The socio-political ties of expert bodies. How to reconcile the independence requirement of reliable expertise and the responsiveness requirement of democratic governance

References

• Bader, V. (2014). Sciences, politics, and associative democracy: Democratizing science and expertizing democracy. Innovation: The European Journal of Social Science Research, 27(4), 420–441.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Biegelbauer, P., & Hansen, J. (2011). Democratic theory and citizen participation: Democracy models in the evaluation of public participation in science and technology. Science and Public Policy, 38(8), 589–597. doi: 10.3152/030234211X13092649606404
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Bouwen, P. (2004). The logic of access to the European Parliament: Business lobbying in the committee on economic and monetary affairs. Journal of Common Market Studies, 42(3), 473–495. doi: 10.1111/j.0021-9886.2004.00515.x
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Brennan, J. (2016). Against democracy. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Busuioc, M. (2009). Accountability, control and independence: The case of European agencies. European Law Journal, 15(5), 599–615. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0386.2009.00480.x
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Busuioc, M. (2013). European agencies: Law and practices of accountability. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Carpenter, D. P. (2010). Reputation and power: Organizational image and pharmaceutical regulation at the FDA. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Christensen, J., & Holst, C. (2017). Advisory commissions, academic expertise and democratic legitimacy: The case of Norway. Science and Public Policy, 44(6), 821–833. doi: 10.1093/scipol/scx016
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Christensen, J. & Hesstvedt, S. (2018). Expertisation or greater representation? Evidence from Norwegian advisory commissions. European Politics and Society. doi:10.1080/23745118.2018.1515861
   Google Scholar
• Cohen, G. A. (2008). Rescuing justice and equality. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Corporate Europe Observatory. (2017, October 3). Corporate capture at its most extreme: 98% of ECB advisors represent industry. Retrieved from https://corporateeurope.org/pressreleases/2017/10/corporate-capture-its-most-extreme-98-ecb-advisors-represent-industry
   Google Scholar
• Curtin, D. (2007). Holding (quasi)autonomous EU administrative actors to public account. European Law Journal, 13(4), 523–541. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0386.2007.00382.x
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Curtin, D. (2017). ‘Accountable independence’ of the European Central Bank: Seeing the logics of transparency. European Law Journal, 23(1–2), 28–44. doi: 10.1111/eulj.12211
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Douglas, H. (2009). Science, policy, and the value-free ideal. Pittsburgh, PA: Pittsburgh University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Egeberg, M., Schaefer, G., & Trondal, J. (2003). The many faces of EU committee governance. West European Politics, 26(3), 19–40. doi: 10.1080/01402380312331280578
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Egeberg, M., & Trondal, J. (2011). EU-level agencies: New executive centre formation or vehicles for national control? Journal of European Public Policy, 18(6), 868–887. doi: 10.1080/13501763.2011.593314
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Ennser-Jedenastik, L. (2016). The politicization of regulatory agencies: Between partisan influence and formal independence. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 26(3), 507–518. doi: 10.1093/jopart/muv022
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Estlund, D. (2008). Democratic authority: A philosophical framework. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
   Google Scholar
• European Central Bank. (2018). Accountability. Retrieved from https://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/orga/accountability/html/index.en.html
   Google Scholar
• European Commission. (2016a). Commission decision establishing horizontal rules on the creation and operation of Commission expert groups, C(2016)3301. Retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regexpert/PDF/C_2016_3301_F1_COMMISSION_DECISION_EN.pdf
   Google Scholar
• European Commission. (2016b). Communication to the Commission. Framework for Commission expert groups: Horizontal rules and public register, C(2016)3300. Retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regexpert/PDF/C_2016_3301_F1_COMMISSION_DECISION_EN.pdf
   Google Scholar
• European Parliament, Council and Commission. (2012). Joint statement and common approach on EU decentralized agencies. Retrieved from https://europa.eu/european-union/sites/europaeu/files/docs/body/joint_statement_and_common_approach_2012_en.pdf
   Google Scholar
• Fischer, F. (2009). Democracy and expertise. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Goldman, A. I. (2001). Experts: Which ones should you trust? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 63(1), 85–110. doi: 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2001.tb00093.x
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Gornitzka, Å, & Krick, E. (2018). The expertisation of stakeholder involvement in EU policymaking. In M. Góra, C. Holst, & M. Warat (Eds.), Expertisation and democracy in Europe (pp. 51–70). London & New York: Routledge.
   Google Scholar
• Greve, C., Flinders, M., & van Thiel, S. (1999). Quangos-what’s in a name? Defining quangos from a comparative perspective. Governance, 12(2), 129–146. doi: 10.1111/0952-1895.951999095
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Haas, P. M. (2004). When does power listen to truth? A constructivist approach to the policy process. Journal of European Public Policy, 11(4), 569–592. doi: 10.1080/1350176042000248034
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Habermas, J. (2015). The lure of technocracy. Cambridge and Malden: Polity Press.
