Old wine in a new bottle: Governance, fragility and armed conflict trio in Swat Valley, Pakistan

Abstract

Fragility in governance and armed conflict are directly linked and are the causes and consequence of each other. This study aimed to understand pre and during conflict scenarios of fragile governance in Swat. This research used qualitative research design and conducted in depth interviews from multiple stakeholders ranging from government officials to men and women in the community. The results showed that weak legislation and legal plurality led to the fragility in governance that later on transformed into armed conflict. The findings reveal that the fragile administrative governance was the root cause in the initiation of armed insurgency in Swat.

Keywords:

• armed conflict
• militancy
• counter insurgency
• governance
• fragility

PUBLIC INTEREST STATEMENT

Globally, weak governance and institutions have contributed in emergence of violent conflicts and civil wars. Evidently, regions with collapsed governance system are hubs of terrorists, militants, insurgents and organized criminals. Therefore, it is the responsibility of every state to restrict their citizens towards peaceful ways by provision of efficient governance through establishment of trustworthy institutions. Significantly, fair and reliable governance system is the key in elimination of insurgency, militancy and other violent activities. So, this paper highlights very timely that issues in governance system contribute towards violent conflict at later stage. It would be right to say that emergence of violent conflict is the continuation of historical events, prolonged weak governance and miss managed state institutions. Therefore, the case study of Swat valley in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistan provides insights to complex nexus of prolonged weak governance and armed conflict.

1. Introduction

According to Country policies and institutions performance assessment (CPIA¹) conducted by World Bank (2005a) illustrated that states with low level of governance and weak institutions are termed as fragile states. Majority of these states have recently been affected by an armed conflict. Moreover, states having weak and frail policies, governance and institutions face issues of corruption, risk of armed violence and less stable political culture i.e. 21 out of 26 states facing civil violence and conflicts during 1992−2002 were LICUS (low income countries under stress) (World Bank, 2005b). Significantly, weak institutions and poor governance may make low income countries prone to higher risk of any violence like insurgency, militancy, terrorism and armed conflict (Fearon, 2011). According to polity IV dataset in 2008 there were 14 countries which were highly fragile as they have no authority over their complete territory. These countries included Pakistan, Myanmar, Iraq, Afghanistan, Cyprus, Democratic Republic of Congo, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Sri Lanka, Serbia, Colombia, Somalia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina (Marshall, 2008). While according to the Fragile States Index (FSI) released by the Fund for Peace, Pakistan in 2018 has slightly improved its ranking in comparison to previous years. FSI positions Pakistan at 18 out of 178 states. The country has moved from the category called High Alert in 2016 to the Alert category in 2017. It was ranked 14th in 2017 and has improved its position to 18th in 2018. So, there has been a strong argument that stability cannot be achieved without ensuring effective and accountable governance; likewise, governance cannot be improved without addressing fragility in state institutions. Kaufmann et al. (2011) have very precisely included absence of violence and terrorism, a stable political system and an effective government as most important indicators for worldwide measurement of governance level. Therefore, it is evident that good governance contributes to stability and reduction of fragility (Oxfam, 2017). Consequently, security threats, political turmoil, devastating humanitarian crises, mass migration, armed and violent conflicts significantly, militancy, insurgency, terrorism and organized crimes are the most adverse outcomes of the fragile states. Therefore, regions directly and recently affected by serious armed conflicts have been politically fragile and prone to instability (Marshall, 2008).

Keeping in view the dynamics of fragility, governance and conflict, the classical case of Swat in Northwestern Pakistan can be analyzed through this triangular relationship. This study, aims to understand which factor contributed the most in the fragility of Swat valley’s administrative governance system? Is inconsistent legislation by the government in Swat made the administrative governance system fragile? In addition, which factor instigated militancy/insurgency and armed conflict in Swat? Is bad governance being the central driver of armed conflict/insurgency from 2007 to 2009 in Swat, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Pakistan?

