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Public Performance & Management Review Volume 44, 2021 - Issue 5: Introduction to the Special Issue: Methodologies toward a New Era of Public Administration: Diversity and Advancement; Guest Editor: Kaifeng Yang
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Articles

Historical Institutionalism the Cognitive Foundations of Cooperation

Sven SteinmoUniversity of ColoradoCorrespondence[email protected]
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Pages 1140-1159 | Published online: 28 Nov 2019

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