- And maybe more; see, for example, A. Chaskalson, “Human Dignity as a Foundational Value of our Constitutional Order” (2000) 16 South African Journal of Human Rights 193 (discussing the South African 1996 Constitution but also referring to the African Charter of Human Rights).
- See among many examples G.P. Fletcher, “Dignity as a Constitutional Value” (1984) 22 University of Western Ontario Law Review 171.
- Comprehensive in the sense that a great number of legal domains have to do with this rise of the human dignity principle: bioethics (see, for example, J.J. Paust, “The Human Right to Die With Dignity: A Policy-Oriented Essay” (1995) 17 Human Rights Quarterly 463), constitutional law (see M.D. Goodman, “Human Dignity in Supreme Court Jurisprudence” (2006) 84 Nebraska Law Review 740), gender and law (see M. Minow, “Lawyering for Human Dignity” (2002–3) Gender Social Policy & Law 143), privacy (see J.Q. Whitman, “The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity and Liberty” (2003–4) 113 Yale Law Journal 1151), honour (see J.Q. Whitman, “Enforcing Civility and Respect: Three Societies” (1999–2000) 109 Yale Law Journal 1279).
- Not to mention the fact that Article 79 of the Basic Law prohibits any constitutional amendment that would modify Articles 1–20—thus making the human dignity principle intangible.
- J.Q. Whitman, the American leading scholar on the subject, has investigated German law thoroughly; so have others: see E.G. Eberle, “Human Dignity, Privacy and Personality in German and American Constitutional Law” (1997) 4 Utah Law Review 963.
- One could add that, as a matter of fact, the only French constitutional text that actually referred to the human dignity principle was rejected, in 1946, by a popular referendum—though certainly not for that reason as such. See Curapp, Le préambule de 1946. Antinomies juridiques et contradictions politiques (Paris, Presses universitaires de France, 1996).
- Even then, only some laws (such as the 1986 law on communication, which turns the human dignity principle into a legal restriction on freedom of speech), or judicial decisions referred to it explicitly.
- C.C., 94–343–344DC, Lois bioéthique, Rec. p. 100: human dignity is said to be a principle of constitutional value (un principe à valeur constitutionnelle).
- C.E., Ass (2 espèces), 27 octobre 1995, Ville d'Aix en Provence et Commune de Morsang sur Orge: human dignity is, along with public tranquility, security and salubrity, a legal aim of preventive police measures (such as, for example, the prohibition of a show in so much as its breaching the peace may be testified by its affecting human dignity).
- Expression by R.G. Wright, “Consenting Adults: The Problem of Enhancing Human Dignity Non- Coercively” (1995) 75 Boston University Law Review 199.
- See J.J. Paust, “Human Dignity as a Constitutional Right: A Jurisprudentially-Based Inquiry” (1984) 27 Howard Law Journal 145.
- This idea was a quite a motto of American constitutional scholarship until the early 2000s; see S.J. Wermiel, “Law and Human Dignity: The Judicial Soul of Justice Brennan” (1998) 7 William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal 223–39. See also W. Brennan, “The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratification” (1986) 27 South Texas Law Journal 443.
- 539 US 558 (2003).
- 536 US 304 (2002).
- 125 US 1183 (2005).
- See C. Jackson, “Constitutional Dialogue and Human Dignity: States and Transnational Constitutional Discourse” (2004) 65 Montana Law Review 15.
- See Goodman, supra n. 3, 743. For a global study, see J. Resnik and J. Chi-hye Suk, “Adding Insult to Injury: Questioning the Role of Dignity in Conceptions of Sovereignty” (2002–3) 55 Stanford Law Review 1921.
- The explanatory report was written by the Praesidium and considered by the authors of the stillborn 2004 treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe to be worthy of receiving binding force; see L. Burgorgue-Larsen, “Article II-112” in L. Burgorgue-Larsen, A. Levade and F. Picod (eds), Traité établissant une Constitution pour l'Europe. Commentaire article par article, Partie II (Brussels, Bruylant, 2005), 658.
- It is, indeed, hard to think of other legal concepts as widely consecrated (by norms) and celebrated (by scholars).