2. Setting the background of the study

Armed conflict is a contested incompatibility between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state and results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in one calendar year (Holtermann, 2009). Armed conflict is both the cause and consequence of state fragility. However, worse fragility increases the probability of experiencing the conflict and violence repeatedly (Dupuy et al., 2016). Therefore, fragile states are very vulnerable to violence, insurgency and armed conflict as the militants find it very easy to recruit the ignored youth (Cockayne, 2011). Similarly, in fragile states the quality of the political settlement is deeply flawed, or significantly undermined (Menocal, 2011). It is illustrated in the literature that an insurgency is a struggle which is designed to use both political and military grounds to weaken an established and legitimate government and consequently expanding insurgent authority and control (Moghadam, 2015). Therefore, fragile and weak states are unable to establish their authority over the entire territory due to lack of capacity and are vulnerable to armed conflicts and civil wars (Keen, 2008). Consequently, weak states become safe havens for insurgents, militants and terrorists as Eubank and Weinberg (2001) illustrated that weak state institutions and poor governance play a pivotal role in transforming an insurgency to brutal terrorism.

Governance and Conflict are dimensions of the Basic societal-systems analysis (Marshall & Cole, 2011) having very deep connection among themselves. Therefore, in this study these two dimensions i.e. governance and conflict have been focused to better explore and understand reinforcing relationship between them. These two dimensions are interconnected i.e. conflict results in weakness of governance similarly, weak and fragile governance results in initiation of violence and conflict (Lederach, 1997). According to field manual of US Army and Marine “the primary objective of any counterinsurgent is to foster the development of effective governance by a legitimate government”.² In fact, revolt against a legitimate and legal authority has been usually termed as an insurgency. Historically, any rebellion or revolt has been properly associated with poor governance i.e. majority of these revolts (insurgencies) would have been surely avoided through provision of fair and reliable governance system (Heuser, 2010). Therefore, establishment of fair, trustworthy, as well as reliable governance system is the most persuasive route in encouraging the people to support the legitimate government. In addition, provision of reliable and fair governance will definitely limit the support for the militants and insurgents (Kazmi, 2012). Most western thinkers have declared legitimacy of government as an important part of counterinsurgency. The legitimacy can only be achieved by efficient and effective government through durable and reliable administrative governance system (Fitzsimmons, 2008). In fact, just and fair governance is the key in elevating the popularity and legitimacy of the government. Therefore, any insurgency against a popular and legitimate government may not be appropriately succeeded (Plakoudas, 2018). However, insurgents or militants may precisely exploit the gaps in the legal and governance system of the government. They will try their best to fill up the gaps by establishing their own illegitimate governance system. For example, in Afghanistan the militants of Taliban took advantage of hurdles in the way of formal governance and legal system. Therefore, they exploited the circumstances and dismantled the legitimate governance system by establishing their own governance system (Kazmi, 2012).

The best available mechanism for any counterinsurgency in both policy and practice is to win the hearts and minds of the people by establishing a legitimate administrative governance system. i.e. good governance (Fitzsimmons, 2008). The character of a government is its basic virtue in defeating an insurgency. Whereas, this best character is always revolving around the establishment of fair and just governance system (Kilcullen, 2010). Every state has institutions which are responsible to restore trust of the people and reintegrate them. Therefore, restricting people to peaceful ways is the core functions of these institutions through their proper service delivery. Hence, for understanding fragility in a state it is very crucial to understand weaknesses prevailing in existing institutions of the state (Vallings & Moreno-Torres, 2005. The principal component of an effective counterinsurgency is the appropriate service delivery through proper governance system to people. Then the people may be kept away from the hands of insurgents and militants i.e. the loyalty of local people can only be gained by establishing efficient and effective governance system (Kazmi, 2012). It is evident and significant that without better and efficient governance fear of insurgency, recurring armed conflicts and state fragility remains very high. There is an established correlation between conflict and fragility i.e. to decrease the convergence of fragility into conflict the state may build trust among its citizens. Although, the process of building trust among citizens and the state is very prolonged process. Therefore, in some countries the process is intentionally undermined by actors who have an incentive to maintain weak state functions. Therefore, fragility leads to violence and armed conflict very quickly (Locke, 2012; Walter, 2014). For example, during 2006–2013 the militants had gained full control of North Waziristan region in Pakistan as a consequence of collapsed civil institutions and governance system (Malik, 2013; Shakirullah & Elahi, 2019). So, the establishment of an illegitimate governance system in a region is befitting response of militants to the government that all legitimate institutions like civil law enforcement agencies and other administrative setup are collapsed (Kazmi, 2012).

