References
- 2001 . Intelligence and National Security , 16 The recent literature on intelligence agencies and assassination has been summarised in Ian Bryan and Michael Salter, “War Crimes Prosecutors and Intelligence Agencies: The Case for Assessing their Collaboration,”, 3 (Autumn: 93–120, 101–102
- 27 May 1945 . OSS/SSU, CIC, and CIA investigated the whereabouts of Eichmann, for example. See Robert Wolfe, “Analysis of the Name File of Adolf Eichmann,” http://www.nara.gov/iwg/declass/eichmann.html. Details of OSS's interest in suspected war criminal Henrich Mueller, chief of the Gestapo, is clear from various documentation available from the U.S. National Archive. See “War Room Publication, G. I. S. Priorities for Interrogation,” Entry 119A, Folder 621, Box 22, Records of the Office of Strategic Services, Record Group (RG) 226; National Archives (NA), Washington, D.C., and 21 May 1945, Entry 119A, Box 22, Folder 621, ibid; W. R. C.3, “Fortnightly Report for the Period Ending 18th June, 1945,” Entry 119A, Folder 639, Box 25, ibid; “Progress Report,” X-2 Branch, 1 June-30 June 1945, attached to Saint (London) to Saint, (Stockholm), 13 July 1945, Entry 125A, Folder 76, Box 7, ibid. War Room Monthly Summary No. 4, 23 July 1945, Entry 119A, Folder 629, Box 24, ibid.; “Arrest Target List-Revision Note, 1 November 1945,” Entry 122, Tab 6, Box 1, ibid. This interest was not related exclusively to planned war crimes prosecution but included a concern that Mueller could be organising guerrilla movements that posed a security threat to Allied Military Government officials
- Wagman , J. 1988 . “ who are otherwise strongly critical of U.S. intelligence, acknowledge that the CIA were responsible for supplying important documentary evidence to official Immigration and Nationality Service (INS) investigators addressing immigrants who had gained entry into America by making false statements about their past involvement in Nazi war crimes. See Charles R. Ashman and Robert J. Wagman ” . In Nazi Hunters: The Shocking True Story of the Continuing Search for Nazi War Criminals New York : Pharos Books . Even Charles Ashman and Robert 223. Further details regarding CIA's logistical and other support for the war crimes prosecution process, for example, developing “powerful and incriminating” evidence of chains of command responsibility for atrocities carried out in the former Yugoslavia, albeit in the difficult context of contradictory U.S. foreign policies, is given by Gary Bass, Stay the Hand of Vengeance: The Politics of War Crimes Tribunals (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), 236–38, 244, 261, 265, and Richard C. Holbrook, To End a War (New York: Random House, 1998), 211–12. For contrasting assessments, see Michael Dobbs, “War Crimes Prosecutor Says U.S. Information Insufficient,” Washington Press7 November 1995, A19; Michael Dobbs and R. Jeffrey Smith, “New Proof Offered of Serb Atrocities,” Washington Post, 29 October 1995, A1, describes a “rare” release of information from an on-going intelligence operation. This revealed the discovery at Srebrenica, a Muslim enclave located in northern Bosnia, of possible mass grave sites constructed by Serbs, which appeared to contain the remains of thousands of Muslim males. This article also describes details of various Serbian massacres of Muslims captured in part by U.S. reconnaissance satellites. In 1996, the CIA was criticised for delays in providing relevant information to the ICTY investigating “ethnic cleansing” in the Balkans. See Charles Lane and Thom Shanker, “Bosnia: What The CIA Didn't Tell Us,” New York Review of Books, 9 May 1996, 10; “The C.I.A. and Bosnia: An Exchange,” New York Review of Books, 6 June 1996, 64; Roger Cohen, “CIA Report on Bosnia Blames Serbs for 90% of the War Crimes,” New York Times, 9 March 1995, A8. On joint NATO and CIA plans to capture suspected Serbian war criminals, see J. Randal, “West reportedly May Arrest Indicted Serb Karadzic as War Criminal,” Washington Post, 6 July 1997, A20. On OSS's support for humanitarian assistance to the victims of Nazi war crimes, see Meredith Hindley, “The Strategy of Rescue and Relief: The Use of OSS Intelligence by the War Refugee Board in Sweden 1944–5,” Intelligence and National Security 12 (1997): 145–65
- Our existing knowledge of this collaborative process is scattered across a number of studies, cited below, whose main focus lies elsewhere, and which the present writer is currently pulling together and supplementing for future publications
- 1992 . The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials: A Personal Memoir New York : Knopf . In particular, readers will recall that the idea behind these trials emerged during 1944–45 through a complicated process of interagency negotiation between the Judge Advocate General's (JAG) department, the U.S. War Department, the OSS and Roosevelt's adviser Samuel Roseman. Telford Taylor recalled that Donovan was interested in war crimes trials since at least 1943 and in 1944 committed the OSS to cooperate with the Judge Advocate General's Office; Telford Taylor, 47. The trial plan stemming partly from Murray Bernays idea of the Nazi regime as a criminal conspiracy was developed and refined by Jackson through various stages as this underlying theory became revised and developed during mid-summer 1945 in response to fresh discoveries of evidence and unanticipated difficulties. During the final stages of preparing and revising draft prosecution briefs, questions of proof and incorporation of relevant evidence predominated. See Bradley F. Smith, ed. The American Road to Nuremberg: The Documentary Record 1944–1945 (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1982
- This section extensively supplements and partially revises some of the points discussed briefly in Bryan and Salter, “War Crimes Prosecutors,” 95–97
- Rischtin , Moses , ed. 1991 . The Jewish Legacy and the German Conscience Berkeley : Judah Magnus Museum . For a reply to criticism of the attacks on the OSS war crimes policy regarding the Jewish genocide and more generally, see Barry M. Katz, “The Holocaust and American Intelligence,” in, ed. 297–307; Michael Salter, “The Visibility of the Holocaust: Franz Neumann and the Nuremberg Trials,” in Social Theory After the Holocaust, ed. Robert. Fine (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2000), 201–11. The OSS received highly prejudicial summaries of information on anti-Semitic persecution from the U.S. State Department. See Walter Laqueur and Richard Breitman, Breaking the Silence: The German who Exposed the Final Solution (Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 1994, 149