- D. Beyleveld and R. Brownsword, Human Dignity in Bioethics and Biolaw (Oxford University Press, 2001), 1: “One conception, ‘dignity as empowerment’ treats human rights as founded on the intrinsic dignity of humans and, characteristically, this issues in a reinforced plea that individual autonomy should be respected. The other conception, ‘human dignity as constraint’ is more concerned with human duties than with human rights.”
- C. Girard and S. Hennette-Vauchez (eds), La dignité de la personne humaine. Recherche sur un processus de juridicisation (Paris, Presses universitaires de France, 2005) insist on the importance of a third meaning of the HDP, that derives from the ancient concept of dignitas, and is all about obligations.
- For others, it is neither and should only be viewed as a virtue, an aspiration, although potentially favoured by a number of fundamental rights; see notably D. Feldman, “Human Dignity as a Legal Value” [1999] Public Law 682 (part 1) and [2000] Public Law 61 (part 2).
- For examples of the importance of the legal reference in everyday life, see notably S. Silbey and P. Ewick, The Commonplace of Law. Stories from Everyday Life (Chicago IL, University of Chicago Press, 1998).
- See A. Simonin, “L'indignité nationale: un châtiment républicain” in M-O. Baruch (ed.), Une poignée de misérables. L'épuration de la société française après la seconde guerre mondiale (Paris, Fayard, 2003), 47.
- On this historical ancestor of the HDP, Feldman writes, “this however, is not human dignity of the sort which could conceivably be treated, in a sane world, as a fundamental value or as capable of generating a fundamental constitutional right”: supra n. 22, Part 1, 687.
- My translation. For a presentation and analysis of many of the 1940–44 constitutional drafts in France, see E. Le Floch, Les projets constitutionnels de Vichy, unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Paris II, 2003.
- J.Q. Whitman, “On Nazi ‘Honour’ and the New European ‘Dignity’” in C. Joerges and N.S. Ghaleigh (eds), Darker Legacies of Law in Europe. The Shadow of National-Socialism and Fascism over Europe and its Legal Traditions (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2003), 243–66. The author continues: “To be sure, there are prominent aspects of the contemporary law of ‘dignity’ or ‘human dignity’ that are best understood as the products of a reaction against fascist- era coldbloodedness [enumeration follows]. Yet at the same time, the unpalatable truth is that certain other prominent aspects of the contemporary European law of dignity rest on practices whose histories reach well back into the fascist period, and even into the Nazi darkness [the protection of personality, or the regularised probation categories of German law are cited here]...” And further: “These facts do indeed tell us something really important about real continuities between the Nazi era and the German world of today. ‘Dignity’ as it is protected in contemporary German law is not just the product of a reaction against Nazism; seen in proper sociological perspective, ‘dignity’ as it is protected today, is the product of an evolution that partly took place during the fascist era”, 243–5.
- See among publications by A. Honneth, “Recognition and Justice: Outline of a Plural Theory of Justice” (2004) 47 Acta Sociologica 351; see also C. Taylor, Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition (Princeton NJ, Princeton University Press, 1992).
- See, for example, Fletcher, supra n. 2.
- See Beyleveld and Brownsword, supra n. 20, 53: “Kantian thinking can be invoked to give support not only to one of the foundational axioms of human dignity as empowerment but also to one of the more problematic aspects of human dignity as constraint.”
- Let us observe that the word “only” is often left aside when reference is made to the imperative.
- See D. Capitant, Les effets juridiques des droits fondamentaux en Allemagne (Paris, Librairie Générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence, 2001); O. Jouanjan, “La théorie allemande des droits fondamentaux” (1998) Actualité juridique droit administratif 44.
- The French Déclaration des droits de l'homme et du citoyen (1789), notably because it ignored duties and only proclaimed rights, constituted the starting point of the late 18th century contra-revolutionary tradition in political philosophy as illustrated notably by the work of Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France (first published 1790) (London, Penguin Classics, 1982).
- The preamble states: “Enjoyment of these rights entails responsibilities and duties with regard to other persons, to the human community and to future generations.” For a critique, see O. Cayla, “La négation de toute possible identité européenne par la Charte européenne des droits fondamentaux” in G. Lebreton (ed.), Regards critiques sur l'évolution des droits fondamentaux de la personne humaine en 1999 et 2000 (Paris, L'Harmattan, 2002), 103–13.
