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Review of International Political Economy Volume 31, 2024 - Issue 3
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Research Articles

The political economy of monetary-fiscal coordination: central bank losses and the specter of central bankruptcy in Europe and Japan

Sebastian DiessnerInstitute of Public Administration, Faculty of Governance and Global Affairs, Leiden University, The Hague, The NetherlandsCorrespondence[email protected]
ORCID Iconhttps://orcid.org/0000-0002-9458-980XView further author information
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Pages 1099-1121 | Received 02 Nov 2022, Accepted 09 Nov 2023, Published online: 28 Dec 2023

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