Positioning member states in EU-NATO security cooperation: towards a typology

ABSTRACT

With the growing density and the plethora of security organisations on the regional and international level, the research programme on interorganisational relations has received increasing scholarly attention. The complexity of European security – in light of the Ukraine conflict since 2014, Russia’s more assertive foreign policy behaviour, and on-going crisis management operations in the Africa, the Mediterranean Sea and Middle East – has revived EU-NATO cooperation. The analysis from the perspective of member states and how they can be positioned in the EU-NATO interorganisational relations, however, has received little exploration. This article, therefore, addresses the roles and positions of member states within the relations between the EU and NATO as Europe’s prime security organisations. Member states have numerous political strategies at their disposal to trigger, strengthen or obstruct interorganisational relations, ranging from forum-shopping to hostage-taking and brokering. Drawing on insights from regime theory, network analysis, organisation theory and interorganisationalism, this article proposes a typology of member states in EU-NATO cooperation. Against the backdrop of this special relationship, the typology is developed which aims to detect and illustrate member states’ positions and strategies.

KEYWORDS:

• European security
• member states
• typology
• EU-NATO cooperation
• interorganisational relations
• regime complexity

Introduction

Interorganisational relations between the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) have recently experienced renewed attention in the International Relations scholarship. Cooperation in security and defence in Europe has become an interesting as well as a highly relevant research topic and has enjoyed high levels of scholarly attention, especially since the involvement of a multitude of international and regional actors in the field (Missiroli 2002, Howorth and Keeler 2003, Biermann 2008, Hofmann 2009, 2011, Græger and Haugevik 2011, Græger 2016, 2017, Biermann and Koops 2017, Duke and Gebhard 2017, Howorth 2017, Smith and Gebhard 2017, Smith et al. 2017, Koops 2017a, 2017b). While security cooperation takes place on the bilateral, minilateral and multilateral levels, these arrangements can be institutionalised or ad hoc (Karlsrud and Reykers 2020). Both empirical and theoretical contributions have analysed and reflected on EU-NATO cooperation based on a number of dominant themes such as explanations for the onset of cooperation and the development of their relations (Hofmann 2009, Flockhart 2014), rivalry and competition between the two organisations (Ojanen 2006, Duke 2008), their conduct of crisis management operations in overlapping geographical areas (Reichard 2006, Gebhard and Smith 2015, Schleich 2014), the different (sub-)actors involved in interorganisational cooperation, i.e. state, international staff and military actors (Smith 2011, Koops 2017a) or the exploration of their cooperation in practice (Græger and Haugevik 2011, Græger 2016, 2017). More broadly, the increase of international and regional organisations with functional overlaps and overlapping mandates as well as the condensed network of these organisations have triggered new research programmes, such as the study of international regime complexes and networks in international relations (Alter and Meunier 2009, Drezner 2009, Hofmann 2009, Biermann 2011, Brosig 2011, 2020, Alter and Raustiala 2018). These imply empirical studies and debates on the theoretical approaches to explaining the phenomena of organisational networks and fields, and the interaction of international organisations (IOs) within the same issue area.

With the revival of enhanced EU-NATO relations after the onset of the Ukraine crisis in 2014, disruptions in Europe’s relations with Russia and the demand for comprehensive approaches to crisis management requiring the toolboxes of both organisations, their cooperation has gained importance for European security more broadly. This is the case despite the different nature of NATO as a security and defence organisation and the EU’s aspiration to become a security provider and effective conflict manager. However, the focus on member states has so far been shallow in the analysis of their interorganisational relationship. There has neither been a systematic analysis of member states’ role in interorganisational relations nor an in-depth study of member states’ contributions to the (dys-)function of EU-NATO cooperation beyond the focus on the so-called Cyprus issue and some individual states, primarily France and the UK (cf. Howorth 2000, Missiroli 2002, Acikmese and Triantaphyllou 2012, Perruche 2014). A separate literature has focused on member states in EU foreign policy-making without paying much attention to the implications for foreign policy cooperation outside the EU, such as within NATO and between the two organisations (cf. Hadfield et al. 2017, Maurer and Wright 2021). This is surprising and problematic for two reasons. First, states build the core foundation of intergovernmental organisations; they are the key providers of essential resources including funding, expertise, logistics and capabilities (cf. Abbott and Snidal 1998, Barnett and Finnemore 1999, Karemos et al. 2001, Magliveras 2011). Second, in foreign, security and defence policy including external relations, states represent the main decision-makers, increasing international security organisations’ dependence on their own member states. Although the research programmes of interorganisational relations, network analysis and regime complexity have acknowledged the relevance of states (see, for example, Simón 2010, Biermann and Koops 2017), a conceptual discussion and analytical framework for the analysis of the role of member states in interorganisational relations – in the security domain – have been largely missing. This article, therefore, uses insights from these theoretical approaches to analyse the perspective of member states in overlapping organisations in security and defence with a specific focus on the EU-NATO relationship.

In doing so, this article contributes to the study and theorising of interorganisational relations in European and international security. While the above-mentioned scholarly works primarily focus on the EU-NATO relationship itself, this article addresses the role of member states in their interorganisational cooperation. For this purpose, interorganisational relations are defined as “links, relationships and modes of interaction between two or more international organisations” (Koops 2012, p. 72), particularly in the same policy area. Among the defining features are functional overlap, i.e. both organisations are tasked with the main mandates in the same policy area, and membership overlap to a significant degree. In addition, the geographical scope is another defining feature both in terms of covering the same geographical space, e.g. Europe or the transatlantic security space, or executing activities in the same geographical area. EU-NATO cooperation thus presents an interesting case of interorganisational relations because of their overlap in membership, mandates and geographical scope. This organisational overlap has thus attracted increasing scholarly attention (see Biermann 2008, Hofmann 2009, 2011, 2019, Simón 2010, Smith 2011, Koops 2017b). Particularly because of their high degree of membership overlap of 21 states, EU-NATO cooperation is used as the empirical example and reference point to illustrate the typology of member states in interorganisational relations.

