- Here, U denotes utility and a superscript i or j designates who the player is.
- For the definition of the subgame-perfect equilibrium, see Reinhardt Selten, “Reexamination of the Perfectness Concept for Equilibrium Points in Extensive Games,” International Journal of Game Theory, Vol. 4, No. 1 (1975), pp. 25–55.
- In this paper I introduce two rather generic extensive-form games suitable for the rivalry situation. Elsewhere, I have developed game theoretic models that are applied to the nuclear inspection game between North Korea and the international community led by the United States. See Woosang Kim, “Perception and Strategic Thinking in a Diplomatic Bargaining Process: A Case of North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Program,” Sejong Review, Vol. 3, No. 1 (November 1995), pp. 147–160. For a similar generic game dealing with perception, misperception and the risk of war, see Woosang Kim and Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, “How Perceptions Influence the Risk of War,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 39, No. 1 (March 1995). Also, for a diplomatic game between South Korea and China, see Woosang Kim, “The Diplomatic Triangle of South Korea, China, and Taiwan,” Issues and Studies, Vol. 32, No. 5 (May 1996), pp. 24–39.
- Claude , Inis L. Jr. 1962 . Power and International Relations New York : Random House . (Edward Gulick, Europe's Classical Balance of Power (New York: Cornell University Press, 1955); Morton A. Kaplan, System and Process in International Politics (New York: John Wiley, 1957); Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1973); Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading: Addison-Wesley 1979).
- Morrow , James D. “Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation Model of Alliances,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 35, No. 4, pp. 904–933; Ronald D. McLaurin and Chung-in Moon, “US Foreign Policymaking toward South Korea: Issues, Structures, and Processes,” in Manwoo Lee, Ronald D. McLaurin and Chung-in Moon, eds., Alliance Under Tension: The Evolution of South Korean-US Relations (Seoul: Kyungnam University Press 1988).
- For discussions about internal and external means of national capabilities, see Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Grace Iusi-Scarborough and Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, “Threat and Alignment Behavior,” International Interaction, Vol. 14, No. 1 (1988), pp. 85–93; Woosang Kim, “Alliance Transitions and Great Power War,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 35, No. 4 (1991), pp. 833–50; Woosang Kim, “Power Transitions and Great Power War From Westphalia To Waterloo,” World Politics, Vol. 45, No. 1 (1992), pp. 153–72; Jack Levy, “Declining Power and the Preventive Motivation for War,” World Politics, Vol. 40, No. 1 (1987), pp. 82–107; Benjamin A. Most and Harvey Starr, “International Relations Theory, Foreign Policy Substitutability, and 'Nice' Laws,” World Politics, Vol. 36, No. 2 (1984), pp. 383–406; Waltz, Theory of International Politics
- One of the reasons for this time span is data availability. Another reason is that the nuclear crisis between North Korea and the international community led by the United States occurred in 1993. For the data, see Jinho Song, An Empirical Analysis of Conflict and Cooperation in the Korean Peninsula, Master's Thesis, Yonsei University, 2001.
- The COPDAB data set is a longitudinal collection of daily “events” that are distinct from routine exchanges, among 135 nation-states during the period from 1948 to 1978, and is compiled by Azar and his associates. See Edward E. Azar, “The Conflict and Peace Data Bank (COPDAB) Project,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 24 (1980); Edward E. Azar, Conflict and Peace Data Bank (COPDAB), 1948–1978: Daily Aggregations, 2nd ICPSR ed. (Ann Arbor: Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research, 1982).
- For example, voluntary unification into one nation is coded as 1; forming major strategic alliance is coded as 2; military support is coded as 3; non-military exchange such as making loans or grants for economic development is coded as 4; cultural or scientific agreement or exchange is coded as 5; official verbal support is coded as 6; exchange of officials or meeting of high level officials is coded as 7; mild verbal hostility is coded as 9; strong condemnation of actions or policies is coded as 10; hostile diplomatic or economic action such as economic sanction or termination of major agreement is coded as 11; political or military hostile action is coded as 12; small scale military act is coded as 13; limited war is coded as 14; and a full scale war is coded as 15. See Azar, Conflict and Peace Data Bank (COPDAB), 1948–1978: Daily Aggregations
- Gary King, “Statistical Models for Political Science Event Counts: Bias in Conventional Procedures and Evidence for the Exponential Poisson Regression Model,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 32, No. 4 (1988), pp. 838–63.
