The Impact of Goal Alignment on Board Existence and Top Management Team Composition: Evidence from Family‐Influenced Businesses*Footnote^*

* The authors are grateful to Joe Astrachan, Sanjay Goel, Niki Kux‐Kardos, Bill Schulze, Alex Stewart, the special issue editors, and three anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments and suggestions on earlier versions of this paper. The study benefited from the financial support of the German EQUA and Friedrich Naumann Foundations, which are both gratefully acknowledged.

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