The simple constitutivist move

References

• Bachman, Z. 2018. “Moral Rationalism and the Normativity of Constitutive Principles.” Philosophia 46: 1–19. doi: 10.1007/s11406-017-9893-1
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Baker, D. 2017. “The Varieties of Normativity.” In The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics, edited by T. McPherson and D. Plunkett, 567–581. Abingdon: Routledge.
   Google Scholar
• Bertea, S. 2013. “Constitutivism And Normativity: A Qualified Defense.” Philosophical Explorations 16 (1): 81–95. doi: 10.1080/13869795.2013.738304
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Bratman, M. 2018. Planning, Time, and Self-Governance. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Côté-Bouchard, C. 2016. “Can The Aim Of Belief Ground Epistemic Normativity?” Philosophical Studies 173 (12): 3181–3198. doi: 10.1007/s11098-016-0657-8
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Enoch, D. 2006. “Agency, Shmagency: Why Normativity Won’t Come From What Is Constitutive of Action.” The Philosophical Review 115: 169–198. doi: 10.1215/00318108-2005-014
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Enoch, D. 2011. “Shmagency Revisited.” In New Waves in Metaethics, edited by M. Brady, 208–233. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
   Google Scholar
• Ferrero, L. 2009. “Constitutivism and the Inescapability of Agency.” Oxford Studies in Metaethics 4: 303–333.
   Google Scholar
• Ferrero, L. 2018. “Inescapability Revisited.” Manuscrito 41: 113–158. doi: 10.1590/0100-6045.2018.v41n4.lf
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Fix, J. n.d. “Two Kinds of Constitutivism.”.
   Google Scholar
• Flowerree, A. K. 2018. “Epistemic Shmagency?” In Metaepistemology: Realism & Antirealism, edited by C. Kyriacou and R. McKenna, 289–310. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
   Google Scholar
• Horst, D. n.d. “In Defense of Constitutivism about Epistemic Normativity”.
   Google Scholar
• Huddleston, A. 2016. “Normativity and the Will to Power: Challenges for a Nietzschean Constitutivism.” Journal of Nietzsche Studies 47 (3): 435–456. doi: 10.5325/jnietstud.47.3.0435
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Katsafanas, P. 2013. Agency and the Foundations of Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Katsafanas, P. 2018. “Constitutivism About Practical Reasons.” In Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity, edited by D. Star, 367–393. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Kolodny, N. 2005. “Why Be Rational?” Mind; A Quarterly Review of Psychology and Philosophy 114 (455): 509–563. doi: 10.1093/mind/fzi509
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Korsgaard, C. M. 1997. “The Normativity of Instrumental Reason.” In Ethics and Practical Reason, edited by G. Cullity and B. Gaut, 215–254. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
   Google Scholar
• Korsgaard, C. M. 2009. Self-Constitution: Agency, Identity, and Integrity. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Lavin, D. 2017. “Forms of Rational Agency.” Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 80: 171–193. doi: 10.1017/S1358246117000091
   Google Scholar
• Leech, J. 2015. ““Logic and the Laws of Thought.” Philosophers’ Imprint 15 (12): 1–27.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Lindeman, K. 2017. “Constitutivism Without Normative Thresholds.” Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 12 (3): 231–258. doi: 10.26556/jesp.v12i3.220
   Google Scholar
• Lindeman, K. n.d. “How Constitutivism Can Explain Normativity.”.
   Google Scholar
• Millgram, E. 2010. “Pluralism About Action.” In Companion Philosophy of Action, edited by T. O’Connor and C. Sandis, 90–96. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Blackwell.
   Google Scholar
• O’Hagan, E. 2014. “Shmagents, Realism and Constitutivism About Rational Norms.” Journal of Value Inquiry 48 (1): 17–31. doi: 10.1007/s10790-013-9400-2
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Paakkunainen, H. 2018. “Doing Away with the Shmagency Objection to Constitutivism.” Manuscrito 41: 431–480. doi: 10.1590/0100-6045.2018.v41n4.hp
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Railton, P. 2003. “On The Hypothetical and Non-Hypothetical in Reasoning About Belief and Action.” In Chap. 10 in Facts, Values, and Norms: Essays Toward a Morality of Consequence, 293–321. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Ridge, M. 2018. “Meeting Constitutivists Halfway.” Philosophical Studies 175 (12): 2951–2968. doi: 10.1007/s11098-017-0989-z
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Rosati, C. S. 2016. “Agents and ‘Shmagents:’ An Essay on Agency and Normativity.” In Oxford Studies in Metaethics. Vol. 11., edited by R Shafer-Landau, 183–211. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Schafer, K. 2017. “Rationality as the Capacity for Understanding.” Noûs. Advance Online Publication. doi: 10.1111/nous.12231
   Google Scholar
• Schafer, K. 2018. “Constitutivism About Reasons: Autonomy and Understanding.” In The Many Moral Rationalisms, edited by Karen Jones and Francois Schroeter, 70–90. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Silverstein, M. 2015. “The Shmagency Question.” Philosophical Studies 172 (5): 1127–1142. doi: 10.1007/s11098-014-0340-x
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Smith, M. 2015. “The Magic of Constitutivism.” American Philosophical Quarterly 522: 187–200.
   Google Scholar
• Smith, M. 2017. “Constitutivism.” In The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics, edited by T. McPherson and D. Plunkett, 371–384. Abingdon: Routledge.
   Google Scholar
• Sussman, D. 2015. “Morality, Self-Constitution, and the Limits of Integrity.” In Why Be Moral?, edited by R. Louden and B. Himmelmann, 123–140. Berlin: De Gruyter.
   Google Scholar
• Thomson, J. J. 2008. Normativity. La Salle, IL: Open Court Publishing Company.
   Google Scholar
• Tiffany, E. 2012. “Why Be an Agent?” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90: 223–233. doi: 10.1080/00048402.2011.605792
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Tubert, A. 2010. “Constitutive Arguments.” Philosophy Compass 5 (8): 656–666. doi: 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2010.00318.x
   Google Scholar
• Velleman, J. D. 2009. How We Get Along. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Walden, K. 2012. “Laws of Nature, Laws of Freedom, and the Social Construction of Normativity.” Oxford Studies in Metaethics 7: 37–79. doi: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199653492.003.0002
   Google Scholar
• Walden, K. 2018. “Practical Reason Not as Such.” Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 13 (2): 125–153. doi: 10.26556/jesp.v13i2.257
   Google Scholar
• Zanetti, L. Forthcoming. “Inescapable Hinges: Steps Towards a Transcendental Hinge Epistemology.” In Non-Evidentialist Epistemology, edited by L. Moretti, and N. Pedersen. Leiden: Brill.
   Google Scholar