References
- Akerlof, G., and R. Kranton. 2005. “Identity and the economics of organizations.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 19 (1): 9–32.
- Arce, D. (Forthcoming) Principals’ preferences for agents with social preferences. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization.
- Asch, B., J. Hosek, and J. Warner. 2001. An Analysis of Pay for Enlisted Personnel, DB-344-OSD. Santa Monica, CA: RAND.
- Asch, B., Hosek, J., and Warner, J. (2007) “New Economics of Manpower in the Post-Cold War Era,” in Handbook of Defense Economics, Volume Two: Defense in a Globalized World, edited by T. Sandler and K. Hartley. Amsterdam and Boston: North-Holland, 1075–1138.
- Asch, B., J. Miller, and J. Warner. 2010. “Economics and the all-volunteer military force.” In Better Living Through Economics, edited by J. Siegfried, 253–269. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Benabou, R., and J. Tirole. 2003. “Intrinsic and extrinsic motivation.” Review of Economic Studies 70 (3): 489–520.
- Berck, P., and J. Lipow. 2011. “Military conscription and the (socially) optimal number of boots on the ground.” Southern Economic Journal 78 (1): 95–106.
- Besley, T., and M. Ghatak. 2005. “Competition and incentives with motivated agents.” American Economic Review 95 (3): 616–636.
- Delfgaauw, J., and R. Dur. 2007. “Signaling and screening of workers’ motivation.” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 62 (4): 605–624.
- Dixit, A. 2002. “Incentives and organizations in the public sector: an interpretive review.” Journal of Human Resources 37 (4): 696–727.
- Eitelberg, M., J. Lawrence, B. Waters, and L. Perelman. 1984. Screening for Service. Report FR-PRD-83-24. Alexandria, VA: Human Resource Research Organization.
- Francois, P. 2000. “Public service motivation as an argument for government provision.” Journal of Public Economics 78 (3): 275–299.
- Handy, F., and E. Katz. 1998. “The wage differential between non-profit institutions and corporations: getting more by paying less?” Journal of Comparative Economics 26 (2): 246–261.
- Kavanaugh, J. 1984. Determinants of Productivity for Military Personnel. TR-193-OSD. Santa Monica, CA: RAND.
- Lipow, J., and J. Simon. 2011. “Military reserves and social welfare.” Economics Letters 113 (3): 208–210.
- Makris, M. 2009. “Incentives for motivated agents under an administrative constraint.” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 71 (2): 187–192.
- Max and Dave Fleischer. 1934. ‘Something about a Soldier,’ http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TSZ31YrEc9Q (accessed 15 October 2012).
- Monks, J. 2000. “The returns to individual and college characteristics: evidence from the national longitudinal survey of youth.” Economics of Education Review 19 (3): 279–289.
- Murdock, K. 2002. “Intrinsic motivation and optimal incentive contracts.” RAND Journal of Economics 33 (4): 650–671.
- Patterson, A. (1978) The goal of motivation in the military: soldier satisfaction or soldier performance? Unpublished thesis. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: United States Army Command and General Staff College.
- Perri, T. (2010) Deferments and the relative cost of conscription. B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis and Policy 10(1): Article 103.
- Perri, T. (2010) Uncle sam wants whom? The draft and the quality of military personnel. Unpublished working paper. Appalachian State University.
- Rosen, S. 1986. “The theory of equalizing differences.” In Handbook of Labor Economics, Volume One, edited by O. Ashenfelter and R. Layard, 641–692. Amsterdam: Elsevier.
- Shierholz H., Sabadish, N, and Wething, H. (2012) ‘The Class of 2012,’ Economic Policy Institute Report.
- Swedish Armed Forces. (2011) ‘Welcome to Our Reality,’ http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AprqomTW-Wo (accessed 15 October 2012).
- Williams, C., and C. Gilroy. 2006. Service to Country: Personnel Policy and the Transformation of Western Militaries. Cambridge: MIT Press.