References
- 1993 . Of Moles and Molehunters: A Review of Counterintelligence Literature, 1977–92 For titles and commentary on the most prominent of these works, see Cleveland Cram, CIA Center for the Study of Intelligence Monograph CSI 93–002 (October
- 1978 . Legend: The Secret World of Lee Harvey Oswald New York : McGraw Hill . (Deception: The Invisible War Between the KGB and the CIA (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989)
- New York: Harper and Row, 1980
- 1987 . Cloak and Gown: Scholars in the Secret War, 1939–1961 322 – 438 . New York : William Morrow .
- 1991 . Cold Warrior: James Jesus Angleton: The CIA's Master Spy Hunter New York : Simon and Schuster .
- 1992 . Molehunt: The Secret Search for Traitors that Shattered the CIA New York : Random House .
- Boston: Little, Brown, 1977
- New York: Crown Publishers, 1980
- 2000 . Spytime: The Undoing of James Jesus Angleton New York : Harcourt .
- Woodstock, NY: Overlook Press, 2002
- Variety According to, a fictionalized Angleton will be the main character of a forthcoming movie by Universal Pictures, The Good Shepherd. Leonard DiCaprio will play James Wilson, an idealistic Yale graduate who joins the CIA at the dawn of the Cold War and endures forty years of professional risk and personal strife
- 1978 . The Night Watch London : Robert Hale . David Atlee Phillips 189
- Molehunt Representative of such characterizations is this one from David Wise: “[Angleton] was… warped, a tortured and twisted man who saw conspiracy and deception as the natural order of things. His mind… was a hopeless bramble of false trails and switchbacks, an intricate maze to nowhere.”, 295
- 23 June 1991 . “[w]e never had a successful Soviet operation that Angleton and his crowd didn't cast some doubt on” (quoted in Burton Hersh, “In the Hall of Mirrors: The Cold War's Distorted Images,” . In Los Angeles Times John Maury:, M2); Rolf Kingsley: “[w]hen I took over, the place had simply quit working… [it] was only going through the motions” (quoted in Mangold, Cold Warrior, 264); William Colby: “we seemed to be putting more emphasis on the KGB as CIA's adversary than on the Soviet Union as the United States' adversary” (Honorable Men: My Life in the CIA [New York: Simon and Schuster, 1978], 245.)
- Mangold . Cold Warrior 249
- 1960 . Wilderness of Mirrors Most prominent among those squelched sources—and the only two regularly cited in published accounts—were NICK NACK, a GRU officer who reported to the CIA and FBI in the early s and in 1972, and KITTYHAWK, a KGB walk-in who in 1966 seemed to corroborate Golitsyn's leads about the mole in the Agency. NICK NACK provided 20 “serials” that, when acted upon after Angleton left, helped uncover GRU espionage in France, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. Angleton thought KITTYHAWK was a provocateur whose reporting about the mole—by then already identified—was a giveaway to establish his credentials. Notwithstanding Angleton's reservations, the CIA and the FBI used KITTYHAWK in a complicated playback scheme that went badly awry (the Shadrin case). Martin, 191–92; Mangold, Cold Warrior, 340–44, 409–10; Wise, Molehunt, 195–97
- 1989 . International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence Samuel Halpern and Hayden Peake, “Did Angleton Jail Nosenko?,” 3 (Winter: 451–64
- 1973 . The idea first appeared in in articles by former CIA operator Miles Copeland, and Aaron Latham borrowed and popularized it
- 2003 . A Look over My Shoulder: A Life in the Central Intelligence Agency New York : Random House . Richard Helms with William Hood, 276; [John Hart,] “The Monster Plot,” June 1978, 178, in Yuri Nosenko FBI Freedom of Information Act File No. 65–68530, section 6
- The Night Watch Former operations officer David Atlee Phillips offered this evocative memory of Angleton: “I watched Angleton as he shuffled down the hall, six feet tall, his shoulders stooped as if supporting an enormous incubus of secrets… extremely thin, he was once described as ‘a man who looks like his ectoplasm has run out.’”, 239
- Blee , David H. 29 November 1976 . (Chief, Counterintelligence Staff) memorandum to Chief, Information Management Staff, “CI Staff Record Study,” declassified in 2000, copy in author's possession
- Grose , Peter . 1994 . Gentleman Spy: The Life of Allen Dulles 422 – 23 . Boston : Houghton Mifflin . The Israeli government acknowledged its special tie to Angleton by dedicating two monuments to him: one on a battlefield near Jerusalem and the other near the King David Hotel in the city center. Andy Court, “Spy Chiefs Honour a CIA Friend,” Jerusalem Post5 December 1987
- Mangold . Cold Warrior 46 If Angleton had used his middle name, he would have pronounced it in its Spanish form “hay-soos,” not “gee-zuss,” as nearly everyone else does when saying it
- Naftali , Timothy J. 1992 . “ARTIFICE: James Angleton and X-2 Operations in Italy,” in ” . In The Secrets War: The Office of Strategic Services in World War II Edited by: Chalou , George C. 222 Washington , D.C. : National Archives and Records Administration .