- Zeiger , Henry A. , ed. 2000 . “ 8 ” . In Civil Rights: New Labour, Freedom and the Human Rights Act London : Pearson . Recent British studies of the legal definition and regulation of human rights and civil liberties address entire chapters to complex issues posed by the legal regulation of intelligence agencies without either cross-referencing—or being acknowledged by—the intelligence studies literature. See Helen Fenwick, chapter A similar mutual insulation is apparent in the literature discussing the legal issues posed by Mossad's dramatic kidnapping of Eichmann in clear violation of international law (leading to a CIA mediated compromise at the United Nations), despite the fact that these formed the substance of important defence arguments in his trial, whose acceptance could—in principle at least—have resulted in Eichmann's acquittal. See Yosal Rogat, The Eichmann Trial and the Rule of Law (Santa Barbara: Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, 1961), 24–25; New York Times, 4 August 1960, 17; Otto Kirchheimer, Political Justice (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1961), 367–68, n.34; Moshe Pearlman, The Capture of Adolf Eichmann (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1961). On the Eichmann case generally, see Hannah Arendt, Justice in Jerusalem (New York: Harper and Row, 1966); ed., The Case Against Adolf Eichmannn (New York: Signet, 1960); Jacob Robinson, And the Crooked Shall Be Made Straight: The Eichmann Trial, the Jewish Catastrophe, and Hannah Arendt's Narrative (New York: Macmillan, 1965). However, in international law the illegality of a person's seizure and detention abroad has rarely been recognised as a defence before subsequent trials. For a review of relevant case-law, see Benjamin Cardozo, “When Extradition Fails: Is Abduction the Solution?” American Journal of International Law 127 (1961). For an early critique of the contradictory character of a legal doctrine rewarded state illegality, see Emma Dickinson, “Jurisdiction Following Seizure or Arrest in Violation of International Law,” American Journal of International Law 231 (1934): 237–39
- This is discussed further below
- Smith , F. 1977 . Reaching Judgement at Nuremberg New York : Basic Books . See Bradley (Smith, The American Road to Nuremberg; Joseph Persico, Nuremberg: Infamy on Trial (New York: Viking/Penguin, 1994); Joseph Persico, Penetrating the Reich (New York: Viking Press, 1978); Joseph Persico, The Lives and Secrets of William Casey: From the OSS to the CIA (New York: Viking/Penguin, 1990)
- Smith , Bradley F. 1983 . The Shadow Warriors: OSS and the Origins of the CIA New York : Basic Books . To be fair to these authors, both Smith and Persico wrote their books long before the major declassification of OSS records had taken place, which would have restricted their access to a large proportion of the necessary archival material. However, the specially commissioned and voluminous R&A reports on various war crimes topics produced for Justice Jackson had already been declassified by the CIA
- 1998 . Inside the Nuremberg Trial: A Prosecutor's Comprehensive Account Lanham , MD : University Press of America . Drexel Sprecher
- 1968 . The Final Judgement: Pearl Habor to Nuremberg San Antonio : Naylor Co . Robert Storey
- 1954 . Tyranny on Trial Dallas : Southern Methodist University Press . Whitney Harris
- Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials See Taylor
- 1982 . Donovan: America's Master Spy 479 – 59 . NY : Rand McNally & Co . Dunlop's biography of Donovan—(—briefly addresses this topic in eleven pages (pp.—80) relying heavily on James Donovan's correspondence with his wife. Barry M. Katz's Foreign Intelligence: Research and Analysis in the Office of Strategic Services, 1941–1945 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), devotes only a brief sub-section to this topic (pp. 51). A late draft of Corey Ford's biography of Donovan—Donovan of OSS (Boston: Little Brown, 1970)—part of the Otto Doering collection at Cornell University, Ithaca, NY—contained a short subsection on war crimes but this was removed from the published version
- Boston College Third World Law Journal Whitney Harris had been employed in OSS on assignment to the US Navy where he served for four years before being re-assigned for special duty with the OSS. See Whitney Harris, “Owen M. Kuperschmid Holocaust and Human Rights Project Seventh International Conference: Judgments on Nuremberg: The Past Half Century And Beyond—A Panel Discussion of Nuremberg Prosecutors,” 16 (1996): 193–98
- Final Judgement Storey's firsthand account of the Jackson/Donovan conflict is particularly informative; Storey, 97–98
- Nazi Concentration Camps See for example the important contributions of Whitney Harris to demonstrating the details of genocide in Eastern Europe discussed below, the devastating impact of OSS's atrocity film entitled the and Hans Gisevius's testimony
- 1996 . The Last Battle 31 London : FPP . Unfortunately, many of these politically-motivated attacks by “revisionists” and/or “holocaust-deniers,” some of which are monograph length and dressed in the trappings of genuine academic scholarship, are freely available on the internet from where their claims find their way into student essays. David Irving's, repeatedly attacks the integrity of the Nuremberg trials partly by reference to the “sinister” role allegedly played by the OSS in “stage managing” proceedings. Irving also claims that “[i]t is quite evident from the CCS files on Operation Crossword, the Dulles/Wolff negotiations, that SS Obergruppenführer Karl Wolff was promised immunity from prosecution in return for surrendering Italy to the Allies in April 1945;” http://www.fpp.co.uk/Hitler/Jews/WashPost260600.html. Irving repeated this claim in his libel action. See http://www2.prestel.co.uk/littleton/day019.htm p. Any decision to debate the extent to which these attacks are even partly justified raises difficult ethical dilemmas. As part of a “debunking exercise,” should one risk further disseminating these problematic claims, many of which are deliberately framed in provocative terms precisely to attract such scholarly and media attention? Alternatively, should one simply ignore these attacks because in substance (if not form) they allegedly articulate a racist political agenda, and are not published primarily to advance scholarship for predominantly scholarly reasons? Do all claims and ideologies deserve to be given an “equal chance” in the marketplace of ideas?
- 1998 . Holocaust and Genocide Studies In response to the Nazi's genocide of European Jews, early details of which were given to Donovan, the OSS created a special Jewish Desk to monitor developments, to feed evidential material into the Nuremberg process and then to assess questions of post-war restitution. See the various materials in the Abraham G. Duker/Irving Dwork Papers, National Archives Gift Collection, RG 200, NA. For criticism of the alleged ineffectiveness of these efforts, see Schlomo Aronson, “Preparations for the Nuremberg Trial: The O.S.S., Charles Dwork, and the Holocaust,” 12, 2 (and, in defence of the OSS's contribution, Salter, “Visibility of the Holocaust.”
