Toward Generalized Evolutionism: Beyond “Generalized Darwinism” and Its Critics

Abstract:

This article seeks to transcend the debate regarding “generalized Darwinism” or “universal Darwinism” for the social sciences. Highlighting recent discoveries in evolutionary biology, the article argues that it is no longer tenable to insist that (neo-)Darwinism is the only proper doctrine for understanding biological evolution. Moreover, social evolution is much more than purely (neo-)Darwinian or (neo-)Lamarckian. As such, the debate on whether we deploy only (neo-)Darwinism or (neo-)Lamarckism — generalized or not — to understand social evolution is a red herring. Instead, social scientists should embrace “generalized evolutionism,” a more accommodating and versatile doctrine that subsumes “(generalized) Darwinism” or “(generalized) Lamarckism.” Empirical inquiries that deploy “generalized evolutionism” have shed important new light on some critical puzzles in human society: from institutional change to the foundation of economic development before 1500 AD, through the coming of the industrial revolution, to the evolution of the international system. More empirical efforts along this line of theorizing are needed.

Keywords::

• generalized Darwinism
• generalized evolutionism
• extended synthesis
• modern synthesis
• (neo-)Darwinism
• (neo-)Lamarckism
• social evolution

JEL Classification Codes::

• B00
• B25
• B52

Notes

¹ See the exchanges in the Journal of Evolutionary Economics (2006, 2008, 2012), the Journal of Economic Issues (March 2007), and entries in “Papers on Economics and Evolution” of the Evolutionary Economics Study at the Max Planck Institute of Economics (www.econ.mpg.de/english/research/EVO/discuss.php). There is no doubt that Hodgson and Knudsen choose the term “generalized Darwinism” to distinguish their doctrine from Dawkins’s (1983) widely known concept of “universal Darwinism.” Not surprisingly, most critics of Hodgson and Knudsen have taken “universal Darwinism” and “generalized Darwinism” as equivalent (e.g., Nelson 2006, 2007a). I do concur with Hodgson and Knudsen (2010), as well as Howard E. Aldrich et al. (2008), that “generalized Darwinism” is preferable to “universal Darwinism.”

² Hence, critics of Hodgson and Knudsen’s generalized Darwinism stand could also benefit from a firmer grasping of the recent advancements in evolutionary biology. As I make it clear below, recent advancements in evolutionary biology make the possibility of moving from generalized Darwinism to “generalized evolutionism” not only possible, but also far more attractive and valid.

³ I do not discuss Herbert Spencer’s work here because his understanding of evolution is not really about evolution per se, but mostly about embryogenesis and development (for an earlier discussion, see Haines 1988), although I am fully aware that many of Spencer’s key ideas (e.g., evolution is design-unfolding toward higher complexity and morality) have remained influential in some fields of social sciences (e.g., structural functionalism in sociology).

⁴ Note that Donald Campbell’s (1965) concept of “retention” is far more accommodating than “inheritance” (for a similar interpretation, see Pelikan 2011, 343, fn. 1). Strictly speaking, inheritance can only mean the passing of information from one generation to the next via replication. By contrast, retention can mean (i) inheritance via replication from one generation to the next and (ii) retention from one round to the next by a single organism in its development and life cycle that does not require replication. Transmission is even broader. It can mean (i) horizontal transmission via DNA jumping (e.g., transposons) and insertion, (ii) horizontal transmission via imitation and learning (in both human and nonhuman animals), and (iii) vertical transmission from offspring to parents. Thus, I use these terms precisely (see Table 1 for details). Campbell banked on “blind variation” and “natural selection” too much, as both Karl Popper ([1974] 1987, 117–119) and Robert J. Richards (1977) have pointed out.

⁵ Earlier, Thorbjørn Knudsen (2001) noted that economic evolution (as one aspect in the ideational dimension of social evolution) is “Lamarckian nesting with Darwinian,” which implies a more accommodating position.

⁶ A reader rightly points out that “Darwin himself repeatedly claimed that his principles could apply to social evolution, including the evolution of languages, morals, and organizations.” Based on this, he/she disputes the contention that “Darwinism is too stringent.” This disagreement is due, in no small part, to the different notions of “Darwinism” and “Darwin’s principles.” Does “Darwinism” imply all of the five features (or principles) of Darwin’s understanding of biological evolution identified by Mayr (1982), or does it merely imply some of them? Certainly, Hodgson and Knudsen’s understanding of Darwinism (2010, ch. 2) admits only three central principles: variation, inheritance, and selection. One could, however, more plausibly contend that variation, inheritance, and selection are really three components of the central mechanism of evolution, rather than “principles” of Darwinism (see section three below).

⁷ Neo-Darwinism becomes even more stringent by eliminating the possibility of “direct inheritance of acquired characteristics” via pangenesis initially held by Darwin (see section three below).

⁸ Apparently, this distinction of phenotype vs. genotype is tightly linked with Weismann’s distinction of somatic cell vs. germ cell and Dawkins and Hull’s distinction of interactor vs. replicator, although the three distinctions are not identical (see the discussion below).

⁹ Maria Kronfeldner (2007, 494496) is a rare exception, yet even her discussion does not go far enough.

¹⁰ Within the existing literature, there are at least six concepts of “Lamarckian” process, covering variation, selection, and inheritance. The six concepts are: (i) DIP-WGM; (ii) environment changes induces organisms to have adaptive variations; (iii) organisms desire adaptive variations (i.e., organisms have will, desire, or volition) to satisfy their new needs in a new environment; (iv) the organism’s use and disuse of some organs (as phenotypes) lead to modifications of these phenotypes and these modifications are directly inherited by the next generation; (v) evolution toward higher order, progress, and perfection; and (vi) evolution toward increased complexity. Many have discussed Lamarckism without differentiating these six notions, which has resulted in serious confusion (see Kronfeldner 2007, 2010; Hallpike 1986, 80-86; Hodgson 2001; Hodgson and Knudsen 2006a, 2010; Hussey 1999, 568–571; Mayr 1972; Nelson 2007b; Wilkins 2001, 164–170).

¹¹ Note that, although Hodgson and Knudsen (2010, 61-62, fn. 1) mention epigenetic inheritance, they fail to grasp the difficulties posed by epigenetic inheritance against labeling even biological evolution as Darwinian and not a bit Lamarckian.

¹² Note that the neo-Darwinian modern synthesis does recognize “niche construction” and “ecological inheritance,” but then treats them as “extended phenotype” (Dawkins 1982) (for succinct discussions on why niche construction and ecological inheritance cannot be easily subsumed under “extended phenotypes,” see Odling-Smee and Laland 2011; Wells 2015; see also the classical discussion by Lewontin 1983).

¹³ For a succinct discussion on the implications of these forms of non-genetic inheritance for an “extended evolutionary synthesis” in the evolutionary biology, see Etienne Danchin et al. (2011, 477–479).

¹⁴ See Joseph Henrich and Robert Boyd (2002) for a formal model showing that evolution can operate without a discrete replicator.

¹⁵ The task will take at least one and perhaps more than one book. I am completing such a manuscript, tentatively titled “On Social Evolution: Phenomenon and Paradigm” (Tang n.d.).

¹⁶ I address selection separately in the next subsection because Hodgson and Knudsen’s (2010) stand on selection in social evolution is even more perplexing.

¹⁷ I use the term “super-Lamarckian” to label such a process (for a more detailed discussion, see Tang n.d.).

¹⁸ Hodgson and Knudsen (2006b, 480n3; 2010b, 50-51) are thus also mistaken to insist that artificial selection does not contradict Darwinian selection, and dismiss John R. Commons’s (1934) critique of Veblen (cf. Ramstad 1994; Vanberg 1997). Also, while Aldrich et al. (2008) cite J. Stanley Metcalfe (1998) approvingly, Metcalfe uses the term “Darwinism” only once (on p. 38). Instead, Metcalfe talks about “evolution” or “evolutionary theory”.

¹⁹ Here, I will point out that niche construction by no means nullifies the possibility of (both natural and artificial) selection in social evolution. Just because human action can reshape their environment, and this environment can then come back to shape human action, does not mean that selection no longer operates (cf. Cordes 2007, 137).

²⁰ As I argue in detail elsewhere (Tang n.d.), power is also a powerful force of inheritance in the sense that the inheritance or retention of many ideational traits in human societies is often backed by power. Because singling out Hodgson and Knudsen’s neglecting power as a critical selection force is sufficient to clarify the point that these authors’ generalized Darwinism stand is inadequate for understanding social evolution, I refrain from discussing power as a key force of artificial inheritance in social evolution here.

²¹ Robert Boyd and Peter Richerson (1985), however, failed to appreciate the role of power in generating and retaining maladaptive cultural traits and institutional arrangements (see the more detailed discussion in section three of this article).

²² Campbell (1974b) had a similar rationale for insisting on a purely Darwinian approach. He explained the near perfect fit between scientific theories and the aspects of nature that these theories seek to explain.

²³ Through personal communications (from January 2011), Marion Blute, Richard Nelson, and the late David Hull confirmed that they would be comfortable with “generalized evolutionism” (see also Blute 2010; Nelson 2006, 2007a, 2007b). Eva Jablonka and Marion Lamb (2005) advance a similar stand.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Shiping Tang

Shiping Tang is the Fudan distinguished professor and the Dr. Seaker Chan chair professor in the School of International Relations and Public Affairs (SIRPA) at Fudan University, Shanghai (China). He also holds a Cheung-Kong/Changjiang distinguished professorship of China’s Ministry of Education. He is grateful to Marion Blute, Geoffrey M. Hodgson, Richard Nelson, Pavel Pelikan, Ulrich Witt, the editor of this journal and two anonymous reviewers of this article, and the late David Hull for their critical comments and discussions.