One important question remains: How and to what extent do member states shape EU-NATO interorganisational cooperation? This further relates to questions on the positioning and political strategies of both single and multiple member states, i.e. those states with membership only in either one or both organisations. With the increasing proliferation of IOs in the same policy area, member states have a variety of strategies to choose from to shape interorganisational relations. These strategies include forum-shopping, obstruction, brokering and hostage-taking (Hofmann 2009, 2019). To offer a first step towards an analytical and systemic account of member states in interorganisational relations between the EU and NATO, this article develops a tentative typology identifying states’ positions and use of strategies. States can subsequently be divided into four types of member states in interorganisational relations: advocates, blockers, balancers, and neutrals. This typology allows scholars and policymakers to predict – ceteris paribus – the reactions and behaviour of member states concerning decisions on fostering interorganisational interactions between the two organisations.

Theorising and conceptualising as well as developing typologies in the Political Science and International Relations Scholarships are long-standing analytical approaches (Berenskoetter 2017). Typologies are useful tools that help to advance conceptualisations, categorise phenomena and observations and make comparisons. According to the conceptualisation, understanding and usage of typologies by Collier et al. (2012), this article employs an explanatory typology with multiple dimensions. These dimensions include the type of membership (single vs. multiple, original vs. subsequent) within IOs, member states’ foreign and security policy orientation, their level of interconnectedness through bilateral and minilateral partnerships, availability of (military) capabilities and resources and the application of cross-institutional strategies. While the type of membership and their internal interconnectedness allow to identify member states’ positions and thus the ability to make use of certain strategies as some are more effective with multiple membership, states’ military capabilities and resources can point towards their contributions to EU and NATO operations and to their interoperability. Overall, the main aim of the typology is to identify a member state’s position within and thus to explain the evolution of the EU-NATO relationship.

This article proceeds as follows. In the first part, the approach of interorganisational relations and EU-NATO cooperation are theorised by synthesising previous findings from interorganisationalism, regime complexity and network analysis. Deriving from these approaches, membership is conceptualised which leads to the development of the typology of member states in interorganisational relations between security organisations with reference to the EU-NATO relationship. Finally, the concluding part reflects on the limitations of the proposed typology and suggests possible avenues for future research within international security and beyond.

Theorising interorganisational relations and EU-NATO cooperation

Taking the research programme of international regime complexity as a point of departure further helps to develop a theoretical framework for the analysis of interorganisational relations. With the emergence of overlapping regimes, for example in the areas of environmental politics and international trade, the idea of regime complexes emerged. According to Raustiala and Victor (2004, p. 279, also see Alter and Raustiala 2018, p. 33), a regime complex is defined as an “array of partially overlapping and non-hierarchical institutions that includes more than one international agreement or authority” in a particular issue or geographical area. It is further seen as “the presence of nested, partially overlapping, and parallel international regimes that are not hierarchically ordered” (Alter and Meunier 2009, p. 13). Therein, the interaction between the existing regimes in the same policy area can be observed, which is often referred to as interplay. Regime complexity further looks at how the rules and norms of overlapping regimes, including their agreements, conventions and treaties, affect one another (Gehring and Oberthür 2003, 2004, 2009, Lipson 2017, Alter and Raustiala 2018).

A theoretical framework that has so far received little attention by scholars interested in the analysis of interactions and cooperation among international security organisations is the framework of interorganisational interaction conceptualised by Gehring and Oberthür (2003, 2004, 2009, also see Gehring and Faude 2014). Generally, interorganisational relations refer to the emergence of separate organisations in the international governance structure that overlap in their mandates, membership and geographical scope (Hofmann 2019). The framework of interorganisational cooperation helps to understand and analyse interactions between organisations, and to examine an organisation’s causal influence on other organisations in the same policy area. Simply described, interorganisational interaction occurs “if one institution (the source institution) affects the development or performance of another institution (the target institution)” (Gehring and Oberthür 2009, p. 127). Loewen takes this definition one step further. Accordingly, “[i]nstitutional interplay refers to situations when the development, operation, effectiveness or broad consequences of one institution are significantly affected by the rules and programmes of another” (2006, p. 11).

Within interorganisational relations, there are two key components – IOs with their secretariats, and member states. Member states, on the one hand, are fundamental parts of organisations and therefore exert influence on the capabilities, design, formalisation, tasks and structure of organisations. Organisations, on the other hand, are vital actors because they serve as coordination hubs and synthesisers of knowledge and expertise. They also receive a high amount of autonomy from their respective member states, which enables them to act independently and to develop their own dynamics, procedures and capabilities to act, including in external relations and partnerships (Barnett and Finnemore 1999). To further understand the interactions and relations between actors – states and organisations – network analysis provides helpful insights, especially because the institutionalisation of security cooperation in Europe has been regarded as a specific system of security governance (Adam and Kriesi 2007, Dorussen and Ward 2008, Mérand et al. 2011, Maoz 2012). Interorganisational relationships can form networks of interlinked actors such as states, IOs and other non-state actors. Seeing interorganisational relations as a network allows to study the interconnectedness of actors (states and organisations), their linkages (directional vs. non-directional), individual actors’ positioning both in organisations but also as actors in their own right and the evolution of organisations’ functions and activities when mandates overlap. Furthermore, these actors in the same network are dependent on each other because organisations are made of states, and states need to create organisations for collective gains. These networks of interlinked actors are also composed of nodes and hubs. Nodes create links of different forms, including membership in organisations, that serve a specific function such as sharing and exchanging resources and information. Hubs represent those actors with a high number of connections and ties to others in the same network.

