References
- 1975 . The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany, 1944–1946 Washington , D.C. : Center of Military History . For a detailed account of the U.S. Army in the early occupation, see Earl F. Ziemke, For an account focused upon South Germany, see Edward N. Peterson, The American Occupation of Germany: Retreat to Victory (Detroit, MI: Wayne State University Press, 1977). The best German account of the American occupation is Klaus-Dietmar Henke, Die amerikanische Besetzung Deutschlands (München: Oldenbourg, 1995)
- 1991 . Entnazifizierung: politische Säuberung und Rehabilitierung in den vier Besatzungzonen 1945–1949 München : Deutsche Taschenbuch Verlag . For discussions of denazification in the U.S. Zone of Germany see the following sources: Clemens Vollnhals and Thomas Schlemmer, eds., (Hans Woller, Gesellschaft und Politik in der amerikanischen Besatzungszone: die Region Ansbach und Fürth (München: Oldenbourg, 1986); Elmer Plischke, “Denazification in Germany: A Policy Analysis” in Robert Wolfe, ed., Americans as Proconsuls: United States Military Government in Germany & Japan, 1944–1952 (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1984), 150–68; Tom Bower, The Pledge Betrayed: America and Britain and the Denazification of Postwar Germany (New York: Doubleday, 1982); Lutz Niethammer, Entnazifizierung in Bayern: Säuberung und Rehabilitierung unter amerikanischer Besatzung (Frankfurt: S. Fischer, 1972); Constantine FitzGibbon, Denazification (New York: W. W. Norton, 1969); John Gimbel, The American Occupation of Germany: Politics and the Military, 1945–1949 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1968); Michael Balfour and John Mair, Four-Power Control in Germany & Austria (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1956); William E. Griffith, “Denazification in the United States Zone of Germany” in The Annals of the American Academy of the Political & Social Sciences, 267.1 (1950): 68–76; Carl J. Friedrich, “Denazification, 1945–1946” in American Experiences in Military Government in World War II (New York: Rinehart, 1948), 255–61
- 1948 . Special Text No. 1: History and Mission of the CIC According to U.S. Army's “the mission of the Counter Intelligence Corps is to contribute to the successful operation of the Army of the United States through the detection of treason, sedition, subversive activity, and disaffection, and the detection and prevention of enemy espionage and sabotage,” 63. A later Army history of the CIC stated that “in general, the mission of the Counter Intelligence Corps [during the war and occupation] was to secure our forces from espionage, sabotage, and subversion and to destroy all enemy intelligence services;” see “History and Mission of the Counter Intelligence Corps in World War II” (Baltimore, MD: Counter Intelligence Corps School, n.d.), 48. John J. McCloy, U.S. High Commissioner for Germany, noted that the CIC had responsibility for the apprehension of war criminals and security suspects as defined by the Potsdam Agreement as well as those individuals subject to automatic arrest; see his Future of Germany found in Department of State Bulletin (6 February 1950): 57. The best-published history of the CIC, with addendum, remains Ian Sayer and Douglas Botting, America's Secret Army: The Untold Story of the Counter Intelligence Corps (London: Fortana Paperbacks, 1990). For a first-hand account, see Ib Melchior, Case by Case: A U.S. Army Counterintelligence Agent in World War II (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1993). For reproductions of portions of the CIC's official history see, John Mendelsohn, ed., Covert Warfare: Intelligence, Counterintelligence, and Military Deception During the World War II Era (New York: Garland Publishing, 1989) and John Mendelshohn, ed., Covert Warfare: The Counter Intelligence Corps in Action (New York: Garland Publishing, 1989)
- 1947 . Occupation of Germany: Policy and Progress, 1945–1946 111 Washington , D.C. : U.S. Government Printing Office .