Ultimately, good governance reduces risks of intrastate armed conflicts (Norris, 2014) and is the major key to avoid recurrence of armed conflict (Hegre & Nygård, 2015). Significantly, good governance has contributed in reduction of armed conflicts. So, the best tool to end an ongoing and avoid a forthcoming armed conflict is an effective and reliable governance system (Yiew et al., 2016). For example, in 1989 the bad governance was the root cause (Bah, 2010) of civil wars in Liberia during which a lot of violence, killings and atrocities were frequently committed (Vinck et al., 2011). Similarly, many reasons are associated with emergence of an insurgent group Boko Haram in Nigeria, but the most prominent had been the ineffective and inefficient governance. Almost the primary cause of every insurgency and militancy everywhere in world could be accredited to the lack of political will from the government i.e. absence of good governance. Therefore, in Nigeria and surroundings the Boko Haram can be eliminated only by establishing an effective and resilient governance system (Mustapha et al., 2019).

3. The classical case of Swat Valley

Swat valley in Northwestern part of Pakistan turned into a battle ground particularly, from 2007 to 2010 due to invasion of Taliban. The governance skeleton of Swat was already fragile which further crumbled by Taliban invasion, and the valley turned into battlefield soon after Taliban’s took over in 2007. Historically, Swat state was merged into sovereign state of Pakistan in 1969 and unfortunately, the major lapses and weaknesses in governance system in Swat started to appear soon after the merger took place.

Particularly, in the first decade of second millennium Swat valley has witnessed serious governance issues, violence and severe armed conflict. As, Avis (2016) stated that Swat Valley an administrative district in Pakistani province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa³ has become synonymous with protracted conflict between state forces and insurgent elements within the region. Rome (2010) illustrates that governance in Swat was of fair standard before merger with Pakistan state. However, after merger the institutions were unable to sustain the fair governance level in Swat. The transition from kingdom to part of democratic state created void in governance and administrative system in Swat (Khalid et al., 2015) that ultimately led to increased frustration level in people. Similarly, there was a clear functionality of legal plurality in district Swat that left people confused and further added to erosion of governance structures. However, it would not be wrong to state that the administrative setup in post-merger Swat was unable to meet the trust of the masses due to its inefficiency (Rome, 2009).

Consequently, militants exploited the frustration which was due to the weak law and order and poor governance in Swat very efficiently (Avis, 2016). Moreover, weakness in governance provided ground for the formation and stabilization of militant groups (Adnan, 2012). Therefore, militants under the command of Fazlullah⁴ defeated the state authorities (Hussain, 2011) and established their own authority over the state institutions (CAMP and Saferworld, 2012). Even, militants formed their own courts besides taking administrative control in Swat which dismantled both the local Jirga⁵ system and formal judicial system (Elahi, 2015).

4. Study area

This study is carried out in Tehsil Matta⁶ also known as Shamizai of district Swat. Yousafzai Pakhtuns are in majority while, other Pakhtun tribes like Trakalani and Shinwari are also residing in study area. In addition, other ethnicities like Syeds, Mullas and Gujjars are also co inhibiting the area with dominant Pakhtun tribes. All ethnicities speak Pushto or Pukhto as their mother language except the Gujjars who use it just for communication with other ethnicities as, their native language is Gujjru. Historically, in Tehsil Matta the aristocratic class is predominantly represented by the Khans of Muhammad Khel, Shama Khel and Nazar Khel.

Tehsil Matta was chosen to study the fragility, governance and armed conflict nexus because it was the nucleus of violence whether, erupted in the form of Kisani Movement⁷ in 1970s, TNSM⁸ in 1990s, and TTP⁹ in 2007, respectively. Tehsil Matta was the final battle ground between the militants of TTP and Pakistan armed forces after the initiation of massive military operation in May 2009, known as operation Rah-e-Rast. The notorious sanctuaries, training camps and hideouts of militants like Peochar, Sakhra, Shawar, Namal, Chuprial, Sarbanda, Lalko, Darmai and Naukhara were all in Tehsil Matta. Therefore, this region had been severely, damaged by activities conducted by both the militants as well military. All the government buildings and offices were occupied by the militants like courts, police stations, frontier constabulary posts, etc.