- Helms . 1978 . A Look over My Shoulder 154; Thomas Powers, The Man Who Kept the Secrets (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 52
- Helms . A Look over My Shoulder 277
- Mangold . Cold Warrior 47
- “The Monster Plot,” 114–16. CIA first heard about the KGB disinformation unit from Polish intelligence officer Michal Goleniewski—a walk-in source of the CIA's beginning in 1959—who had dealt with the KGB on dezinformatsiya matters since 1953. Although he was not the first Agency asset to refer to the practice of disinformation, Goleniewski was the first to emphasize the role that Soviet counterintelligence officers played in disseminating it
- Studies in Intelligence CIA analysts first began describing differences between Moscow and Beijing in the early 1950s and were more forward leaning than many counterparts in the U.S. Intelligence Community and the CIA's operations directorate. These skeptics believed that the early evidence of a split was too sketchy, too inferential, and too contrary to other signs of continued cooperation. They also believed that one of the major irritants in bilateral relations, animosity between Khrushchev and Mao, was eliminated with the Soviet leader's ouster in 1964, and that afterward mutual interest would bring the communist powers back together. Harold P. Ford, “Calling the Sino-Soviet Split,”, Winter 1998–1999, 57–72
- Successive Soviet intelligence services ran the Trust from 1921 to 1927 against White Russian émigré groups abroad. The program used a bogus anti-Bolshevik organization (the Monarchist Association of Central Russia) to penetrate, control, and disrupt the intelligence and political activities of more than one million expatriate dissidents, principally in Germany, France, and Poland. The Trust also hoodwinked the intelligence services of Great Britain, France, Poland, the Baltic states, and Finland into financially supporting it, fed them disinformation, and fooled them into disclosing their White Russian and other anti-Soviet contacts
- In the early 1950s, the Soviets used a formerly authentic dissident group in Poland—Wolnosc I Nepodleglosc (”Freedom and Independence” and known by its acronym WiN)—that had been penetrated by the Polish security service to monitor Western intelligence personnel, plans, and activities. Western intelligence services thought that in 1947 the Soviets had eliminated resistance groups operating inside Poland. A Polish agent dispatched to London claimed that WiN—formerly a remnant of the Polish Home Army—had survived, however, and soon the CIA and MI-6 were airdropping money, ordnance, and radios to supposed WiN elements all over Poland
- Angleton's first venture into writing intelligence history came after World War II, when he prepared detailed studies of German intelligence units for use in interrogations or possible war crimes trials
- 1979 . The Rote Kapelle: The CIA History of Soviet Intelligence and Espionage Networks in Western Europe, 1936–1945 Lanham , MD : University Publications of America . One of them has been published as
- Wise . 1989 . Molehunt 45 – 47 . Richard Harris Smith, “The First Moscow Station: An Espionage Footnote to Cold War History,” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 3 (Winter: 340–43
- Schechter , Jerrold L. and Peter Deriabin , S. 1992 . The Spy Who Saved the World: How a Soviet Colonel Changed the Course of the Cold War 204 New York : Charles Scribner's Sons . Like others at the CIA, Angleton started to have doubts about Penkovsky after the U.S. Government learned the Russian had been arrested in September 1962. The CIA looked into the possibility that Penkovsky had been a controlled disinformation agent before and during the Cuban missile crisis. The idea was soon discounted, but Angleton—by then influenced by Golitsyn's ideas—wrongly held on to that theory and added the twist that a Soviet mole inside the U.S. or British governments had compromised Penkovsky. Ibid., 189, 194, 391–94
- Wilderness of Mirrors Only a tiny handful of CIA officers knew about the West German plan. When Goleniewski reported that the KGB also was aware, to Angleton it was a clear sign that a source inside the CIA or the BND was responsible. Because it was never determined that either of the known Soviet spies inside the German service (Heinz Felfe and Hans Klemens) was to blame, Angleton had to accept the possibility that the mole was in the Agency. Martin, 105–6; Thomas Powers, “Spook of Spooks,” New York Review of Books, 17 August 1989, 41
- From Peter Deriabin, who had defected in 1954. Penkovsky was still in place, but he was in the GRU and reported mostly on Soviet strategic and military subjects
