In whose interests? Former rebel parties and ex-combatant interest group mobilisation in Aceh and East Timor

Abstract

An important factor shaping rebel-to-party transformations and post-conflict party governance pertains to how these groups relate to their former rank and file. While drawing on veterans of the war provides for stable source of support and organisational stability for the former rebel parties, ex-combatants may also pose challenges to such parties as they expect continued political influence, material rewards and social recognition for their contribution to the armed group. By identifying ex-combatants as a distinct interest group this argues that party-ex-combatant interaction directly shapes intra-party dynamics as well as policy formulation. Focusing on former rebel parties and ex-combatant interest group mobilisation in Aceh and East Timor, and this articles asks: How does rebel group mobilisation affect how former rebel parties mobilise political support? How do parties address and integrate demands made by ex-combatants?

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1. The article uses the terms ‘former rebel group members’ and ‘ex-combatants’ interchangeably. For the East Timorese case, it also uses the term ‘former resistance members’ and ‘veterans’ where appropriate, as these are terms commonly used in the country’s public discourse.

2. Exceptions also include a substantial body of literature specific to post-independence politics in Southern Africa that treat ex-combatant political mobilisation, including Schafer (2007); Kriger (2003); Metsola and Melber (2007); Wiegink (2013).

3. As Berdal and Ucko (2009a) and Söderström (2013) emphasise, individual ex-combatants and groups of ex-combatants may also seek political influence beyond interest organisations, such as NGOs, media and public service. These additional forms of political mobilisation by ex-combatants fall outside the scope of this article.

4. See Barakat et al. (2002) on HDC-process and Sindre (2014) on implications for GAM.

5. For details see Barron and Burke (2008); Kingsbury (2006).

6. In addition, another strand has also sought to explain the decision by armed movements to build party branches and join electoral politics without relinquishing their arms, e.g. Weinberg et al. (2008); Weinberg and Pedahzur (2003).

7. Such links were traditionally (and to some extent still are) common between socialist parties and trade unions in Europe (see Duverger 1954, Padgett and Paterson 1991, 177–85), between agrarian parties and farmers’ unions (Duverger 1954) and also between conservative parties and business associations (Schmitter 2001, 82).

8. For specific case-discussions on partisan veteran politics see Kriger (2003); McGregor (2002); McMullin (2013, 78–156); Metsola and Melber (2007); Schafer (2007); Wiegink (2013).

9. The material for this section is gathered in interviews with 12 regional commanders, 2 AMM representatives and GAM leaders Nur Djuli, Irwandi Yusuf and Bachtiar Abdullah and Zakkaria Zaman in Aceh in 2006–2008. Information is also triangulated with secondary sources, see Barron and Burke (2008).

10. Author interview Ibrahim Syamsddin (alias KBS), KPA spokesman, Banda Aceh, May 2008 (see also Anderson 2013).

11. In a recent reshuffling of the government, Xanana has stepped down as prime minister and created a Unity Government in which Rui Maria de Araujo from Fretilin has taken over.

12. This was not the result of land being given to ex-combatants as part of the DDR process as has been common elsewhere. This has not been a source of contention, however, primarily because land is plentiful in Aceh and there has been little desire amongst ex-combatants to farmland (Barron et al. 2013, (note 117) p. 123, MSR 2009, 44–5).

13. Xanana-Lasama sei estuda ezijensia CPD-RDTL [Xanana-Lasama will study demands of CPD-RDTL], Jornal Independente, 6 October 2011.

14. Open letter to the Prime Minister, 5 October 2011.

15. i.e. the party set up by Cornélio da Gama (alias L-7 and founder of the Sagrada Familia group) and his nephew L-4 in 2005. These are parties whose membership base is primarily made up of veterans.

16. The framework Law No 3/2006 that covers legislation on veterans’ benefits has been revised by Laws 9/2009 and 2/2011 (ICG 2011 6 n. 48).

17. Numbers are also available at www.budgettransparency.gov.tl.

18. According to Law 2/2009 and 2/2011, there are four major categories of benefits depending on the number of years of ‘exclusive’ contribution to the resistance with compensations ranging between the equivalent of one-year salary of a junior civil servant and a lifetime pension between $345 and $575.