5. Methods and methodology

This study used qualitative approach to understand the issue under research. Qualitative research is used for comprehensive understanding of human behavior in specific circumstances and contexts. Interview method was preferred to collect the primary data from the study area because interviews are used as data collection tool in a qualitative research (Dörnyei, 2007). The strength of unstructured interviews lies in the complete freedom they provide in terms of content and structure. Interview method provides the flexibility to formulate the questions and raise the issues on the spur of the moment, depending upon what occurs in the context of the discussion (Kumar, 2010). Therefore, interviews provide the most appropriate way for researchers to assess and investigate the views of people in larger depth (Kvale, 2003). Similarly, Cohen et al. (2007) argue that the most valuable data collection tool for better understanding of meanings in their natural setting is interviews. Interviews format developed for this study comprised of diverse questions covering the history of the Swat, pre- and post-merger scenarios as well as, phases of pre and during armed conflict in region. Almost one and half hour on the average was spent with each respondent except the government officials i.e. they were unable to give that much time because of their other responsibilities. All respondents were interviewed in Pushto/Pukhto except the military officers whose interviews were conducted in Urdu because they were unable to understand Pushto.

Purposive and snowball sampling techniques were used to select respondents from the study area. The respondents selected were comprised of government officials including both civil and military, Jirga members, political leaders, lawyers, academia professionals, key informants and a journalist. Hence, two officials ranking from Brigadier to Colonel were interviewed from the military administration at the Government Afzal Khan Lala¹⁰ post graduate college in the main town of Matta. The military officers were interviewed because during conflict and in post conflict phase military has remained the main stake holder and responsible for maintaining law and order in the region. Similarly, three out of nine respondents representing the civil administration including District Nazim,¹¹ District Deputy Nazim, ADC (Additional Deputy Commissioner) were interviewed in their respective offices at district head quarter (Saidu Sharif). While, the remaining six i.e. Tehsil Nazim, Tehsil Deputy Nazim, AC (Assistant commissioner), SDPO (Sub Divisional Police Officer), SDFO (Sub Divisional Forest Officer) and TMO (Tehsil Municipal Officer) were interviewed in their corresponding offices at Tehsil Headquarter (Matta).

On the other hand, five Jirga members were interviewed. Moreover, five political leaders including both current and former members of national, provincial and local assemblies hailing from Tehsil Matta were interviewed in order to understand the political perspective of the region. Similarly, 14 key informants from major villages in tehsil Matta were interviewed. Five women key informants were interviewed to get female perspective on the issue as well. Furthermore, a journalist, two lawyers and academia professionals were also interviewed. Keeping in view the context of armed conflict and governance fragility, respondents of diverse nature were selected to record and analyze their opinion about various factors of armed conflict and insurgency.

The respondents other than government officials and representatives were all interviewed in their respective Hujras¹² and houses. While, opinions of females were noted down in Manrai¹³ of their respective houses. Because, non-relative males were traditionally, not allowed to enter premises of their houses. The researcher made substantial efforts to include the women say in the study, considering the strong traditional patriarch culture. Moreover, there were the security forces including the military, so during the field it was difficult to carry the interview guide freely and to conduct open field interviews, due to the sensitivity of the study and region. Furthermore, there was lack of trust in the usage of voice recorder to record the interviews of respondents. Hence, to eliminate any kind of resistance, the choice was made to use pen and paper for writing the responses of each respondent.

6. Results and discussions

In this section, the causes and consequences of fragility are discussed and analyzed focusing mainly on administrative governance. The analysis based on primary data collected from the respondents while some of the arguments are supported by secondary data.