- An FBI tally of the leads Nosenko provided in his early debriefings showed that out of 157 cases (63 concerning American citizens and 94 involving foreigners), 104 (52 in each category) were already known or suspected, unproductive or not yet active, lacked access to classified information, or could not be investigated because Nosenko's knowledge was vague or ambiguous. Nosenko FBI FOIA File No. 6568350, section 5
- 1993 . Case Closed: Lee Harvey Oswald and the Assassination of JFK New York : Random House . Nosenko's contention that Soviet intelligence had had no operational interest in Oswald seemed implausible, considering that the American had been stationed at an airbase in Japan involved in U-2 missions. Oswald's comfortable living conditions in Minsk, his marriage to the niece of a Soviet army intelligence officer, and the circumstances of his return to the United States could be interpreted as suggesting that he had some tie to the KGB. None of Nosenko's information about Oswald and the KGB could be confirmed independently; nor would Nosenko, a counterintelligence officer, necessarily be able to say without reservation whether the KGB's foreign intelligence component had or had not recruited a particular individual. Nosenko's knowledge of Oswald is well summarized in Gerald Posner, 46–56
- Cold Warrior Quoted in Mangold, 151–52
- 1995 . Inside CIA's Private World: Declassified Articles from the Agency's Internal Journal, 1955–1992 New Haven , CT : Yale University Press . CIA officer Richards J. Heuer, Jr., incisively examines the flaws in the analysis of Nosenko's case in “Nosenko: Five Paths to Judgment,” in, ed. H. Bradford Westerfield 379–414
- 23 April 1978 . Washington Star “Epstein's Thesis Hints of KGB Entanglements,”, G5
- 1999 . The Sword and the Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive and the Secret History of the KGB New York : Basic Books . Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, 184–86, 367–68. Nosenko was later vindicated (at least partly) after the Deputy DCI, to whom DCI Helms had delegated the case, assigned it to the Office of Security. Using an analytical methodology that tended to explain away Nosenko's inconsistencies and inaccuracies—the converse of the approach that Angleton and the Soviet Division had taken—the Office of Security concluded that Nosenko's detractors had not proven their argument: “it is not considered that based on all available information a conclusion that Nosenko is or is not a bona fide defector can be incontrovertibly substantiated at this time.” [Bruce Solie,] “Yuri Ivanovich NOSENKO,” 19 June 1967, declassified 1994, in John F. Kennedy Assassination Records, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD, record number 104-10150-10026. Nosenko was then released under supervision, resettled, compensated, and hired as a contractor lecturing CIA officers on counterintelligence
- Cold Warrior Angleton's reaction to Philby's perfidy was so severe that he burned the memoranda describing his three dozen meetings with his erstwhile friend and confidante. Mangold, 67–68
- Lawrence , P. and Jepson , II . 1997 . The Espionage Threat Defense Intelligence Agency publication no. DOS-2400-219-88, September 1988, 41–42; Stan A. Taylor and Daniel Snow, “Cold War Spies: Why They Spied and How They Got Caught,” Intelligence and National Security 12 (April appendix
- Molehunt According to Golitsyn, the mole used the codename “Sasha,” was of Slavic origin, had a surname beginning with “K” and ending in “ski” or “sky,” had been recruited around 1950, and was stationed in Germany for several years. The CIA determined that “Sasha” was a Russian émigré named Aleksandr Kopatzky. An ex-Nazi spy who worked for the OSS, Kopatzky became a Soviet agent in 1949 and was “recruited” by the CIA two years later. He served as a contract employee supporting operations in West Germany during the 1950s. Through his involvement in Agency attempts to recruit Soviets and encourage defections, he was well positioned to compromise operations, disclose agent identities and tradecraft secrets, and facilitate KGB dangles. He fell under suspicion by the end of the decade (before Golitsyn's defection) after an unusually high percentage of his cases went bad, and the CIA dismissed him in 1961. After he was identified, the FBI investigated him off and on until he died in 1982. Wise, chaps. 13 and 19; David E. Murphy, “Sasha Who?,” Intelligence and National Security 8 (January 1993): 102–7; idem, “The Hunt for ‘Sasha’ Is Over,” CIRA Newsletter 25 (Fall 2000): 11–15; Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield, 148–49, 176–78
- Andrew and Mitrokhin . The Sword and the Shield 460 – 66 .
