The relationship between anomalistic belief, misperception of chance and the base rate fallacy

References

• Aarnio, K., & Lindeman, M. (2005). Paranormal beliefs, education, and thinking styles. Personality and Individual Differences, 39(7), 1227–1236. doi:10.1016/j.paid.2005.04.009
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Alloy, L. B., & Tabachnik, N. (1984). Assessment of covariation by humans and animals: The joint influence of prior expectations and current situational information. Psychological Review, 91(1), 112–149. doi:10.1037//0033-295X.91.1.112
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Bar-Hillel, M. (1980). The base-rate fallacy in probability judgements. Acta Psychologica, 44(3), 211–233. doi:10.1016/0001-6918(80)90046-3
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Barbey, A., & Sloman, S. (2007). Base-rate respect: From ecological rationality to dual processes. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 30(3), 241–254. doi:10.1017/S0140525X07001653
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Blackmore, S. J., & Trościanko, T. (1985). Belief in the paranormal: Probability judgements, illusory control, and the chance baseline shift. British Journal of Psychology, 76(4), 459–468. doi:10.1111/j.2044-8295.1985.tb01969.x
   Google Scholar
• Blagrove, M., French, C. C., & Jones, G. (2006). Probabilistic reasoning, affirmative bias, and belief in precognitive dreams. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 20(1), 65–83. doi:10.1002/acp.1165
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Bouvet, R., & Bonnefon, J. -F. (2015). Non-Reflective thinkers are predisposed to attribute supernatural causation to uncanny experiences. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 41(7), 955–961. doi:10.1177/0146167215585728
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Bressan, P. (2002). The connection between random sequences, everyday coincidences, and belief in the paranormal. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 16(1), 17–34. doi:10.1002/acp.754
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Brotherton, R., & French, C. C. (2014). Belief in conspiracy theories and susceptibility to the conjunction fallacy. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 28(2), 238–248. doi:10.1002/acp.2995
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Brugger, P., Landis, T., & Regard, M. (1990). A sheep–goat effect in repetition avoidance: Extrasensory perception as an effect if subjective probability? British Journal of Psychology, 81(4), 455–468. doi:10.1111/j.2044-8295.1990.tb02372.x
   Google Scholar
• Brugger, P., Regard, M., & Landis, T. (1991). Belief in extrasensory perception and illusory control: A replication. The Journal of Psychology, 125(4), 501–502. doi:10.1080/00223980.1991.10543314
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Chapman University. (2017). Paranormal America 2017: The Chapman University survey of American fears, Wave 4. Retrieved from https://blogs.chapman.edu/wilkinson/2017/10/11/paranormal-america-2017/.
   Google Scholar
• Cohen, J., & Cohen, P. (1983). Applied multiple regression/correlation analysis for the behavioral sciences (2nd ed.). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
   Google Scholar
• Croson, R., & Sundali, J. (2005). The gambler’s fallacy and the hot hand: Empirical data from casinos. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 30(3), 195–209. doi:10.1007/s11166-005-1153-2
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Dagnall, N., Drinkwater, K., Denovan, A., Parker, A., & Rowley, K. (2016). Misperception of chance, conjunction, framing effects and belief in the paranormal: A further evaluation. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 30(3), 409–419. doi:10.1002/acp.3217
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Dagnall, N., Drinkwater, K., Parker, A., & Rowley, K. (2014). Misperception of chance, conjunction, belief in the paranormal and reality testing: A reappraisal. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 28(5), 711–719. doi:10.1002/acp.3057
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Dagnall, N., Parker, A., & Munley, G. (2007). Paranormal belief and reasoning. Personality and Individual Differences, 43, 1406–1415. doi:10.1016/j.paid.2007.04.017
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Dahl, E., Tagler, M. J., & Hohman, Z. P. (2018). Gambling and the reasoned action model: Predicting past behavior, intentions, and future behaviour. Journal of Gambling Studies, 34(1), 101–118. doi:10.1007/s10899-017-9702-6
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Dawson, E., Gilovich, T., & Regan, D. T. (2002). Motivated reasoning and performance on the Wason selection task. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 28(10), 1379–1387. doi:10.1177/014616702236869
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Denovan, A., Dagnall, N., Drinkwater, K., & Parker, A. (2018). Latent profile analysis of schizotypy and paranormal belief: Associations with probabilistic reasoning performance. Frontiers in Psychology, 9, 35. doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2018.00035
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Drinkwater, K., Dagnall, N., Denovan, A., Parker, A., & Clough, P. (2018). Predictors and associates of problem–reaction–solution: Statistical bias, emotion-based reasoning, and belief in the paranormal. SAGE Open, 8(1), 215824401876299–215824401876211. doi:10.1177/2158244018762999
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Drinkwater, K., Dagnall, N., & Parker, A. (2012). Reality testing, conspiracy theories, and paranormal beliefs. The Journal of Parapsychology, 76, 57–77.