These networks of interconnected IOs develop with the emergence of increasing functional overlap as well as when interests, norms and rules converge (Alter and Raustiala 2018). Functional overlap refers to the overlap of regulatory jurisdiction, tasks, responsibilities and geographical scope. This means that IOs maintain similar or even the same functions, such as acting as security providers including a security and defence policy, they have a similar geographical scope, include a high amount of overlapping member states and possess similar decision-making procedures as well as similar or compatible organisational structures. Functional overlap can either be unintentional or deliberate membership (Gehring and Oberthür 2009, Faude 2015). Either the bureaucracies of the IOs or their member states become active to promote and facilitate the overlap of tasks and responsibilities, geographical scope and membership. This can occur, for example, through the “alumni effect” (Koops 2017a, p. 205), i.e. when a member of staff has first worked for one and then for the other organisation and thus provides inputs from the previous work placement, or when a member state finds that functional overlap might lead to the usage of fewer resources. Functional overlap thus triggers interorganisational relations due to the already existing links and connections of IOs. Important similarities and overlaps are, for example, geography, membership, responsibilities and organisational structures (Gehring and Oberthür (2009, Biermann 2008). Consequentially, Koops (2007, p. 22) argues that “the more organisations learn from each other and the more similar they tend to become, the easier their cooperation will become”.

Increasing interactions and functional overlap depend, however, also on the distribution of power among the two organisations, which can either be symmetric or asymmetric. Traditionally, power is in the hands of states with autonomy over decision-making and it has been distinguished between “power over”, power exerted by one actor over another in a relationship, and “power to”, the ability to trigger change and shape certain outcomes (Ojanen 2018). In this context, power of an organisation denotes “its ability to retain, or expand, its capability to pursue its policies within the area of functional overlap”. Under an asymmetric power distribution, a so-called “sectoral specialisation” of the organisations is most likely to happen because the weaker organisation needs to withdraw its governance activities from the respective policy area (Gehring and Faude 2014, p. 479). In the case of a symmetric power distribution, both organisations need to coordinate their governance activities in the overlapping policy area. Herein, multiple members – those states that are members of more than one international organisation within the same interorganisational network – play a crucial role as they can negotiate the institutional arrangements within both organisations to avoid conflicts and malfunctions of the regulatory bodies. Under symmetrical power distribution, co-governance and a division of labour are more likely to occur than role specification (Gehring and Faude 2014). Accordingly, Gehring and Faude propose “that institutional adaptation gives rise to an institutionalised division of labour among the elemental institutions of an institutional complex” (2014, p. 482). Division of labour then results in enhanced cooperation and fostered exchanges. In the case of the EU and NATO, their functional overlaps have increased over time as both have actively collaborated, for example, in crisis management operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina and off the Somali coast. As a result, they have become so-called interlocking institutions due to their increasing coordination and cooperation (Biermann 2009, Schleich 2014).

Interorganisational interactions are not a one-way street and can take different forms including exchanges of information and material resources, coordination of activities, joint activities and decision-making and the establishment of formal structures (cf. Biermann 2008, 2015). Interorganisational relations may also go a step further in which one organisation can influence and shape the other’s policies, procedures and institutions, leading to a process of socialisation and learning from the other organisation (Johnston 2001). While learning can be accelerated through the rotation and exchange of staff members, the so-called alumni effect (Koops 2017a, 2017b), it can also be prevented by communication problems, lack of implementation and shortage of resources.

Since interorganisational relations are a dynamic process of exchanges and coordination, they take place on different levels within the organisations. Building on Waltz (1959) distinction of three levels of analysis – international system, state and individual – interorganisational interactions occur within the network of IOs in the same policy area (international system level), are shaped by their member states as well as by individual key players within the organisations and their member states. Koops (2017a, 2017b) introduces two additional levels: the bureaucratic level and the inter-secretariat (also called inter-institutional) level. While the bureaucratic level refers to administrative structures within IOs, where decisions are taken and the day-to-day management occurs, the inter-secretariat level includes jointly created cooperation channels, such as working groups and steering committees that oversee the formal cooperation in an interorganisational relationship. Liaison committees and working groups in the case of EU-NATO cooperation have played particularly relevant roles. For example, the EU and NATO introduced and actively engaged via their liaison facilities since 2000 with a focus on capabilities which later resulted in the creation of the EU-NATO Capability Group in 2003 (Messervy-Whiting 2005). Besides these formal channels of cooperation, informal exchanges play a crucial role, especially in cases of organisational incompatibility or other institutional and legal barriers. This is particularly relevant for EU-NATO relations because of the so-called participation problem and the issue of limited sharing of classified information and intelligence despite the signing of the 2003 Security of Information Agreement (Lachmann 2010, Smith 2011, Græger 2017).