- Wise . “ 10 ” . In Molehunt 162 – 66 . 250–52; Mangold, Cold Warrior, chap.; Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, KGB: The Inside Story (New York: HarperCollins, 1990), 566–67
- Mangold . 1980 . “ 19 ” . In Cold Warrior New York : Doubleday . chap.; Wise, Molehunt, 112–14; John Sawatsky, Men in the Shadows: The RCMP Security Service chap. 16
- Spyhunter It is the opening “grabber” in the television version of Mangold's book, shown in the United States by the Public Broadcasting Service in 1991
- Mangold . “ 14 ” . In Cold Warrior chap.; Wise, Molehunt, 170–72, 214–18
- Mangold . Cold Warrior 435 n. 4
- Cold Warrior Quoted in Mangold, 308
- Prados , John . 2003 . Lost Crusader: The Secret Wars of CIA Director William Colby 56 – 59 . New York : Oxford University Press .
- Prados . Lost Crusader 160 – 61 . Mangold, Cold Warrior, 310–11
- Prados . Lost Crusader 193; Mangold, Cold Warrior, 313
- Prados . Lost Crusader 246 – 47 .
- Colby . Honorable Men 334; Mangold, Cold Warrior, 351
- Colby . Honorable Men 364 – 65 . Martin, Wilderness of Mirrors, 212–13; Mangold, Cold Warrior, 299–302
- 1976 . Final Report… Book III, Supplementary Detailed Staff Reports on Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans Washington , D.C. : GPO . The CI Staff's involvement in HTLINGUAL ran from 1955 to 1974; similar projects of shorter duration also intercepted mail between the United States and Communist China and Cuba. By indexing all the mail and reading some of it, Angleton hoped to learn about possible Soviet espionage contacts in America and Soviet tradecraft and mail handling procedures. HTLINGUAL never produced much of value, and reservations about it were voiced within the CIA, but Angleton persisted with it. MHCHAOS found no insidious contacts between American radicals and hostile foreign governments. U.S. Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities [hereafter, Church Committee], (561–636, 681–721; Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States [hereafter, Rockefeller Commission], Report to the President (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1975), 101–15, 130–50
- Martin . Wilderness of Mirrors 216
- Mangold . Cold Warrior 159
- Final Report… Book I Church Committee, 171
- Mangold . “ 22 ” . In Cold Warrior chap. and Wise, Molehunt, chap. 17
- Molehunt Quoted in Wise, 297
- Recent Espionage Cases, 19751999 Security Research Center, Defense Security Service, (September 1999). The officers were David Barnett, Edward Lee Howard, William Kampiles, Edwin Moore, and Sharon Scranage
- 1988 . U.S. Counterintelligence and Security Concerns: A Status Report, Personnel and Information Security Washington , D.C. : GPO . U.S. House of Representatives, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Subcommittee on Oversight and Evaluation, 19; Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 20 August 1988, 2345
- “Unclassified Abstract of the CIA Inspector General's Report on the Aldrich H. Ames Case,” September 1994, 4, copy in author's possession
- The National Interest Quoted in Abram N. Shulsky and Gary J. Schmitt, “The Future of Intelligence,”, 38 (Winter 1994–95), 73
- Kaplan , E. “To Tell the Truth,” . In U.S. News and World Report Kevin Whitelaw and David 11 June 2001, 18ff.; Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, A Review of the FBI's Performance in Deterring, Detecting, and Investigating the Espionage Activities of Robert Philip Hanssen, 14 August 2003, accessed on the Department of Justice website at http://www.doj.gov/oig/product.htm.
- Deception Quoted in Epstein, 45