- Pollock , James K. 1949 . Germany Under Occupation: Illustrative Materials and Documents 17 – 8 . Ann Arbor , MI : George Wahr Publishing Co. . Of course, in application Allied powers each defined democracy differently; in the case of the Soviets, democracy was a form of totalitarian dictatorship
- 1996 . Heidelberg 1945 Stuttgart : Franz Steiner Verlag . Several studies touching upon the CIC and the denazification of Heidelberg University have been written over the past decade or so. Most significant is a collection of essays compiled by Jürgen Hess, Hartmut Lehmann and Volker Stellin entitled Within this work, the following essays were particularly helpful in writing this article: Uta Gerhardt, “Die Amerikanischen Militäroffiziere und der Konflikt um die Wiedereröffnung der Universität Heidelberg 1945–1946,” 28–52; James F. Tent, “Edward Yarnall Hartshorne and the Reopening of the Ruprechts-Karls-Universität in Heidelberg, 1945: His Personal Account,” 53–72; Geoffrey J. Giles, “Self-Help in the Search for Democracy in Heidelberg,” 73–81; and Eike Wolgast, “Karl Heinrich Bauer—der erste Heidelberger Nachkriegsrektor Weltbild und Handeln 1945–1946,” 107–2 9, the last being a generally positive account of Bauer's role in the reopening of Heidelberg. Drawing upon the personal papers of American Military Government officer Earl L. Crum, the first American scholarly account concerning U.S. denazification at Heidelberg is James Mumper, “The Reopening of Heidelberg University, 19451946: Major Earl L. Crum and the Ambiguities of American Postwar Policy” found in F. X. J. Homer and Larry Wilcox, eds., Germany and Europe in the Era of the Two World Wars: Essays in Honor of Oron James Hale (Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press, 1986), 210–48. Like Crum, Mumper portrays the denazification of Heidelberg as an unfortunate episode in the university's history, one that was rightly left in the care of a handful of supposedly reliable German academics. Using records in the U.S. National Archives apparently unavailable to Mumper, Ralph W. Brown III demonstrates the incompatibility of the German notion of academic freedom with the American notion of democracy in “Denazification at Heidelberg University: Academic Freedom and Democracy,” MA Thesis, James Madison University, 1988. Using untapped German primary sources, Geoffrey J. Giles built upon Mumper's work in “Reeducation at Heidelberg University, Pedagogica Historica, 33. 1 (1997): 201–19. Most recently, Steven P. Remy in “The Heidelberg Myth: The Nazification and Denazification of a German University, 1933–1957,” Ph.D. diss., Ohio University, 2000, revised as The Heidelberg Myth: The Nazification and Denazification of a German University (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 2002), rejects the “myth” of a Heidelberg faculty as victims of National Socialism, though he underestimates the practical difficulties in undertaking denazification for all the parties involved
- 1990 . Hochschuloffiziere und Wiederaufbau des Hochschulwesens in Westdeutschland 1945–1952: Teil 2: Die US- Zone Hildesheim : Edition Bildung und Wissenschaft im Verlag A. Lax . As James F. Tent notes, “denazification in German higher education demonstrated… the difficulties which [the] American Military Government experienced” with denazification in general; see his “Denazification of Higher Education in U.S. Occupied Germany, 1945–1949” in Manfred Heinemann, 9
- Remy, “The Heidelberg Myth,” 364–5
- 1926 . Volksstrum After military service in World War I, Henk studied philosophy, literature, economics, history, and sociology at Heidelberg University. As a university student, Henk became a member of the Socialist Student League and, in joined the German Social Democrats (SPD). After Hitler's seizure of power, he was arrested by the Gestapo “for high treason” and, in March 1935, sentenced to 20 months imprisonment due to his anti-Nazi writings and illegal border crossings to visit SPD exiles residing in France (1933–1934). Later, Henk took part in the July 1944 plot to assassinate Hitler. It should be noted that even this anti-Nazi might look less-then- pure on paper. After all, during the Nazi period he had trained briefly with the, served as a member of the Nazi Labor Front, and came to own and revive a struggling chemical-pharmaceutical firm. During the American occupation, Henk violated Military Government dictates against employing Nazis through the hiring of Leonhard Thum, a NSDAP member from 1937–1945 and SA Scharfuehrer, as his business manager, allegedly illegally paying Thum from his private account. According to the CIC, Henk was present in his office for “only one hour a day,” devoting his time to serving as the “most active SPD functionary in the Heidelberg area.” See Henk's CIC file obtained under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) from U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command, Freedom of Information/Privacy Office, Fort George G. Meade, Maryland