   Google Scholar
• Holst, C., & Molander, A. (2017). Public deliberation and the fact of expertise: Making experts accountable. Social Epistemology, 31(3), 235–250. doi: 10.1080/02691728.2017.1317865
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Holst, C., & Moodie, J. R. (2015). Cynical or deliberative? An analysis of the European Commission’s public communication on its use of expertise in policy-making. Politics and Governance, 3(1), 37–48. doi: 10.17645/pag.v3i1.240
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Jasanoff, S. (2005). Judgment under siege: The three-body problem of expert legitimacy. In S. Maasen & P. Weingart (Eds.), Democratization of expertise? Exploring novel forms of scientific advice in political decision-making (pp. 209–224). Dordrecht: Springer.
   Google Scholar
• Keleman, R. D. (2002). The politics of ‘Eurocratic’ structure and the New european agencies. West European Politics, 25(4), 93–118. doi: 10.1080/713601644
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Krick, E. (2015). Negotiated expertise in policy-making: How governments use hybrid advisory committees. Science and Public Policy, 42(4), 487–500. doi: 10.1093/scipol/scu069
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Krick, E. (2018). Creating participatory expert bodies. How the targeted selection of policy advisers can bridge the epistemic-democratic divide. European Politics and Society. doi:10.1080/23745118.2018.1515865
   Google Scholar
• Landemore, H. (2012). Democratic reason: Politics, collective intelligence, and the rule of the many. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Landwehr, C. & Wood, M. (2018). Reconciling credibility and accountability: How expert bodies achieve credibility through accountability processes. European Politics and Society. doi: 10.1080/23745118.2018.1515875
   Google Scholar
• Lane, M. (2014). When the experts are uncertain: Scientific knowledge and the ethics of democratic judgment. Episteme, 11(1), 97–118. doi: 10.1017/epi.2013.48
   Google Scholar
• Lentsch, J., & Weingart, P. (2011). Quality control in the advisory process: Towards an institutional design for robust science advice. In J. Lentsch & P. Weingart (Eds.), The politics of scientific advice: Institutional design for quality assurance (pp. 353–354). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Liberatore, A., & Funtowicz, S. (2003). ‘Democratising’ expertise, ‘expertising’ democracy: What does this mean, and why bother? Science and Public Policy, 30(3), 146–150. doi: 10.3152/147154303781780551
   Google Scholar
• Lodge, M. (2008). Regulation, the regulatory state and European politics. West European Politics, 31(1/2), 280–301. doi: 10.1080/01402380701835074
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Lord, C. (2011). The European Parliament and the legitimation of agencification. Journal of European Public Policy, 18(6), 909–925. doi: 10.1080/13501763.2011.593317
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Lord, C. (2018). No epistocracy without representation? The case of the European Central Bank. European Politics and Society. doi: 10.1080/23745118.2018.1515868
   Google Scholar
• Nowotny, H. (2003). Democratising expertise and socially robust knowledge. Science and Public Policy, 30(3), 151–156. doi: 10.3152/147154303781780461
   Google Scholar
• Parkinson, J., & Mansbridge, J. (eds.). (2012). Deliberative systems: Deliberative democracy at the large scale. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Pérez-Durán, I. (2018). Interest group representation in the formal design of European Union agencies. Regulation and Governance, 12(2), 238–262. doi:10.1111/rego.12150
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Peters, B. (1991). Rationalität, Recht und Gesellschaft. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.
   Google Scholar
• Pettit, P. (2004). Depoliticizing democracy. Ratio Juris, 17(1), 52–65. doi: 10.1111/j.0952-1917.2004.00254.x
   Google Scholar
• Pfister, T., & Horvath, A. (2014). Reassessing expert knowledge and the politics of expertise. Innovation: The European Journal of Social Science Research, 27(4), 311–316.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Rosén, G. & Tørnblad, S. H. (2018). How does expert knowledge travel between EU institutions? The case of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership. European Politics and Society. doi:10.1080/23745118.2018.1515870
   Google Scholar
• Rothstein, B. (2018). Epistemic democracy and the quality of government. European Politics and Society. doi: 10.1080/23745118.2018.1515873
   Google Scholar
• Saward, M. (2010). The representative claim. New York: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Sen, A. (2009). The idea of justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Sunstein, C. R. (2016). The most knowledgeable branch. University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 164(13), 1600–1648.
   Google Scholar
• Swift, A., & White, S. (2008). Political theory, social science, and real politics. In D. Leopold & M. Stears (Eds.), Political theory. Methods and approaches (pp. 49–69). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Thatcher, M., & Sweet, A. S. (2002). Theory and practice of delegation to non-majoritarian institutions. West European Politics, 25(1), 1–22. doi: 10.1080/713601583
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Turner, S. (2013). The politics of expertise. New York, NY: Routledge.
   Google Scholar
• Verhoest, K., Guy Peters, B., Bouckaert, G., & Verschuere, B. (2004). The study of organisational autonomy: A conceptual review. Public Administration and Development, 24(2), 101–118. doi: 10.1002/pad.316
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Vibert, F. (2007). The rise of the unelected. Democracy and the new separation of powers. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Waldron, J. (2016). Political political theory. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
   Google Scholar