6.1. From autocracy to democracy: historical perspective on Swat’s governance system

After merger with Pakistan, Swat state underwent major transition from autocracy to democracy on 28th of July 1969. During the transition phase a lot of weaknesses appeared i.e. a new legal system was emerged in which executive officers were authorized to act simultaneously both as administrative and judicial officers. These executive officers were not locals, creating further complexity in smooth extension of services. The newly, appointed officers were not aware of the local customs that ultimately created friction between government officials and the local people in Swat. In addition, record keeping was very weak. Policy documentation and formulation of new development projects were undermined by Pakistani state in Swat (Adnan, 2012; Fleischner, 2011; Rome, 2010). The distinction of roles and responsibilities among various departments to some extent was not clear e.g., in post-merger phase both the executive and judiciary were the same. Gradually, a legal gap between the jurisdiction and authority of both executive and judiciary arose during the devolution process. The power struggle between different government departments negatively impacted the service delivery to public. As, discussed above Kazmi (2012) has termed establishment of fair, trustworthy, as well as reliable governance system the most persuasive route in encouraging the people to support the legitimate government. But the state of Pakistan was unable to establish an efficient, effective, fair and reliable administrative governance system in Swat. Therefore, weakness of governance in Swat can be traced back to the PATA¹⁴ regulation act of 1969 under article 246(b) of constitution of Pakistan. As

Clause(3) of Article 247 of the Constitution of Pakistan provides that no Act of Parliament or a Provincial Assembly shall apply to a Provincially Administered Tribal Areas, or any part thereof, unless the Governor of the Province in which the Tribal Area is situated, with the approval of the President, so directs, and in giving such direction with respect to any law, the Governor may direct that the law shall, in its application to a Tribal Area, or to a specified part thereof, have effect subject to such exceptions and modifications as may be specified in the direction.¹⁵

In addition, the

clause (4) of Article 247 of the Constitution of Pakistan provides that the Governor of a Province, with the prior approval of the President, may, with respect to any matter within the legislative competence of the Provincial Assembly, make regulations for the peace and good governance of Provincially Administered Tribal Areas or any part thereof.¹⁶

Therefore, countless and inconsistent legislation under the PATA regulation act created legal pluralism in Swat i.e. Swat was pendent between the jurisdictions of both the federal and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa governments. The provincial government was unable to pursue any legislation or reforms without the prior approval of the federal government. While, the executive officers, which were also acting legally, as judicial officers, were working under the due consent of the provincial government. This legal dilemma is also described by Adnan (2012) and Fleischner (2011). Therefore, gaps and confusion in legislation provided ground for the fragility in the administrative governance system. It is also evident that any system moving under the transition phase is more vulnerable to become fragile (Wilkin, 2011). Immediately, complete powers of the ruler (before merger) were delegated to the commissioner, (DC)¹⁷ and respective ACs¹⁸ in Swat. The commissioner, DC and ACs were under the provincial government but the provincial government was unable to initiate any legal reforms without the due approval of President of Pakistan. Therefore, the executive was unable to use their authority freely. As a senior civil officer said

We had the powers and authority of pre-merger ruler, but we were unable to exercise them and the people of Swat were expecting from us the performance which was existing before merger. Therefore, we were confused that what should we do?

Moreover, an academia professional expressed

The bureaucracy in Swat was very much confused. They had powers but the mechanisms of governance were unclear. In addition, the officers were unfamiliar with the context and social landscape of Swat. Much of the time was wasted in understanding the complexity of the context by the officers deployed by Pakistani State.

In addition, a lawyer argued

I remember the day when the deputy commissioner of Swat was the chief guest in the Matta bar council. I asked him why you (bureaucracy) have been remained so much inactive regarding the administration and governance in Swat. He replied, this region (Swat) is much different from the rest of the province (KP). We are being overburdened as, we are facing hurdles in adjusting to the people and conditions of the Swat.

It reflected that government of Pakistan was not fully prepared to extend the writ of the state in Swat Valley. Officers were not properly trained according to the needs of the area. Local representation was not ensured in administrative bureaucracy which was one of the major reasons of fragility in governance and administration. Therefore, Fitzsimmons (2008) has rightly argued that legitimacy in a region can only be achieved by efficient and effective government through its durable and reliable administrative governance system i.e. good governance is fundamental in gaining minds and hearts of the people.