- To be sure, the CIC also noted in its first report concerning the university that there might be trouble ahead. As the first CIC agents who arrived at Heidelberg saw it, one possible course of action would be to allow a future Allied approved German government to “dissolve the existing faculty.” Such a “procedure would have the advantage not only of removing all those [faculty members] with the Nazi taint from the faculty but also of removing teachers whom fifteen years of Nazism have made unsuited for teaching at a free university.” The report concluded that even those professors it deemed “anti-Nazi” had been “so long in contact with the Nazi regime and methods and the German tradition that they” were “not mentally equipped to lead in the teaching of democracy;” see “Subject Heidelberg,” 9 April 1945. For a copy of this CIC report see Hess, et al., eds., Heidelberg 1945, 393–401
- 1944 . Covert War: Intelligence, Counterintelligence, and Military Deception During the World War II Era In late March 1945, the CIC reported that 91 agents newly arrived in Germany lacked the ability to “make quick judgments” and did not have even a “low level knowledge of the German way of life.” Earlier reports in December reveal the need for CIC agents with German language training; see Mendelsohn, 305 and 308
- Die geistige Situation der Zeit (The Spiritual Situation of Our Times) The CIC's file on Jaspers indicates that he was able to publish several books during the 1930s after the Nazi came to power; see Jaspers' CIC file obtained under the FOIA from U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command, Freedom of Information/Privacy Office, Fort George G. Meade, Maryland. According to what is most likely a CIC wartime report contained in the file, Jaspers had been “originally a liberal but [he now is] visibly influenced by current anti-rationalistic tendencies” found in Nazi Germany. According to an unknown CIC source, Jaspers' work published in 1931 had a “surprising influence on the German people” and “established as early as 1931 a kind of spiritual preparedness for any authoritarian or totalitarian regime.” Interestingly, Heidelberg's Nazi era Rector Ernst Krieck used this book, which the CIC viewed as paving the way for German acceptance of Nazism, as part of the anti-Nazi evidence sent to Nazi Ministry of Culture in Baden in a successful 1937 request for Jaspers' dismissal from the university. For a discussion of Krieck's use of Jaspers' work, see Remy, “The Heidelberg Myth,” 286
- 2002 . The Heidelberg Myth For a critical account of Jaspers, see Remy, 170. For a sound assessment of Jaspers during the immediate postwar period, see Mark W. Clark, “A Prophet Without Honour: Karl Jaspers in Germany, 1945–1948,” Journal of Contemporary History, 37. 2 (: 197–222
- 10 July 1945 . Diplomat Among Warriors Garden City , NY : Doubleday . Even at the time, however, some Americans took a more guarded view of the Heidelberg situation. State Department representative John J. Muccio reported his own “concern” regarding the actions being taken to reopen a university of not only German but international importance. Muccio warned that without the Military Government first being completely assured that “all active Nazis had been removed,” the institution should remain closed because the reopening of Heidelberg would generate great publicity and have a psychological influence on the Germans. He believed that the Germans would view the American denazification effort at Heidelberg “as an indication of whether we really meant business or not in eradicating Nazism.” Therefore, Muccio concluded that it was “all-important” that Heidelberg should be “completely denazified” prior to reopening. For Muccio's report see his “Memorandum” to Robert Murphy, found in box 38, Office of the U.S. Political Advisor (POLAD) to Germany, Berlin, Classified General Correspondence, 1945–1949, U.S. National Archives Record Group (NA- RG) 84. Muccio's letter does not seem to have made a lasting impression upon Murphy; Murphy highlights some of the injustices of denazification in his memoir; see (1964, 293–96
- 1937 . The German Universities and National Socialism Cambridge , MA : Harvard University Press . Hartshorne's book is
- 1945 . Heidelberg 1945 For an example, see James F. Tent, “Edward Yarnell Hartshorne and the Reopening of the Ruprecht-Karls-Universität in Heidelberg,: His Personal Account” found in Hess, et al., eds.
- 1 August 1945 . “Screening Instructions—Heidelberg University,” folder 38, box 75, Office of Military Government (U.S.) for Germany (OMGUS), Adjutant General's Office, NA-RG 260. Cited hereafter as “Screening Instructions—Heidelberg University.”
- 5 March 1946 . Handbook of 7 July 1945 Headquarters U.S.F.E.T. The Military Government slightly adjusted denazification categories following the direction of the Allied Control Council's 12 January 1946 directive, known as “Directive No. 24.” Later the Military Government again changed the denazification categories by approving the “Law for Liberation from National-Socialism and Militarism,”
- Kraftfahrerkorps “Screening Instructions—Heidelberg University.” According to the later Allied “Directive No. 24,” Germans who had been members of organizations affiliated with the Nazi party but had served only as non-officials and lacked Nazi sympathies could be considered for “discretionary removal.” Organizations affiliated with the Nazi party included the NS (NSKK). In any case, “the guiding principle in all these cases must be whether the person under examination has or has not been more than a nominal participant in the activities of the Nazi party.”