- Harris , See . “Owen M. Kuperschmid Holocaust and Human Rights Project,” 198–99
- 1946 . Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression See ibid. Jackson credits Harris and other OSS staff including Daniel F. Margolies and Bernard Meltzer, with helping prepare the prosecution evidence on “Persecution of the Jews,” “Concentration Camps,” “Plunder of Art Treasures,” and the “Criminal Organizations”. See Office of United States Chief of Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality, (Washington D.C., G.P.O., preface
- Inside the Nuremberg Trial Sprecher, 523–31
- 1986 . University of Chicago Law Review For brief confirmation of Meltzer's OSS role, see Gerhard Casper, “Bernie,” 53 (: 1; Taylor, Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials, 264. After leaving the OSS, Meltzer enjoyed a distinguished academic career as both a labour lawyer and law professor. See Bernard D. Meltzer, “A Note on Some Aspects of the Nuremberg Debate,” University of Chicago Law Review 14 (1947): 455; “The Weber Case: The Judicial Abrogation of the Antidiscrimination Standard in Employment,” University of Chicago Law Review 47 (1980): 423, 466
- Inside the Nuremberg Trial For materials on different aspects of the OSS's role within the Nuremberg literature that had not yet been assimilated by the OSS scholarship, see Sprecher, 52–54, 68, 84, 167, 343, 515, 530, 881, 1191; Storey, Final Judgement, 80–85, 89, 91, 96–99, 102, 114, 124, 137, 140, 177; Harris, Tyranny on Trial, 14, 28, 217–19, 334–35, 349–50, 485, 487, 438–39; Taylor, Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials, 33–34, 46–49, 52–53, 56, 60–61, 68, 78–79, 80, 90, 98, 117, 123, 138–39, 146–49, 173, 177–86, 197, 199–200, 231, 238–40, 263, 273–74, 371, 387, 504, 574, 625; Dan Kiley, “Architect of Palace of Justice Renovations,” in Witnesses to Nuremberg, eds. Bruce M. Stave and Michele Palmer (New York: Twain, 1998), 15–38; Persico, Nuremberg, 27–28, 37, 42, 46, 91–92, 119–21, 128, 134, 143–44, 173, 313. Unsurprisingly, the most fulsome and insightful accounts are contained in the memoirs of OSS officials, such as Sprecher, Harris, and Kiley, or other prosecutors who had previously worked in military intelligence, including Robert Storey and Telford Taylor. The publication of these memoirs has meant that standard accounts of the Nuremberg trials now need extensive revision to take fulsome account of the nature and issues posed by the OSS's contribution
- 1999 . Manitoba Law Journal David Matas, “What Happened to Raoul Wallenberg?” 26 (: 335; Francis M. Nevins, “Cape Fear Dead Ahead: Transforming A Thrice—Told Tale Of Lawyers And Law,” Legal Studies Forum 24 (1999): 611; Gerald Berendt et al., “Arthur J. Goldberg's Legacies To American Labor Relations,” John Marshall Law Review 32 (1999): 667. See also Drexel Sprecher's contribution to New York Law School Journal of Human Rights 12 (1990): 453; Ronald S. Miller, “In Memoriam: Arthur J. Goldberg 1908–1990,” Northwestern University Law Review 84 (1990): 824
- 1993 . New York Law School Journal Human Rights See Sprecher's recollections in “The Fifth Annual Ernst C. Steifel Symposium: 1945–1995: Critical Perspectives on the Nuremberg Trials and State Accountability,” 12 (1995): 453. Another instance is Judge Murray Gurfein, whose OSS background only became clear to the present writer through a statement made in passing in two law articles, which cited Sanford J. Ungar, The Papers & The Papers: an Account of the Legal and Political Battle over the Pentagon Papers (NY: Columbia University Press, 1989; revised from an original 1972 edition), 124. See James L. Oakes, “The Doctrine of Prior Restraint Since the Pentagon Papers.” University of Michigan Law Journal 15 (1982): 28; John Cary Sims, “Triangulating the Boundaries of Pentagon Papers,” William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal 2 (: 341
- Tyranny on Trial See Whitney Harris, 98–199
- Donovan This was clearly Donovan's position. See Dunlop, 483
- 1996 . Boston College Third World Law Journal 16 (:193, 212
- 2002 . Rutgers Journal of Law and Religion Claire Hulme and Michael Salter, “The Nazi's Persecution of Religion as a War Crime: The OSS's response within the Nuremberg War Crimes Process,”, http://www.lawandreligion.com Nuremberg Project, 1–23, 15
- Shadow Warriors See Smith
- 1946 . Foreign Intelligence New York : Duell . See Katz, 51–59; Samuel Padover, Experiment in Germany: The Story of an American Intelligence Officer (F. L. Neumann et al., Civil Affairs Handbook. Germany: Manual M356–9 (Civil Affairs), Headquarters, Army Service Forces (Washington D.C.: 1944)
- 14 June 1945 . “ 9 ” . In Shadow Warriors 395 See Morse and Deutsch to Neumann, Entry 1, Germany 3 file, Box 16, RG 226, NA; Smith, 386–89, chapter esp. pp.—96
- None of the standard works on the Nuremberg trials devote even a brief subheading to the nature, extent and limits of the OSS's contribution. Much of what appears is discussed only in passing and is open to contestation
- 1981 . Donovan and the CIA: A History of the Establishment of the CIA 5 Federick , MD : University Publications of America . See Thomas Troy, 44–49; Lawrence C. Soley, Radio Warfare: OSS and CIA Subversive Propaganda (New York: Praeger, 1989), 55; Michael Warner, OSS: America's First Central Intelligence Agency (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs/CIA, 2000), 8. Hoover succeeded in preventing COI/OSS from operating in Latin America. See Soley, Radio Warfare, 63; The Senate Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect To Intelligence Activities, Final Report, S. Rep. No. 755, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., bk. IV, 4–5 (1976) noted that: “From the outset the Military were reluctant to provide OSS with information to enable it to fulfil its research and analysis role. In addition, the military restricted its operations…. In addition to demanding that OSS be specifically prohibited from conducting domestic espionage, FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover and Nelson Rockefeller, then coordinator of Inter—American Affairs, insisted on maintaining their jurisdiction over Latin America, thereby excluding OSS from that area” (at p.). By contrast, the literature on military law has recognised the importance of these conflictual institutional dimensions, albeit not in the context of the Nuremberg project. For example, Crane states: “Personality clashes, mistrust, and rivalry between the various service intelligence components and the intelligence branches of the other agencies remained a problem throughout the war.” David M. Crane, “Divided We Stand: Counterintelligence Coordination Within the Intelligence Community of the United States” Army Law 26 (1995): 49
- Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials , 136 See Taylor, 148; Persico, Nuremberg 119–22. This reductionist tendency is found even within the most recent Nuremberg scholarship published in top ranking law journals. For instance, Wald has stated: “Indeed there was debate originally whether any live witnesses would be used at all in the major Nuremberg trials. Jackson's preference was to rely on documentary evidence alone. Another aide, William ‘Wild Bill’ Donovan, the famed Office of Strategic Services (OSS) leader, fell out with Jackson over this very issue. Donovan wished to present the Nuremberg judges with warm breathing witnesses to incredibly horrible events. It should be noted here that the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal specifically authorized it to consider the reports of national State commissions which held public hearings and took live testimony involving atrocities in their respective countries. In the proceedings before the Nuremberg Tribunal, only ninety-four live witnesses (in addition to nineteen of the defendants) eventually testified.” Patricia M. Wald, “To ‘Establish Incredible Events by Credible Evidence’: The Use of Affidavit Testimony in Yugoslavia War Crimes Tribunal Proceedings,” Harvard International Law Journal 42(2001: 535, 538–39
- 1972 . The Tangled Web Washington DC : Robert Luce . On Albrecht's operation more generally, see the Editors of the Army Times, 178; Soley, Radio Warfare 95
- 1972 . Foreign Intelligence Berkeley : University of California Press . See Katz, 51–59; Salter, “Visibility of the Holocaust;” Robert Harris Smith, OSS: The Secret History of America's First Central Intelligence Agency 239–40; Salter and Hulme, The Nazi's Persecution of Religion as a War Crime.
- Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials Donovan was also frustrated in this ambition not by Jackson but rather by Charles Fahy, head of the U.S. Army's legal division. See Taylor, 273
- 1996 . International Law and Espionage The Hague : Martinus Nijh off . See John Kish
- The Nazi's Persecution of Religion as a War Crime See Hulme and Salter
- Taylor , See . Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials 180 – 86 .
