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ABSTRACT
Studies of the relationship between the EU and NATO often focus on the limitations of cooperation, be it at the political or the operational level. However, little is known about the functioning of the political institutional linkages between the EU and NATO. This article therefore studies the main decision-making bodies of the two organisations at the political, ambassadorial level, namely the Political and Security Committee (PSC) of the EU and the North Atlantic Council (NAC) in NATO, as well as their joint meetings. The article employs an inductive Grounded Theory approach, drawing on open-ended interviews with PSC and NAC ambassadors, which reveal direct insights from the objects of analysis. The findings emphasise the impact of both structural and more agency-related categories on decision-making in these three fora. The article thus addresses both the paucity of study on these bodies more broadly and the complete lacuna on joint PSC–NAC meetings specifically, warranting the inductive approach this article endorses.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
Notes on contributors
Dr Simon J. Smith is currently a Lecturer of International Relations at Staffordshire University, a Senior Research Fellow at the Scotland Institute, an Honorary Research Fellow at Aston University and co-Editor-in-Chief of the journal Defence studies. His current research interests include EU and NATO security cooperation, transatlantic security, European Defence transformation as well as the defence and security implications of “Brexit”. He has published multiple peer-reviewed journal articles, book chapters, policy reports on these topics and engages with the media regularly. Simon has been an active contributor to the UK Chief of Defence Staff’s Strategy Forum/SDSR Process as well as the NATO Strategic Foresight Analysis and Defence Planning Process.
Dr Nikola Tomić is a Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the University College Dublin, School of Politics and International Relations. He previously held academic posts at Loughborough University and Nottingham Trent University in the UK. His research interests include EU foreign policy and external relations, including the EU’s military and civilian crisis management, enlargement policy, as well as external aspects of the EU’s migration, environmental and development policies. His publication record includes a co-edited volume, book chapters and peer-reviewed articles in English, German, Romanian and Serbian.
Dr Carmen Gebhard is a Lecturer and Deputy Director of the Graduate School of the School of Social and Political Science at the University of Edinburgh as well as and co-Editor-in-Chief of the journal Defence studies. She previously held academic posts at Nottingham University, the Institute of Advanced Studies in Vienna and the European Institute of Public Administration (EIPA). Her research interests are inter-organisational cooperation in security and defence, the EU’s external relations and foreign policy of small states. She is the author of two monographs and multiple book chapters as well as four edited volumes, and her research has i.a. been published in Cooperation and conflict, European security, European foreign affairs review and Scandinavian political studies.
Notes
1 Twenty-two of 28 member states of the EU are also NATO members, and most of the EU member states that do not have full membership of NATO (Austria, Finland, Ireland and Sweden) are part of NATO's Partnership for Peace. Cyprus is the only EU member state that is not part of or associated with NATO in any way.
2 As outlined in section 3 of the EU–NATO: The Framework for Permanent Relations and Berlin Plus, “Such EU-NATO consultations involve the EU’'s PSC and NATO’'s NAC, the EU and NATO Military Committees as well as the Secretary General/High Representative and NATO Secretary General.” For full details, please see European Council (Citation2003). Background on EU–NATO permanent arrangements (Berlin Plus).
3 Jørgensen (Citation2004) reached a similar conclusion over a decade ago:
How different is intergovernmental cooperation in the CFSP from intergovernmental cooperation within NATO? Such a comparison, to my knowledge, has not been attempted by anyone. […] The absence of such comparative studies is unfortunate because we cannot reach general conclusions about intergovernmental cooperation or something about the specifics of each of the institutions mentioned. (p. 21)
4 In the case of the NAC, this is an unspoken rule or “gentlemen's agreement”; Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty does refer to “unanimous agreement” but only in connection to NATO enlargement. Voting procedures in the PSC fall under Article 23 of the Treaty of the European Union which states that decisions “shall be taken by the Council acting unanimously” (Signatories to the Treaty of the European Union 1992 Title V, Article 23.1). However, for some procedural matters as well as adopting joint actions and common positions, qualified majority voting is applicable with the exception of “decisions having military or defence implications” (Signatories to the Treaty of the European Union 1992 Title V, Article 23.2).
5 The labels for these conceptual categories were taken ad litteram from the interviews.
6 Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey, the UK, and the US.
7 In 2000 an interim PSC was set up by Council Decision 2000/143/CFSP.
8 Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the UK.
9 Prior to the creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS), the PSC agenda was “agreed by the rotating Presidency and the Council Secretariat” (Howorth Citation2007, p. 71). However, post-Lisbon the PSC has had a Permanent Chairman. From 2010 to mid-2013, the former Swedish Representative to the PSC, Olof Skoog, held the job. Since 2013, the role has been undertaken by Walter Stevens.
10 While the majority of published research on the EU and NATO is either atheoretical or using a deductive approach, there have been attempts at “building bridges” through the use of abduction. Mérand (Citation2012) used a combination of empirical observation, inductive theorising and hypothesis building, and a deductive comparison of Rational Choice and Historical Institutionalism to explain the emergence of the CSDP, effectively focusing more on the actual social practices found in the case than on theoretical premises about them.
11 In the study of international security organisations, forms of data collection that involve direct participation or observation are not normally an option given the heightened levels of confidentiality.
12 In this study, this translated into conducting several rounds of elite interviews. The interviewees can be the same or changed, and the approach allows for experimentation and variance in the targeted groups that are studied, which are “chosen in accordance with [the] emergent analytic framework” (Glaser and Strauss Citation1967, p. 53).
13 Where GT inconveniently remains vague is the actual process of data analysis and writing of theory, which represents GT's main limitation, as some critics duly point out (Allan Citation2003, Kelle Citation2005). Inductive inference still relies on intuition or what Glaser and Strauss (Citation1967) refer to as “theoretical sensitivity” (p. 46).
14 Given the reliance of inductive reasoning on probability, we are aware that conclusions should draw on a dataset as large as possible. However, due to the fixed size of membership within the organisations under investigation, the sample size was limited to 28 and 28 ambassadors. The data collection consisted of a total of four rounds of interviewing with NAC and PSC ambassadors as well as deputies within the permanent representations. The first three rounds were conducted within a relatively short time frame and were therefore treated as one round in the analysis. All direct quotations in the following empirical sections were attained from transcripts; they are numbered throughout to allow replication. Beyond this information, no details of our interlocutors can be disclosed due to confidentiality.
15 In the case of the NAC, the ambassadorial formation is the one meeting most frequently, which, alongside with the direct comparability this ensures, was the main reason for targeting it in our data collection.
16 In line with GT, the labels for each category were set in vivo, meaning that they were drawn from recurring phrases and expressions used by the interlocutors.
17 “[The meetings] very much depend on the issue and the established procedures” (Interview 5, 2012).
18 The same respondent suggested that the reduction in NAC meetings was due to pressure by then Sec/Gen Rasmussen, who thought there were to “too many” (Interview 2, 2012). This did not emerge from other interviews but there was a more subtle suggestion that the PSC and the NAC were going in opposite directions. This may also be connected to the difference in size and scope of the PSC agenda (see below) compared to that of the NAC.
19 At the NAC, informal consultation among national representatives is internally understood as the “lifeline of the Alliance” (Interview 13, 2016).
20 A 2016 NATO “Fact Sheet” states ‘since 2003 the “Berlin Plus” arrangements provide the basis for NATO–EU cooperation in crisis management in the context of EU-led operations that make use of NATO's collective assets and capabilities, including command arrangements and assistance in operational planning (North Atlantic Treaty Organization Citation2016). In effect, the “Berlin Plus” arrangements allow the Alliance to support EU-led operations in which NATO as a whole is not engaged. According to Yost (Citation2007, p. 12):
Operation Althea is the only on-going EU-led operation under “Berlin Plus”, and it alone can be considered in a formal NATO-EU format. Aside from capability development issues, Althea is the only agreed agenda subject that can be discussed without the presence of Cyprus.
21 At the 2016 NATO Warsaw Summit, the President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission and the NATO Secretary General signed a Joint Declaration “to give new impetus and new substance to the NATO-EU strategic partnership in light of common challenges”.
22 “Consensus based and consensus driven that essentially influences to a large extent how things are negotiated; if you can be out voted than you start negotiating in a different way” (Interview 3, 2012)
23 “The PSC was designed to reach consensus” (Interview 9, 2016).
24 “We keep it informal here” (Interview 9, 2016); “Informally, there are receptions, dinners, working lunches […] so you meet your colleagues every day” (Interview 2, 2012).
25 “New allies and new ambassadors […] integrate into the various social and political occasions and meetings” (Interview 5, 2012).
26 From the data, we can infer the following: PSC Ambassadors seem to work under the assumption that their remit is more “fun” due to a wider ranging scope and the amount of foreign policy instruments at their disposal. Some PSC Ambassadors see the EU as the “wave of the future”, whereas NATO is an Alliance that has “mapped out its territory quite well” but is not really an “organisation in development” (Interview 2, 2012). However, NAC Ambassadors assume that although the scope of the conversation in the NAC is more limited than in the PSC, the quality and the depth is much higher. The interviews suggest that NAC ambassadors believe they believe the PSC is only “scratching the surface” whereas they are “going in depth” (Interview 5, 2012).
27 “Scheduling of meetings and the rhythm of work is very well established” (Interview 7, 2016).
28 “I have never experienced when an Ambassador was shouting or losing his or her temper. They are professionals” (Interview 5, 2012).
29 “Not all states have the expertise or a strong interest in all issues” (Interview 11, 2016).
30 “This gives him a huge weight vis-à-vis his own administration and huge freedom of manoeuver” (Interview 5, 2012).
31 “I think it is much more the personality of the individual” (Interview 7, 2016)
32 For a discussion on supranational features of the PSC, see Howorth (Citation2012).
33 The official residence of the President of France.