An interorganisational relationship emerges only under certain circumstances. In the regime complexity and organisation theory literatures, scholars have developed and compiled key components. These allow to identify and study EU-NATO cooperation as an interorganisational relationship and highlight the specifics of their relationship. For example, both Merrett and Aldrich (cited in Dijkstra 2017) identify four key dimensions of interorganisational interactions – formalisation, intensity, symmetry and standardisation – which have also been picked up by Gehring and Oberthür (2004, 2009). In addition to the levels of institutionalisation, the frequency and intensity of interactions, and the power relations (symmetry) among organisations, Gehring and Oberthür, emphasise the relevance of functional overlap and membership overlap. In this context, Young (1999) distinguishes between functional interplay and political interplay. Functional interplay occurs when at least two organisations deal with the same issue or problem and when these organisations are geophysically or socioeconomically linked. Political interplay implies an intentional interplay, i.e. created on purpose by the concerned organisations to set up links in pursuit of specific goals, which can either be collective or individual.

Regime complexity, network analysis and interorganisational relations, interestingly, cannot grasp the full scope of member states in the interactions between two organisations. Although they possess the explanatory power to depict the relevance of secretariats, member states still play a minor role. Due to their focus on the bureaucracies and secretariats, these approaches express little about how states can impact the evolution of interorganisational relations. As reality has shown, several member states have essentially affected EU-NATO relations, particularly France, Cyprus and Turkey, which needs to be accounted for in theorising interorganisational cooperation. After all, states are the key building blocks of organisations, possess the main decision-making power in security issues and make essential contributions of financial resources and capabilities (Abbott and Snidal 1998, Koch 2008). Member states have thus a decisive impact also on interorganisational cooperation because they can steer the direction of the organisation’s external relations, its partnerships and general orientation. Against this backdrop, member states shape interorganisational relations under certain conditions: They need to be the main decision-makers, particularly in cases of unanimity rule, and provide key resources for maintaining cooperation.

While the interactions between the EU and NATO are rooted in the security and defence realm and are based on several formal agreements and declarations such as the 2003 and 2016 Joint Declarations and the Security of Information Agreement, they also maintain liaison offices and frequently exchange information. Yet, what has become most prominent in their relationship are the overlaps in their functions and membership. Functional overlap indicates the overlap of policy areas and mandates that are covered by the IOs (Gehring and Oberthür 2009, Hofmann 2019). It is expected that more links and opportunities for dialogue and exchanges exist with more functional overlaps. This dimension also includes geographical scope, i.e. the geographical area covered by an international organisation regarding both membership and activity. Membership overlap is another defining component, which refers to the number of states that are members in more than one international security organisations. Here it is assumed that a higher level of membership overlap facilitates interactions and generally affects cooperation, either positively or negatively. Membership overlap is particularly defining for EU-NATO cooperation since twenty-one NATO states are also member of the EU, which means that issues discussed at NATO’s North Atlantic Council (NAC) are transferable to the EU’s Political and Security Committee (PSC) and vice versa. Although the high degree of membership overlap makes EU-NATO cooperation a specific case of interorganisational relations, the issue of membership has also provided much room for tensions and obstacles (cf. Koops 2017b).

Member states in the EU-NATO interorganisational relationship

Member states play vital roles in both shaping institutional design of organisations and the design of interactions between international security organisations. The high degree of membership overlap between the EU and NATO makes their relationship a unique case of interorganisational cooperation. However, existing research on the actual role of individual member states within interorganisational interactions, and particularly in EU-NATO relations, is shallow and rather little attention has so far been paid to membership and positioning within the relations between organisations. For the development of the typology of member states in interorganisational relations, a conceptualisation of membership is needed before making assumptions and providing explanations about the positioning of member states in EU.

Membership in IOs can take varying forms and different types can be identified based on states’ time of accession, size and geographical location. For example, Magliveras (2011) identifies to two dimensions: original and subsequent membership. Original membership refers to those states that take the initiative to create an international organisation and who have the right over its determination, directions and nature. Subsequent members are those states that join the international organisation at a later stage and their membership is granted based on the discretion of original members as well as depending on the organisation’s admission clauses. Koch (2008) also considers two types: political and administrative membership. Political members include states and governments that formally apply for membership, possess decision-making rights are guided by their national interests. Administrative membership, in contrast, refers to secretariats as well as independent experts and advisers that are responsible for an organisation’s day-to-day operations. For interorganisational cooperation, both types are involved, yet the decision-making power lies with state actors. States’ size – big vs. small – and geographical position, i.e. located in the centre or at the periphery, are additional characteristics for membership. Because of the unanimity rule in the EU and NATO, however, each state has the same veto rights and thus their size does not matter for decision-making. As described below, other characteristics, as well as states’ bilateral and minilateral relations and contributions to the two organisations, are more decisive.

Gehring and Oberthür (2009, also see Hofmann 2009) further distinguish between two categories of member states – multiple members and single members – that serves as a crucial foundation for developing the present typology because it helps to identify member states’ specific roles and their available political strategies. Single member states are those states which are members in only one organisation and who might not be directly affected from functional overlap of organisations. Furthermore, single members do not have the ability to exert influence immediately as they are not involved in the decision-making process of those organisations of which they are not member. In terms of interorganisational cooperation, these states lack the ability to influence certain decisions, receive less information about the developments in the respective other organisation, and might be restricted in participating in joint interorganisational activities. For instance, in the EU-NATO relationship, Cyprus, Finland, Sweden, Turkey and the US have been identified with the most prominent single member states. Since the UK’s withdrawal from the EU and the lack of a cooperation agreement on foreign, security and defence issues (Whitman 2020), it has recently also become a single member state.