   Google Scholar
• Fischoff, B., & Bar-Hillel, M. (1984). Diagnosticity and the base-rate effect. Memory & Cognition, 12, 402–410. doi:10.3758/BF03198301
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Fortune, E. E., & Goodie, A. S. (2012). Cognitive distortions as a component and treatment focus of pathological gambling: A review. Psychology of Addictive Behaviors, 26(2), 298–310. doi:10.1037/a0026422
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• French, C. C. (2001). Paranormal perception? A critical evaluation, monograph series No. 42. (pp. 1–24). London: Institute for Cultural Research.
   Google Scholar
• French, C. C., & Stone, A. (2014). Anomalistic psychology: Exploring paranormal belief & experience. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
   Google Scholar
• Gaissmaier, W., Wilke, A., Scheibehenne, B., McCanney, P., & Barrett, H. C. (2016). Betting on illusory patterns: Probability matching in habitual gamblers. Journal of Gambling Studies, 32(1), 143–156. doi:10.1007/s10899-015-9539-9
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Gigerenzer, G. (1991). How to make cognitive illusions disappear: Beyond “Heuristics and Biases. European Review of Social Psychology, 2(1), 83–115. doi:10.1080/14792779143000033
   Google Scholar
• Goodie, A. S., & Fortune, E. E. (2013). Measuring cognitive distortions in pathological gambling: Review and meta-analyses. Psychology of Addictive Behaviors, 27(3), 730–743. doi:10.1037/a0031892
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Griffiths, T. L., & Tenenbaum, J. B. (2007). From mere coincidences to meaningful discoveries. Cognition, 103(2), 180–226. doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2006.03.004
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Griffiths, T. L., & Tenenbaum, J. B. (2009). Theory-based causal induction. Psychological Review, 116(4), 661–716. doi:10.1037/a0017201
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Hadlaczky, G., & Westerlund, J. (2011). Sensitivity to coincidences and paranormal belief. Perceptual and Motor Skills, 113(3), 894–908. doi:10.2466/09.22.PMS.113.6.894-908
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Hertwig, R., Zangerl, M. A., Biedert, E., & Margraf, J. (2008). The public’s probabilistic numeracy: How tasks, education and exposure to games of chance shape it. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 21(4), 457–470. doi:10.1002/bdm.611
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• JASP Team. (2017). JASP (Version 0.8.1.1) [Computer software]. Retrieved from https://jasp-stats.org/download/
   Google Scholar
• Joukhador, J., Blaszczynski, A., & Maccallum, F. (2004). Superstitious beliefs in gambling among problem and non-problem gamblers: Preliminary data. Journal of Gambling Studies, 20(2), 171–180. doi:10.1023/B:JOGS.0000022308.27774.2b
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Kahan, D. M., Peters, E., Dawson, E. C., & Slovic, P. (2017). Motivated numeracy and enlightened self-government. Behavioural Public Policy, 1(1), 54–86. doi:10.1017/bpp.2016.2
   Google Scholar
• Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1972). Subjective probability: A judgment of representativeness. Cognitive Psychology, 3(3), 430–454. doi:10.1016/0010-0285(72)90016-3
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1973). On the psychology of prediction. Psychological Review, 80(4), 237–251. doi:10.1037/h0034747
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Kareev, Y. (1995). Positive bias in the perception of covariation. Psychological Review, 102(3), 490–502. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.102.3.490
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Kassinove, J. I. (1998). Development of the gambling attitude scales: Preliminary findings. Journal of Clinical Psychology, 54(6), 763–771. doi:10.1002/(SICI)1097-4679(199810)54:6 < 763::AID-JCLP2 > 3.0.CO;2-I
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Koehler, J. J. (1996). The base rate fallacy reconsidered: Descriptive, normative and methodological challenges. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 19(1), 1–53. doi:10.1017/S0140525X00041157
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Kunda, Z. (1990). The case for motivated reasoning. Psychological Bulletin, 108(3), 480–498. doi:10.1037/0033-2909.108.3.480
