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ABSTRACT
Although the sad track record of the EU Battlegroups has attracted considerable scholarly attention, analyses have largely focused on obstacles related to the provision of the Battlegroup troops and to the consensus within the EU Council, hence taking a supply-side perspective. This article calls for complementing this perspective with an analysis of the demand for their deployment. That implies analysing whether and why the EU Battlegroups were (not) considered as an option by those actors taking the initiative to intervene in a particular crisis. Applying a rational-institutionalist approach, this article explains the absence of the Battlegroups from three recent crises: Libya (2011), Mali (2013) and the Central African Republic (2013–2014). Using data from document analysis and elite interviews, it shows that once a rapid military reaction became urgent, the EU Battlegroups were not even considered as an option by those initiating an international reaction.
Acknowledgements
The author would like to thank Bart Kerremans, Stephan Keukeleire, Floor Keuleers, the editors and the two anonymous reviewers for their pertinent comments and insightful suggestions. Many thanks also to the Center on International Cooperation at New York University, where first input was provided in the writing of this article, and the participants at the EU in International Affairs Conference (Brussels, 11–13 May 2016).
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes on contributor
Yf Reykers is a Ph.D. fellow of the Research Foundation Flanders (FWO). He conducts his research at the Leuven International and European Studies (LINES) Institute at KU Leuven and is a former visiting scholar at the Center on International Cooperation at New York University. His research focuses on the relationship between the United Nations Security Council and regional organisations in military operations.
ORCiD
Yf Reykers http://orcid.org/0000-0002-0080-1815
Notes
1. Authorised by UNSC Resolution 1484 “to take all necessary measures to fulfil its mandate” (S/RES/1484), Operation Artemis consisted of about 1800 troops, provided by 12 EU members and led by France as a “framework nation”.
2. That is, joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping, and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilisation (Article 43(1) of the Treaty on European Union).
3. According to the European Land Forces Interoperability Center (Finabel), which consists of 21 EU member states’ Chiefs of Staff, the EU Battlegroups should be able to act in the following scenarios: conflict prevention, separation of parties by force, stabilisation and reconstruction, non-combatant evacuation and assistance to humanitarian operations. In its study, aimed to inform EU member states of the activities, missions and tasks that Battlegroups might face, Finabel also stresses taking into account the feasibility of these tasks given the Battlegroups’ limited size (Finabel Citation2014).
4. Engberg (Citation2013, pp. 47–48) identified six EU military operations throughout the history of EU CSDP: Operation Concordia in Macedonia (2003), Operation Artemis in the DRC (2003), Operation EUFOR Althea in Bosnia (2004–ongoing), Operation EUFOR RD Congo (2006), Operation EUFOR Chad/CAR (2008–2009) and Operation EUNAVFOR Atalanta (2009–ongoing). Since her publication, two more can be added: EUFOR RCA in the CAR (2014) and EUNAVFOR MED in the Mediterranean (2015–ongoing).
5. The Nordic Battlegroup is led by Sweden, supplemented with contingents from Estonia, Finland, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania and Norway.
6. While the (rational-)institutionalist literature treats states as key actors in decision-making, it nevertheless acknowledges that international organisations can also operate autonomously from the interests of the states that created them. Barnett and Finnemore (Citation1999, p. 707), for instance, refer to the importance of international organisations’ legitimacy stemming from their rational-legal authority and their control over information and expertise, making rational states willing to submit to this authority. Abbott and Snidal (Citation1998, p. 17) highlight that their legitimacy offers them a chance to even act as “initiating organisations”.
7. Within the UNSC, the informal practice exists that dossiers are divided among the P5. Nadin (Citation2016) indicates that France is generally the penholder for issues regarding the francophone countries such as the CAR, Mali, the DRC, the Great Lakes, Burundi and Côte d’Ivoire, while the UK usually holds the pen for Yemen, Cyprus, Sierra Leone, Darfur, Libya and Somalia. He stresses that “In practice, the penholder becomes the de facto leader on the topic” (Nadin Citation2016, p. 107). Their ability to shape decision-making can hence be assumed to be much greater when they are holding the pen.
8. The Libya crisis created a security threat at the EU’s immediate borders, maintaining peace and security in Mali was at the core of the EU’s 2011 Sahel Strategy and tackling the humanitarian crisis in the CAR was at the EU’s interest, as it is the country’s main donor.
9. When it comes to the earlier mentioned pivotal position of France and the UK at the demand side, it should be noted that France was the penholder for UNSC resolutions on the conflicts in Mali and the CAR, and positioned itself as the frontrunner in the intervention in Libya. It can hence be assumed that the French decision-making considerations were much more decisive in these cases than those of the UK.
10. Interviews were anonymised at the request of the respondents and in line with organisational regulations (for a full overview, see Annex).
11. Traynor, I., 2011. Libya conflict: EU awaits UN approval for deployment of ground troops. The Guardian, 18 April 2011.
12. Traynor, I., 2011.
13. The Economist, 2013. Europe in a foreign field. The Economist, 19 January 2013.
14. European Parliament News, 2013. Mali: It’s a shame that the EU’s tactical battle groups are not being deployed. [online] Available from: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-room/content/20130125STO05492/html/Mali-It’s-a-shame-that-the-EU’s-tactical-battle-groups-are-not-being-deployed.
15. For example, J. Dempsey 2013. The Depressing Sage of Europe’s Battle Groups, Carnegie Europe. [online] Available from: http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/?fa=53975.
16. For example, A. Croft, 2013. EU to send military force to Central African Republic, Reuters. [online] Available from: http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/20/us-centralafrican-eu-idUSBREA0J0SC20140120.
17. The costs for an operational headquarter fall under shared CFSP costs funded through the Athena mechanism (Council Decision, Citation2011/871/CFSP).