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Legal Ethics Volume 17, 2014 - Issue 2
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Book Reviews

Book Review Symposium

W Bradley Wendel Professor of Law, Cornell University, USA.
,
Katherine R Kruse Professor of Law, Hamline University School of Law, USA. I dedicate this review essay to my father, John Kruse, a now-retired Methodist minister whose activism in the Civil Rights Movement shaped my childhood years in Eau Claire, Wisconsin. My father can still show you the tree under which he stood to hear Dr King deliver his famous speech after the March on Washington in 1963. He loaned me his personal copy of A Testament of Hope to help me write this review essay. Spending time with both the inspiring words of Dr King and my father's occasional notations in the text have helped me appreciate the legacy I carry forward in my professional life.
,
Eli Wald Eli Wald is Charles W Delaney, Jr Professor of Law, University of Denver, Sturm College of Law, USA.; We wish to thank Deborah Cantrell, Charles Mendez and Hilary Sommerlad for their helpful comments on a draft of this paper. We credit inspiration for the title to Tina Turner and to Deborah J Cantrell, ‘What's Love Got to Do With It? Contemporary Lessons on Lawyerly Advocacy from the Preacher Martin Luther King, Jr’ (2010) 22 St Thomas Law Review 296.
,
Russell G Pearce Russell G Pearce is Edward & Marilyn Bellet Professor of Legal Ethics, Morality & Religion, Fordham University School of Law, USA.; We wish to thank Deborah Cantrell, Charles Mendez and Hilary Sommerlad for their helpful comments on a draft of this paper. We credit inspiration for the title to Tina Turner and to Deborah J Cantrell, ‘What's Love Got to Do With It? Contemporary Lessons on Lawyerly Advocacy from the Preacher Martin Luther King, Jr’ (2010) 22 St Thomas Law Review 296.
&
Charles R Mendez Faculty Fellow, University of Denver, Sturm College of Law, USA. I am grateful to Eli Wald for the engaging and thoughtful discussions regarding the book and his many comments on earlier drafts of this review.
Pages 313-369 | Published online: 07 May 2015

  • The Standard Conception involves two principles of action, partisanship and neutrality, and an evaluative principle, nonaccountability. A lawyer owes duties of loyalty and competence to her client (partisanship), and should not be infuenced by any moral qualms she may have about her client's identity, ends, or the means used in the course of the representation, provided they are lawful (neutrality). A lawyer who follows the principles of partisanship and neutrality should be judged by others not to have engaged in moral wrongdoing (nonaccountability). For the article considered to be the frst statement of the Standard Conception, see Murray Schwartz, ‘The Professionalism and Accountability of Lawyers' (1978) 66 California Law Review 669. The term for this conception of professional ethics originated, so far as I know, in Gerald J Postema, ‘Moral Responsibility and Professional Ethics' (1980) 55 New York University Law Review 63. The Standard Conception is generally understood as an aspect of political liberalism. See eg Tim Dare, The Counsel of Rogues? A Defence of the Standard Conception of the Lawyer's Role (Ashgate, 2009).
  • Robert K Vischer, ‘Legal Advice as Moral Perspective’ (2006) 19 Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics 225.
  • Ibid, 244–6.
  • See also Katherine R Kruse, ‘Beyond Cardboard Clients in Legal Ethics' (2010) 23 Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics 103; William H Simon, ‘Legal Advice and Client Autonomy: Mrs Jones's Case’ (1991) 50 Maryland Law Review 213.
  • Vischer (n 2) 253–4. See also Thomas L Shaffer, ‘The Legal Ethics of Radical Individualism’ (1987) 65 Texas Law Review 963.
  • Vischer (n 2) 248–52.
  • Cambridge University Press, 2009.
  • The term ‘public reason’ is from John Rawls, Political Liberalism (Columbia University Press, 1993) 217, 242–3.
  • See Michael J Sandel, ‘Political Liberalism’ (1994) 107 Harvard Law Review 1765 (book review).
  • See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, bk I.7, at 1097a15–35 (WD Ross trans., JO Urmson ed) (Oxford University Press, rev edn 1984).
  • See Elizabeth Anderson, Value in Ethics and Economics (Harvard University Press, 1993) 17.
  • Ibid, 19.
  • Ibid, 70.
  • Cambridge University Press, 2013. Page references in the text are to this book.
  • Jeffrey Stout, Democracy and Tradition (Princeton University Press, 2004) 130.
  • Ibid, 151.
  • Ibid, 140.