- For a somewhat more detailed investigation, see S. Hennette-Vauchez, “Kant contre Jéhovah? Refus de soins et dignité de la personne humaine” (2004) Recueil Dalloz 3154.
- Citizens' Rights and New Technologies: A European Challenge. Report of the European Group on Ethics on the Charter on Fundamental Rights related to technological innovation, 23 May 2000, 11 http://ec.europa.eu/european_group_ethics/docs/prodi_en.pdf (last visited 13 April 2007): “According to some people, all rights and freedoms stem from dignity, as an inherent value of the human person. Thus ideally there should be no conflict between dignity and freedom. But it cannot be denied that there are conflicts between these ideas in the current debate. The bioethical discussion in particular illustrates this kind of conflict in a wide range of issues such as abortion and euthanasia. The Group believes that clearly associating the ideas of dignity and freedom is the best way to ensure that the principle of dignity does not lead to an authoritarian society. In associating dignity and freedom, the Group underlines the necessity to debate what appears contrary to dignity according to society and to the person concerned.”
- My addition.
- In particular, one cannot fail to be delighted that it is the first time “biomedical issues” appear in a general text on human rights, which signifies that those issues are no longer specialised but are considered as they ought to be, ie as a matter of fundamental rights.
- On this perspective, regarding the European Charter as such, see P. Pescatore, “La coopération entre la cour communautaire, les juridictions nationales et la cour européenne des droits de l'homme dans la protection des droits fondamentaux. Enquête sur un problème virtuel” (2003) 466 Revue du marché commun et de l'union européenne 151; regarding international human rights norms, see C. Girard, “L'universalisation à visage humain?” in S. Hennette- Vauchez (ed.), Bioéthique, biodroit, biopolitique. Réflexions à l'occasion du vote de la Loi du 6 août 2004 (Paris, Librairie Générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence, 2006), 51.
- Feldman, supra n. 22, Part 1, 688.
- See S. Hennette-Vauchez, “Commentaire de l'article II-64” in L. Burguorgue-Larsen et al, supra n. 18, 52; and also S. Michalowski, “Health Care Law” in S. Peers and A. Ward, The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Politics, Law and Policy (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2004), 287, both on the irrelevance of Art. 3 since the rights it proclaims fall outside the scope of EU law and on the restrictive and conservative dimension of those rights conveyed by the objective vision of human dignity.
- ECJ, 9 October 2001, C-377/98, Kingdom of the Netherlands v European Parliament.
- Ibid, §77.
- For a criticism of this aspect of the decision, see C. Maubernard, “Le droit fondamental à la dignité humaine en droit communautaire” (2003) 54 Revue trimestrielle des droits de l'homme 491.
- ECJ, 1st chamber, 14 October 2004, Omega Spielhallen v Oberbürgermeiseterin der Bundesstadt Bonn.
- See §34, quoted below at n. 48.
- See the final ruling: “Community law does not preclude an economic activity consisting of the commercial exploitation of games simulating acts of homicide from being made subject to a national prohibition measure adopted on grounds of protecting public policy by reason of the fact that that activity is an affront to human dignity.”
- See §34 of the decision: “As the Advocate General argues in paragraphs 82 to 91 of her Opinion, the Community legal order undeniably strives to ensure respect for human dignity as a general principle of law. There can therefore be no doubt that the objective of protecting human dignity is compatible with Community law, it being immaterial in that respect that, in Germany, the principle of respect for human dignity has a particular status as an independent fundamental right.” And despite the final ruling (see supra n. 42), it can be inferred from the decision that it is left to the discretion of the Member States to determine whether given activities conflict with the HDP.
- Some authors say “heteromorpheous”: see C. Kombos, “Fundamental Rights and Fundamental Freedoms: A Symbiosis” (2006) 12 European Public Law 433.
- See for example M.K. Bulterman and H.R. Kranenborg, “What if Rules on Free Movement and Human Rights Collide? About Laser Games and Human Dignity: The Omega Case” (2006) 31 European Law Review 93, 101: “The ECJ could have done more than just paying lip service to the necessity and proportionality tests.” See also T. Ackerman, comment in (2005) 42 Common Market Law Review, 1107, who acknowledges the fact that despite the apparent inclusion of the HDP in EC law—throughout its appraisal as a matter of public policy—what it really comes down to is “taking national value judgments as a basis as long as the underlying conceptions vary between Member States”.