- “Screening Instructions—Heidelberg University.”
- Remy, “The Heidelberg Myth,” 406
- 18 July 1945 . “Opening the Medical Faculty, Heidelberg,” folder 38, box 75, OMGUS, Adjutant General's Office, NA-RG 260. Cited hereafter as “Opening the Medical Faculty, Heidelberg.” Hartshorne was an author of the above report
- 1988 . Die vertriebenen Heidelberger Dozenten: zur Geschichte der Ruprecht-Karls-Universität nach 1933 Heidelberg : Carl Winter . Dorothee Mussgnug, 187
- Bauer's CIC file obtained under the FOIA from U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command Freedom of Information/Privacy Office, Fort George G. Meade, Maryland, cited hereafter as “Bauer Intelligence File.”
- 14 August 1945 . Fragebogen The CIC checked the following sources for information concerning Bauer and his colleagues: SHAEF files, CIC files, Heidelberg University records, NSDAP files as well asHochschulfragebogen; see the CIC's report concerning Heidelberg found in Hess, et al., eds., Heidelberg 1945, 405–6. Certainly, Bauer produced written testimony from witnesses claiming that he had endured harassment during the Hitler years, though to what degree these depositions can be trusted remains uncertain. See for instance the depositions in favor of Bauer written by Dr. Rudolf Geissendörfer, Dr. Viktor von Weizsäcker, and Dr. Erich Bederke in mid-November 1945; their letters are located in the Smith-Crum Papers, box 8, folder 9, George C. Marshall Library, Lexington, Va. Unfortunately, at least one of these depositions came from an unreliable source; Weizsäcke seemingly had rationalized the killing of schizophrenics in a 1933 lecture. After the war, he continued to justify such actions as part of a supposedly noble group sacrifice. The Breslau clinic where Bauer and he had worked during the war regularly received brains from patients killed at the mental hospital at Lubiniec; see Benno Müller-Hill, Murderous Science: Elimination by Scientific Selection of Jews, Gypsies, and others in Germany, 1933–1945, George R. Fraser, trans. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 92. For an account focused on Weizsäcke, see Karl Heinz Roth, “Psychosomatische Medizin und ‘Euthanasie’ Der Fall Viktor von Weizsäcke,” in 1999 Zeitschrift für Sozialgeschichte des 20. und 21. Jahrshunderts 1 (1986): 65–99. In addition, a late 1946 the Policy Enforcement Branch of OMGUS revealed that Weizsäcke had been a member of the NSKK (1934–1945), and perhaps other Nazi organizations such as the NSV and NS Altherren; see “Denazification of Heidelberg University,” 15 November 1946, folder: Policy Enforcement Check, box 34, OMGUS, Civil Administrative Division, NA-RG 260 (cited hereafter as “Denazification of Heidelberg University”)
- 1945 . Remy notes that the Military Government's Special Branch officer Frederick Wallach, a German-Jewish émigré, also had difficulties with Bauer in July implying Bauer held anti-Semitic prejudice. Remy uses Bauer's diary to demonstrate that Bauer resented Wallach's attempt to force Bauer to grant Wallach's uncle Sigmund Weil a position of head of the university's orthopedic clinic, then held by Otto Dittmar; see his “Heidelberg Myth,” 472–3. Omitted, however, is the quid pro quo that took place; Weil attained the position at Heidelberg, and he subsequently wrote a letter of support on behalf of Bauer to the Military Government; for a copy of Weil's 7 March 1946 letter of support for Bauer, see the Smith-Crum Papers, box 8, folder 9. In the letter, Weil claims that during the 1930s Bauer vainly fought to retain him at Breslau and, after his removal, sent him aid and comfort
- 1998 . Academic Proconsul: Harvard Sociologist Edward Y. Hartshorne and the Reopening of German Universities 1945–1946: His Personal Account Trier : Wissenschaftlicher Verlag . “Opening the Medical Faculty, Heidelberg.” Interestingly, Hartshorne had little to say about the Willer matter, noting in his diary that he sent Willer to Bauer; see James F. Tent, ed., 73. The above source is an edited collection of letters and diary entries written by Hartshorne in Germany during the early occupation
- Academic Proconsul Tent, ed., 101 and 118
- 16 August 1945 . Academic Proconsul In his 12 September 1945 diary entry Hartshorne writes the following sentences: “Bauer must evidently be carefully watched. God help us if his indiscretions get out of hand and we have to ‘crack down’ on him.” Apparently contradicting his earlier statement of to Bauer concerning “a pool” of readily available German medical faculty in the U.S. Zone, Hartshorne conceded that the denazification at Heidelberg's Medical School “may have to be temporized another six months” due to the lack of suitable replacements; see Tent, ed., 120–1 and 101
- 1945 . Despite his private misgivings, Hartshorne included Bauer on his list of academics that were “acceptable without reservations” in July; see “Opening the Medical Faculty, Heidelberg.”
