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Special Issue: Beyond Responsibility vs. Responsiveness: Reconfigurations of EU Economic Governance in Response to Crises. Guest Editors: Crespy, Amandine; Moreira Ramalho, Tiago; Schmidt, Vivien

Responsible judges or judging responsibilities? EU Court of Justice, Bundesverfassungsgericht and EU economic governance

ORCID Icon, ORCID Icon & ORCID Icon
Pages 1051-1074 | Received 01 May 2023, Accepted 17 Dec 2023, Published online: 27 Dec 2023

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