  • Thomas L Shaffer, ‘Faith Tends to Subvert Legal Order’ (1998) 66 Fordham Law Review 1089.
  • Stanley Hauerwas and William H Willimon, Resident Aliens: Life in the Christian Colony (Abingdon Press, 1989) 72.
  • See John Christman, ‘Autonomy’ in The Oxford Handbook of the History of Ethics (Oxford University Press, 2013) § 32.2.2, 696–7.
  • Roger J Sullivan, Immanuel Kant's Moral Theory (Cambridge University Press, 1989) 107–8.
  • Ibid, 193.
  • See eg Thomas Albert Howard, Imago Dei: Human Dignity in Ecumenical Perspective (Catholic University of America Press, 2013); Gilbert C Meilaender, Neither Beast Nor God: The Dignity of the Human Person (Encounter Books, 2009); Jürgen Moltmann, On Human Dignity: Political Theology and Ethics, M Douglas Meeks (trans) (Fortress Press, 1984).
  • Martha C Nussbaum, ‘Human Functioning and Social Justice: In Defense of Aristotelian Essentialism’ (1992) 20 Political Theory 202.
  • David Luban, ‘Lawyers as Upholders of Human Dignity (When They Aren't Busy Assaulting It)’ in Legal Ethics and Human Dignity (Cambridge University Press, 2007) 66.
  • Ibid, 68–73.
  • Ibid, 76.
  • Vischer discusses my treatment of client counselling in W Bradley Wendel, Lawyers and Fidelity to Law (Princeton University Press, 2010) at 269–75, and worries that grounding principles of legal ethics in a political conception of citizenship, rather than in the human terms of moral agency and dignity, might tend to dull the lawyer's sense of personal responsibility for serving the common good, which in turn is an end that encompasses more than the legal entitlements of citizens. I share his concern that the moral faculties of lawyers can be dulled by habitually narrowing the richness of moral life by imposing legal categories on this experience. In this I very much agree with Roger Cramton's classic article on the process by which law students are turned into moral skeptics. See Roger C Cramton, ‘The Ordinary Religion of the Law School Classroom’ (1978) 29 Journal of Legal Education 247; see also William Stringfellow, ‘The Crisis of Confidence and Ethics in the Legal Profession’ (1979) 9 Capital University Law Review 1. The reason I see moral counselling as marginal to the lawyer's core function (Vischer's accurate characterisation—see p 271) is twofold. The frst, alluded to below in connection with Christian Realism, is that I do not believe that lawyers, on the whole, are better at discerning and acting on moral values than clients, on the whole. The second is that the whole point of the rule of law and, derivatively, of the role of lawyers, is to secure an agreed-upon basis for action in the name of society as a whole, which is at least in principle independent of what any individual believes ought to be done, as a matter of morality, love, justice, dignity or anything else.
  • Rawls (n 8) 36, 144.
  • The concept of secular saints was popularised by a course on the meaning of life, given by a Catholic philosopher. See Francis J Ambrosio, ‘Philosophy, Religion, and the Meaning of Life’, audio recording (Teaching Company, 2009).
  • See eg Richard P Church, First Be Reconciled: Challenging Christians in the Courts (Herald Press, 2008); Thomas L Shaffer, ‘Should a Christian Lawyer Sign Up for Simon's Practice of Justice?’ (1999) 51 Stanford Law Review 903, 908–9 (discussing the Anabaptist-inspired response of renouncing all forms of coercive power, including the law).
  • Charles Fried, ‘The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relation’ (1976) 85 Yale Law Journal 1060.
  • William Stringfellow, ‘The Christian Lawyer as a Churchman’ (1957) 10 Vanderbilt Law Review 939, 964.
  • Ibid, 962.
  • Ibid, 966.
  • See Milner S Ball, ‘A Meditation on Vocation’ in Andrew W McThenia (ed), Radical Christian and Exemplary Lawyer: Honoring William Stringfellow (Eerdmans, 1985) 133 (quoting Stringfellow: ‘[W]here Christians, in the same frailty and tension as any other human beings, become participants in specific violence they do so confessionally, acknowledging throughout the sin of it’).
  • Robin W Lovin, Christian Realism and the New Realities (Cambridge University Press, 2008) 43–44.
  • Ibid, 94.
  • I Corinthians 13:12.
  • See Walter Rauschenbusch, A Theology for the Social Gospel (Macmillan, 1917).
  • See Reinhold Niebuhr, Christian Realism and Political Problems (Charles Scribner's Sons, 1953).
  • Ibid, 190.
  • Distinctive features of Lutheran social ethics include an understanding of humans as simultaneously justifed and sinful (simul justus et peccator), and the idea of differentiated orders of creation in which God is at work in different ways. Luther's doctrine of the Two Kingdoms has often been misunderstood—by Niebuhr, among others—as mandating disengagement and quietism, but it is better understood along Christian Realist lines: ‘[T]he hoped-for future must contend with the dangerous and complex realities of this world… [Lutheran theologian Robert] Benne is sceptical of claims to transform the world into the image of the anticipated kingdom; not only are the practicalities of such claims outside the church's technical competence, but such claims frequently imperil the relative order and justice necessary for human life.’ Robert Tuttle, Review: Karen L Bloomquist and John R Stumme (eds), The Promise of Lutheran Ethics (2001) 16 Journal of Law and Religion 861; see also James Childs, ‘Helmut Thielicke on the Christian Life’ (2009) 9 Journal of Lutheran Ethics (online).
  • JB Schneewind, The Invention of Autonomy (Cambridge University Press 1998) 71–72.
  • Rawls (n 8) 217, 242–3.
  • Isaiah Berlin, ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’ in Henry Hardy (ed), The Proper Study of Mankind (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1998).
  • John Gray, Isaiah Berlin (Princeton University Press, 1996) 61–62.
  • Stephen L Pepper, ‘The Lawyer's Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, A Problem, and Some Possibilities' [1986] American Bar Foundation Research Journal 613, 617.
  • Lovin (n 37) 189.
  • Ibid, 190.
  • See Martin Luther King, Jr, ‘Letter from Birmingham City Jail’ in Hugo Adam Bedau (ed), Civil Disobedience in Focus (Routledge, 1991) 74.
  • Robert K Vischer, Martin Luther King Jr and the Morality of Legal Practice: Lessons in Love and Justice (Cambridge University Press, 2013).
  • See eg W Bradley Wendel, Lawyers and Fidelity to Law (Princeton University Press, 2010) 123–5. See also the exchange on this topic in William H Simon, ‘Should Lawyers Obey the Law?’ (1996) 38 William and Mary Law Review 217; David Luban, ‘Legal Ideals and Moral Obligations: A Comment on Simon’ (1996) 38 William and Mary Law Review 255; David B Wilkins, ‘In Defense of Law And Morality: Why Lawyers Should Have a Prima Facie Duty to Obey the Law’ (1996) 38 William and Mary Law Review 269.
  • Alice Woolley, ‘The Problem of Disagreement in Legal Ethics Theory’ (2013) 26 Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 181.
  • Vischer (n 1) 94–100 (discussing the lawyers for Enron, Refco and Lehman Brothers); at 231–5 (discussing the Bush Administration torture memos); and at 189–91 (discussing the litigation tactics of the lawyers defending the Catholic Church against liability for sexual abuse perpetrated by priests).
  • Vischer (n 1) 171.
  • Charles J Ogletree, Jr, ‘Beyond Justifcations: Seeking Motivations to Sustain Public Defenders' (1993) 106 Harvard Law Review 1239; Abbe Smith and William Montross, ‘The Calling of Criminal Defense’ (1999) 50 Mercer Law Review 443.
  • Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness (New Press, 2010).
  • Michael J Klarman, ‘The Racial Origins of Modern Criminal Procedure’ (2000) 99 Michigan Law Review 48.
  • Powell v Alabama, 287 US 45, 53 S Ct 55 (1932) (Fourteenth Amendment required appointment of counsel); Norris v Alabama, 294 US 587 (1935) (Equal Protection Clause was violated by evidence of systematic exclusion of black citizens from jury service).
  • Brown v Mississippi, 297 US 461 (1936).
  • Katherine R Kruse, ‘Race, Angst and Capital Punishment: The Burger Court's Existential Struggle’ (1998) 9 Seton Hall Constitutional Law Journal 67. For a detailed description of the campaign to abolish the death penalty, see Michael Meltsner, Cruel and Unusual: The Supreme Court and Capital Punishment (Random House, 1973).
  • Alexander (n 7) 11–13.
  • Ibid, 21.
  • Ibid, 40–58.
  • Human Rights Watch, ‘Nation Behind Bars: A Human Rights Solution’ (May 2014), 5.
  • Michael Tonry, Punishing Race: A Continuing American Dilemma (Oxford University Press, 2011) 34–35.
  • Ibid, 11.
  • Human Rights Watch (n 15) 6.
  • Tonry (n 16) 50–51.
  • Ibid, 51–52.
  • See generally Sarah Hyser, ‘Two Steps Forward One Step Back: How Federal Courts Took the “Fair” Out of the Fair Sentencing Act’ (2012) 117 Penn State Law Review 504.
  • American Civil Liberties Union, ‘The War on Marijuana in Black and White: Billions of Dollars Wasted on Racially Biased Arrests' (June 2013).
  • See generally Tonry (n 16).
  • Ibid, 116.
  • Ibid, 123–5.
  • Ibid, 136–7.
  • Ibid, 10.
  • Ibid, 90–97.
  • Alexander (n 7) 141.
  • Michael Pinard, ‘An Integrated Perspective on the Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions and Reentry Issues Faced by Formerly Incarcerated Individuals' (2006) 86 Boston University Law Review 623, 634–5.
  • Alexander (n 7) 142.
  • Ibid, 140–54. For a complete catalogue of the collateral consequences of criminal offences, see generally Cecelia Klingele, Jenny Roberts and Margaret Colgate-Love, Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions: Law, Policy and Practice (Thomson-West treatise, updated January 2014), § 1:10.
  • gabriel J Chin, ‘Race, the War on Drugs, and the Collateral Consequences of Criminal Conviction’ (2002) 6 Journal of Gender, Race & Justice 253, 259.
  • Klingele et al (n 32) § 1:11.
  • Ogletree (n 6) 1254–60.
  • Barbara Allen Babcock, ‘Defending the guilty’ (1983) 23 Cleveland State Law Review 175, 177.
  • Smith and Montross (n 6) 452.
  • Martin Luther King, Jr, ‘An Experiment in Love’ in James M Washington (ed), A Testament of Hope: The Essential Writings of Martin Luther King, Jr (Harper & Row, 1986) 16, 19.
  • Vischer (n 1) 58.
  • Ibid, 64–67.
  • Ibid, 75–76.
  • Ibid, 64, quoting gabriel Marcel, The Existential Background of Human Dignity (Harvard University Press, 1963) 122–3.
  • Ogletree (n 6).
  • Ibid, 1273.
  • Ibid, 1283.
  • Martin Luther King, Jr, ‘The American Dream’ in A Testament of Hope (n 38) 208, 210.
  • Ibid.
  • Baxter's stories are collected on the We Are All Criminals webpage, along with a travelling photo exhibit that juxtaposes the stories of uncharged criminals with persons who have been convicted of similar crimes. See www.bushfoundation.org/blog/we-are-all-criminals-bush-fellow-turns-lens-criminal-records (accessed August 2014).
  • Emily Baxter, We Are All Criminals, ‘Bush Fellow Turns the Lens on Criminal Records' (26 June 2013).
  • Ibid.
  • Nicole Simms, ‘Collateral Costs: Racial Disparities and Injustice in Minnesota's Marijuana Laws' Minnesota 2020 (April 2014).
  • Ibid, 3.
  • Vischer (n 1) 199–201.
  • Ogletree (n 6) 1275.
  • Smith and Montross (n 6) 453.
  • Amy Bach, Ordinary Injustice: How America Holds Court (Metropolitan Books, 2009).
  • King (n 46) 216.
  • Ibid.
  • Bach (n 56) 74.
  • Ibid.
  • Ogletree (n 6) 1288.
  • Martin Luther King, Jr, ‘I Have a Dream’ in A Testament of Hope (n 38) 217, 219.
  • Ibid.
  • For more information, see http://gideonspromise.org (accessed August 2014).
  • Eli Wald and Russell G Pearce, ‘Beyond Cardboard Lawyers in Legal Ethics' (2010) 15 Legal Ethics 125, 125.
  • See eg Russell G Pearce and Eli Wald, ‘The Obligation of Lawyers to Heal Civic Culture: Confronting the Ordeal of Incivility in the Practice of Law’ (2011) 34 University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Journal 1; Eli Wald and Russell G Pearce, ‘Making Good Lawyers' (2011) 9 University of St Thomas Law Journal 403.
  • Wald and Pearce (n 1) 129.
  • Ibid, 130.
  • Ibid.
  • Russell G Pearce and Eli Wald, ‘The Obligation to Heal Civic Culture: Confronting the Ordeal of Civility in the Practice of Law’ (2011) 34 University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Review 1, 8 fn 33, 43.