- 13 November 1945 . “Field Intelligence Study No. 41: The Liberal Universities of Baden II (Heidelberg)” folder: AG 350.09-Intelligence Reports 1945–1946, box 124, OMGUS, Adjutant General's Office, NA-RG 260 (hereafter cited as “Field Intelligence Study”). It should be noted that the above study was produced by the Strategic Services Unit, Germany and the copy examined by the author had “General Clay” penciled in at the top, perhaps indicating that the American Military Governor Lucius D. Clay read and was influenced by its contents
- 24 July 1945 . Indeed, nearly a month before, Major John E. Peterson, Assistant to the Adjutant General at Seventh Army Headquarters, signed the order allowing the university to hold several courses at the medical school; see Peterson's “Heidelberg University Medical School,” folder 38, box 75, OMGUS, Adjutant General's Office, NA-RG 260
- 1983 . Karl Jaspers, K. H. Bauer: Briefwechsel, 1945–1968 Mumper, “Reopening,” 224 and Renato de Rosa, ed., (Berlin-Heidelberg-New York: 23
- 4 July 1945 . “Plan for Reopening the Medical Faculty of Heidelberg,” folder 38, box 75, OMGUS, Adjutant General's Office, NA-RG 260
- Tent , James F. 1982 . Mission on the Rhine: Reeducation and Denazification in American- Occupied Germany 51 Chicago : University of Chicago Press .
- Like other Military Government officers in the field, Crum obtained vital “primary intelligence” for the Military Government Intelligence Branch
- 1945 . Academic Proconsul Mumper, “Reopening,” 228. Technically Crum was assigned to a Military Government detachment for Land Württemberg-Baden, headquartered in Stuttgart. In reality, Crum worked under USFET. In October the U.S. State Department's Brewster H. Morris approvingly wrote from Heidelberg of Crum. According to Morris, Crum “impresses me as an able and understanding man for his job, anxious to interfere as little as necessary in the day to day workings of the university;” see “Present State of Heidelberg University,” 19 October 1945, box 38, POLAD, NA-RG 84 (cited hereafter as “Present Status of Heidelberg University”), By contrast, in February 1946 Hartshorne concluded that Crum was a “dope,” clearly blaming Crum for failing to monitor adequately the situation at Heidelberg. Hartshorne also implied that Crum was distracted by a “Bulgarian mistress;” see Hartshorne's correspondence home of 26 February 1946, found in Tent, ed., 260. It should be recalled, however, that this private assessment of Crum came after CIC Special Agent Daniel F. Penham raised questions concerning incomplete denazification at Heidelberg. Certainly, Penham's charge of ineffective denazification embraced not only Crum's tenure at Heidelberg but also the months prior to Crum's arrival at the university, including Hartshorne's time of responsibility. As for his alleged mistress, Crum did have close relations with one of his secretaries, Ludmila Georgieva or Georgiva; Crum saw to her care when she was ill. On the other hand, Crum did mention the Bulgarian woman to his wife; Crum also honestly insisted that he longed to return home as rapidly as possible, suggesting perhaps that if a Crum-Georgieva love affair had taken place, it was over by early March 1946; see Crum letter 15 March 1946, folder 6, box 6, Smith-Crum Papers. Unfortunately, Hartshorne's diary and correspondence record little concerning Crum before Penham noted the problems at Heidelberg, leaving the door open to the possibility though perhaps not the probability that Crum served as the fall guy for what Penham might see as Hartshorne's and the CIC's earlier failure to denazify the university along with their failure to adequately “watch” Bauer. Interestingly, Penham claimed that Georgieva illegitimately enrolled Bulgarian students at the university without their being screened by the CIC; see Daniel F. Penham, “Screening of Heidelberg University,” 23 February 1946, folder: Heidelberg University—Staff, box 36, OMGUS for Württemberg-Baden, Education and Cultural Relations Division, Records of the University Branch, NA- RG 260 (cited hereafter as “Screening of Heidelberg University”)
- Mumper, “Reopening,” 227
- Crum , Earl L. 1949 . “Heidelberg University Reopens,” . In The American German Review 16 2 (December: 12
- “Present Status of Heidelberg University.”