6.2. Lack of coherence in prevailing institutions

In 1975, some PATA amendments were introduced. Under these amendments the criminal and civil sectors were separated. Before, the separation of civil and criminal sectors the Swat was administered under the PATA act, 1969 and Pakistan Criminal Procedure Code 1898 (Anwar & Ahmad, 2017). After the amendments, Under the act of 1975, in some conditions it was the jurisdiction of the Tribunal (Tribunal was transformed into Jirga in 1976) to intervene in cases of civil nature and minor crimes. The minor crimes were called the Tribal crimes (Nichols, 2013) under the PATA act of 1975. While in some civil cases, this was the jurisdiction of the Deputy Commissioner who was simultaneously acting as both supreme executive and judicial officer to exercise its authority. For example, in civil cases the tribunal was authorized to take decisions while, the DC was also empowered to pass orders in civil matters. Similarly, all the state related committed crimes defined under the Pakistan Criminal Procedure Code 1898, were decided by the Deputy Commissioner. While, minor crimes called Tribal crimes were under the jurisdiction of the Tribunal (Jirga). According to Rome (2009, 2010) the Tribunal (Jirga) was to be nominated by the Deputy Commissioner (DC). Moreover, this was the complete prerogative of the DC to nominate any one as the member of the Jirga (formerly, known as the tribunal). The Jirga (Tribunal) was authorized to decide the cases of civil nature while, in some situations it has also the legal mandate to intervene in criminal cases.

As an academia professional narrated “Some administrative and judicial decisions were taken according to the laws of Pakistan while, other were under the Riwaj Nama¹⁹ of Swat”. On the other hand, the DC was legally, authorized to abolish the decision of the Jirga unanimously. So, there was prevailing a complete confusion and uncertainty which led to the fragility of the state institutions and finally, in the weakness of governance in Swat.

6.3. Kisani movement: first post-merger armed violence in Swat

This movement was emerged in 1972 as result of the Islamic socialism of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto.²⁰ As according to Orakzai (2011) and Avis (2016) the Kisani conflict in Swat was associated with Bhutto’s Islamic socialism agenda. This movement was backed by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto as his opponents were in NAP²¹ (National Awami Party) and majority of them were landlords. The aim of Bhutto was to make the NAP weakened and divided. As a senior lawyer revealed “This was a political movement initiated by the PPP against the NAP. As, the two members of PPP (Pakistan people’s party) were to visit Swat and basically their aim was to strengthen the Kisani movement in Swat.”

During the Kisani conflict the landless people (mostly Gujjars) took arms and occupied the lands of their respective landlords (mostly Pakhtuns). In Swat the Kisani movement was very strong in the areas of present study area. In 1973, the conflict reached its peak in which armed violence was erupted. Armed clashes were started between the Gujjars and Pakhtuns. Which resulted in several deaths and huge property losses. These circumstances highlight the failure and weakness of state institutions which were prevailing in Swat at that time. The prevailing law enforcement agencies comprised of levies²² and provincial police were unable to stop the armed clashes therefore; Frontier corps (FC) which is a paramilitary force was deputed in Swat by the federal government. After the arrival, of the frontier corps the clashes remained for some time but, in 1974 the Kisani movement was completely ended.

So, eruption of violence in the form of Kisani Movement is clearly, indicating the fragility and failure of the existing local executive. As, it was unable to maintain the law and order so, the paramilitary forces were deployed to control the situation in Swat.

6.4. Fragile governance led to the emergence of the TNSM and armed violence in Swat

After Kisani Movement in 1970s, Swat went through another politico religious movement. The weakness of the state institutions resulted in the manifestation of the violence due to fragile governance. Adnan (2012) illustrated the loopholes in the performance of the institutions regarding the emergence of TNSM.²³ During the military rule of General Zia-ul-Haq,²⁴ the Fazl-e-Haq²⁵ was appointed as governor of KP.²⁶ During their rule a tribunal was formed. The objective of tribunal was to visit the Malakand division and give recommendations about legal future of the region. Unfortunately, the tribunal failed to produce any report. People in Malakand division were annoyed due to the weak governance and poor services delivery of the state institutions as elaborated by Rome (2009) and Orakzai (2011), therefore TNSM in the district Dir of Malakand division emerged.

