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Special Issue: Beyond Responsibility vs. Responsiveness: Reconfigurations of EU Economic Governance in Response to Crises. Guest Editors: Crespy, Amandine; Moreira Ramalho, Tiago; Schmidt, Vivien

The ECB and the inflation monsters: strategic framing and the responsibility imperative (1998–2023)

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Pages 999-1025 | Received 02 May 2023, Accepted 30 Oct 2023, Published online: 19 Nov 2023

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