- Spruchkammer In August 1946, the Heidelberg (German denazification body) attempted unsuccessfully to fine Ernst 500 Reichsmarks for his membership in the SA during the Third Reich. In his own defense, Ernst claimed that he had been impressed into the Nazi organization, leaving it as soon as an opportunity arose. He also noted that he refused to join the NSDAP, despite the damage that such an action caused his academic career. Without doubt Ernst was a German nationalist during the early 1930s and during World War II, a fact that he downplayed after World War II; see Remy, “The Heidelberg Myth,” 275 and 515–17. Yet when compared to other historians on the Heidelberg faculty during the Third Reich, Ernst could rightfully claim to be no Nazi. Despite membership in the SA (1933–1934), the Nazi Dozentenbund (1941), and NSV (1934), Ernst's CIC file describes him as “shrewd” and undoubted patriot” but also as a victim of attacks by Nazi denunciations during the Third Reich. According to the CIC, Karl Jaspers described Ernst “as the most desirable and promising historian of Germany today, and absolutely free from militaristic ideas;” see Ernst's CIC file obtained under the FOIA from U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command, Freedom of Information/Privacy Office, Fort George G. Meade, Maryland. Ernst also had the support of anti-Nazi Professor Alfred Weber for the position of university pro-rector; see Tent, ed., Academic Proconsul, 71. A careful reading of Hartshorne's diary entry of 10 August 1945 concerning Ernst's suitability to be the university's pro-rector reveals no doubts about Ernst in regard to the German history professor's SA membership or a denunciation on the part of Willy Andreas. It does reveal that Hartshorne had yet to make a determination concerning Ernst. At this point, Hartshorne had not had the opportunity to meet Ernst or study the professor's Fragebogen; see Tent, ed., Academic Proconsul, 97. As for Hartshorne's later view of Ernst, his correspondence and diary are silent, suggesting that Hartshorne discovered no reason to object to Ernst's role as pro-rector
- 1993 . Heisenberg's War: The Secret History of the German Bomb Boston : Little, Brown . “Field Intelligence Study.” In a similar vain, Max Planck reportedly told Werner Heisenberg during the Nazi takeover of German universities that if “thirty professors get up and protest against the government's actions, by tomorrow there will be 150 individuals [academics] declaring their solidarity with Hitler, simply because they're after the jobs,” see Thomas Powers, 39
- 1998 . Seeing Like the State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed New Haven , CT : Yale University Press . Though not in the pure vain of deconstructionist theory, James C. Scott, (might have used denazification as an example of “state simplification;” the Military Government created a “formal scheme” that was rational but could not hope to make allowances for the pressures of actual life under the Nazi regime, thus punishing some who were the “intended beneficiaries,” in this case those anti-Nazi Germans who joined the party as a formality
- “Field Intelligence Study.”