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Leonard, C. A., & Williams, R. J. (2019). Fallacious beliefs: Gambling specific and belief in the paranormal. Canadian Journal of Behavioural Science/Revue Canadienne Des Sciences du Comportement, 51(1), 1–11. doi:10.1037/cbs0000113
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Lopes, L. L., & Oden, G. C. (1987). Distinguishing between random and nonrandom events. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 13, 392–400. doi:10.1037//0278-7393.13.3.392
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Markovits, H. (1986). Familiarity effects in conditional reasoning. Journal of Educational Psychology, 78(6), 492–494. doi:10.1037/0022-0663.78.6.492
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Markovits, H., & Vachon, R. (1990). Conditional reasoning, representation, and level of abstraction. Developmental Psychology, 26(6), 942–951. doi:10.1037//0012-1649.26.6.942
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• McInnes, A., Hodgins, D. C., & Holub, A. (2014). The gambling cognitions inventory: Scale development and psychometric validation with problem and pathological gamblers. International Gambling Studies, 14(3), 410–431. doi:10.1080/14459795.2014.923483
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• McKenzie, C. R. M. (2006). Increased sensitivity to differentially diagnostic answers using familiar materials: Implications for confirmation bias. Memory & Cognition, 34, 577–588. doi:10.3758/BF03193581
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Medin, D. L., & Edelson, S. M. (1988). Problem structure and the use of base-rate information from experience. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 117(1), 68–85. doi:10.1037/0096-3445.117.1.68
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Moore, D. W. (2005). Three in four Americans believe in paranormal. Gallup News Service. Retrieved from http://www.gallup.com/poll/16915/Three-Four-Americans-Believe-Paranormal.aspx
   Google Scholar
• Moore, S. M., & Ohtsuka, K. (1999). The prediction of gambling behavior and problem gambling from attitudes and perceived norms. Social Behavior and Personality: An International Journal, 27(5), 455–466. doi:10.2224/sbp.1999.27.5.455
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Morris, R., & Griffiths, M. D. (2013). The relationship between gambling affinity, impulsivity, sensation seeking, superstition, and irrational beliefs: An empirical study among committed gamblers. Aloma: Revista de Psicologia, Ciències de l’Educació i de l’Esport, 31, 109–121.
   Google Scholar
• Musch, J., & Ehrenberg, K. (2002). Probability misjudgment, cognitive ability, and belief in the paranormal. British Journal of Psychology, 93(2), 169–177. doi:10.1348/000712602162517
   PubMedGoogle Scholar
• Oskarsson, T., Van Boven, L., McClelland, G. H., & Hastie, R. (2009). What’s next? Judging sequences of binary events. Psychological Bulletin, 135(2), 262–285. doi:10.1037/a0014821
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Passanisi, A., Craparo, G., & Pace, U. (2017). Magical thinking and decision-making strategies among late adolescent regular gamblers: A mediation model. Journal of Adolescence, 59, 51–58. doi:10.1016/j.adolescence.2017.05.016
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Pennycook, G., Fugelsang, J. A., & Koehler, D. J. (2012). Are we good at detecting conflict during reasoning? Cognition, 124(1), 101–106. doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2012.04.004
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Prike, T., Arnold, M. M., & Williamson, P. (2017). Psychics, aliens, or experience? Using the anomalistic belief scale to examine the relationship between type of belief and probabilistic reasoning. Consciousness and Cognition, 53, 151–164. doi:10.1016/j.concog.2017.06.003
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Prike, T., Arnold, M. M., & Williamson, P. (2018). The relationship between anomalistic belief and biases of evidence integration and jumping to conclusions. Acta Psychologica, 190, 217–227. doi:10.1016/j.actpsy.2018.08.006
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Qualtrics. (2017). Qualtrics [computer software]. Provo, Utah, USA.
