Conditional Factors of Political Budget Cycles: Economic Development, Media Pressure, and Political Fragmentation

References

• Abdel-Monem, T., Herian, M. N., Hoppe, R., PytlikZillig, L. M., & Tomkins, A. J. (2016). Policymakers’ perceptions of the benefits of citizen-budgeting activities. Public Performance & Management Review, 39(4), 835–863.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Alesina, A. (1987). Macroeconomic policy in a two-party system as a repeated game. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 102, 651–678.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Alesina, A., Cohen, C. D., & Roubini, N. (1992). Macroeconomic policy and elections in OECD democracies. Economics and Politics, 4, 1–30.
   Google Scholar
• Alesina, A., & Paradisi, M. (2014). Political budget cycles: Evidence from Italian cities (NBER Working Paper No. 20570). Cambridge: National Bureau of Economic Research.
   Google Scholar
• Alesina, A., & Rosenthal, H. (1994). Partisan politics, divided governments, and the economy. New York: Cambridge University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Allers, M., De Haan, J., & Sterks, C. (2001). Partisan influence on the local tax burden in the Netherlands. Public Choice, 106, 351–363.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Allison, P. D., Williams, R., & Moral-Benito, E. (2017). Maximum likelihood for cross-lagged panel models with fixed effects. Socius: Sociological Research for a Dynamic World, 3, 1–17.
   Google Scholar
• Arellano, M., & Bond, S. (1991). Some tests of specification for panel data: Monte Carlo evidence and an application to employment equations. Review of Economic Studies, 58, 277–297.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Arellano, M., & Bover, O. (1995). Another look at the instrumental variables estimation of error components models. Journal of Econometrics, 68, 29–51.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Bastida, F., Benito, B., & Guillamón, M. D. (2009). An empirical assessment of the municipal financial situation in Spain. International Public Management Journal, 12(4), 484–499.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Baum, C., Schaffer, M., & Stillman, S. (2003). Instrumental variables and GMM: Estimation and testing. Stata Journal, 3(1), 1–31.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Benito, B., Bastida, F., & Vicente, C. (2013). Municipal elections and cultural expenditure. Journal of Cultural Economy, 37, 3–32.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Binet, M. E., & Pentecôte, J. S. (2004). Tax degression and the political budget cycle in French municipalities. Applied Economics Letters, 11, 905–908.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Blais, A., & Nadeau, R. (1992). The electoral budget cycle. Public Choice, 74(4), 389–403.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Block, S. A. (2002). Political business cycles, democratization, and economic reform: The case of Africa. Journal of Development Economics, 67(4), 205–228.
   Google Scholar
• Blundell, R., & Bond, S. (1998). Initial conditions and moment restrictions in dynamic panel data models. Journal of Econometrics, 87, 115–143.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Brender, A., & Drazen, A. (2005). Political budget cycles in new versus established democracies. Journal of Monetary Economics, 52, 1271–1295.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Cuadrado-Ballesteros, B., Frías-Aceituno, J., & Martínez-Ferrero, J. (2014). The role of media pressure on the disclosure of sustainability information by local governments. Online Information Review, 38(1), 114–135.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• De Haan, J., & Klomp, J. (2013). Conditional political budget cycles: A review of recent evidence. Public Choice, 157, 387–410.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Downs, A. (1957). An economic theory of political action in a democracy. Journal of Political Economy, 65(2), 135–150.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Drazen, A., & Eslava, M. (2010). Electoral manipulation via voter-friendly spending. Theory and evidence. Journal of Development Economics, 92(1), 39–52.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Foremy, D., & Riedel, N. (2014). Business taxes and the electoral cycle. Journal of Public Economics, 115, 48–61.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Foucault, M., Madies, T., & Paty, S. (2008). Public spending interactions and local politics. Empirical evidence from French municipalities. Public Choice, 137, 57–80.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Frey, B. S., & Schneider, F. (1978a). A politico-economic model of the United Kingdom. Economic Journal, 88, 243–253.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Frey, B. S., & Schneider, F. (1978b). An empirical study of politico-economic interaction in the United States. Review of Economics and Statistics, 60, 174–183.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Frey, B. S., & Schneider, F. (1979). An econometric model with an endogenous government sector. Public Choice, 34(1), 29–43.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Galli, E., & Rossi, S. (2002). Political budget cycles: The case of the Western German Lander. Public Choice, 110(3–4), 283–303.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• García-Sánchez, I. M., Prado-Lorenzo, J. M., & Cuadrado-Ballesteros, B. (2010). Do progressive governments undertake different debt burdens? Partisan vs. electoral cycles. Revista de Contabilidad – Spanish Accounting Review, 14(1), 29–57.