- Mumper, “Reopening,” 242
- 3 November 1945 . Crum letter, folder 5, box 6, Smith-Crum Papers
- Crum, “Heidelberg University Reopens,” 12
- 1 October 1945 . “Subject: Cleared and Rejected Professors, Medical Faculty,” Col. Clifton Lisle folder: Heidelberg University—Staff, box 36, OMGUS, NA-RG 260. Interestingly, the Military Government's dependence on Germans can be demonstrated through a careful reading of the document; the date is given as “1st Oktober 1945,” a spelling of October most likely employed by a German secretary
- Karl Jaspers, K. H. Bauer De Rosa, ed., 99
- Mumper “Reopening,” 234
- 1992 . Counterspy Mission in World War II: Recollections and Impressions of a United States Army Counter Intelligence Corps Special Agent Tempe , AZ : Vaughan Publications . Most CIC agents in the 307th CIC Detachment held the ranks of non-commissioned officers; for a reproduction of a list of the detachment's personnel and ranks, including the rank of Thomas A. Emmet, see Bradley W. Vaughan, 73. The lack of officer status caused CIC agents no end of difficulties and, as early as 1943, was noted in the official histories of the CIC. As one report pointed out, the “CIC needed an increase of officers because the low rank of its leaders hampered operations… in small detachments,” see Mendelsohn, Covert Warfare: Intelligence, Counterintelligence, and Military Deception During the World War IIEra, 259 and 276
- 16 November 1945 . Crum letter, folder 5, box 6, Smith-Crum Papers. Bauer also initially had a positive view of Penham; see Mumper, “Reopening,” 236
- 18 November 1945 . Crum letter, folder 5, box 6, Smith-Crum Papers
- Mission on the Rhine Tent, 60
- 21 October 1945 . Crum Letter, folder 5, box 6, Smith-Crum Papers
- Crum, “Heidelberg University Reopens,” 11–16
- “Screening of Heidelberg University.”
- The Heidelberg Myth Serving as Heidelberg's first rector during the Nazi period, Andreas had made speeches and written publications praising Hitler. Remy characterizes Andreas as a typical German professor, hostile to Weimar and a “conservative nationalist” in his politics; see his “The Heidelberg Myth,” 101–3. Without explanation, Remy also notes that Penham recommended Andreas for emeritus status at Heidelberg, a curious recommendation given Penham's denunciation of Andreas; see, 164
- “Screening of Heidelberg University.”
- Ibid
- “Bauer Intelligence File.” A document in Bauer's file entitled, “Notes on Draft of Investigation of Heidelberg University Dated 16 May 1946,” noted that “responsibility for processing Fragenbogens, however, has not been defined between the University and Special Branch.”
- 5 March 1946 . “Screening of Heidelberg University.” Penham's accusations against Heidelberg's students if anything were more strident; he claimed that the Heidelberg “student body, both German and foreign,” was “rife with Nazi and militaristic elements.” The undesirable students included “former members of the Azanoff Legion, Yugoslav desperados, Syrian members of the Grand Mufti government, White Russians, Red Russians, Rumanian Volksdeutsche, former Lithuanian officials of the propaganda ministry and many other elements hostile to American democracy.” Penham believed that United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Agency (UNRRA) personnel at Heidelberg unwittingly supported these students, perhaps out of mistaken kindness. On William H. Sudduth and Ruth E. Prager of the UNRRA at Heidelberg reluctantly wrote to Crum concerning Penham's interrogations of displaced persons (DPs) who attended the university as students. They claimed that “we do not doubt Mr. Penham's complete sincerity [concerning denazification] but we feel that his health condition has caused him to be overwrought and excitable in his dealings with students.” As an example, Sudduth and Prager noted that Penham objected to the “students wearing boots,” worn frequently because this was the only footwear available and not as a sign of support for militarism. Finally, the UNRRA personnel claimed that Penham attempted to interfere in the billeting and feeding of approved students; see letter to Crum, folder 9, box 8, Smith-Crum Papers
- Elliott , Loran L. 25 February 1946 . Mission on the Rhine “Heidelberg University,” folder 10, box 8, Smith-Crum Papers. Col. William Dawson, stationed in nearby Manheim initially supported Penham, almost closing the university in late February 1946; see Tent, 84
- 4 February 1946 . Crum Letter, folder 5, box 6, Smith-Crum Papers
- 27 February 1946 . Major Earl L. Crum, “CIC Investigations in Heidelberg University,” folder: Heidelberg University—Staff, box 36, OMGUS for Württemberg Baden, Education and Cultural Relations Division, Records of the University Branch, NA-RG 260
- “Report of the Senate of Heidelberg University,” n.d., folder 9, box 8, Smith-Crum Papers
- 3 March 1946 . In letter to his wife, Crum noted that the “CIC tried to make it tough for me” at Heidelberg. In response, “[George H.] Geyer and [John W.] Taylor and Hartshorne… went over the entire adverse report.” Taylor concluded that the trouble at Heidelberg “was 99% the fault of the CIC,” see Crum Letter, folder 6, box 6, Smith-Crum Papers. A few days later, a still worried Crum traveled to Berlin. Apparently immediately after Crum had a meeting with “Mead” and Major John P. Steiner, he composed another letter to his wife; interestingly, Crum used writing paper with Steiner's name printed on the top. In this yet another letter he wrote, “Col. Taylor and Penham, the CIC man who has been giving me so much trouble, are in the next room, and I hear loud shouting there. This situation is a mess, and I think that the fellow will not refuse to go to any limits with his stories to make me out a bad man [emphasis in original]. However, I think that our fellows will stand behind me,” see Crum Letter, 10 March 1946, folder 6, box 6, Smith-Crum Papers
- 22 March 1946 . John P. Steiner, “Report on Heidelberg University,” folder: Heidelberg University—Staff, box 36, OMGUS for Württemberg-Baden, Education and Cultural Relations Division, Records of the University Branch, NA- RG 260. Cited hereafter as “Report on Heidelberg University.”