- For example, “cross-over” topics spanning the two disciplines could include a study of issues arising from the following: the admissibility and credibility as trial evidence of incriminating materials contained in intelligence files; the potential legal accountability of the leadership of intelligence agencies before the emerging International Criminal Court for illegal acts committed directly or indirectly by their subordinates; the potential liability of such agencies in civil law for “intelligence failures” to prevent terrorist atrocities; the potential legal liabilities of intelligence officers who publish their memoirs; the continuing obligation to protect covert sources of intelligence whilst also cooperating with various law enforcement processes; issues arising under international human rights law regarding the partial accountability of the state for breaches of legal recognised privacy rights through programmes of surveillance
- This discussion extends two of the points made in a preliminary way in Bryan and Salter, “War Crimes Prosecutors and Intelligence Agencies”, 95–98
- 1995 . Blind Eye to Murder: Britain, America and the Purging of Nazi Germany—A Pledge Betrayed Tom Bower, (2nd ed., London: Warner Books,; C. Simpson, Blowback: America's Recruitment of Nazis and Its Effects on the Cold War (New York: Collier Books, 1988); C. Simpson, The Splendid Blond Beast: Money, Law and Genocide in the 20th Century (New York: Grove Press, 1993)
- 1983 . The Borman Brotherhood London : Stevenson . Arguably the works of Tom Bower and Christopher Simpson fall into this category. Whilst Aarons and Loftus concentrate on Western intelligence their primary goal is to “expose” the latently anti—Semitic policies of the ruling powers-elites during the twentieth century. William Stevenson's (aims to expose the postwar success of Nazi plans to stage a clandestine revival once military defeat appeared likely from 1943, and evaluates the recruitment of suspected Nazi war criminals in this particular context
- 1989 . Blowback Simpson, xiv; Bower, Blind Eye to Murder, 406–15; Stevenson, The Borman Brotherhood, 19; Charles R. Allen, Nazi War Criminals in America: Facts—Action: The Basic Handbook (New York: Highgate House, 1985); John Loftus, The Belarus Secret, Nathan Miller ed. (New York Paragon House, rev. ed. 1982); Allan A. Ryan, Jr., Quiet Neighbors: Prosecuting Nazi War Criminals in America (San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1984); Ashman and Wagman Nazi Hunters; Tim J. Watts, Nazi War Criminals in the United States: A Bibliography (Monticello, IL: Vance Bibliographies, 1989); Howard Blum, Wanted: The Search for Nazis in America (New York: Quadrangle/The New York Times Book Company, 1977)
- 1947 . Nazi Hunters See Ashman and Wagman, 143–54; W. Unrath, “A Matter of Hindsight: Army Clandestine Intelligence Operations and the Klaus Barbie Affair: A Personal Perspective on the Vagaries of the Intelligence Profession,” American Intelligence Journal 14, 1 (Autumn/Winter 1993): 47–51. Guyora Binder notes: “At war's end, the French government named Barbie as a wanted man, but did not pursue him. From 1945 to Barbie lived a shadowy existence as a fugitive in occupied Germany; but by 1947, the United States occupation force had lost interest in the punishment of war criminals. The American Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) hired Barbie to gather information about communists in France, Germany and Eastern Europe. One of Barbie's American employers praised him as ‘strongly anticommunist and a Nazi idealist.’… In 1948, the CIC permitted French officials to interrogate Barbie, who did name Hardy [a French resistance leader and alleged Nazi collaborator] as his informant. Nevertheless, the CIC would not turn a valued agent over to the French, whom they considered communists. For two years, unsuccessful attempts to summon Barbie brought his own crimes under increasing scrutiny in France. At the end of this period, the Americans offered Barbie's services as a witness against Hardy, on the condition that he be returned. Now interested in trying Barbie as well, the French government could no longer accept this condition. Lacking Barbie's testimony, Hardy's prosecution failed again, this time provoking a public furor in France against both the American government and Barbie. In the face of increasing French pressure, the American government in 1951 smuggled Barbie out of Germany to Bolivia, where he was welcomed by a German émigré community which owned 60 percent of the Bolivian economy.” “Representing Nazism: Advocacy and Identity at the Trial of Klaus Barbie,” Yale Law Journal 98 (1998):1325–26. See also Tom Bower, Klaus Barbie: Butcher of Lyons (London: Corgi Books, 1984). Barbie was subsequently extradited, and then tried and convicted for war crimes in France. Bower, Blind Eye to Murder 413–15; A.A. Ryan Jr., Klaus Barbie and the United States Government, A Report to the Attorney General of the United States (Washington, D.C.: Criminal Division, United States Department of Justice, 1983). Barbie had provided the CIC with important information on Soviet uranium supplies being developed for its emergent nuclear weapons programme
- Milano , J. V. and Brogan , P. 1995 . Soldiers, Spies, and the Rat—Line: America's Undeclared War Against the Soviets Washington D.C. : Brassey's . (John Loftus and Mark Aarons, The Secret War Against the Jews (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), 86, 112–13, 146; Mark Aarons and John Loftus, Unholy Trinity: The Vatican, the Nazis, and the Swiss Banks (New York St. Martin's Griffin, 1998); Simpson, Blowback, 176–85, 196
- Secret War See Aarons and Loftus
- See the discussion on Operation Sunrise below
- Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists Notably the postwar recruitment by the US Army Chemical Corps of scientists who had either been prosecuted at Nuremberg, such as Dr. Kurt Blome (former head of Nazi biological warfare research which included “medical” experimentation upon concentration camp inmates), and others who, in effect, traded their scientific expertise for legal immunity. One recruit, Dr. Arthur Rudolph, was accused by testimony given at the Nuremberg trials of involvement in atrocities at the Nordhausen concentration camp. See Linda Hunt, “U.S. Coverup of Nazi Scientists,” (April 1985): 16ff; Linda Hunt, Secret Agenda: The United States Government, Nazi Scientist and Project Paperclip, 1945 to 1990 (New York: St.Martins Press, 1991); Simpson, Blowback, 26; C. Lasby, Project Paperclip: German Scientists and the Cold War (New York: Atheneum, 1975); John Gimbel, “German Scientists, United States Denazification Policy, and the ‘Paperclip Conspiracy.’” International History Review 12, 3 (Aug. 1990): 441–65; John Gimbel, “Project Paperclip: German Scientists, American Policy, and the Cold War,” Diplomatic History 14, 3 (1990): 343–365
- For example, the U.S. Army's G2 section ultimately struck a deal to acquire full control of Richard Gehlen's organisation. Gehlen had been Hitler's head of Eastern European Military Intelligence, and controlled a hidden stash of Nazi Germany's extensive military espionage networks, files and operations against the Soviet Union
- Nazi Hunters The charges against the OSS include their recruitment of Ferenc Vajta, a proNazi Hungarian newspaper editor who was implicated in the deportation of Hungarian Jews and—despite also working for the US Army's CIC—was later deported from America. A second allegation relates to Allen Dulles's wartime negotiations with SS General Karl Wolff regarding Operation Sunrise and his wider immediate postwar role in OSS Germany in selecting which suspected war criminals (including Kurt Waldheim to whom Dulles was related through marriage) could—following OSS debriefing—be spared prosecution. See Ashman and Wagman, 108–109, 189
