Further thoughts about a Frankfurt-style argument

References

• Fischer , J. M. 1994 . The Metaphysics of Free Will , Oxford : Blackwell Publishers .
   Google Scholar
• Fischer , J. M. , Kane , R. , Pereboom , D. and Vargas , M. 2007 . Four Views on Free Will , Oxford : Blackwell Publishers .
   Google Scholar
• Frankfurt , H. 1969 . Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility . Journal of Philosophy , 66 : 829 – 39 .
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Ginet , C. 1996 . In Defense of the Principle of Alternative Possibilities: Why I Don't Find Frankfurt's Arguments Convincing . Philosophical Perspectives , 10 : 403 – 17 .
   Google Scholar
• Ginet , C. 2000 . The Epistemic Requirements for Moral Responsibility . Philosophical Perspectives , 14 : 266 – 77 .
   Google Scholar
• Ginet , C. 2002 . Review of “Living without Free Will” . Journal of Ethics , 6 : 305 – 9 .
   Google Scholar
• Hunt , D. 2000 . Moral Responsibility and Unavoidable Action . Philosophical Studies , 97 : 195 – 227 .
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Hunt , D. 2005 . Moral Responsibility and Buffered Alternatives . Midwest Studies in Philosophy , 29 : 126 – 45 .
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Moya , C. 2006 . Moral Responsibility: The Ways of Skepticism , Oxford : Oxford University Press .
   Google Scholar
• Otsuka , M. 1998 . Incompatibilism and the Avoidability of Blame . Ethics , 108 : 685 – 701 .
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Nelkin , D. Rational Agency, Responsibility, and Freedom , manuscript
   Google Scholar
• Pereboom , D. 1995 . Determinism ‘Al Dente’ . NoÛs , 29 : 21 – 45 .
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Pereboom , D. 2000 . Alternative Possibilities and Causal Histories . Philosophical Perspectives , 14 : 119 – 37 .
   Google Scholar
• Pereboom , D. 2001 . Living Without Free Will , Cambridge : Cambridge University Press .
   Google Scholar
• Pereboom , D. 2003 . “ Source Incompatibilism and Alternative Possibilities ” . In Freedom, Responsibility, and Agency: Essays on the Importance of Alternative Possibilities , Edited by: McKenna , M. and Widerker , D. 185 – 99 . Aldershot, , U.K : Ashgate Press .
   Google Scholar
• Pereboom , D. 2005 . Defending Hard Incompatibilism . Midwest Studies , 29 : 228 – 47 .
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Pereboom , D. 2008 . “ Defending Hard Incompatibilism Again ” . In Essays on Free Will and Moral Responsibility , Edited by: Trakakis , Nick and Cohen , Daniel . 1 – 33 . Newcastle : Cambridge Scholars Press .
   Google Scholar
• Widerker , D. 1995 . Libertarianism and Frankfurt's Attack on the Principle of Alternative Possibilities . The Philosophical Review , 104 : 247 – 61 .
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Widerker , D. 2000 . Frankfurt's Attack on Alternative Possibilities . Philosophical Perspectives , 14 : 181 – 201 .
   Google Scholar
• Widerker , D. 2006 . Libertarianism and the Philosophical Significance of Frankfurt Scenarios . Journal of Philosophy , 103 : 163 – 87 .
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar