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The Journal of Economic Education Volume 35, 2004 - Issue 1
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Original Article

Limit Pricing with Incomplete Information: Answers to Frequently Asked Questions

Timothy L. Sorenson Seattle University Albers School of Business and Economics
Pages 62-78 | Published online: 07 Aug 2010

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