Adaptation and the Measurement of Well-being

Abstract

The fact that people adapt to changes in their life circumstances has had a significant impact on the debate about well-being and its relationship to public policy, leading some to reject the use of subjective well-being measures, while others continue to advocate them. This paper discusses the effects of adaptation upon subjective measures of well-being, the extent to which it can be regarded as a genuine influence upon well-being or as a distorting factor, and what this implies for the use of such measures. The extent to which adaptation can be seen as distorting will vary between different theories of well-being. However, the paper argues that, on any plausible theory, it will be true that adaptation sometimes has a distorting effect, but does not invalidate subjective measures and may sometimes be a genuine influence on well-being. The paper concludes by suggesting some steps that might minimise distortion affecting subjective measures, and argues for a broadly based approach to well-being measurement including both subjective and objective measures. Though this is not a complete solution to the problem of adaptation, it may be the best available without a resolution of the debate between competing theories.

Keywords:

• Well-being
• Happiness
• Subjective Well-being
• Measurement of Well-being
• Adaptation
• Adaptive Preferences
• Policy

Notes

1. Easterlin also argues that between countries levels of happiness do not correlate particularly well with income.

2. I discuss this distinction at more length in Taylor 2012, 38–40.

3. I argue in detail for this approach in Taylor, forthcoming.

4. Although Hurka's perfectionism is not put forward as a theory of well-being, it could in principle be developed as such.