- 2000 . Blowback New Haven , CT : Yale University Press . Given its field of intelligence expertise on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, Gehlen's organisation had a vested interest in encouraging an anti-Soviet orientation in order to strengthen demand for its services and thereby enhance its own authority and power within US intelligence, military and government circles. Allegedly, it secured its future by repeatedly exaggerating the nature and extent of the Soviet military threat. See Simpson, 56–58. On the growing U.S. intelligence concern with the internal “communist threat,” see Stephan Alexander, Communazis: FBI Surveillance of German Émigré Writers
- 1977 . Reaching Judgment at Nuremberg New York : Basic Books . Ironically, those former—OSS R&A Branch staff re—assigned to the State Department sceptical of the growing anti—Soviet atmosphere associated with the emerging cold war divisions, were attacked by Col. Grombach, an individual who had served in the US War Department's Military Intelligence Section—one of OSS's most bitter rivals. Grombach claimed that the OSS R&A staff had “downplayed” Stalin's war crimes, such as the Katyn forest massacre carried out by the NVGB, an atrocity with which the Nazis were charged at Nuremberg but which was not accepted by the Court itself. See B. F. Smith, 71, 104, 106, 302. Whether this attack exercised any real impact is doubtful. Both Donovan and Dulles supplied Justice Jackson with intelligence reports that blamed the Russians for the Katyn massacre. See William Jackson's contribution to “The Fifth Annual Ernst C. Steifel Symposium: 1945–1995: Critical Perspectives On The Nuremberg Trials And State Accountability,” New York Law School Journal Human Rights 12: 453; Eugene Davidson, The Trials of the Germans (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1966), 8, 71, 583. On 12 April 1990, Mikhail Gorbachev admitted Stalin had ordered his secret service—the NKVD—to carry out this atrocity. See Allen Paul, Katyn: Stalin's Massacre and the Seeds of Polish Resurrection (Annapolis, MD: United States Naval Institute Press, 1996); Roger Boyes, “Yeltsin Snubs Katyn Massacre Ceremony,” The Times (London), 6 June 1995. On emerging cold war imperatives as the motivation behind the recruitment of Nazi war criminals, see Lord Janner's interview for BBC News April 1, 1999 (http://news6.thdo.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/uk/news/id%58309000/ 309814.stm). Lord Janner is a former war crimes investigator and Chair of the Holocaust Education Trust
- 2001 . Justice Delayed: How Britain Became a Refuge for Nazi War Criminals London : Phoenix Press . See 34, Stevenson, Bormann Brotherhood, 73, 140; Trevor Barnes, “The Secret Cold War: The CIA and American Foreign Policy in Europe, 1946–1956. Part 1,” Historical Journal 24, 2 (1981): 399–415. Where these compromises were driven by anti—Nazi, as distinct from anti-Soviet, interests, they attract less criticism. The OSS made various mutually beneficial arrangements with Italian-America Mafia figures in preparation for the Allied invasion of Sicily. See A. Cockburn and St Clair, Whiteout: The CIA, Drugs and the Press (London: Verso, 1998): 34–35, 138–39
- 1998 . Official Secrets: What the Nazis Planned and what British and Americans Knew 224 London : Penguin-Viking . For a critical examination of OSS monitoring of the Jewish genocide and Allied policy more generally, see Richard Breitman 120, 131, 139, 231–32, 246, 308 n.17–18; Aronson, “Preparations for the Nuremberg Trial;” S. Friedman, No Haven for the Oppressed: United States Policy toward Jewish Refugee, 1938–1945 (Dettroit: Wayne State University Press, 1973); A. D. Morse, While Six Million Died: A Chronicle of American Apathy (New York: Overlook Press, 1998; H. L. Feingold, The Politics of Rescue: The Roosevelt Administration and the Holocaust, 1938–1945 (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1970); D. S. Wyman, Paper Walls: America and the Refugee Crisis, 1938–1941 (Boston: Pantheon Book, 1969); D. S. Wyman, The Abandonment of the Jews: America and the Holocaust, 19411945 (New York: New Press, 1984) esp. pp. n. 314. For a better-informed analysis of OSS's role in relationship to the Holocaust, see Katz, “The Holocaust and American Intelligence.” Certainly many senior OSS officials took the concentration camp atrocities most seriously, and some were included amongst the first official visitors to newly-liberated camps. See Hall to Donovan, 5 April 1944, and Hall to Donovan, 25 May 1944, Office of the Chief, Box 2, RG 226, NA. OSS was not aware of the full extent and systematic nature of Nazi atrocities within concentration camps. Certainly, Allen Dulles was shocked when receiving reports on the Auschwitz-Birkenau report. See Walter Laqueur, The Terrible Secret (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1998), 98–99; John Mendelsohn, The Holocaust: Selected Documents in Eighteen Volumes, Vol. 11: “The Wannsee Protocol and a 1944 Report on Auschwitz by the OSS” (New York: Garland, 1982). Whilst based in Turkey, OSS's Murray Gurfein, who went on to serve at Nuremberg, made real efforts to support Jewish rescue plans by seeking a specific allocation of shipping but was rebuffed by his superiors. See Monty Penkower, The Jews Were Expendable: Free World Diplomacy and the Holocaust (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1983), 165. With reference to Judge Herber Will, who in 1944–45 was OSS's Chief of the X2 Counter-Espionage Branch in the European Theater, Yonover notes: “On April 11, 1945, he was one of the first Americans to enter Buchenwald. In his Summer 1995 address in Strasbourg, Judge Will recalls that day fifty years ago: The tour of Buchenwald was one of the most unhappy experiences of my life. In addition to our guide, a large number of emaciated inmates joined us. Almost immediately we saw the long pile of naked corpses about five feet high, thousands of skeletons covered only with skin. I have read that they were neatly stacked like logs on a cordwood stockpile. I remember them as carelessly thrown on top of each other in grotesque configurations. Close by was the crematorium still warm. Rows of barracks stretched as far as I could see. We went into one and a number of the inmates were in their three-high straw-covered bunks too weak to move or do more than raise a hand. I opened the door at the end of another barracks and several corpses fell at my feet from the top of a pile of naked bodies. Several inmates picked them up, put them back on the pile and we closed the door. I could go on describing the almost unbelievable horror of what we saw but many of you were there and I don't have to describe it to you. I am sure that whatever camp you were in, it was the same. If I had not seen it, I would not have believed that human beings could do to other human beings what I saw at Buchenwald.” See Geri J. Yonover, “Anti-Semitism and Holocaust Denial in the Academy: A Tort Remedy,” Dickinson Law Review. 101 (1996): 71. citing “Hubert L. Will, Address at Strasbourg, June 23, 1995” (on file at Judge Will's chambers, Chicago, IL)
- 2000 . “ 7 ” . In Justice Delayed. How Britain Became a Refuge for Nazi War Criminals London : Phoenix Press . For a thoroughly researched criticism of the immediate postwar failure of British military and secret intelligence to screen Eastern suspected European war criminals prior to their entry into Britain, see David Cesarani, (new ed., chapter Allen Dulles has recently been the subject of a number of accusations that, partly to protect himself from embarrassment, he protected his pre-war German financial clients and bankers from war crimes charges, thereby effectively subverting Roosevelt's explicit policy. See C. Higham, Trading with the Enemy: An Expose of the Nazi-American Money Plot, 1939–1945 (New York: Delacorte, 1983); C. Higham, American Swastika (New York: Doubleday, 1985); Aarons and Loftus, Unholy Trinity, 269–70, 276–77
- 2001 . Neue Politische Literatur See Schlomo Aronson, “Preparations for the Nuremberg Trial;” Stephanie Middendorf, “Emigranten als Deutschlandexperten im ‘Office of Strategic Services’ und im amerikanischen Außenmisterium 1943–1955,” 46 (: 35–37, cf. Salter, “Visibility of the Holocaust.”
