References
- Acharya, V. V., Y. Amihud, and L. Litov. 2011. “Creditor Rights and Corporate Risk-Taking.” Journal of Financial Economics 102 (1): 150–166. doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.04.001.
- Bae, K. H., and V. K. Goyal. 2009. “Creditor Rights, Enforcement, and Bank Loans.” The Journal of Finance 64 (2): 823–860. doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2009.01450.x.
- BENMELECH E and BERGMAN N K. (2011). Bankruptcy and the Collateral Channel. The Journal of Finance, 66(2), 337–378. 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2010.01636.x
- Boubakri, N., and H. Ghouma. 2010. “Control/Ownership Structure, Creditor Rights Protection, and the Cost of Debt Financing: International Evidence.” Journal of Banking and Finance 34 (10): 2481–2499. doi:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2010.04.006.
- Bradford, W., C. Chen, and S. Zhu. 2013. “Cash Dividend Policy, Corporate Pyramids, and Ownership Structure: Evidence from China.” International Review of Economics and Finance 27: 445–464. doi:10.1016/j.iref.2013.01.003.
- Cai, G., S. Xie, Y. Xu, Y. Zeng, and J. Zhang. 2019. “Ultimate Parent’s Board Reform and Controlling Shareholder Entrenchment: Evidence from a quasi-Natural Experiment in China.” Emerging Markets Review 38: 389–403. doi:10.1016/j.ememar.2018.11.002.
- Chakraborty, P. 2016. “Judicial Quality and Regional Firm Performance: The Case of Indian States.” Journal of Comparative Economics 44 (4): 902–918. doi:10.1016/j.jce.2016.07.001.
- Chauhan Y, Dey D Kumar and Jha R Ranjan. (2016). Board structure, controlling ownership, and business groups: Evidence from India. Emerging Markets Review, 27 63–83. 10.1016/j.ememar.2016.03.003
- Chee, H. K., C. W. Hooy, and C. A. Ooi. 2016. “The Influence of Ultimate Ownership Concentration on Leverage.” Jurnal Pengurusan (UKM Journal of Management) 47 (1): 55–65. doi:10.17576/pengurusan-2016-47-05.
- Cheema, A., F. Bari, and O. Saddique. 2003. Corporate Governance in Pakistan: Ownership, Control and the Law. 5, Lahore: Lahore University of Management Sciences.
- Chemin, M. 2012. “Does Court Speed Shape Economic Activity? Evidence from a Court Reform in India.” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 28 (3): 460–485. doi:10.1093/jleo/ewq014.
- Chemin, M. 2020. “Judicial Efficiency and Firm Productivity: Evidence from a World Database of Judicial Reforms.” The Review of Economics and Statistics 102 (1): 49–64. doi:10.1162/rest_a_00799.
- Choi, N., and S. Y. Kang. 2014. “Competition Law Meets Corporate Governance: Ownership Structure, Voting Leverage, and Investor Protection of Large Family Corporate Groups in Korea.” Peking U. Transnat’l L. Rev 2: 411.
- Claessens, S., S. Djankov, and L. H. P. Lang. 2000. “The Separation of Ownership and Control in East Asian Corporations.” Journal of Financial Economics 58 (1–2): 81–112. doi:10.1016/S0304-405X(00)00067-2.
- Cole, R. A. 2013. “What Do We Know about the Capital Structure of Privately Held US Firms? Evidence from the Surveys of Small Business Finance.” Financial Management 42 (4): 777–813. doi:10.1111/fima.12015.
- Espinosa-Méndez, C., M. Jara-Bertín, and C. Maquieira. 2018. “The Influence of Family and Pyramidal Ownership on Corporate Diversification in Chile.” The North American Journal of Economics and Finance 43: 158–168. doi:10.1016/j.najef.2017.10.012.
- Faccio M, Lang L H and Young L. (2001). Dividends and Expropriation. American Economic Review, 91(1), 54–78. 10.1257/aer.91.1.54
- Fan, J. P. H., S. Titman, and G. Twite. 2012. “An International Comparison of Capital Structure and Debt Maturity Choices.” Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 47 (1): 23–56. doi:10.1017/S0022109011000597.
- Flannery, M. J., and K. P. Rangan. 2006. “Partial Adjustment Toward Target Capital Structures.” Journal of Financial Economics 79 (3): 469–506. doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2005.03.004.
- Gungoraydinoglu, A., and Ö. Öztekin. 2011. “Firm- and Country-Level Determinants of Corporate Leverage: Some New International Evidence.” Journal of Corporate Finance 17 (5): 1457–1474. doi:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2011.08.004.
