On knowing one's own resistant beliefs

References

• Alston, W. 1988. “The Deontological Conception of Epistemic Justification.” Philosophical Perspectives 2: 257–299. doi: 10.2307/2214077
   Google Scholar
• Armstrong, D. M. [1968] 1994. “Introspection.” In Self-knowledge, edited by Q. Cassam, 109–117. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Bar-On, D. 2004. Speaking My Mind: Expression and Self-knowledge. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
   Google Scholar
• Blair, I. V. 2002. “The Malleability of Automatic Stereotypes and Prejudice.” Personality and Social Psychology Review 6 (3): 242–261. doi: 10.1207/S15327957PSPR0603_8
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Borgoni, C. 2014. “Dissonance and Irrationality: A Criticism of the In-between Account of Dissonance Cases.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly. doi:10.1111/papq.12039.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Borgoni, C. 2015. “Dissonance and Moorean Propositions.” Dialectica. doi:10.1111/1746-8361.12095.
   Google Scholar
• Bortolotti, L. 2010. Delusions and Other Irrational Beliefs. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Boyle, M. 2011. “Transparent Self-knowledge.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary 85: 223–241. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-8349.2011.00204.x
   Google Scholar
• Broughton, J. 2008. “Self-Knowledge.” In A Companion to Descartes, edited by J. Broughton and John Carriero, 179–195. Oxford: Blackwell.
   Google Scholar
• Burge, T. [2007] 2011. “Self and Self-understanding.” The Journal of Philosophy CVIII (6/7): 287–383.
   Google Scholar
• Carruthers, P. 2011. The Opacity of Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Cassam, Q. 2010. “Judging, Believing and Thinking.” Philosophical Issues 20 (1): 80–95. doi: 10.1111/j.1533-6077.2010.00179.x
   Google Scholar
• Cassam, Q. 2011. “Knowing What You Believe.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111: 1–23. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9264.2011.00296.x
   Google Scholar
• Cavell, M. 2006. Becoming a Subject: Reflections in Philosophy and Psychoanalysis. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Dasgupta, N., and A. G. Greenwald. 2001. “On the Malleability of Automatic Attitudes: Combating Automatic Prejudice with Images of Admired and Disliked Individuals.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 81 (5): 800–814. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.81.5.800
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Davidson, D. [1984] 2001. “First Person Authority.” In Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, edited by D. Davidson, 3–14. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
   Google Scholar
• Davidson, D. [1985] 2004. “Incoherence and Irrationality”. In Problems of Rationality, edited by D. Davidson, 189–198. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
   Google Scholar
• Evans, G. 1982. The Varieties of Reference. New York: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Finkelstein, D. 1999. “On the Distinction Between Conscious and Unconscious States of Mind.” American Philosophical Quarterly 36: 79–100.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Finkelstein, D. 2008. Expression and the Inner. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Gendler, T. 2008. “Alief and Belief.” The Journal of Philosophy 105: 634–663.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Gertler, B. 2011. “Self-knowledge and the Transparency of Belief”. In Self-knowledge, edited by A. Hatzimoysis, 125–145. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Hieronymi, P. 2006. “Controlling Attitudes.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87: 45–74. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2006.00247.x
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Hieronymi, P. 2009. “Two Kinds of Agency.” In Mental Actions, edited by L. O'Brien and M. Soteriou, 138–162. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Hunter, D. 2011. “Alienated Belief.” Dialectica 65 (2): 221–240. doi: 10.1111/j.1746-8361.2011.01269.x
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Moran, R. 2001. Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self-knowledge. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Peacocke, C. 1998. “Conscious Attitudes, Attention, and Self-knowledge.” In Knowing Our Own Minds, edited by C. Wright, B. Smith, and C. MacDonald, 63–98. Oxford: Oxford Clarendon Press.
   Google Scholar
• Rowbottom, D. P. 2007. “‘In-between Believing’ and Degrees of Belief.” Teorema 26: 131–137.
   Google Scholar
• Russell, B. 1912. The Problems of Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Ryle, G. 1949. The Concept of the Mind. London: Routledge.
   Google Scholar
• Schwitzgebel, E. 2010. “Acting Contrary to Our Professed Beliefs, or the Gulf Between Occurrent Judgment and Dispositional Belief.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (4): 531–553. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2010.01381.x
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Shoemaker, S. 1994. “Self-knowledge and “Inner Sense”.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (2): 271–290. doi: 10.2307/2108489
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Wittgenstein, L. 1953. Philosophical Investigations. Translated by G. E. M. Anscombe. New York: Macmillan.
   Google Scholar
• Wright, C. [1989] 2003. “Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy of Mind: Sensation, Privacy and Intention.” In Privileged Access: Philosophical Accounts of Self-knowledge, edited by B. Gertler, 147–157. Aldershot: Asghate.
   Google Scholar
• Wright, C. 1998. “Self-knowledge: The Wittgensteinian Legacy.” In Knowing Our Own Minds, edited by C. Wright, B. Smith, and C. MacDonald, 13–45. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
   Google Scholar