- 1945 . Blowback Through the Gehlen organisation, Otto von Bolschwing was recruited to become a high-ranking CIA contract employee heavily involved in espionage penetration of the Soviet Union. As Simpson notes: “Supremely opportunist, von Bolschwing succeeded in traversing the whole evolution of U.S. policy toward Nazi criminals. He had profited during the war from Nazi confiscation of Jewish property, then later from the defeat of Nazi Germany itself. Von Bolschwing enlisted as a CIC informer for the Americans in the spring of and before two years were out, CIA agents in Vienna, Austria, had recognized his skills and recruited him for special work on some of the most sensitive missions the agency has ever undertaken…. Von Bolschwing teamed up with Eichmann in 1936 and 1937 to draw up the SS's first comprehensive program for the systematic robbery of Europe's Jews: ‘The Jews in the entire world represent a nation which is not bound by a country or by a people but [rather] by money,’ von Bolschwing argues in a pivotal SS policy study. ‘Therefore they are and must always be an eternal enemy of National Socialism… [and they] are among the most dangerous enemies.’ The whole point of his plan, he notes, was to ‘purge Germany of its Jews.’” Simpson, 253–54
- The Bormann Brotherhood Stevenson dismisses the “Communist threat as simply the quickest and most convenient way to get the Yankee Dollar,”, 121
- 2001 . “ 8 ” . In The Hidden Hand 184 – 85 . London : John Murray . By contrast, Aldrich's recent analysis of the various British and American compromises with Nazi war criminals, including Klaus Barbie, does succeed in showing the benefits of locating these within an emerging cold war context without using this wider context as a blanket excuse for the subversion of legality. See Richard Aldrich, chapter esp. pp. 200–205
- What if the successful prosecution of major war criminals required intelligence agencies not only to supply a selection of incriminating evidence obtained by covert means to prosecutors but also to recruit agents implicated, to a lesser degree, in the same atrocities to act as informants, perhaps in return for promises of at least partial immunity from prosecution? Does the vindication of legality achieved by the former justify the subversion of legality in the latter, particularly where agreeing to such “trade offs” represent the only realistic method for obtaining important evidence of war criminality?
- Justice Delayed See Cesarini, 140–42, regarding the SIS's use of the Lithuanian General Povilas Pechaviciciusas as an informant who was allegedly implicated in atrocities and unsuccessfully sought by the Soviets as a war criminal
- Justice Delayed Cf. Cesarini, 144–45
- 27 February 2002 . BBC News
- 26 December 2001 . Boston Globe See Mark Fritz, “From Hot Conflict to Cold War,”: “Earlier this year, the flow of declassified data washed ashore hundreds of pages of CIA and US Army intelligence on Wilhelm Hoettl, an SS major in Hungary during the deportation of nearly half a million Hungarian Jews into the Auschwitz death camps in Poland. Hoettl purportedly stole a fortune in jewels, gold, and other valuables from Holocaust victims. He even testified at the Nuremberg war crimes trials, where he estimated the number of Jews killed by the Nazis at 6 million. Although Hoettl was considered a master fabricator, the files linked him to a dozen intelligence agencies in the two decades following the war, including those run by the United States, Soviet Union, Israel, the Vatican—even famed Nazi hunter Simon Wiesenthal, who denied the relationship when the allegation first surfaced in 1963. The records show that Hoettl was dropped as a US source in 1953 because of suspicions that he was also on the KGB payroll, yet he enjoyed freedom and wealth until he died in the 1960s.” http://www.boston.com/globe/nation/packages/secret_history/index9_8.shtml.
- Hidden Hand Aldrich, 182–85
- 1945 . The Bormann Brotherhood Whilst Stevenson quotes extracts the relevant OSS/R&A report on postwar Nazi plans from March whose conclusions were strongly supported by both the results of electronic intercepts of communications with German intelligence agents in Argentina and Dulles's agent within the German Foreign Ministry, he ignores its implications for his critique., 71
- 1987 . Cloak and Gown New York : Morrow . It is likely that James Angeleton and Allen Dulles were involved in securing the services of Rauff as an informant once he was released by his CIC interrogators to OSS unit S Force Verona. See Robin Winks, 350; Aarons and Loftus, Unholy Trinity, 339, n.1
- Secret War Aarons and Loftus, 72–73
- Claire Hulme and the present writer are presently conducting research on precisely this point by comparing the widely cited allegations made by Simpson and Aaron and Loftus against the archival record
- Blowback On occasions, Simpson's analysis acknowledges this important point, albeit only in passing;, 66–68. The only OSS case Simpson discusses is the “admission” by Charles Thayer, chief of OSS Vienna, that he deleted Hans Herwarth's name from the relevant war crimes list in order to gain his expertise in anti-Soviet diplomacy and political warfare. However, during World War II, Herwarth had supplied the OSS with military secrets on the Soviet/Hitler pact, and was an associate of members of the anti-Nazi opposition movement, such as von Stauffenberg, who sought to assassinate Hitler. Ibid., 68, 86–88
- OSS See Smith, 239
- Unholy Trinity Aarons and Loftus, 258
- 11 March 1985 . Denver Journal of International Law and Policy Louis Beres notes: “Indeed, at the end of World War II, America shielded large numbers of Nazi war criminals from prosecution, preferring to enlist their services as spies against East Germany and the Soviet Union. At a time when the U.S. was involved as the principal architect of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, a secret military program—known aptly as “Ratline”—used Nazi war criminals as highly-paid intelligence agents against the East. All of this took place when tens of thousands of concentration camp survivors were denied admittance to the United States.” “Iraqi Crimes and International Law: The Imperative to Punish,”, 23 (1993): n.33. See also R. Blumenthal, “Nazi Whitewash in 1940's Charged,” New York Times, 1. It has been alleged that OSS's Allen Dulles was partly responsible for creating Vatican-run “ratlines” that aided over 1,000 wanted Nazi war criminals to escape including Franz Stangl, commandant at Treblinka extermination camp, Gustav Wagner, who ran the Sobibor death camp, Adolf Eichmann, the architect of the Holocaust and Joseph Mengele, notorious for his experiments on death camp inmates at Auschwitz. See D. G. Guyatt, “Holy Smoke and Mirrors,” Nexus Magazine 7 (2000): Online at http://www.nexusmagazine.com/smokemirrors.html; B. Tutt, “A World War II's Mystery Sub Voyage and Surrender of a German U-Boat in 1945 May Prove One of the Conflict's Most Ironic Episodes,” Houston Chronicle, 10 January 1999 (alleging Dulles shielded Heinrich Mueller, the chief of the Gestapo in return for secret military technologies)
- Blowback , 36 The majority of scholarship has addressed both NARA Record Groups other than the OSS's RG 226, e.g., RG 260, RG 319 and other U.S. military sources derived from US Freedom of Information Act requests regarding CIC records. See, for example, Simpson, 49, 151, 170, 209n, 213, 225n, 236, 258, and notes at 324, 328; Bower, Blind Eye to Murder, 123, 126, 133, 188, 413–14, 473; Hunt, Secret Agenda.
