS: Political Science & Politics, 43(01), 29–35. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1049096510990781
   Google Scholar
• Morgan, T. C., & Bapat, N. A. (2003). Imposing sanctions: States, firms, and economic coercion. International Studies Review, 5(4), 65–79. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1079-1760.2003.00504007.x
   Google Scholar
• Morgan, T. C., & Schwebach, V. L. (1997). Fools suffer gladly: The use of economic sanctions in international crises. International Studies Quarterly, 41(1), 27–50. https://doi.org/10.1111/0020-8833.00032
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Morris, L. J., Mazarr, M. J., Hornung, J. W., Pezard, S., Binnendijk, A., & Kepe, M. (2019). Gaining competitive advantage in the gray zone: Response options for coercive aggression below the threshold of major war. RAND Corporation.
   Google Scholar
• Norris, W. (2016). Chinese economic statecraft: Commercial actors, grand strategy, and state control. Cornell University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Nossal, K. R. (1994). Rain dancing: Sanctions in Canadian and Australian foreign policy. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
   Google Scholar
• Nuñez-Mietz, F. (2016). Lawyering compliance with international law: Legal advisers in the ‘war on terror’. European Journal of International Security, 1(2), 215–238. https://doi.org/10.1017/eis.2016.9
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Pape, R. A. (1997). Why economic sanctions do not work. International Security, 22(2), 90–136. https://doi.org/10.1162/isec.22.2.90
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Paradise, J. (2019). Sanction effectiveness in the China-South Korea THAAD dispute. In E. Yang & W. Liang (Ed.), Challenges to China’s economic statecraft: A global perspective (pp. 33–60). Rowman and Littlefield.
   Google Scholar
• Peksen, D., & Peterson, T. (2016). Sanctions and alternate markets: How trade and alliances affect the onset of economic coercion. Political Research Quarterly, 69(1), 4–16. https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912915620049
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Perlez, J., Landler, M., & Sang-Hun, C. (2017, November 1). China blinks on South Korea, making nice after a year of hostilities. New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/01/world/asia/china-south-korea-thaad.html.
   Google Scholar
• Peterson, T. (2014). Dyadic trade, exit costs, and conflict. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 58(4), 564–591. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002713478794
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Reilly, J. (2012). China’s unilateral sanctions. The Washington Quarterly, 35(4), 121–133. https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2012.726428
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Reilly, J. (2021). Orchestration: China’s economic statecraft across Asia and Europe. Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Vekasi, K. (2019). Politics, markets, and rare commodities: Responses to Chinese rare earth policy. Japanese Journal of Political Science, 20(1), 2–20. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1468109918000385
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Watts, R. C. (2018). “Rockets’ red glare”—Why does China oppose THAAD in South Korea, and what does it mean for U.S. policy? Naval War College Review, 71(2), 6–20.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Weiss, T. (1999). Sanctions as a foreign policy tool. Journal of Peace Research, 36(5), 499–509. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343399036005001
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Yamada, K. (2017, February 7). Samsung quits South Korean business lobby. Nikkei Asian Review. https://web.archive.org/web/https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Samsung-quits-South-Korean-business-lobby.
   Google Scholar
• Yang, F. W.-T. (2019). Asymmetrical interdependence and sanction: China’s economic retaliation over South Korea’s THAAD deployment. Issues and Studies, 55(4), 1–39.
   Google Scholar
• Yonhap. (2017, March 21). China's THAAD sabotage spills over to smaller firms. Yonhap. https://web.archive.org/web/https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20170321003200320.
   Google Scholar
• Yonhap. (2018, May 25). China's tour ban lifting yet to help related sectors: Sources. Yonhap. https://web.archive.org/web/https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20180525004000320.
   Google Scholar