Knowledge, judgement and the curriculum: on the past, present and future of the idea of the Practical

Abstract

In 1970, Joseph Schwab published the first of four papers that argued for a turn to the idea of the Practical in curriculum research and practice. In this paper, I revisit Schwab’s original paper and explore the extent to which his case for the Practical is still relevant today. I first look at the past of the deliberative tradition in which Schwab’s argument is located. I argue that a more precise engagement with the work of Aristotle – particularly the distinction between making/production and doing, and between knowledge of the eternal and of the variable – can strengthen Schwab’s case and allow for a better understanding of the kind of knowledge and judgement needed in education. In relation to the present, I highlight three ways in which the current context has changed from when Schwab published his paper. These concern the strongly diminished space for teachers’ professional judgement; the rise of a call for evidence-based education; and the shift in curriculum studies away from practical questions. To (re)connect the field of curriculum studies and research with questions about the ‘doing’ of curriculum is, in my view, where a deliberative approach such as the one articulated by Schwab remains highly relevant.

Keywords:

• curriculum
• the practical
• Aristotle
• evidence
• judgement

Acknowledgments

The author thanks Zongyi Deng for his invitation to contribute to this symposium and him and Ian Westbury for helpful feedback and suggestions on an earlier version of this paper.

Notes

1. For a nuanced and sympathetic discussion of Schwab’s work in relation to these dangers, see Reid (1999).

2. The reason for referring to Dewey’s position as ‘more radical’ is meant in relation to Aristotle. Whereas Aristotle would still rely on the distinction between knowledge of the eternal and knowledge of the variable, Dewey actually rejected the former option, partly on ontological grounds—because over time even what appears eternal will eventually change and perish—and partly on methodological grounds, that is, on the assumption that knowledge is something that occurs in the domain of (trans)action not pure observation. It is particularly in Schwab’s discussion of the theoretic and of theoretical knowledge that he appears to rely on an ‘unpractical’ or ‘non-pragmatic’ conception of knowledge.

3. This is not to suggest that such alternatives are entirely absent or that education policy around the world operates in one and the same (depressing) mode. For an analysis of different trends in recent curriculum policy and practice, taking Scotland’s new Curriculum for Excellence as a ‘case,’ see Priestley and Biesta (2013).

4. This is also how Reid (1999) reads Schwab, and I am inclined to agree with his reading.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Gert Biesta

Gert Biesta (www.gertbiesta.com) is professor of Educational Theory and Policy at the University of Luxembourg. University of Luxembourg, Faculty of Language and Literature, Humanities, Arts and Education, Campus Walferdange, Route de Diekirch, BP2, L-7220 Luxembourg: e-mail: [email protected]. He previously worked in the Netherland and the UK in education and teacher education. His research focuses on the theory and philosophy of education and educational research, with a particular interest in citizenship, curriculum and teacher education. Recent books include Good education in an age of measurement (2010) and The beautiful risk of education (2013) (both with Paradigm Publishers), and Reinventing the curriculum. New trends in curriculum policy and practice (2013; co-edited with Mark Priestley; Bloomsbury Publishers).