  • Vischer also argues that the decline of self-regulation undermines trust in the attorney–client relationship (118–21) but we do not quite see how either a shift from self-regulation to external regulation of the profession or a gradual transformation of the traditional top-down regulatory mode to a more compliance-based regime directly impacts, let alone compromises trust in, the attorney–client relationship.
  • See American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct, R 1.7, com 22 (2014).
  • See ibid, R 1.10(a) (2014). See also Brown v Florida Department of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, 2012 US Dis LEXIS 145159.
  • Russell G Pearce and Eli Wald, ‘Rethinking Lawyer Regulation: How a Relational Approach would Improve Professional Rules and Roles' [2012] Michigan State Law Review 513.
  • Russell G Pearce and Eli Wald, Relational Infrastructure of Law Firm Regulation: Is the Death of BigLaw Greatly Exaggerated? (2013) 42 Hofstra Law Review 109.
  • Wald and Pearce (n 2) 429–30.
  • Luigino Bruni and Robert Sugden, ‘Fraternity: Why the Market need not be a Morally-Free Zone’ (2008) 24 Economics and Philosophy 35.
  • Wald and Pearce (n 1) 133.
  • See n *.
  • Pearce and Wald (n 10) 529–35.
  • Cf Russell G Pearce and Amelia J Uelmen, ‘Religious Lawyering in a Liberal Democracy: A Challenge and an Invitation’ (2004) 55 Case Western Law Review 127; Russell G Pearce, ‘The Jewish Lawyer's Question’ (1996) 27 Texas Tech Law Review 1259.
  • See eg Eli Wald, ‘An Unlikely Knight in Economic Armor: “Law and Economics” in Defense of Professional Ideals' (2001) 31 Seton Hall Law Review 1042; Eli Wald, ’A Primer on Diversity, Discrimination and Equality in the Legal Profession or Who is Responsible for Pursuing Diversity and Why’ (2011) 24 Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics 1079.
  • David B Wilkins, ‘Team of Rivals? Toward a new Model of the Corporate Attorney-Client Relationship (2010) 78 Fordham Law Review 2067.
  • Stephen L Pepper, ‘Lawyers' Ethics in the Gap between Law and Justice’ (1999) 40 South Texas Law Review 181, 190.
  • Stephen L Pepper, ‘The Lawyer Knows More than the Law’ (2012) 90 Texas Law Review 691, 699.
  • Pepper (n 20) 191.
  • Ibid, 192.
  • nicole Martorano Van Cleve, ‘Reinterpreting the Zealous Advocate: Multiple Intermediary Roles of the Criminal Defense Attorney’ in Lawyers in Practice: Ethical Decision Making in Context Leslie C Levin and Lynn Mather (eds) (University of Chicago Press, 2012) 293.
  • See www.gjp.org.
  • Internal citation omitted.
  • Complicating this matter further is the question we discuss above of how non-Christian or secular lawyers are to understand personalism.
  • Discussing W Bradley Wendel, Lawyers and Fidelity to Law (Princeton University Press, 2010).
  • Martin Luther King, Jr, Foreword to Where Do We Go from Here: Chaos or Community? (Beacon Press, 1968) xxiv.
  • robert K Vischer, Martin Luther King Jr and the Morality of Legal Practice: Lessons in Love and Justice (Cambridge university Press, 2013).
  • russell Pearce explains that the legal profession's tendency to favour a Blue State—embracing a liberal public philosophy—is the result of legal ethics and jurisprudence. See russell G Pearce, ‘the Legal Profession as a Blue State: refections on Public Philosophy, Jurisprudence, and Legal Ethics' (2006) 75 Fordham Law Review 1339, 1340. the Blue State, and thus the legal profession, is less likely to push moral values in the public sphere, and it operates with the principle that personal ethics should not be imposed on others. Ibid.
  • Bradley Wendel notes that the hesitancy to enforce a particular ethical value on everyone is itself an ethical value—such as respect for human dignity or toleration for individual autonomy. See W Bradley Wendel, ‘teaching Ethics in an Atmosphere of Skepticism and relativism’ (2002) 36 University of San Francisco Law Review 711, 726.
  • Pepper's concern is that lawyers bent on enforcing morality would have the ability to act as gatekeepers, refusing access to the law, a public good, to citizens based upon personal, and perhaps arbitrary, moral reasons. Stephen L Pepper, ‘the Lawyer's Amoral Ethical role: A Defense, a Problem, and Some Possibilities' [1986] American Bar Foundation Research Journal 613, 617.
