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Articles

The terror of ‘terrorists’: an investigation in experimental applied ethics

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Pages 195-211 | Received 11 Jul 2014, Accepted 30 Jul 2014, Published online: 22 Sep 2014
 

Abstract

Some theorists argue that appropriate responses to terrorism are in part shaped by popular sentiment. In two experiments, using representative design and ecological stimuli (e.g. actual news reports), we present evidence for some of the ways popular sentiment about terrorism tracks theory and can be constructed. In Experiment 1, we document that using the word ‘terrorist’ to describe a group of people decreases willingness to understand the group's grievances, decreases willingness to negotiate with the group, increases perceived permissibility of violence against the group, and decreases the perceived rationality of the group. In Experiment 2, we demonstrate that judgment about the permissibility of the use of force against terrorist groups can be biased by simple memory-priming manipulations. Results are interpreted in terms of (1) implications for philosophical theories about terrorism and (2) the role that experimental investigation can play in applied ethics.

Acknowledgements

Authorship is equal. We would like to thank Tomis Kapitan for feedback on earlier drafts.

Notes on contributors

Adam Feltz is an Assistant Professor of Psychology and Applied Ethics at Michigan Technological University where he directs the Ethical Decision-making and Ethical Naturalism Laboratory.

Edward T. Cokely, Ph.D., is Associate Professor of Psychology at Michigan Technological University, Visiting Scientist at the Max Planck Institute for Human Development, and founder of RiskLiteracy.org. He specializes in the psychology of superior decision-making with applications in health, finance, and education (e.g. decision support, assessment, risk communication, training).

Notes

1. There are plenty of examples of experimental philosophers presenting evidence that is surprising and contrary to predictions of philosophers. For example, the moral valence of side effects of intentional actions appears to influence intentionality judgments of those side effects (Knobe, Citation2003a, Citation2003b, Citation2004a, Citation2004b, Citation2006). Personality traits are related to intentional action intuitions (Cokely & Feltz, Citation2009, Citation2011; Feltz, Harris, & Perez, Citation2012) and intuitions about free will and moral responsibility (Feltz, Citation2013; Feltz & Cokely, Citation2009; Feltz & Millan, Citationin press; Feltz, Perez, & Harris, Citation2012). There are cross-cultural differences in epistemic intuitions (Weinberg et al., Citation2001) and intuitions about reference (Machery, Mallon, Nichols, & Stich, Citation2004), and some intuitions that are thought to be widely shared among the folk are not (Feltz & Zarpentine, Citation2010; May et al., Citation2010).

2. Allhoff's scenarios are actually some of the more realistic in applied ethics. Compare his thought experiments with other thought experiments in applied ethics such as incredibly growing babies or trolley problems.

3. Following a significant result from a MANOVA with ANOVAs is a tested practice, see Hummel and Sligo (Citation1971) and Rencher and Scott (Citation1990).

4. Participants also completed the Brief Big 5 Personality Inventory (Gosling, Rentfrow, & Swann, Citation2003). Overall and consistent with previous research (Feltz & Cokely, Citation2013b), the personality trait openness to experience was related to the dependent variables F (4, 309) = 2.852, p = 0.02, . Ongoing research in our labs is investigating this phenomenon further.

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