- Others also have used the Poisson regression model to explain the likelihood of war or alliance behavior. See, for example, Patrick J. McGowan and Robert M. Rood, “Alliance Behavior in Balance of Power Systems: Applying a Poisson Model to Nineteenth-Century Europe,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 69, No. 4 (1975), pp. 859–70; Woosang Kim, “Superpower Influence on the Arab-Israeli Dispute: An Expected Utility Analysis, 1948–1978,” Asian Perspective, Vol. 23, No. 1 (1999), pp. 155–78. For details about the Poisson regression model, see William Feller, An Introduction to Probability Theory and Its Application (New York: Wiley, 1967); Gary King, “Variance Specification in Event Count Models: From Restrictive Assumptions to Generalized Estimators,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 33, No. 4 (1989), pp. 762–84.
- Moon , Chung-in and Steinberg , David I. 1999 . “The Kim Dae-jung Government and the Sunshine Policy,” . In Kim Dae-jung Government and Sunshine Policy: Promises and Challenges Edited by: Chung-in , Moon and Steinberg , David I. Seoul : Yonsei University Press . Many studies have suggested that China is one of the most influential external actors in shaping the course of the Sunshine Policy and in influencing the behavior of North Korea. For example, see in, eds., (Samuel S. Kim, “Will Seoul's Sunshine Policy also Rise in Beijing? A Chinese Perspective,” in Chung-in Moon and David I. Steinberg, eds., Kim Dae-jung Government and Sunshine Policy: Promises and Challenges (Seoul: Yonsei University Press 1999).
- Kim , see Woosang . 1997 . The Two Korea: A Contemporary History Reading : Addison-Wesley . For example, “Inducement Measures for the Opening of North Korea,” Korea Observer, Vol. 24, No. 4 (Winter 1993), pp. 497–527; Nicholas Eberstadt, The End of North Korea (Washington DC: The AEI Press, 1999), p. 40. Oberdorfer also tells us North Korea's businesslike manner in the negotiation tables. See Don Oberdorfer, (
- Moon , Chung-in . 1999 . “Understanding the DJ Doctrine: The Sunshine Policy and the Korean Peninsula,” . In Kim Dae-jung Government and Sunshine Policy: Promises and Challenges Edited by: Chung-in , Moon and Steinberg , David I. Seoul : Yonsei University Press . For the operating principles of the sunshine policy, see in, eds., (Chung-in Moon, “The Sunshine Policy and Ending the Cold War Structure: Assessing Impacts of the Korean Summit,” in Chung-in Moon, Odd Arne Westad, and Gyoo-hyong Kahng, eds., Ending the Cold War in Korea: Theoretical and Historical Perspectives (Seoul: Yonsei University Press 2001).
- Sigal , Leon V. 1998 . Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea Princeton : Princeton University Press .
- Tit-for-tat is the best known strategy. But, tit-for-tat strategy does not always mean immediate retaliation. To successfully induce cooperation from the counterpart, Axelrod suggests the “forgiveness” option, and Downs, Rocke and Siverson suggest a half chance of responding with retaliation in case the rival defects. See Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984); George W. Downs, David M. Rocke, and Randolph M. siverson, “Arms Race and Cooperation,” World Politics, Vol. 38, No. 1 (1985), pp. 118–46.
- For example, see Kazuro Umezu, “Russia's New Standing in Northeast Asia,” World Affairs, Vol. 8, No. 1 (Winter/Spring 2001), pp. 137–47.
Korean Journal of Defense Analysis
Volume 14, 2002 - Issue 2