Epistemology andthe metaphor of the book

Notes and literature cited

• This account is based on M. Johnston and G. Lakoef: M etaphors We Live By; 1980, Chicago, IL, University of Chicago Press.
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• Outlines of Pyrrhonism, I: 164, 166, 168, II: 20.
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• Metaphysics, Γ4, 1006a8ff.; Posterior Analytics, A3.72b5ff.
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• T. Reid: Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man; 1785, Edinburgh, J. Bell.
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• O. Neurath: ‘Protocol sentences’, reprinted in A. J. Ayer (ed.): Logical Positivism; 1959, New York, NY, Free Press.
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• B. Blanshard: The Nature of Thought; 1939, London, Allen & Unwin. Blanshard comes from the Hegelian tradition. Hegel also rejected the idea of linearity, but he did so tacitly, in the context of a discussion of other issues.
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• W. Sellars: Science, Perception, and Reality; 1963, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul.
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• J. Locke: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. IV.3.26, IV.12.13; 1975, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
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• The most puzzling and most controversial case is provided by Newton’s fourth rule in the ‘General scholium’ of the Principia, which first appeared in the third edition of 1726: ‘hypotheses non fingo’ (‘I do not feign hypotheses’). This rule is so obviously violated by Newton that historians of science have never ceased to be intrigued by its interpretation.
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• W. Whewell: History of Inductive Sciences; 1837, London and The Philosophy of Inductive Sciences, Founded upon their History; 1840, London.
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• For an informal and clear presentation see B. Van Fraassen: The Scientific Image; 1980, Oxford, Oxford University Press, especially chapter 3.
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• K. R. Popper: Objective Knowledge: an Evolutionary Approach; 1972, Oxford, Clarendon.
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• The point is put very forcefully in D. Bloor: Knowledge and Social Imagery, chap. 1; 1980, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul.
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• Cf. W. Sellars: Science, Perception, and Reality (see Note 7).
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• In decision-theoretic terms: K. Lehrer: Theory of Knowledge; 1990, London, Routledge, especially chapter 6. In Bayesian terms: M. B. Hesse: The Structure of Scientific Inference; 1974, Berkeley, CA, University of California Press.
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• D. M. Edwards and L. Hardman: ‘ “Lost in hyperspace”: cognitive mapping and navigation in a hypertext environment’, in R. Mcaleese (ed.): Hypertext: Theory into Practice, 105–125; 1989, Norwood, NJ, Ablex.
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• J. Conklin: ‘Hypertext: an introduction and survey’, IEEE Computer, 1987, 20, (9), 17–41.
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• The most elaborate taxonomy is provided in R. H. Trigg: ‘A network-based approach to text handling for the online scientific community’, PhD thesis, Department of Computer Science, University of Maryland, 1983 (University Microfilms 8429934), cited in J. Nielsen: Hypertext and Hypermedia, 108; 1990, San Diego, CA, Academic Press. Another taxonomy is given in R. Kuhlen: Hypertext. Ein nicht-lineares Medium zwischen Buch und Wissensbank, 106; 1991, Berlin/ H eidelberg, Springer.
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• D. Canter, R. Rivers and G. Storrs: ‘Characterizing user navigation through complex data structures’, Behaviour and Information Technology, 1985, 4, (2), 93–102. See also R. Mcaleese: ‘Navigation and browsing in hypertext’, in R. Mcaleese (ed.): Hypertext: Theory into Practice, 6–44; 1989, Norwood, NJ, Ablex; A. Simpson: ‘Navigation in hypertext: design issues’, Online Information, 1990, 14, 241–255; K. Utting and N. Yankelovich: ‘Context and orientation in hypermedia networks’, A CM Transactions on Information Systems, 1989, 7, 58–84.
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• See K. Kelly: The Logic of Reliable Inquiry; 1996, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
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• J. Nielsen: Hypertext and Hypermedia, pp. 46–48, 58–60 (see Note 17).
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