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Articles

Legal central bank independence and inflation in various phases of transition

Pages 167-186 | Received 05 Feb 2014, Accepted 06 Feb 2015, Published online: 07 Apr 2015

National legislation

  • Act on the Bank of Slovenia, Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia No. 1/91-I, No. 58/02, No. 72/06, Act Amending ZBS-1B.
  • Act on the Croatian National Bank NN br. 9/91, br. 74/92, NN br.79/93, NN br. 7/95, NN br. 35/95, NN br. 36/01., NN br. 135/06, NN br. 75/08, NN br. 54/13.
  • Act on the Czech National Bank No. 6/1993, as amended by Act No. 60/1993., Act No. 15/1998., Act No. 442/2000., Act No. 482/2001., Act No. 127/2002., Act No. 257/2004., Act No. 377/2005., Act No. 57/2006., Act No. 62/2006., Act No. 230/2006., Act No. 160/2007., Act No. 36/2008., Act No.124/2008, Act No. 254/2008., Act No. 281/2009., Act No. 285/2009., Act No. 295/2009., Act No. 145/2010., Act No. 156/2010., Act No. 41/2011., Act No. 92/2011., Act No. 136/2011. (part), Act No. 139/2011., Act No. 357/2011., Act No. 428/2011. and Act No. 227/2013.
  • Act on the Magyar Nemzeti Bank, LX of 1991., CXXIX of 1996., LVIII of 2001., CCVIII of 2011.
  • Act on the National Bank of Poland of January 31, 1989, Act on August 29, 1997.
  • Act on the National Bank of Slovakia, No. 566/1992, amended by No. 26/1993, Act No. 159/1993, Act No. 249/1994, Act No. 374/1994, Act No. 202/1995, Act No. 118/1996, Act No. 386/1996, Act No. 348/1999, Act No. 149/2001., Act No. 602/2003, Act No. 747/2004, Act No. 519/2005. and Act No. 659/2007
  • Law on the Bank of Latvia, with amendments passed by the Saeima of the Republic of Latvia on June 18, 1997, on October 29, 1998, on November 4, 1999, on June 1, 2000, on October 25, 2001, on June 20, 2002, on December 1, 2005, on June 15, 2006, on October 8, 2009, and on January 10, 2013.
  • Law on the Bank of Lithuania, adopted by Seimas 12.01.1994., amended 03.13.2001., amended 04.15.2004., issues 04.25.2006., issues 12.02.2009., issues 12.10.2009., issues 04.14.2011., issues 12.15.2011Law on the Bulgarian National Bank
  • Law on the Bulgarian National Bank, published in the Darjaven Vestnik, issue 46 of 10 June 1997; amended, issues 49 and 153 of 1998; issues 20 and 54 of 1999; issue 109 of 2001; issue 45 of 2002; issues 10 and 39 of 2005; issues 37 and 59 of 2006: in force on the date of entry into force of the Treaty of Accession of the Republic of Bulgaria to the European Union; issue 108 of 2006; issues 52 and 59 of 2007; amended, issues 24, 42 and 44 of 2009; amended; issues 97 and 101 of 2010
  • Law on the Central Bank of the Republic of Estonia, passed on May 18, 1993, April 05, 1994, June 18, 1998, January 26, 1999, June 06, 2001, June 13, 2001, June 12, 2002, January 22, 2003, January 29, 2003, June 07, 2006, January 25, 2007, Mart 12, 2008, April 22, 2010, October 28, 2010, December 15, 2011
  • Law on the Statute of the National Bank of Romania No. 34/1991, Law No. 101/1998, Law No. 312/2004
  • Treaty on European Union. (1992).

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