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ABSTRACT
Examining the impact of the international system on the domestic system in countries in the process of democratisation, the article seeks to account for the relation between regime-initiated democratic transitions and the international factor, taking two case studies of the way the international factor interacted with the decisions and tactics of regime and opposition elites. The first is the Spanish exemplary reforma pactada of 1977; the second is the much less studied case of the short-lived and aborted “Markezinis experiment” in Greece in 1973, the failure of which has been blamed by its protagonist on external- mainly American- opposition.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Note on contributor
Ioannis Tzortzis is Teaching Fellow at the Department of Political Science and International Studies, University of Birmingham, UK.
Notes
1. Most of the literature on the Spanish transition and the international factor stresses the European influences, considered positive in contrast to the American ones; as Story and Pollack (Citation1991, p. 134) argue, Europe “became synonymous with the EEC and democracy, while the continuity of the Franco regime was equated with the United States”.
2. On the wide speculation about US intervention in the 1967 coup in Greece (see Murtagh Citation1994, Papahelas Citation1997, Klarevas Citation2006). On the EEC influences in the regime and its reluctant self- transformation process, see Verney and Tsakaloyannis Citation1986.
3. On the concept of conditionality see, among others, Gillespie and Youngs Citation2002, p. 7, hence the citation.
4. The article will first present the successful case of the Spanish reforma and its foreign implications rather than the “Markezinis experiment” which preceded the Spanish transition by four years, in hope that this comparison will more effectively stress the differences between the two cases.
5. As early as in 1966, thirty three per cent of the Spanish people according to a survey conducted “answered that the solution to Spain’s economic problems was membership in the Common Market”. Two years later the number had risen to forty one per cent, and in the 1970s many surveys “showed a persistent proportion of between 70 and 75 per cent in favour of Spain joining the Common Market (Nicolas Citation2004, p. 100)”.
6. Powell (Citation2002, p. 289) quotes the US Ambassador in Madrid from 1975 to 1978 saying “the fact is that the United States didn’t do a great deal” about Spain’s transition process.
7. It is also notable that the communists’ reappearance in the electoral scene made the European socialists work hard to strengthen the PSOE: the German Socialists in particular “were determined to try and ensure that a strong Spanish Socialism and a unified union organisation would keep out any Communist alternative (Anaya Citation2002, p. 10)”.
8. “While for the United States Spain’s future was primarily a defense and security issue, for the former [the EEC] it was essentially a political one. This discrepancy reflects fundamentally different attitudes towards the promotion of democracy (Powell Citation2002, p. 293)”.
9. On all those points see Couloumbis et al. Citation1986, p. 133–134.
10. National Intelligence Estimate: Short-Term Prospects in Greece, 19/7/1973.
11. Hooper to FCO, Greece: Annual Review for 1972, 2/1/1973, WSG1/2, FCO9/1709.
12. Hooper to Home, Abolition of the Greek Monarchy, 15/6/1973, WSG1/9, FCO9/1713.
13. Goodison to FCO, British policy towards Greece, 13/11/1973, WSG 8/548/3, FCO 9/1732.
14. Martin to Cornish, Denson Report on US/Greek relations, 17/9/1973, WSG 3/304/1, FCO 9/1732.
15. As Barkman (ibid. 105) noted at the end of June, “The opposition is not making a positive political development much easier. They have-in typical Greek fashion-rejected everything that the regime has offered without themselves indicating a new direction”.
16. Hooper to Goodison, Greece: Internal Situation, 25/11/1973 WSG 25/304/12 FCO 9/1717.
17. Tomkys to Goodison, US/Greek relations . 25/10/1973, WSG 3/304/1, FCO 9/1732.
18. Kissinger (Citation1982, p. 708) mentions Palamas’ statement that “the US bases have nothing to do with the Arab-Israeli war (October 13 happened to be the start of our all-out airlift)”.
19. Martin to Cornish, Greece and the Middle East crisis, 1/11/1973 WSG 3/304/1, FCO 9/1729.
20. Action Memorandum from the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Lord) to Secretary of State Kissinger, US Policy toward Greece, 15/2/1974.
21. Martin to Cornish, ibid.
22. Hooper to Goodison, Greece and the US, 18/10/73, WSG 3/304/1, FCO 9/1729.
23. Gauvin to FCO, Aftermath of new coup in Greece, 25/11/1973, WSG 1/14, FCO9/1717.
24. Gauvin to FCO, ibid.
25. Embassy in Greece to the Department of State, Greece’s Apparent New Master: Demetrios Ioannides; Some Fears, 26/11/1973.
26. Martin to FCO, Greek Internal Situation, 6/12/1973, WSG1/14, FCO9/1712.
27. Action Memorandum, ibid. Emphasis in original.