- See for such an interpretation of the Omega decision Ackerman, ibid, 1116.
- C-112/00, Schmidberger v Austria, 2003 ECR I-5659. For an analysis on the differences between the Omega and Schmidberger decisions, see also Bulterman and Kranenborg, supra n. 50.
- Indeed, although the ECJ in the Omega case made it clear that the HDP was a principle of European law— thus apparently avoiding a So Lange-type hypothetical conflict between national and European norms—uncertainty remains for at least two reasons. First, the Court does not justify (nor, hence, does it convince) that the HDP belongs to the European legal order. Second, it certainly falls short of giving a European meaning to the principle and merely ratifies the—specific—German meaning that was attached to it in the challenged decision.
- D. Birnbacher, “Ambiguities in the Concept of Menschenwürde” in K. Bayertz (ed.), The Sanctity of Life and Human Dignity (Dordrecht, Kluwer Academic Press, 1996), 107, 109.
- Now medical finality.
- See for example earlier cases such as C.E., 27 January 1982, Benhamou (physician's compliance with a patient's refusal of treatment does not lead to liability because the survival of the patient was not at stake) or C.E., 29 July 1994, Garnier (a disciplinary sanction is not illegal although the physician was only respecting his patient's refusal of chemotherapy when prescribing homeopathic (illusory?) treatments). For a more thorough analysis, see S. Hennette-Vauchez, “French Report” in M. Adams, J. Griffiths and H. Meyers, Euthanasia and Law in Europe (Oxford, Hart Publishing, forthcoming 2008).
- C.A.A. Paris, 9 June 1998 (administrative court of appeal).
- The commissaire du gouvernement in the administrative courts in France delivers his opinion before the judges and gives his opinion (conclusions) as to what should be ruled.
- M. Heers, conclusions, C.A.A. Paris, 9 June 1998 (1998) 6 Revue française de droit administratif, 1231– 42.
- See C.E., 26 October 2001; C.E., 16 August 2002.
- This is all the more striking since it appears that one of the legislator's aims when passing the 4 March 2002 law was precisely to prevent such court decisions.
- See Girard and Hennette-Vauchez, supra n. 21.
- H. Kuhse, “Is there a Tension between Autonomy and Dignity?” in P. Kemp, J. Rendtorff (eds), Bioethics and Biolaw, vol. ii, Four Ethical Principles (Copenhagen, Rhodos International Science and Art Publishers and Centre for Ethics and Law), 61–74, 62. Kuhse actually speaks of invocation of the HDP in the bioethics literature, but I believe that her analysis can validly be extended to other domains. For a similar analysis on the conservative political stance embedded in the HDP, see also Beyleveld and Brownsword, supra n. 20 and Michalowski, supra n. 41.
- B. Mathieu and M. Verpeaux, Contentieux constitutionnel des droits fondamentaux (Paris, Librairie générale de droit et de jurisprudence, 2003), 506. Unless otherwise specified, the translations are mine.
- G. Vedel, cited by L. Favoreu in his commentary of C.C., 94–343–344DC, 27 July 1994, in (1994) Revue française de droit constitutionnel, 808.
- B. Jorion, “La dignité de la personne humaine ou la difficile insertion d'une règle morale dans le droit positif” (1999) 1 Revue du droit public 198.
- M-L. Pavia, “La dignité de la personne humaine” in R. Cabrillac, M-A. Frison-Roche and T. Revet (eds), Libertés et droits fondamentaux (Paris, Dalloz, 7th edn, 2001), 127.
- L. Weil, “La dignité de la personne humaine en droit administratif” in M-L. Pavia and T. Revet (eds), La dig-nité de la personne humaine (Paris, Economica, 1999), 85.
- See P. Pedrot (ed), Ethique, droit et dignité de la personne. Mélanges offerts à Christian Bolze (Paris, Economica, 1999), a book in which the HDP is presented as foundational of numerous derivatives in labour law, social protection law, housing law, bioethics law, penal law...
- “word of ardent, multiform, indiscernible and somewhat sacred meaning. Gives the illusion that by that word one can answer anything”, cited by P. Wachsmann, “La chambre criminelle, la convention européenne des droits de l'homme et la loi sur la presse” (2001) Recueil Dalloz 3001.