   Google Scholar
• Riekki, T., Lindeman, M., Aleneff, M., Halme, A., & Nuortimo, A. (2013). Paranormal and religious believers are more prone to illusory face perception than skeptics and non-believers. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 27(2), 150–155. doi:10.1002/acp.2874
   Google Scholar
• Roberts, M. J., & Seager, P. B. (1999). Predicting belief in paranormal phenomena: A comparison of conditional and probabilistic reasoning. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 13(5), 443–450. doi:10.1002/(SICI)1099-0720(199910)13:5 < 443::AID-ACP592 > 3.0.CO;2-K
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Rogers, P., Davis, T., & Fisk, J. (2009). Paranormal belief and susceptibility to the conjunction fallacy. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 23(4), 524–542. doi:10.1002/acp.1472
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Rogers, P., Fisk, J. E., & Lowrie, E. (2016). Paranormal believers’ susceptibility to confirmatory versus disconfirmatory conjunctions. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 30(4), 628–634. doi:10.1002/acp.3222
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Rogers, P., Fisk, J. E., & Lowrie, E. (2018). Paranormal belief, thinking style preference and susceptibility to confirmatory conjunction errors. Consciousness and Cognition, 65, 182–196. doi:10.1016/j.concog.2018.07.013
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Rogers, P., Fisk, J. E., & Wiltshire, D. (2011). Paranormal belief, conjunction and confirmation biases. The role of constituent relatedness in paranormal believers’ susceptibility to the conjunction fallacy. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 25(5), 692–702. doi:10.1002/acp.1732
   Google Scholar
• Ross, R. M., Hartig, B., & McKay, R. (2017). Analytic cognitive style predicts paranormal explanations of anomalous experiences but not the experiences themselves: Implications for cognitive theories of delusions. Journal of Behavior Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry, 56, 90–96. doi:10.1016/j.jbtep.2016.08.018
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Ruscher, J. B. (n.d.). Repeated measures multiple regression. Retrieved from http://www.tulane.edu/∼PsycStat/ruscher/Psyc611/rmmr.pdf
   Google Scholar
• Sanchez, C., & Dunning, D. (2018). Overconfidence among beginners: Is a little learning a dangerous thing? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 114(1), 10–28. doi:10.1037/pspa0000102
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Schulter, G., & Papousek, I. (2008). Believing in paranormal phenomena: Relations to asymmetry of body and brain. Cortex, 44(10), 1326–1335. doi:10.1016/j.cortex.2007.08.022
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Shannon-Missal, L. (2013). Americans’ belief in god, miracles and heaven declines. Harris Interactive. Retrieved from http://www.theharrispoll.com/health-and-life/Americans__Belief_in_God__Miracles_and_Heaven_Declines.html
   Google Scholar
• Siegrist, M., & Keller, C. (2011). Natural frequencies and Bayesian reasoning: The impact of formal education and problem context. Journal of Risk Research, 14(9), 1039–1055. doi:10.1080/13669877.2011.571786
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Simmonds-Moore, C. (2014). Exploring the perceptual biases associated with believing and disbelieving in paranormal phenomena. Consciousness and Cognition, 28, 30–46. doi:10.1016/j.concog.2014.06.004
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Stanovich, K. E., West, R. F., & Toplak, M. E. (2013). Myside bias, rational thinking, and intelligence. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 22(4), 259–264. doi:10.1177/0963721413480174
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Steiger, J. H. (1980). Tests for comparing elements of a correlation matrix. Psychological Bulletin, 87(2), 245–251. doi:10.1037/0033-2909.87.2.245
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Thalbourne, M. A., & Delin, P. S. (1993). A new instrument for measuring the sheep–goat variable: Its psychometric properties and factor structure. Journal of the Society for Psychical Research, 59, 172–186. Retrieved from http://www.spr.ac.uk/page/spr-publications-parapsychology
   Google Scholar
• Tobacyk, J. J. (2004). A revised paranormal belief scale. International Journal of Transpersonal Studies, 23(1), 94–99. Retrieved from http://www.transpersonalstudies.org/ doi:10.24972/ijts.2004.23.1.94
   Google Scholar
• Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1974). Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases. Science, 185(4157), 1124–1131. doi:10.1126/science.185.4157.1124
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Van Prooijen, J. W., Douglas, K. M., & De Inocencio, C. (2018). Connecting the dots: Illusory pattern perception predicts belief in conspiracies and the supernatural. European Journal of Social Psychology, 48(3), 320–335. doi:10.1002/ejsp.2331
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Wagenaar, W. A. (1970). Subjective randomness and the capacity to generate information. Acta Psychologica, 33, 233–242. doi:10.1016/0001-6918(70)90135-6
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Wagenmakers, E. J. (2007). A practical solution to the pervasive problems of p values. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 14(5), 779–804. doi:10.3758/BF03194105
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Wierzbicki, M. (1985). Reasoning errors and belief in the paranormal. The Journal of Social Psychology, 125(4), 489–494. doi:10.1080/00224545.1985.9713529
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Wilke, A., Scheibehenne, B., Gaissmaier, W., McCanney, P., & Barrett, H. C. (2014). Illusionary pattern detection in habitual gamblers. Evolution and Human Behavior, 35(4), 291–297. doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2014.02.010
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Wiseman, R., & Watt, C. (2006). Belief in psychic ability and the misattribution hypothesis: A qualitative review. British Journal of Psychology, 97(3), 323–338. doi:10.1348/000712605X72523
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Xu, J., & Harvey, N. (2014). Carry on winning: The gamblers’ fallacy creates hot hand effects in online gambling. Cognition, 131(2), 173–180. doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2014.01.002
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Yakovenko, I., Hodgins, D. C., el-Guebaly, N., Casey, D. M., Currie, S. R., Smith, G. J., … Schopflocher, D. P. (2016). Cognitive distortions predict future gambling involvement. International Gambling Studies, 16(2), 175–192. doi:10.1080/14459795.2016.1147592
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar