- Lind , William S. 1985 . Maneuver Warf are Handbook , 5 – 6 . Boulder and London : Westview Press .
- Lind , William S. 1984 . "The Case for Maneuver Warfare" ” . In The Defense Reform Debate , Edited by: Clark , Asa A. IV , Chiarelli , Peter W. , McKitrick , Jeffrey S. and Reed , James W. 90 Baltimore : The Johns Hopkins University Press .
- lbid.9 pp. 6-7. Lind is answering a question posed to himself: How does one consistently maneuver faster than the enemy to maintain the advantage of the OODA cycle? Here he answers in terms of general theory; things to think about: 1) Only a decentralized military can have a fast OODA loop. "If the observations must be passed up a chain of command, the orientation made and the decision taken at a high level, and the command for action is then transmitted back down the chain, the OODA loop is going to be slow." 2) Maneuver warfare means you will not only accept confusion and disorder but you will generate confusion through such maneuver tactics as recon pull. In such cases, higher headquarters can neither direct nor predict the exact path of advance but neither can the enemy. 3) All patterns, recipes and formulas are to be avoided. "If your tactics follow predictable patterns, the enemy can easily cut inside your OODA loop."
- US Army . 1999 . Command and Control* (FM 100-34) A-3 Washington, DC Draft
- US Army Training and Doctrine Command . 1998 . Annual Report on the Army After Next (AAN) Project , 6 Fort Monroe, VA : Training and Doctrine Command .
- US Army . 1993 . Operations, (FM 100-5) , 2 – 7 . Washington, DC : Department of the Army .
- Naveh , Shimon . 1997 . In Pursuit of Military Excellence , 279 Portland, OR : Frank Cass Publishers .
- Ibid., p. 258
- Boyd , John . 1976 . "Destruction and Creation" ” . Quantico, VA an unpublished 16-page essay archived at the Marine Corps University Research Archives, chart 1
- Ibid
- Ibid., p. 2
- Ibid., p. 3
- Boyd , John . "Destruction and Creation" ” . chart 10
- Ibid., "Heisenburg in 1927 showed that one could not simultaneously fix or determine precisely the velocity and position of a particle or body. Specifically he showed, due to the presence and influence of an observer, that the product of the velocity and position uncertainties is equal to or greater than a small number (Planck's Constant) divided by the mass of the particle or body being investigated … In other words, when the intended distinction between observer and observed begins to disappear, the uncertainty values hide or mask phenomena behavior … Under these circumstances, the uncertainty values represent the inability to determine the character or nature (consistency) of a system within itself … Keeping in mind that the Heisenberg Principle implicitly depends upon the indeterminate presence and influence of an observer, we can now see … that the magnitude of the uncertainty values represent the degree of intrusion by the observer upon the observed. When intrusion is total (that is, when the intended distinction between observer and observed essentially disappears), the uncertainty values indicate erratic behavior."
- Ibid.) p. 12. "Entropy is a concept that represents the potential for doing work, the capacity for taking action, or the degree of confusion and disorder associated with any physical activity. High entropy implies a low potential for doing work… Low entropy implies just the opposite. Viewed in this context the Second Law of Thermodynamics states that all observed natural processes generate entropy. From this law it follows that entropy must increase in any closed system - or, for that matter, in any system that cannot communicate in an ordered fashion with other systems or environment external to itself."
- Ibid., p. 13
- Boyd , John . "Patterns" ” . chart 2
- Ibid., chart 71
- Ibid., chart 72
- Ibid., chart 78
- Boyd , John . 1986 . "Organic Design for Command and Control" ” . In Discourses on Winning and Losing Quantico, VA unpublished slide presentation archived at the Marine Corps University Research Archives, charts 16, 25
- Ibid., chart 18
- Ibid., chart 23
- Antal , John . 1993 . "Thoughts About Maneuver Warfare" ” . In Maneuver Warfare Anthology , Edited by: Hooker , Richard D. Jr. 57 CA : Presidio Press .
- Boyd , John . 1986 . "Patterns of Conflict" ” . In Discourses on Winning and Losing Quantico, VA unpublished slide show archived at the Marine Corps University Research Archives chart 79
- Ibid., chart 90
- Ibid., chart 96
- Ibid., chart 117
- Ibid
- Alexander , Bevin . 1995 . The Future of Warfare , 62 New York : W.W. Norton & Company . Bevin Alexander adds in his analysis of the coming age of smaller wars that the implications as described by the Cantigny Conference members include an Army that is smaller and more mobile. "American soldiers in future wars will form small battle groups of combined arms. These groups will operate independently but will coordinate with other groups. They will possess high mobility either in land or air vehicles, and will wield weapons that are deadly and accurate at long ranges against enemy weapons and peoples." Gen. Eric Shinseki, Chief of Staff of the Army, recently recommended a move in this direction for the entire Army when he ordered the creation of the two medium contingency brigades at Ft. Lewis. His vision includes a medium brigade in every division and possible elimination of all tracked vehicles in an attempt to make the Army into a more modular, faster moving force both strategically and operationally than ever before. All of this supports the prevailing notion that the large wars of massed armies have been replaced with the smaller conflicts of varying intensities fraught with asymmetric threats
- Lind, The Theory and Practice of Maneuver Warfare, p. 10. The idea behind recon pull is to use reconnaissance assets to find the gaps and surfaces of the enemy and to pull the main body towards the gaps for penetration. It implies flexibility and adaptability by higher headquarters with the acceptance that the reconnaissance units and not higher headquarters determine the point of penetration
- Ibid
- Leonard , Robert R. 1993 . "Maneuver Warfare and the United States Army" ” . In Maneuver Warfare Anthology , Edited by: Hooker , Richard D. Jr. 47 CA : Presidio Press . Leonard offers his personal accounts of this phenomenon in Desert Storm and at the NTC. "We use detailed control at every level of command. From my personal observations during the Gulf War (I served in an infantry battalion in the 3rd Armored Division),1 saw no freedom for small unit commanders to make any decisions regarding battlefield maneuver. Brigade, battalion, and company commanders were told where to go, when to move, when to shoot, and when to cease fire. Above all, they were warned to keep their flanks tied in with friendly units." At the NTC, Leonard observed that "the keys to success in the training scenarios are unity of command, flawless gunnery, and good navigation. Battle is inevitable and cannot be avoided through cleaver maneuvering. Therefore there is little opportunity or payoff for a small unit commander to find a gap in the enemy defenses. This phenomenon is less obvious in mixed or close terrain. When terrain or vegetation refocuses the small unit commander's ability to see, there is a natural tendency to rely on subordinates more."
- Ibid., p. 30
- Bolger , Daniel P. 1993 . "Maneuver Warfare Reconsidered" ” . In Maneuver Warfare Anthology , Edited by: Hooker , Richard D. Jr. 21 – 2 . CA : Presidio Press .
- Ibid., p. 22
- Ibid., p. 25
- Ibid.9 p. 32. The quote here is from Edward Luttwak which Bolger cites as a maneuverist.
- Ibid., p. 30
- Palmer , Col. Dave R. 1984 . Summons of the Trumpet , 148 New York : Ballantine Books .
- Mintzberg , Henry . 1994 . The Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning , 227 – 8 . 339 New York : The Free Press . He writes, "Planning assumes predetermination in a number of respects: the prediction of the environment through forecasting … , the unfolding of the strategy formation process on schedule, and the imposition of the resulting strategies on an acquiescent environment…" His bottom line is that discontinuities in the plan invariably arise making forecasting notoriously inaccurate. He adds that, "part of the assumption of predetermination … is the notion that while planning is done, and historical data are analyzed, the world sits patiently by… Here we wish to show that all this too is fallacious, that the process of strategy making usually takes place precisely because the world does not hold still."
- Ibid., p 256. Mintzberg notes that "Effective strategists are not people who abstract themselves from the daily detail but quite the opposite: they are the ones who immerse themselves in it, while being able to abstract the strategic messages from it." The idea here is that organizational decisions must not be made in a vacuum.
- Klein , Gary . 1999 . Source of Power: How People Make Decisions , l25 Massachusetts : The MIT Press .
- Tzu , Sun . 1994 . The Art of War , Edited by: Sawyer , Ralph D. 198 Oxford : Westview Press .
Defense Analysis
Volume 16, 2000 - Issue 3