Rebel politics and the state: between conflict and post-conflict, resistance and co-existence

Abstract

An important factor shaping the rebel-to-political transition of armed movements in post-conflict settings pertains to the political identity these groups develop in wartime. This political identity is itself a multi-dimensional concept shaped not only by the political ideology, practices and institutions established by the rebel organisation, but also by the relationship with the state and its political institutions. Far from functioning in a vacuum or isolated, rebel groups, especially when operating as alternative providers of governance, build multi-layered networks of relations with the state, the pre-existing traditional society institutions as well as with other domestic and international political actors. The study focuses specifically on two complex armed groups, Hezbollah and Hamas, relying on primary sources as well as in-depth fieldwork on these groups’ socio-political institution (In this case field work refers to both in-depth direct observation of the groups’ social networks and political infrastructures as well direct interviews and meetings with key stakeholders involved in the administration of those activities. The time-frame for the field work spans between 2008 and 2013). The research tracks their multiple interactions with the state through grassroots activism, institutional politics and governance. Despite their considerable differences, at their cores, both organisations operate in a liminal space between open war and fragile post-conflict setting; between grassroots activism and institutional politics; between armed resistance and political accommodation; and between competition and cooperation with the state. As such, they represent useful starting points to begin deconstructing and problematising existing dichotomies still prevalent in studying both rebel governance and rebel-to-political transitions, including the binary state-non-state opposition. In doing so, the analysis highlights the importance of taking into account the often hybrid and multi-layered political legacies adopted by armed groups during wartime and their impact in shaping their political trajectories as well as the potential roles for these groups in post-conflict settings.

Notes

1. In the article, the terms NSAG, armed group and violent non-state actor are used interchangeably when referring to organizations that are armed, willing and capable to use force to attain their political, economic or ideological goals and not under the formal or de facto control of a state. (International Council on Human Rights Policy 1995; Schneckener 2009). In the case of Hamas and Hezbollah, both groups can be labeled as NSAGs. In addition, they can be described as ‘rebel opposition groups,’ referring to a politically-motivated sub-type of violent non-state actor (Holmqvist 2005).

2. After Hamas’s electoral victory in the 2006 Palestinian Legislative Council elections, the group and its historical political foe – Fatah – struggled to reconcile and share power in the Palestinian political arena. After failing to establish a unity government, rising tensions between Hamas and Fatah eventually culminated in a military confrontation in the early summer of 2007, leading to a Hamas ‘takeover’ of Gaza. In the past decade, Palestine has been de facto divided between Gaza – under the rule of Hamas – and the West Bank, led by Fatah through its control of the Palestinian Authority. Despite many attempts to move beyond this situation, Palestinian politics remain, to date, divided.

3. For example, in its 2009 Manifesto, Hezbollah reiterated: ‘The continuous Israeli threats oblige Lebanon to endorse a defensive strategy that couples between a popular resistance that participates in defending the country and an army that preserves the security of the country and safeguards its security and stability in a complementary process that has proved in the previous phase to be successful.’ The Political Document (Manifesto) of Hizbollah 2009 AC/1430 H, Hezbollah Press Office (obtained by the author).

4. See for example Hezbollah’s internal deployment of weapons in the spring of 2008 in the midst of an internal political crisis that had been in place since December 2006. ‘Hezbollah militants take over West Beirut,’ CNN, May 9, 2008, <http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/meast/05/09/beirut.violence/index.html>, [accessed 15 September 2015].

5. See for example <http://www.waad.org.lb/> (Arabic), [accessed 25 September 2015].