- 1946 . Ibid. Penham's second report of 6 March 1946 has not been located. In late February the author of an unsigned draft memorandum intended for Col. William Dawson noted that the adverse CIC reports were “inconsistent and appear to reveal a serious attempt to prove a preconceived notion that the university is operation deliberately against the interests of the occupation.” The report also noted that the situation at Heidelberg had become so murky that it was “doubtful whether any one statement of an individual [involved] can be accepted to be true or be proved to be truth.” Finally, the author of the report attacked the tactics, personality, and judgment of Penham, finding them all wanting, see “CIC Investigation of Heidelberg University,” n.d., folder: Heidelberg University—Staff, box 36, OMGUS for Württemberg-Baden, Education and Cultural Relations Division, Records of the University Branch, NA-RG 260. In addition, Karl Jaspers supported Bauer against Penham; see Clark, “A Prophet without Honour,” 207–8. Jaspers seems likely to have been in agreement with the assessment of Penham noted in the draft report above
- 14 March 1946 . New York Herald Tribune European ed., and Mumper, “Reopening,” 239
- “Report on Heidelberg University.”
- Ibid
- Rassenhygiene, ihre biologischen Grundlagen “Subject: K. H. Bauer:,” folder 9, box 8, Smith-Crum Papers. The existence of a translated synopsis of Rassenhygiene in the Smith-Crum Papers demonstrates that the American major at least had the opportunity to become familiar with an outline of Bauer's book
- “Bauer Intelligence File.”
- 1946 . Mumper calls Penham a “Torquemada,” see “Reopening,” 239. The CIC noted in May that the Military Government's Information Control Division was preparing a negative report concerning Bauer and denazification at Heidelberg; a report that embodied “essentially the same conclusions” submitted earlier by Penham; see “Bauer Intelligence File.” Curiously, Penham's report is not included in Bauer's CIC file
- “Bauer Intelligence File.”
- 1988 . Der Chirurg “Bauer Intelligence File.” Bauer published his article in For discussions concerning the relationship between Nordic pyseudo-science and legitimate science and medicine see Robert Proctor, Racial Hygiene: Medicine Under the Nazis (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, Also see, Robert N. Proctor, The Nazi War on Cancer (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999)
- Deutsche Akademie, Reichskolonialbund “Bauer Intelligence File.” Bauer was also a member of several organizations affiliated with the Nazi party, including the NSKK, NSV, and Deutsche Jägerschaft.
- Mumper, “Reopening,” 223. In response to Penham's charges, the Heidelberg faculty senate claimed that the CIC agent believed that no German could be acceptable to the Americans unless he was sent to a concentration camp, see “Report of the Senate of Heidelberg University.”
- “Bauer Intelligence File.”
- Mumper, “Reopening,” 236
- 1990 . Lucius D. Clay: An American Life New York : Henry Holt . Jean Edward Smith 302
- 1950 . Decision in Germany Garden City , NY : Doubleday . Lucius D. Clay, 70
- Mission on the Rhine Tent, 98
- “Denazification of Heidelberg University.”
- Weisert , Hermann . 1968 . Die Rektoren der Ruperto Carola zu Heidelberg und die Dekane ihrer Fakultäten 1386–1968 (Heidelberg, 72
- 16 December 1947 . New York Times For the Heidelberg faculty's universal negative reaction to Clark's article see Remy, “The Heidelberg Myth,” 581–83