Multiple member states, in contrast, refer to those states that are members of two or more IOs. Gehring and Oberthür (2009, p. 150) claim that multiple members can “transmit influence from one institution to another” and moreover, they play key roles in exerting influence on both organisations as well as in the interactions with each other. Consequently, multiple members can create functional overlap and advocate for overlapping mandates on purpose “to challenge the regulatory dominance of an existing one (…), or if they seek to shift regulatory activities from one to another [organisation]” (Gehring and Faude 2014, p. 474). Even though these states have the ability to shape an organisation’s direction as well as external actions and partnerships, multiple member states might also have a clear preference for one organisation over another. As a result, multiple member states can trigger, for example, regime-shifting which implies the change of organisational structures, as well as take blocking and obstructive roles in interorganisational relations (Alter and Meunier 2009, Hofmann 2009, Gehring and Faude 2014). When pursuing this approach, multiple members “advocate policies that shape the capability and mandate of one institution – often at the expense of the other” (Hofmann 2009, p. 47). For example, in the EU-NATO relationship, the majority of states are multiple member state, the two organisations, therefore, have a high degree of membership overlap. While this membership overlap accounts for twenty-one states, this does not automatically mean that each organisation advocates for closer EU-NATO cooperation. Instead, among these states, some have a clear preference for taking actions through the EU, the so-called Europeanists, and some states are in favour of NATO as the main forum for security and defence, often labelled as Atlanticists (cf. Biermann 2008; Gebhard and Smith 2015).

Member states, especially those that enjoy membership in multiple IOs, can use IOs for their national purposes as well as to affect both the organisational processes and structures of such organisations and on their external relations with other actors. Generally, member states can shape interorganisational relations through different channels and on numerous levels while they also have the capacity to behave differently in each of the participating organisations. In areas of high politics in international relations, Koops (2017a, pp. 198–199) identifies the following responsibilities, powers and duties of member states: approval for negotiations, approval for the formation of contractual relationships between organisations and subunits, providing key resources, veto power which allows states to obstruct deeper cooperation, facilitating interorganisational coherence, and facilitating cooperation across organisations to limit duplication. This range of identified tasks and responsibilities has also triggered the question of the position of member states as well as their availability and usage of political cross-institutional strategies to shape interorganisational relations.

Given the different categorisations of membership and member states’ range of responsibilities and tasks within IOs, they can apply a variety of cross-institutional strategies to exert influence. The most relevant strategies that have been identified for the study of member states in interorganisational relations are forum-shipping, hostage-taking, balancing, also referred to as brokering, and regime-shifting. Especially forum-shopping is among the most prominent strategies in interorganisational relations. When a member state applies this strategy, it purposely chooses one organisation over another with the aim to put a particular issue on the agenda because it is convinced that it will receive more gains when acting through this organisation than through another one (Alter and Meunier 2009, Gehring and Oberthür 2009). Due to the increasing proliferation of IOs, the likelihood for states to select the appropriate governance structures and IOs according to their interests has increased significantly and has thus enabled states to make use of forum-shopping for frequently (Alter and Meunier 2009, Drezner 2009, Hofmann 2019). While the political and/or normative contexts may shape a state’s choice of organisation, they would ideally avoid this forum-shopping to opt for greater interorganisational cooperation to make use of both organisations’ comparative advantages. The use of this strategy has been shown, for example, by France. It continuously tries to push for enhanced security and defence cooperation, and it seeks to add this issue to NATO’s agenda whenever it is not successful at the EU level. Yet, forum-shopping can also be considered as a new form of free-riding as it increasingly allows multiple member states to pursue national interests, instead of common objectives through the organisations, which causes greater fragmentation and less optimal results for the organisation and the other member states (Faude 2015).

Hostage-taking and regime-shifting are additional political strategies exercised by member states in EU-NATO relations. Hostage-taking refers to cases when single member states “use their membership to obstruct the relationship between both institutions, holding them hostage in pursuit of narrow interests” (Hofmann 2009, p. 46). When hostage-taking occurs, those member states that are willing to enhance interorganisational interaction often try to find informal arrangements to circumvent the situation and overcome political stalemates created by hostage-taking member states. States can also resort to regime-shifting or even regime-creating, which means that they shift regimes thereby moving the decision-making process from one organisation to another to realise their national interests and goals. For example, France’s focus on the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) especially in the 1990s can be seen as a form of regime-shifting due to its absence from NATO’s military command structures. In the context of the EU-NATO relationship, Cyprus and Turkey present the most prominent examples of hostage-taking because they both make use of their membership to obstruct the membership of the respective other (Hofmann 2011), which ultimately affects EU-NATO cooperation by restricting exchanges of information and intelligence as well as explaining the participation problem in this interorganisational relationship (Smith 2011).

Other options for both single and multiple member states are balancing, also referred to as brokering, and muddling through. Brokering is applied by those states that “act as links between actors that would otherwise remain disconnected” (Goddard 2009, pp. 255–256). This strategy implies that member states “do not necessarily appreciate both IOs in equal terms, but they want them to work according to their mandates” and often mediate among the organisations as well as among other member states (Hofmann 2019, p. 5). Similarly, muddling through is a strategy applied by states that generally seek to enhance EU-NATO cooperation but are aware of the existing political obstacles. This strategy implies informal cooperation – thereby muddling through to avoid the problems faced by formal cooperation – and has been used, for example, by Germany, the Netherlands and the UK (Hofmann 2009).

In addition, actors take specific positions and roles within interorganisational relations, which can further promote stronger cooperation and intensify functional overlaps. Jönsson (1986) as well as Doreian and Fujimoto (2004) focus on linking-pin actors in interorganisational networks. These are defined as those actors “that have extensive and overlapping ties to different parts of the network” (Aldrich and Whetten 1981, p. 390) and they, therefore, take an “integrative role in interorganisational networks” (Doreian and Fujimoto 2004, p. 46). Linking-pin actors thus serve as important communication points and hubs between actors in the international system. Translating this to interorganisational relations, linking-pin actors can enable the exchange of information, trigger regime shift and increase functional overlap. States can also take the position of “Interorganisational hegemon” (Koops 2017a, p. 201), which refers to specific promotors of interorganisational cooperation that are equipped with significant powers and influence. The above conceptualisations of membership and descriptions of member states’ responsibilities in IOs then help to study member states’ roles and to develop a tentative typology of member states in the EU-NATO interorganisational relationship.

Towards a typology of member states in EU-NATO interorganisational relations

Derived from the different memberships and political strategies, states can take different roles and positions within IOs. To better understand and conceptualise the roles that member states can take in the interactions between the EU and NATO, these distinctions have been helpful, but they do not tell the whole story and miss to provide useful indicators that grasp the complexity of this specific interorganisational relationship. So far, the conceptualisations of membership have primarily focused on member states in IOs, omitting their automatic participation in interorganisational interactions specifically in the context of EU-NATO cooperation. To fully understand the function and dysfunction of EU-NATO relations triggered by member states as key capability providers and decision-makers in security and defence affairs, a better analytical tool and conceptualisation is required. This article, therefore, proposes a tentative typology of member states in interorganisational relations that take into consideration the different dimensions of membership within IOs, their foreign and security policy orientation, member states’ interconnectedness (bilateral and minilateral partnerships), availability of (military) capabilities and resources and the application of political strategies. The categorisation then depends on how members seek to pursue policies that would impact interorganisational relations based on their attitudes towards EU-NATO cooperation, the level of engagement in negotiations and material contributions to their operations. By doing so, this article contributes to the analysis and expands the understanding of the EU-NATO interorganisational relationship.

Member states in interorganisational relations vary in different dimensions. In this attempt to developing the tentative typology of member states, specifically the distinction between single and multiple membership is considered. Their membership status can also define the availability of political cross-institutional strategies, which is relevant to define states’ positions and categorise them in the typology. Furthermore, this typology draws on additional dimensions to position member states in the EU-NATO interorganisational relationship. First, states’ foreign and security policy orientation indicates their specific characteristics, norms, histories, operational experiences and national caveats (cf. Bloomfield 2012, Biehl et al. 2013), which allows to identify their forum of choice for as well as their overall position in security and defence affairs. Second, states’ contributions in the form of resources and (military) capabilities to the respective organisations’ mandates for security and defence activities, e.g. crisis management operations, training and exercises and joint procurement projects, demonstrates not only their general preference for multilateral cooperation and their forum of choice but helps to investigate their contributions to coordinated activities supporting both the EU and NATO. Further, member states’ participation in informal and formal minilateral groupings and the maintenance of bilateral partnerships with other member states points to states’ ability to span wider networks that help to ease tensions and facilitate informal negotiations over intractable issues with diverging interests (cf. Moret 2016). By integrating these dimensions and aspects of member states, this article contributes to the wider literatures on interorganisationalism, regime complexity and network analysis by adding the member state perspective.

As a result, member states can take different positions within the EU-NATO interorganisational relationship. The logic of these dimensions leads to the development of four types: (1) advocates, (2) blockers, (3) balancers or (4) neutrals. These four categories provide the basis of the typology of member states in interorganisational relations (Table 1). The first type consists of advocates as the key promoters of enhancing interorganisational cooperation. They are identified as multiple members – or at least single member states with strong linkages and potential for influence in the organisation without membership – who participate in negotiations and decision-making processes equally in both participating organisations. Because these states prefer a well-functioning and effective relationship between the EU and NATO, they actively promote their interactions and cooperation by developing ties with other member states either based on their own multiple memberships and their shared interests or through creating functional overlap, e.g. activities such as exchanges and joint actions. They can also play the role of bridging two or more IOs due to their embeddedness in international networks and their extensive network of bilateral and minilateral partnerships. Among multiple member states, it is significant to identify the leading and more powerful governments in interorganisational relations, i.e. the “interorganisational hegemon” (Koops 2017a, p. 201). In addition, to be effective, advocates need to possess significant capabilities and resources, e.g. in the form of specific military capabilities, expertise and know-how, to be able to influence policies, preferences and interests of IOs. In the position of promoters and bridges between IOs, advocates, therefore, serve as vital contact points in interorganisational relations (cf. Jönsson 1986). Prior to the UK’s departure from the EU following the 2016 referendum, it was considered as the key advocate in the EU-NATO relationship. Though it initially opposed the development of the EU’s security and defence policies, it agreed under the condition of close EU-NATO cooperation including regular consultations and mutual benefits, and that the EU should not duplicate NATO and thus limit its activities to crisis management (O’Donnell 2011, Ewers-Peters 2021). Other prominent examples of advocates include the Central and Eastern European states as well as the three Baltic states, who all take traditional Atlanticist stances but actively promote closer cooperation in order not to be left out of European security (Haukkala et al. 2017, Pomorska 2017).

Table 1. Typology of member states in EU-NATO interorganisational cooperation.

	Advocates	Blockers	Balancers	Neutrals
Membership status	Single, multiple	Primarily single, can also be multiple	Multiple	Single
Level of interconnectedness	Moderate to high	Moderate to high	Moderate	Low to moderate
(Military) capabilities and resources	Moderate to high defence budgets; specialisation and key capabilities	High defence budgets; key capabilities	Moderate defence budgets; moderate capabilities	Low defence budgets; small armed forces; specialisation
Application of political strategies	Forum-shopping, regime-shifting	Hostage-taking, forum-shopping, regime-shifting	Brokering	N/a
Foreign and security policy orientation	Both organisations for their area of expertise; division of labour	Preference for one organisation	Balanced approach; division of labour	Preference for organisation with membership; division of labour

In contrast, the second type consists of blockers. These states are not per se against interorganisational cooperation between the EU and NATO, however, they are driven by specific national interests that cause blockages or vetoes towards strengthening this interorganisational relationship. While single members are more likely to take this position, multiple members can also act as blockers. Blockers are especially prone to obstructing enhanced interorganisational interactions by making use of strategies such as hostage-taking and regime-shifting as well as forum-shopping in case of multiple membership (Hofmann 2009, 2011). For example, Turkey and Cyprus block each other’s memberships in the respective other organisation whereby they also obstruct the enhancement of EU-NATO cooperation. While EU-NATO relations were considered as smooth and functioning, this changed with Cyprus’ accession to the EU in 2014 and the subsequent double veto to memberships. This political stalemate is one of the unsurmountable obstacles that the EU-NATO relationship has been facing; however, it has also been used as an alibi for other member states to slow down efforts (Acikmese and Triantaphyllou 2012, Flockhart 2014). France’s approach to EU-NATO relations throughout the 1990s and 2000s serves as an example of a blocker by a multiple member state. Its ambivalence towards and absence from NATO’s military command structure until 2009, divergences with both the UK and the US, and its role as the main driver of EU strategic autonomy have led to obstructions in facilitating joint exercises and coordinating efforts (Reichard 2006, Perruche 2014). Although France has strengthened its relations with both the UK and the US, President Macron’s claim that NATO was “brain dead” and the continuous push for stronger security and defence cooperation within the EU framework and through minilateral groups such as the European Intervention Initiative, have raised questions about France’s view on NATO, its indirect undermining of EU-NATO cooperation and the idea to move beyond (Franke and Varma 2019, Major 2021, Pannier 2022).

The third category is presented by the group balancers which contains those member states that seek to find a balance in their own foreign and security policy approach towards multilateral forums as well as to strike a balance among other member states in the EU-NATO interorganisational relationship. Thus, they also try to balance between the two organisations and among conflicting members, and by doing so, balancers seek to moderate and mediate between them and their member states. These states have no explicit preference for one over the other organisation. Instead, they acknowledge and value the benefits of each international organisation and aim to make full use of each organisation’s own strength (Hofmann 2019). Consequently, they favour co-governance of IOs in which a clear division of labour is defined and agreed by all participating actors. Two key characteristics are their position as hubs in interorganisational relations and their use of brokering strategies. Balancers “are positioned as vital nodes in networks, creating links between actors that would otherwise remain unconnected” (Goddard 2009, p. 250). Instead of military capabilities, the key resources of balancers are their networked character, i.e. extensive links to other member states through bilateral and minilateral partnerships and by filling relevant positions in the EU and NATO, and their negotiation and mediation skills. Germany alongside some Southern European states such as Italy take the roles of balancers in the EU-NATO relationship. For example, it uses informal minilateral groups within both organisations to act as broker and networker and to mitigate tensions between member states, especially between France, the UK and the US (Ewers-Peters 2020), and furthermore balances its own contributions to NATO and the EU. Similarly, Italy faces legal restrictions regarding the use of force. It thus focuses on negotiations and dialogue in both the EU and NATO to contribute to closer cooperation and to ease tensions among other member states (cf. Marrone and Di Camillo 2013).

The last group of member states in the typology present neutrals. These states are neither active nor obstructive in the EU-NATO interorganisational relationship and less likely to apply cross-institutional strategies. Single members are likely to take this position to indirectly facilitate cooperation without their own involvement, i.e. without obstructing any coordination and collaboration efforts. Neutrals do not have the resources and interconnectedness to play an active part in interorganisational relations, their efforts to influence decisions on an organisations’ external relations are thus limited, and they sometimes even seem to be disengaged because of national constraints, such as concerning the use of force. While not to be confused with militarily neutral or non-aligned states in general, though this is a present characteristic in this group, single members such as Austria, Finland and Sweden account for neutrals in EU-NATO cooperation (cf. Tiilikainen 2006). These states are thus considered as neutrals because they are neither proactive nor obstructive towards EU-NATO cooperation, though they might occasionally support efforts of bigger member states in the other types, such as Germany or the UK, that can affect interorganisational cooperation. A special case of a neutral is presented by Denmark. Due to its CSDP opt out, it cannot partake in any EU security and defence activities but has a relatively high defence budget compared to other states among the neutrals. In EU-NATO cooperation, however, Denmark chooses not to obstruct any efforts and therefore remains on the sidelines (Wivel 2013).

