Self-knowledge about attitudes: rationalism meets interpretation

References

• Bayne, T., and M. Montague, eds. 2011. Cognitive Phenomenology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Bilgrami, A. 2006. Self-Knowledge and Resentment. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Block, N. 1997. “On a Confusion about a Function of Conscience.” In The Nature of Consciousness. Philosophical Debates, edited by N. Block, O. Flanagan, and G. Güzeldere, 375–415. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
   Google Scholar
• Boyle, M. 2009. “Two Kinds of Self-Knowledge.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (1): 133–164. doi: 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2008.00235.x
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Burge, T. 1996. “Our Entitlement to Self-Knowledge.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96: 91–116.
   Google Scholar
• Byrne, A. 2011. “Transparency, Belief, Intention.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 85 (1): 201–221. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-8349.2011.00203.x
   Google Scholar
• Byrne, A. 2012. “ Review of the Opacity of Mind, by Peter Carruthers.” Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2012.05.11. Accessed November 9, 2014. https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/30799-the-opacity-of-mind-an-integrative-theory-of-self-knowledge/.
   Google Scholar
• Carruthers, P. 2009. “How We Know Our Own Minds: The Relationship Between Mindreading and Metacognition.” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (2): 121–182. doi: 10.1017/S0140525X09000545
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Carruthers, P. 2011. The Opacity of Mind. An Integrative Theory of Self-Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Cassam, Q. 2010. “Judging, Believing and Thinking.” Philosophical Issues 20 (1): 80–95. doi: 10.1111/j.1533-6077.2010.00179.x
   Google Scholar
• Churchland, P. 1999. Matter and Consciousness: A Contemporary Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind. Revised edn. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
   Google Scholar
• Crimmins, M. 1992. “Tacitness and Virtual Beliefs.” Mind and Language 7 (3): 240–263. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0017.1992.tb00207.x
   Google Scholar
• Gertler, B. 2011a. Self-Knowledge. Abingdon, NY: Routledge.
   Google Scholar
• Gertler, B. 2011b. “Self-Knowledge and the Transparency of Belief.” In Self-Knowledge, edited by A. Hatzimoysis, 125–145. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Goldman, A. 2006. Simulating Minds. The Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience of Mindreading. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Gopnik, A. 1993. “How We Know Our Minds: The Illusion of First-Person Knowledge of Intentionality.” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1): 1–14. doi: 10.1017/S0140525X00028636
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Heavey, C. L., and R. T. Hurlburt. 2008. “The Phenomena of Inner Experience.” Consciousness and Cognition 17 (3): 798–810. doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2007.12.006
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Horgan, T., and J. Tienson. 2002. “The Intentionality of Phenomenology and the Phenomenology of Intentionality.” In Philosophy of Mind. Classical and Contemporary Readings, edited by D. Chalmers, 520–533. New York: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Kriegel, U. 2011. The Sources of Intentionality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Martin, J.-R., and E. Pacherie. 2013. “Out of Nowhere: Thought Insertion, Ownership and Context Integration.” Consciousness and Cognition 22 (1): 111–122. doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2012.11.012
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• McGeer, V. 1996. “Is ‘Self-Knowledge’ An Empirical Problem? Renegotiating the Space of Philosophical Explanation.” The Journal of Philosophy 93 (10): 483–515. doi: 10.2307/2940837
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Moran, R. 2001. Authority and Estrangement. An Essay on Self-Knowledge. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Nichols, S., and Stich, S. 2003. Mindreading. An Integrated Account of Pretence, Self-Awareness, and Understanding Other Minds. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
   Google Scholar
• Peacocke, C. 2008. Truly Understood. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Pitt, D. 2004. “The Phenomenology of Cognition Or: What Is It Like to Think That P?” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (1): 1–36. doi: 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2004.tb00382.x
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Pitt, D. 2011. “Introspection, Phenomenality, and the Availability of Intentional Content.” In Cognitive Phenomenology, edited by T. Bayne and M. Montague, 141–173. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Rosenthal, D. 2005. Consciousness and Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Shah, N., and J. D. Velleman. 2005. “Doxastic Deliberation.” The Philosophical Review 114 (4): 497–534. doi: 10.1215/00318108-114-4-497
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Shoemaker, S. 1996. “Self-Knowledge and ‘Inner Sense’.” In The First-Person Perspective and Other Essays, 201–268. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
   Google Scholar