  • See John P Heinz and Edward O Laumann, Chicago Lawyers: The Social Structure of the Bar (northwestern university Press, rev edn 1994) 127.
  • See thomas L Shaffer and robert F Cochran, Jr, Lawyers, Clients, and Moral Responsibility (West Group, 1994).
  • thomas L Shaffer, ‘the Legal Ethics of radical Individualism’ (1987) 65 Texas Law Review 963.
  • See eg Bernard A Burk and David McGowan, ‘Big but Brittle: Economic Perspectives on the Future of the Law Firm in the new Economy’ [2011] Columbia Business Law Review 1, 17–24.
  • Heinz and Laumann (n 6) 160–2.
  • See David B Wilkins, ‘team of rivals? toward a new Model of the Corporate Attorney-Client relationship’ (2010) 78 Fordham Law Review 2067 (exploring the impact that ongoing competitive pressures and trends have on the attorney–client relationship, paying special attention to large law firms and large organisational clients).
  • I discuss in further work that understanding the client is not immediate. It takes a conscious deal of effort by the attorney. See Charles r Mendez, The Ethics of Understanding (unpublished manuscript).
  • William H Simon, ‘Lawyer Advice and Client Autonomy: Mrs Jones's Case’ (1991) 50 Maryland Law Review 213.
  • I discuss the demanding nature of autonomy and how an attorney's attempt to enhance it is quite limited because it is often outside of her control. Charles r Mendez, ‘Defating Autonomy’ (2014) 66 South Carolina Law Review (forthcoming).
  • Simon (n 13) 214.
  • Ibid.
  • Vischer acknowledges that it is not ‘an easy feat for the lawyer to discern the client's goals which “are subjective and peculiar to the individual”’. Vischer (n 2) 41 (quoting Geoffrey C Hazard Jr, Susan P Koniak and roger C Cramton, The Law and Ethics of Lawyering (Foundation Press, 3rd edn 1999) 3).
  • See eg richard L Abel, Lawyers in the Dock (Oxford university Press, 2008). Abel chronicles the careers of several attorneys who fall into a trap of professional misconduct because of a high-volume caseload that becomes too demanding. See also Eli Wald, review of richard L Abel, Lawyers in the Dock: Learning from Attorney Disciplinary Proceedings (2009) 59 Journal of Legal Education 311.
  • 263 Minn 346 (1962).
  • Ibid.
  • Ibid.
  • Ibid.
  • Ibid.
  • roger C Cramton and Lori P Knowles, ‘Professional Secrecy and its Exceptions: Spaulding v Zimmerman revisited’ (1998) 83 Minnesota Law Review 63, 63–64.
  • Ibid.
  • Ibid.
  • Katherine r Kruse, ‘Beyond Cardboard Clients in Legal Ethics' (2010) 23 Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics 103, 105.
  • Ibid, 106.
  • Cramton and Knowles (n 24) 84–86; W Bradley Wendel, ‘Civil Obedience’ (2004) 104 Columbia Law Review 363, 404–5; norman W Spaulding, ‘reinterpreting Professional Identity’ (2003) 74 University of Colorado Law Review 1, fn 197; see also nathan M Crystal, ‘using the Concept of “A Philosophy of Lawyering” in teaching Professional responsibility’ (2007) 51 St Louis University Law Journal 1235, 1256–66 (discussing different ways of approaching the dilemma faced by Zimmerman's attorneys).
  • See Albert r Jonsen and Stephen toulmin, The Abuse of Casuistry: A History of Moral Reasoning (university of California Press, 1988) (suggesting that moral truths come not from theories applied in a deductive manner but from an intuitive response to a set of facts).
  • W Bradley Wendel, review of David Luban, Misplaced Fidelity Lawyers and Fidelity to Law (2012) 90 Texas Law Review 673, 689.
  • See Eli Wald and russell G Pearce, ‘What's Love Got to Do with Lawyers? thoughts on relationality, Love, and Lawyers' Work’, this volume.
  • See W Bradley Wendel, Lawyers and Fidelity to Law (Princeton university Press, 2010).
  • Eli Wald discusses the idea that attorney–client communication is a one-way street, in which the client is expected to tell everything to the attorney, including information not necessarily related to the legal representation, while the attorney discloses relatively nothing about himself. Eli Wald, ‘taking Attorney-Client Communications (and therefore Clients) Seriously’ (2008) 42 University of San Francisco Law Review 747, 755–7.
  • Ibid.

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