This tentative typology introduces a new perspective on the study of interorganisational cooperation and presents a wider array of types and categories of member states in the EU-NATO relationship. It considers previous approaches to conceptualising membership and the availability of cross-institutional strategies and highlights that membership goes beyond the distinction between single and multiple members or between original and subsequent members. While the present categorisation is a first attempt of developing a typology of member states in the EU-NATO interorganisational relationship, one key limitation needs to be highlighted. Member states are not necessarily fixed to one of the types since domestic politics as well as external circumstances and shocks influence a state’s approach towards interorganisational cooperation. While foreign and security policy orientations do not change abruptly, the domestic political context can change, such as the shaping and formation of interests and the diverging preferences of political parties, which can heavily influence states’ attitudes, practices and behaviour. An exemplary case is France where political parties have diverging views on NATO and its value for the country’s security and defence, and therefore, have different preferences for the transformation of NATO and relations with the EU depending on their policy preference (Hofmann 2017). In addition, the UK’s departure from the EU has also altered its position in the EU-NATO relationship as it did not agree on a security and defence cooperation agreement with the EU. This makes the UK a de facto single member state without the necessary power to shape EU-NATO cooperation in the future (cf. Ewers-Peters 2021). Consequently, some member states present boundary cases that can swing between two types triggered by changes on the domestic level with effects on their positions within the organisations as well as in their relationship.

Conclusion: generalisability and outlook for future research

The increasing proliferation and density of IOs has led to overlapping organisations in security and defence affairs, which gave further rise to opportunities for interorganisational relations. States, particularly in Europe, have a greater variety of organisations to choose from and since the end of the Cold War, the EU-NATO relationship has emerged as the most prominent example of an interorganisational relationship. Scholars have primarily investigated the conditions that trigger interactions, the factors that lead to either cooperation or rivalry, the issue of overlapping mandates and the design of interorganisational relations (cf. Jönsson 1986, Biermann 2008, Hofmann 2009, 2011, Brosig 2011, 2020, Faude 2015, Dijkstra 2017). What has remained underexamined is the role of member states in the interorganisational relations between the EU and NATO. The main aim of this article was to contribute to the on-going debates on interorganisational relations by highlighting and adding the perspective of member states to the study of interorganisational relations. States have the steering wheel of international security organisations in their hands since they are the key decision-makers and retain control over mandates, military capabilities and troop contributions.

Borrowing from related approaches to the study of overlapping institutions and the interactions between IOs, such as organisation theory, interorganisationalism and regime complex theory, this article first conceptualised interorganisational relations to point out the concept’s many dimensions and aspects including functional overlap, formalisation, frequency and intensity of interactions. Following this, the importance of the membership dimension has been highlighted which is decisive specifically in interorganisational cooperation among international security organisations. To grasp the different positions and roles of member states in the EU-NATO relationship, this article developed a tentative typology composed of four types of member states: advocates, blockers, balancers and neutrals. While the scholarly literature had previously focused on membership in IOs and distinguished between dichotomous types (subsequent vs. original, political vs. administrative, small vs. big, single vs. multiple), member states can also be categorised according to foreign and security policy orientation, level of interconnectedness through bilateral and minilateral partnerships, capabilities and resources as well as contributions to the EU and NATO’s security and defence activities. States have furthermore a multitude of cross-institutional strategies at their disposal to influence the interorganisational interactions such as forum-shopping, hostage-taking and regime-shifting as well as promoting, balancing and obstructing closer cooperation. As a reference point for this typology, cooperation between the EU and NATO served as an illustrative example as it not only meets the outlined criteria to count for an interorganisational relationship but, more importantly, its membership overlap is a striking characteristic. The EU-NATO relationship has been heavily shaped by their member states which offers an intriguing opportunity to study their relations from the membership perspective.

The development of the present typology of member states focused solely on the EU-NATO relationship. Notwithstanding, its analytical and conceptual relevance for the study of interorganisational relations is wider and can be applied beyond the security domain through adaptation and modification. By introducing this typology and providing a conceptual tool to categorise member states, this article seeks to open a new avenue for the study of overlapping institutions and interorganisational relations. Other policy areas with an increasing proliferation of overlapping organisations and regime complexes which also demonstrate a high degree of membership overlap include environmental policy, international trade, and human rights (Alter and Raustiala 2018). In these policy areas, states often maintain multiple memberships and therefore provide interesting opportunities to apply the present tentative typology as well as avenues for future research on member states’ roles in overlapping organisations and interorganisational relations.

While this typology adds to the research on interorganisational relations, it is a first starting point and still faces several limitations. Its application presupposes a high degree of membership overlap which is not always given in cases of interorganisational interactions, and any empirical analysis is subject to member states as the key decision-makers. Though unanimous decision-making prevails in both organisations, the typology not yet considers that NATO is often guided by the US' preferences while security concerns of all member states influence the EU’s foreign policy agenda. Furthermore, neither the conceptualisation of interorganisational relations nor the typology of member states considers external influences. Future research will therefore need to include empirical studies applying and testing these four types beyond the EU-NATO relationship that would also consider external influences. In addition, both the EU and NATO undergo reforms and internal changes that impact their external relations, which need to be included in the study of interorganisational relations and the elaboration of this typology. For example, with the treaty changes of the EU, its institutions gained increasing relevance in external relations which ultimately affects the role of member states in EU foreign policy-making (cf. Maurer and Wright 2021). Lastly, the exploration of methodological considerations to categorise member states provide another avenue for future research for which this typology as an analytical tool provides the first point of departure.

Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank the anonymous reviewers and express her gratitude to Trine Flockhart, Toni Haastrup, Stephanie C. Hofmann, Robert O. Keohane, Heidi Maurer and Richard G. Whitman for their insightful comments and thought-provoking impulses. Previous versions of this article were presented at the EISA Pan-European Conference on International Relations, Barcelona, September 2017 and the ISA Convention, San Francisco, April 2018.

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No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by University of Kent.