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Abstract
In this article, structural issues with regard to the quality of the self-governance of the 35 Olympic sport governing bodies (SGBs) are analysed. First, this article presents empirical evidence on the lack of accountability arrangements in SGBs. In particular, the watchdog function of their member organizations is severely undermined by the general absence of objective criteria and transparency in the distribution of funding to members. With regard to checks and balances, arguably the most topical issue is the complete lack of independent ethics committees. Second, our survey demonstrates that most SGBs have institutionalized athlete participation. However, in the overwhelming majority of the organizations, they have not been granted a share of formal decision-making power. Third, with regard to executive body members, there is the rather anachronistic dominance of the European continent and also the preponderance of male officials. In addition, the general lack of term limits poses serious threats with regard to the concentration of power, which is evidenced for instance by the overall number of years SGB presidents are in office. The empirical evidence clearly supports the recent calls for improved governance in sport, according to which SGBs need to agree upon, and act in accordance with, a set of well-defined criteria of good governance. Only then will the self-governance of sport be credible and the privileged autonomy of these organizations justifiable.
Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank the two anonymous reviewers and Barrie Houlihan for their excellent comments and suggestions to an earlier version of this paper. This study was part of the Action for Good Governance in International Sports Organizations (AGGIS) project. The AGGIS project has received funding from the European Commission under the framework of the 2012 Preparatory Actions in Sport. For more information, please visit http://www.aggis.eu.
Notes
1. In this article, we use the term international non-governmental sport organization (INGSO) as an umbrella term for all types of international sport organizations chiefly because it relates to the terms International Governmental Organization (IGO) and International Non-Governmental Organization (INGO), which have a long tradition in the field of politics and political science.
2. Here, we used outcome rather than rules-based indicators. For instance, an organization may have enshrined in its statutes that its general assembly elects the members of the ethics committee, but when some of them also have a seat in the executive body of the organization, we do not deem the committee to be independent.
3. We did not include any budgeting information on ethics committees, since such information was extremely scarce.
4. Although the choice for Switzerland could initially be explained through ‘pioneer mover-follower’ and/or ‘dominant mover-follower’ models (Croci and Forster Citation2004, p. 9), Switzerland’s rather broad interpretation of the freedom of association while it is not subject to harmonizing EU law probably is the main reason for SGBs to keep it as the home base for their activities.
5. This contrasts with the situation in North-America, where collective bargaining agreements govern the employer–employee relationships between the owners of professional sports teams and players’ associations (Dryer Citation2008). In Europe, on the other hand, sport was for a long time regarded solely as a leisure activity and therefore, the ‘sports industry’ concept is not yet as developed and player unions have been relatively weaker and not equipped with the necessary bargaining powers (Halgreen Citation2004, p. 79).
6. North America, Central America and the Caribbean.
7. We could not find information for the International Rugby Board (IRB) and the International Golf Federation (IGF).