- 1986 . The Second Oldest Profession London : Andre Deutsche . Philip Knightley, 236
- 1945 . Unholy Trinity On the recruitment point, this quote is ambiguous as to whether it is referring to staff employed by the OSS between May 1945 and October or to those of successor organizations or to other U.S. intelligence agencies. Allegedly, from 1947, Allen Dulles had direct control of his own unofficial and ultra-conservative group, the Document Disposal Unit, financed by the State Department, who were waiting to unleash former fascists as anti-communist “freedom fighters.” This group's recruitment of Nazi war criminals was subverting the investigative work of the official post-OSS organizations, including the early years of the CIA. See Aarons and Loftus, 234
- The Second Oldest Profession Knightly, 236
- 1945 . Unholy Trinity One example is Ferenc Vajta, a Hungarian fascist implicated in Utasha's wartime atrocities against civilians. See Aarons and Loftus, 52. The OSS had also been monitoring Vajta's high level contacts via Miha Krek with the Vatican. Ibid., 301. See OSS Report, February No. 113566, RG 226, NA
- Secret Hand See Aldrich, 199–205
- 2001 . Gehlen: Spy of the Century New York : Random House . Allegedly these included Emil Augsburg and Dr. Franz Six, who were implicated in mobile killing squads within Eastern Europe that killed Jews, intellectuals, and Soviet partisans. Breitman claims that: “Nine of the fourteen persons in this second tier [of Nazi war criminals whose name files were released in July] had some contact with the West German intelligence organization established by General Reinhard Gehlen”, “Historical Analysis of 20 Name Files from CIA Records,” http://www.nara.gov/iwg/declass/rg263.html. See also E.H. Cook- ridge, (1972, 271
- Blowback See Simpson, 42–43
- Justice Delayed See Cesarini, 154–55; Aarons and Loftus, Unholy Trinity, 150, 258–59
- 1978 . Hitler's Spies: German Military Intelligence in World War II New York : Macmillan . See David Kahn, 142–51, 428–35
- 1984 . “ 16 ” . In Quiet Neighbours New York : Harcourt Brace Jovanovich . See A. Ryan, 218–45; Simpson, Blowback, xiii, 44–45, chapter
- 1972 . The Service: The Memoirs of General Richard Gehlen New York : World Publishing . See Richard Gehlen, 143
- Blowback See Simpson, 2; Smith, OSS, 239–41
- Daily Telegraph See Philip Jacobson, “War Crimes Court Wants SAS to Trap Karadzic,”, 12 March 2000; Tim Butcher, “French Snatch Squad Use SAS Tactics,” Daily Telegraph, 4 April 2000
- See G. Tenet (CIA director of central intelligence), “Does America Need the CIA?,” http://www.cia.gov/cia/public_affairs/speeches/dci_speech_111997.html.
- Official Secrets See the one-sided focus Breitman develops in his well-researched, 219–23
- Donovan In the immediate postwar months, OSS officers were given instructions to give a high priority to war crimes investigative work, particularly gathering documentary and other evidence. This resulted in the capture of both incriminating film evidence and John English's discovery of “10 tons of damning records behind the bricked up walls of the castle dungeon.” See Dunlop, 536
- 1997 . Studies in Intelligence The History Channel endlessly repeats the sensationalised “Odessa Files.” Ruffner has recognised the mixed character of media interest in this topic and the blurring of fictional and non-fictional genres. See K. Ruffner, “A Persistent Emotional Issue: CIA's Support to the Nazi War Criminal Investigations,” 1 http://www.cia.gov/csi/studies/97unclas/naziwar. html. For a sprinkling of media coverage, see Dale Russakoff, “American Officials Accused of Aiding Nazi Collaborators,” The Washington Post, 17 May 1982, A1 and A6; Thomas O'Toole and Morton Mintz, “US Probes Report Nazi Collaborators Were Helped to Immigrate,” The Washington Post, 18 May 1982, A3; Thomas O'Toole, “Nazis Brought to US to Work against Soviets in Cold War,” The Washington Post, 20 May 1982, A1 and A20; and Thomas O'Toole, “The Secret under the Little Cemetery,” The Washington Post, 23 May 1982, A1 and A5
- Foreign Intelligence For more details on this positive support, see Ruffner, “A Persistent Emotional Issue;” Katz, 51–59; Hulme and Salter, The Nazi's Persecution of Religion as a War Crime; Salter, “Visibility of the Holocaust;” G. Tenet, “Does American Need the CIA?” (arguing that CIA played an indispensable role in supplying evidence of atrocities in Bosnia to war crimes prosecutors); C. Lockwood, “UK passes evidence to war crimes tribunal,” Daily Telegraph, 21 April 1999; “Cook Boost to War Crimes Probe.” http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/europe/newsid%5F323000/323884.stm.
- McDonald . “ an expert archivist on OSS records, has—albeit only in passing—made a similar point regarding the role of American intelligence within the Nuremberg war crimes process. See Lawrence McDonald, “The OSS and its Records” in ” . In The Secrets War: The Office of Strategic Services in World War II George C. Chalou, ed. (Washington, D.C.: National Archives, 1992), 100
- 1944 . The Spoils of War In the OSS created an “Art Looting Investigation Unit” whose purpose was (1) to provide information helpful in the art-restitution process; and (2) to provide evidence for the prosecution of Nazi leaders at the Nuremberg trials. Members of the Unit miraculously recovered a Nazi-generated inventory of cultural items taken from Belgium, France, Italy and the Netherlands. The inventory included information about the artworks' provenance, the condition of the artwork and, most important, the works' whereabouts. See James S. Plaut, “Investigation of the Major Nazi Art-Confiscation Agencies,” in, Elizabeth Simpson, ed. (New York: H.N. Abrams, 1997), 124–25. The OSS report is addressed and placed in a wider context by a number of legal studies. For example, see Diane Walton Kelly, “Leave No Stone Unturned: The Search for Art Stolen by the Nazis and the Legal Rules Governing Restitution of Stolen Art,” Fordham Media & Entertainment Law Journal 9 (1999): 549; Lynn Nicholas, “Neutrality, Morality, and the Holocaust: The Rape of European Art,” American University International Law Review 14 (1998): 237. Nicholas notes that: “After the war… hundreds of thousands of works were returned to their owners, but, of course, not everything was found or claimed. In the neutral countries, after the war, the [OSS] and British Intelligence sent teams to Switzerland, Portugal, and Spain to trace looted works. These teams were authorized, in certain instances, to represent the recuperation commissions of other Allied nations. Although their initial reception in Switzerland was warm, they soon ran into great resistance…. But, as soon as Allied pressure decreased, the matter died down. The OSS art unit was withdrawn from Switzerland in January 1946. By 1946, the OSS had traced only about seventy-five pictures to Switzerland, which is another reason the Swiss federal government gave for not pushing the investigation.” Ibid., 241. The OSS discovered and reorganised the meticulous inventories and catalogues kept by the Nazis listing the works of art they looted, and includes a “Biographical Index of Individuals Involved in Art Looting” incriminating over 2,000 individuals. The report is available at: http://docproj.loyola.edu.