- See O. Cayla, “Dignité humaine: le plus flou des concepts” Le Monde, 30 January 2003.
- There are three meanings of the dignity principle in general (including the old dignitas), but only two have to do with the human dignity principle. See Girard and Hennette-Vauchez, supra n. 21, 107.
- Note that all preventative administrative police measures in France are legally conditioned to their being oriented or guided by the notion of “ordre public“.
- C.E., 27 October 1995, Ville d'Aix en Provence et Commune de Morsang sur Orge.
- And M. Wackenheim, the dwarf of the case, knows that better than anyone, since all his arguments articulated around the HDP, such as his demonstration that after years of economic instability due to dwarves being discriminated against in the job market, he had finally found a means for making a decent living, were rejected.
- A somewhat similar analysis of the HDP in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights is given by Michalowski, supra n. 41, 287, 308: “The prohibitions [contained in Art. 3] though formulated as if they were designed to shape the individual right to physical and mental integrity, in fact restrict the individual right to integrity in the name of an objective vision of human dignity.” Therefore, she sees the HDP as a vector of policy statements that are often about asserting collective control over individual choices more than as a vector of individual rights.
- O. Cayla, “Le coup d'état de droit” (1998) Le Débat 108.
- Explicitly for example in C. Neirinck, “La dignité humaine ou le mauvais usage juridique d'une notion philosophique” in Pedrot, supra n. 69, 39.
- See B. Mathieu, “De quelques moyens d'évacuer la dignité humaine de l'ordre juridique” (2005) Recueil Dalloz 1649 (section “tribune”).
- See B. Mathieu, “La dignité de la personne humaine: Quel droit? Quel titulaire?” (1996) Recueil Dalloz 282.
- See N. Lenoir, “Eléments de réflexion sur le droit comparé: les juges constitutionnels et la bioéthique” in Mélanges en l'honneur de Jacques Robert (Paris, Montchrestien, 1998), 376.
- For there are other competing understandings of the HDP, notably those mostly based on the concepts of empowerment, autonomy—and thus, rights (vs obligations).
- C.C., 94–359DC, 19 January 1995, Loi relative à la diversité de l'habitat; and commentary by B. Mathieu, supra n. 80, 285.
- C.C., 2001–446DC, 27 June 2001, Interruption volontaire de grossesse II; and commentary by B. Mathieu, “Une jurisprudence selon Ponce Pilate” (2001) Recueil Dalloz 2534.
- Mathieu, supra n. 64, 285.
- For further developments with regard to this aspect, see Girard and Hennette-Vauchez, supra n. 21.
- Supporting such theoretical representations of the legal order, see mostly A. Supiot, Homo juridicus. Essai sur la fonction anthropologique du droit (Paris, Le Seuil, 2005). For a critique see D. de Béchillon, “Porter atteinte aux catégories anthropologiques fondamentales” (2002) Revue trimestrielle de droit civil 47.
- Cour de Cassation, 17 November 2000, the “Perruche” case. Commentaries are far too numerous to be cited here, for it could well be one of the most commented upon judicial decisions ever in France.
- The reaction was initiated by the publication of an article signed by many law professors in Le Monde (20 November 2000, “La vie humaine comme prejudice?”). A response written by (only) three other law professors was published in the same paper a little later (Le Monde, 21 December 2000, by D. de Béchillon, O. Cayla and Y. Thomas). But most importantly, the rather violent opposition was both inside and outside law faculties, and kept public opinion concentrated on the topic for months. For tentative deconstructions of the anti-Perruche naturalist positions, see mostly O. Cayla and Y. Thomas (eds), Du droit de ne pas naître (Paris, Gallimard, 2002).
- Law 2002–303 of 4 March 2002 on patients' rights.
- Note that France was later condemned by the European Court of Human Rights on the grounds that the provision of the law that established that it should be applicable immediately (including to cases that were pending at the time) constituted a violation of legitimate expectations of compensation that some families could have; see Draon v France, Maurice v France“On being Dispossessed of a Head of Claim in a Pending Case” (case note) (2006) 65 Cambridge Law Journal 257–9.
- D. Birnbacher, supra n. 54, 107.
Legal Ethics
Volume 10, 2007 - Issue 2