- Gutiérrez, M., J. A. Tribó, and B. Mariano. 2012. “Ownership Structure and Minority Expropriation: The Case for Multiple Blockholders.” Applied Financial Economics 22 (24): 2075–2083. doi:10.1080/09603107.2012.697119.
- Haselmann, R., and P. Wachtel. 2010. “Institutions and Bank Behavior: Legal Environment, Legal Perception, and the Composition of Bank Lending.” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 42 (5): 965–984. doi:10.1111/j.1538-4616.2010.00316.x.
- Hooy, G.-K., C.-W. Hooy, and H.-K. Chee. 2019. “Ultimate Ownership, Control Mechanism, and Firm Performance: Evidence from Malaysian Firms.” Emerging Markets Finance and Trade 56(15) 1–24 doi:10.1080/1540496X.2019.1584101.
- Huang, X., R. Kabir, and L. Zhang. 2018. “Government Ownership and the Capital Structure of Firms: Analysis of an Institutional Context from China.” China Journal of Accounting Research 11 (3): 171–185. doi:10.1016/j.cjar.2018.07.001.
- Jappelli, T., M. Pagano, and M. Bianco. 2005. “Courts and Banks: Effects of Judicial Enforcement on Credit Markets.” Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 37 (2): 223–244. doi:10.1353/mcb.2005.0021.
- Jara, M., C. Pinto-Gutiérrez, and P. Núñez. 2018. “The Effects of Ownership Structure and Intragroup Loans on Leverage: Evidence from Family Firms in Chile.” Emerging Markets Finance and Trade 54 (11): 2614–2629. doi:10.1080/1540496X.2017.1369401.
- Judge, W. Q., T. J. Douglas, and A. M. Kutan. 2008. “Institutional Antecedents of Corporate Governance Legitimacy.” Journal of Management 34 (4): 765–785. doi:10.1177/0149206308318615.
- Kang, M., S. Kim, and M. K. Cho. 2019. “The Effect of R&D and the Control–Ownership Wedge on Firm Value: Evidence from Korean Chaebol Firms.” Sustainability 11 (10): 2986. doi:10.3390/su11102986.
- Khan N U, Shah Jehan Q Ul and Shah A. (2017). Impact of taxation on dividend policy: Evidence from Pakistan. Research in International Business and Finance, 42 365–375. 10.1016/j.ribaf.2017.07.157
- Kim, M. I., C. H. Sonu, and J. H. Choi. 2015. “Separation of Corporate Ownership and Control and Accounting Conservatism: Evidence from Korea.” Asia-Pacific Journal of Accounting and Economics 22 (2): 103–136. doi:10.1080/16081625.2014.912374.
- Kwon, Y., and S. H. Han. 2019. “Controlling Shareholders’ Preference in Business Groups: Evidence from Korea.” Emerging Markets Finance and Trade 56(4) 1–20 doi:10.1080/1540496X.2018.1553157.
- La Porta R, Lopez-De-Silanes F and Shleifer A. (1999). Corporate Ownership Around the World. The Journal of Finance, 54(2), 471–517. 10.1111/0022-1082.00115
- La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-silanes, A. Shleifer, and R. Vishny. 1998. “Law and Finance.” Journal of Political Economy 106 (6): 1113–1155. doi:10.1086/250042.
- La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-silanes, A. Shleifer, and R. Vishny. 2000. “Investor Protection and Corporate Governance.” Journal of Financial Economics 58 (1–2): 3–27. doi:10.1016/S0304-405X(00)00065-9.
- La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-silanes, A. Shleifer, and R. W. Vishny. 1997. “Legal Determinants of External Finance.” Journal of Finance 52 (3): 1131–1150. doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb02727.x.
- Lemmon, M. L., M. R. Roberts, and J. F. Zender. 2008. “Back to the Beginning: Persistence and the Cross-Section of Corporate Capital Structure.” Journal of Finance 60: 2575–2619. doi:10.2139/ssrn.881899.
- Lepore, L., F. Paolone, and D. R. Cambrea. 2018. “Ownership Structure, Investors’ Protection and Corporate Valuation: The Effect of Judicial System Efficiency in Family and Non-Family Firms.” Journal of Management and Governance 22 (4): 829–862. doi:10.1007/s10997-018-9405-0.
- Lepore, L., F. Paolone, S. Pisano, and F. Alvino. 2017. “A Cross-Country Comparison of the Relationship between Ownership Concentration and Firm Performance: Does Judicial System Efficiency Matter?” Corporate Governance: The International Journal of Business in Society 17 (2): 321–340. doi:10.1108/CG-03-2016-0049.
- Liu, Q., and G. Tian. 2012. “Controlling Shareholder, Expropriations and Firm’s Leverage Decision: Evidence from Chinese Non-Tradable Share Reform.” Journal of Corporate Finance 18 (4): 782–803. doi:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2012.06.002.