   Google Scholar
• Guillamón, M. D., Bastida, F., & Benito, B. (2013). The electoral budget cycle on municipal police expenditure. European Journal of Law and Economics, 36, 447–469.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Hibbs, D. A. (1977). Political parties and macroeconomic policy. American Political Science Review, 71(4), 467–487.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Hong, S. (2016). Government press releases and citizen perceptions of government performance: Evidence from Google Trends Data. Public Performance & Management Review, 39(4), 885–904.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Jung, H., Kwon, H. U., & Jeon, G. (2015). An alternative system GMM estimation in dynamic panel models. Journal of Economic Theory and Econometrics, 26(2), 57–78.
   Google Scholar
• Katsimi, M., & Sarantides, V. (2012). Do elections affect the composition of fiscal policy in developed, established democracies? Public Choice, 151(1–2), 325–362.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Khemani, S. (2004). Political cycles in a developing economy: Effect of elections in the Indian states. Journal of Development Economics, 73(1), 125–154.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Klomp, J., & De Haan, J. (2013). Do political budget cycles really exist? Applied Economics, 45(3), 329–341.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Lago-Peña, I., & Lago-Peña, S. (2008). Explaining budgetary indiscipline: Evidence from Spanish municipalities. Public Finance and Management, 8(1), 36–69.
   Google Scholar
• Lee, P. S., & Leung, L. (2008). Assessing the displacement effects of the Internet. Telematics and Informatics, 25(3), 145–155.
   Google Scholar
• Nordhaus, W. D. (1975). The political business cycle. Review of Economic Studies, 42(2), 169–190.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Pettersson-Lidbom, P. (2001). An empirical investigation of the strategic use of debt. Journal of Political Economy, 109(3), 570–583.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Reid, B. G. (1998). Endogenous elections, electoral budget cycles and Canadian provincial government. Public Choice, 97, 35–48.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Rogoff, K. (1990). Equilibrium political budget cycles. American Economic Review, 80(1), 21–36.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Rogoff, K., & Sibert, A. (1988). Elections and macroeconomic policy cycles. Review of Economic Studies, 55(1), 1–16.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Roubini, N., & Sachs, J. D. (1989a). Government spending and budget deficits in the industrial countries. Economic Policy, 8, 99–132.
   Google Scholar
• Roubini, N., & Sachs, J. D. (1989b). Political and economic determinants of budget deficits in the industrial democracies. European Economic Review, 33, 903–938.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Sakurai, S. N., & Menzes-Filho, N. (2011). Opportunistic and partisan election cycles in Brazil: New evidence at municipal level. Public Choice, 148, 233–247.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Schick, A. (1998). A contemporary approach to public expenditure management (Report No. 35116). Washington DC: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, World Bank Institute.
   Google Scholar
• Schuknecht, L. (2000). Fiscal policy cycles and public expenditure in developing countries. Public Choice, 102, 115–130.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Seitz, H. (2000). Fiscal policy, deficits and politics of subnational governments: The case of the German Laender. Public Choice, 102, 183–218.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Song, C., & Lee, J. (2016). Citizens’ use of social media in government, perceived transparency, and trust in government. Public Performance & Management Review, 39(2), 430–453.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Strömberg, D. (2004). Mass media competition, political competition, and public policy. Review of Economic Studies, 71, 265–284.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Tellier, G. (2006). Public expenditure in Canadian provinces: An empirical study of politico-economic interactions. Public Choice, 126, 367–385.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Tovmo, P. (2007). Budgetary procedures and deficits in Norwegian local governments. Economics of Governance, 8(1), 37–49.
   Google Scholar
• Veiga, L. G., & Veiga, F. J. (2007). Political business cycles at the municipal level. Public Choice, 131, 45–64.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Vergne, C. (2009). Democracy, elections and allocation of public expenditures in developing countries. European Journal of Political Economy, 25(1), 63–77. doi:10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2008.09.003
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Wooldridge, J. M. (2010). Econometric analysis of cross section and panel data. Cambridge: The MIT Press.
   Google Scholar