- 2000 . Studies in Intelligence See Donald P. Steury, “Tracking Nazi ‘Gold’: The OSS and Project SAFE- HAVEN,” 9 (Summer 35–50. Even Stevenson acknowledges that Donovan had played an active role in monitoring looted Nazi funds in the immediate postwar months; The Bormann Brotherhood, 149
- 1999 . Dickinson Journal of International Law See Jeffrey Craig Mickletz “An Analysis of the $1.25 Billion Settlement Between the Swiss Banks and Holocaust Survivors and Holocaust Victims' Heirs,” 18 (: 199; Jodi Berlin Ganz, “Heirs Without Assets and Assets without Heirs: Recovering and Reclaiming Dormant Swiss Bank Accounts,” Fordham International Law Journal 20 (1997): 1306
- 1998 . Cardozo Law Review See Antonio Louca, “Looted Nazi Gold: Nazi Gold And The Swiss-Portuguese Connection,” 20 (: 497. See also references to OSS records in the Testimony before the Subcommittee on Government management, Information and Technology of the House Government Reform and Oversight Committee http://www.state.gov/ww/policyremarks/1998/980714slanynazi.htm. This investigation represented the largest investigation yet undertaken using the OSS and other U.S. National Archives records
- 1999 . The Art Newspaper 1 The OSS's post-war “Art Looting Investigation Unit” was set up to interrogate Nazi officials in order to determine ownership of looted works, with the aim of both aiding restitution to rightful owners, and providing evidence for Nuremberg prosecutors. See Plaut, “Investigation.” A trade journal, published an OSS document on its web site (http://www.theartnewspaper.com) in January listing over 200 individuals reportedly involved in art trade with the Nazis. See “The Art Trade Under the Nazis: The Not So Secret List.” The preface to the list states that it: “gives an extraordinary panorama, especially for Paris, of the art trade in war time. Much of this trade was not illegal, even if it was collaborationist;” p
- 1999 . Whittier Law Review In addition to references already cited above, see Pierre Th. Braunschweig, “Fifteenth Annual International Law Symposium ‘Nazi Gold and other Assets of The Holocaust: The Search For Justice—A Postscript’: In the Eye of the Hurricane: Switzerland in World War II,” 20 (: 659, 672–73
- 1997 . U.S. and Allied Efforts to Recover and Restore Gold and Other Assets Stolen or Hidden by Germany During World War II, Preliminary Study Washington , D.C. : G.P.O. May . OSS monitored Swiss/German trafficking in gold and other financial assets. X-2: “provided the OSS and Washington with an extensive summary of Nazi gold and currency transfers arranged via Switzerland through most of the war.” According to X-2, these included: gold and bonds looted by the Nazis from all over Europe and received by certain Swiss banks; funds sent by the Deutsche-VerkehrsKreditbank of Karlsruhe to Basel; securities held in Zurich by private firms for the Nazi party; large quantities of Swiss francs credited to private accounts in various Swiss banks; money and property held in Liechtenstein; more than 2 million francs held by the Reichsbank in Switzerland; forty-five million Reichsmarks held in covert Swiss bank accounts. In addition to obvious official transactions, German and Swiss corporation and banks brought in these sums. See William Z. Slany, U.S. Department of State, (coordinated by Stuart E. Eizenstat) ((Eizenstat Report), viii, 40
- 24 October 2001 . Guardian See Christopher Zinn, “Medics wheel Nazi suspect to court,” (re 88 year old Konrad Kalejs)
- It is arguable that the fact that such formidable surveillance capacities are monopolised by largely unaccountable agencies of the state is a problem in itself
- 3 March 1948 . University of Pennslvania Law Review On the difficulties of proving a legal framework of intelligence oversight that can strike a workable balance between institutional effectiveness and liberal democratic notions of legal accountability, see David Colton, “Speaking Truth to Power: Intelligence Oversight in an Imperfect World,” 137 (1988): 571; W. M. Reisman and J. E. Baker, Regulating Covert Action: Practices, Contexts and Policies of Covert Coercion Abroad in International and American Law (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992). On the war crimes point in particular, see, for example, the discussion in “War Crimes and Rule of Law,” Wall Street Journal, 2
- 7 June 1945 . See Justice Jackson's preliminary report to the US President, available online at: http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/jack01.htm. See also the comments on the need for a genuine trial to re-assert the rule of law between nations contained in Shawcross's statement to the IMT on 4 December 1945 available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/proc/12-04-45.htm.
- This is part of a wider difficulty arising whenever “newsworthiness” and academic “topicality” is defined in a manner that precludes the reporting of undramatic, but positive, institutional developments
- 1994 . In From the Cold: National Security and Parliamentary Democracy Oxford : Clarendon Press . For a critical discussion of the political, legal and constitutional context in which the UK intelligence and security services operated until the late 1990s, see Laurence Lustgarten and Ian Leigh
- 1994 . “ 6 ” . In Forgotten Victims: The Abandonment of Americans in Hitler's Camps Boulder : Westview Press . See Mitchell Bard, chapter; also Jim Downes' present article in this edition of the Journal of Intelligence History.
- It is important to differentiate the actions and orientation of former-OSS prosecutors, who may have defined their Nuremberg assignments as a complete break from their earlier OSS work, from the policies and activities of the OSS prior to and immediately after the German surrender
- 1994 . The Secret War Against Hitler Boulder : Westview Press . See Fabian von Schlabrendorff, (new edition), 260–63
- Donovan Donovan sought to “turn” these defendants into presenting evidence for the prosecution; ibid.; Dunlop, 483
- 1943 . The Bormann Brotherhood On SS Major Otto Skorzeny's interrogation by Donovan, see Stevenson, 117. Skorzeny, a former German commando leader who in September rescued Mussolini from Allied hands and was acquitted of war crimes charges “largely with the help of testimony by a British secret service agent”, is regularly accused of having run the Odessa organisation to facilitate the escape of Nazi war criminals to Latin America. See ibid.,120
- Donovan Arguably, it was the combination of roles, which entailed mobilizing OSS files, other resources and officials such as Adolph Schmidt, that makes Donovan's contributions worthy of research. See Dunlop, 482
- The Nazi's Persecution of Religion as a War Crime For an earlier empirical analysis along these lines, see Hulme and Salter
- 1944 . Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation, Analysis of Government, Proposals for Redress Washington : Carnegie Endowment for International Peace . See Raphael Lemkin
- Nazi Hunters See Ashman and Wagman, 68–70, who note that Bernays, who is often cited as the architect of the trial plan, even obtained an advance copy of Lemkin's path-breaking book from the OSS
- 1950 . World Politics See, for example, the critical comments of Franz Neumann, “The War Crimes Trials,” 2 (: 135–47; John Herz, Denazification and Related Policies,” in From Dictatorship to Democracy: Coping with the Legacies of Authoritarianism and Totalitarianism, John Herz, ed. (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1968), 19–38
- Donovan See Dunlop, 482
- 1994 . Architect of Palace of Justice Renovations; See Kiley, Barry Katz, “The Arts of War: ‘Visual Presentation’ and National Intelligence,” Design Issues 12 (: 3–21
- 1997 . Nazi Hunters See Ashman and Wagner, 277 (they misspell Kempner's name as “Knepner”); Markus Wolf, Man Without a Face (New York: Times Books, 289; A. Weinstein and A. Vassiliev, The Haunted Wood: Soviet Espionage in America: The Stalin Era (New York: Random House, 1999)
- An entire series of Nuremberg source reports—the “R series”—was based on OSS/R&A documentation supplied by Rothschild's London Field Office
- Nazi Hunters , 84 Although when the controversy first erupted the CIA denied possessing relevant files on Waldheim, they reportedly suppressed OSS background file preparing during the war (in conjunction with British intelligence), which in fact was under their custody, apparently on the grounds that its disclosure would be too politically embarrassing. See Ashman and Wagner, 104; cf. Ruffner, “A Persistent Emotional Issue.”
- See Salter, “Visibility of the Holocaust.”
- 1996 . Simon Wiesenthal: A Life in Search of Justice London : Weidenfeld . Incidentally, included amongst the many hundred individuals arrested by Wiesenthal in these early postwar months were several SS personnel from the Mauthausen camp, the very place where torture and other war crimes had been committed against captured OSS/SOE personnel from the Dawes Mission. See Hella Pick, 88–89, 91. Pick's account is clear about the growing conflict faced by U.S. intelligence agencies between the policy of securing anti-communist informants and scientists, and continuing to rigorously pursuing war crimes prosecutions and denazification hearings, and the problems created by overlapping jurisdictions of different rival agencies, ibid., 113, 115, 123, 156. Although Ashman and Wagman indicate that Wiesenthal's investigative work led to many convictions, they acknowledge only the support he received from CIC; Nazi Hunters, 288–89