- Modigliani F and Perotti E. (1997). Protection of minority interest and the development of security markets. Manage. Decis. Econ., 18(7–8), 519–528. 10.1002/(SICI)1099-1468(199711/12)18:7/8<519::AID-MDE857>3.0.CO;2-M
- Oehmichen, J. 2018. “East Meets West—Corporate Governance in Asian Emerging Markets: A Literature Review and Research Agenda.” International Business Review 27 (2): 465–480. doi:10.1016/j.ibusrev.2017.09.013.
- Paligorova, T., and Z. Xu. 2012. “Complex Ownership and Capital Structure.” Journal of Corporate Finance 18 (4): 701–716. doi:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2012.05.001.
- Pellicani A Damasceno and Kalatzis A Elie. (2019). Ownership structure, overinvestment and underinvestment: Evidence from Brazil. Research in International Business and Finance, 48 475–482. 10.1016/j.ribaf.2018.10.007
- RAJAN R G and ZINGALES L. (1995). What Do We Know about Capital Structure? Some Evidence from International Data. The Journal of Finance, 50(5), 1421–1460. 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1995.tb05184.x
- Saeed, A., Y. Belghitar, and E. Clark. 2015. “Political Connections and Leverage: Firm-Level Evidence from Pakistan.” Managerial and Decision Economics 36 (6): 364–383. doi:10.1002/mde.2674.
- Selcuk, E. A., and P. Sener. 2018. “Corporate Governance and Tunneling: Empirical Evidence from Turkey.” Economics Bulletin 38 (1): 349–361.
- Shah, A., H. A. Shah, J. M. Smith, and G. Labianca. 2017. “Judicial Efficiency and Capital Structure: An International Study.” Journal of Corporate Finance 44: 255–274. doi:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2017.03.012.
- Shah, A. 2011. “Impact of Judicial Efficiency on Debt Maturity Structure: Evidence from Judicial Districts of Pakistan.” The Pakistan Development Review 50 (4II): 663–682. doi:10.30541/v50i4IIpp.663-682.
- Shah, H. A., and A. Shah. 2016. “The Relationship between Judicial Efficiency and Corporate Cash Holdings: An International Study.” Economic Modelling 59: 448–462. doi:10.1016/j.econmod.2016.08.016.
- Shah, M. H., Z. Xiao, S. Q. Abdullah, M. Ahmad, and M. Ahmad. 2020. “Internal Pyramid Structure, Contract Enforcement, Minority Investor Protection, and Firms’ Performance: Evidence from Emerging Economies.” Research in International Business and Finance 52: 101170. doi:10.1016/j.ribaf.2019.101170.
- Shleifer, A., and R. W. Vishny. 1986. “Large Shareholders and Corporate Control.” Journal of Political Economy 94 (3, Part 1): 461–488. doi:10.1086/261385.
- Shleifer, A., and R. W. Vishny. 1997. “A Survey of Corporate Governance.” The Journal of Finance 52 (2): 737–783. doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb04820.x.
- Su, K., L. Li, and R. Wan. 2017. “Ultimate Ownership, Risk-Taking and Firm Value: Evidence from China.” Asia Pacific Business Review 23 (1): 10–26. doi:10.1080/13602381.2016.1152021.
- Su, K., R. Wan, B. Li, and P. Yuanhui Li. 2013. “Ultimate Ownership, Institutionality, and Capital Structure: Empirical Analyses of Chinese Data.” Chinese Management Studies 7 (4): 557–571. doi:10.1108/CMS-09-2013-0175.
- Su, K. 2015. “The Inner Structure of Pyramid and Capital Structure: Evidence from China.” Economics 9 (1): 1. doi:10.5018/economics-ejournal.ja.2015-14.
- Utama C Afriani, Utama S and Amarullah F. (2017). Corporate governance and ownership structure: Indonesia evidence. CG, 17(2), 165–191. 10.1108/CG-12-2015-0171
- VIG V. (2013). Access to Collateral and Corporate Debt Structure: Evidence from a Natural Experiment. The Journal of Finance, 68(3), 881–928. 10.1111/jofi.12020
- Wei J (Diana), Ferguson M F and Chichernea D. Deal Risk, Liquidity Risk, and the Profitability of Risk Arbitrage. SSRN Journal, 10.2139/ssrn.1844405
- Zhou, T., and J. Xie. 2016. “Ultimate Ownership and Adjustment Speed toward Target Capital Structures: Evidence from China.” Emerging Markets Finance and Trade 52 (8): 1956–1965. doi:10.1080/1540496X.2015.1062311.