One of the Jirga members said,

There may be more reasons behind the emergence of TNSM, but the main factor is the persistent bad governance and weak institutions in Malakand division and particularly in Swat. People supported the TNSM as they were very much annoyed due to the bad performance of these institutions.

In addition, a civil officer said, “The failure of the civil executive surfaced in the emergence of the TNSM. Therefore, the paramilitary force (FC) was deployed by the federal government to restrict the growing misdeeds of TNSM.”

Soon after emergence, the TNSM became very popular in the entire Malakand division. People of the region were demanding a system which may deliver services fast and efficiently as compared to the prevailing system. It is clear from the literature, see Kazmi (2012) that armed violence seekers may precisely exploit the gaps in the legal and governance system of the government. They will try their best to fill up the gaps by presenting their own demands. Therefore, TNSM protested for achievement of its main objectives i.e. the enforcement of the Islamic law (Shariah) in Malakand region. The activists of TNSM went for armed agitation in April 1994 and blocked the main Malakand road. Moreover, the violent protestors also made the complete executive and judiciary hostile in the Matta region of Swat. The assistant commissioner, police officials and judges were made hostage. Therefore, they were rescued by the local influential landlords. These circumstances clearly exposed the fragility in the governance of the administrative institutions in Swat. One of the lawyers said,

I was present in the court area when the agitators of the TNSM kept the judge and the assistant commissioner of Matta hostage. The police were also afraid of these violent agitators, so they didn’t come to rescue them. They both were rescued by the local landlord hailing from the Durushkhela village of Matta. The landlord pacified the angry protestor by saying these are our guests don’t harm them.

In addition, during this armed violence in Swat, MPA (Member of provincial assembly) was also killed by the TNSM supporters. Therefore, again the Frontier corps was deputed in Swat by the federal government to establish writ of the government. As a political leader narrated

The TNSM and their supporters had made the whole administration and judiciary hostile and the police were unable to rescue them as they were also afraid of them. There was no writ of the government as, the armed agitators were that much violent that they killed the MPA elected from Shangla.

After negotiation with TNSM leaders, the provincial government of KP under the due approval of president of Pakistan in 1994, introduced the Provincially Administered Tribal Areas Nifaze Nizame Shariah Regulation act 1994 in the Malakand division. Later in 1999, the Qazi courts²⁷ were established under the Shariah Nizame Adl act 1999 due to the continuous agitation of TNSM. The above act was introduced in 1999, under the due consent of the federal government (Fleischner, 2011; Rome, 2010).

At the beginning of the second millennium i.e. 2000, TNSM again went for the armed violence and blocked all the roads in Swat. Moreover, they hosteled and humiliated the government officials. This clearly, indicates that government institutions were failed to counter them i.e. no executive institution including police, frontier constabulary and district administration comprised of DC and ACs was able to confront them. Therefore, again the federal government sent the paramilitary Frontier Corps to manage the issue. As an academia professional argued “Despite the announcement and implementation of the sharia regulation acts in Swat. The governance issues remained unchanged as, the capacity of the executive was extremely hallow. Therefore, the TNSM reemerged in Swat and occupied major roads and buildings.”

TNSM members were armed and have occupied some strategic positions in the Valley but fortunately, with arrival of FC²⁸ the militants did not confronted it and escaped to their respective houses. Therefore, police personnel revealed

Initially, the armed members of TNSM were much sentimental to embrace martyrdom while, fighting the security forces i.e. they had dugout graves for themselves in advance to be buried in. But when the frontier corps (FC) arrived all armed members escaped to their respective homes without fighting and saved their lives.

6.5. Fragility in civil institutions led to deployment of paramilitary force

In Swat repeatedly, the paramilitary force (FC) was used by the government to maintain law and order as consequence of armed violence. A paramilitary force is deployed when the civil law enforcement agencies particularly, the police lack the capacity to overcome deteriorated law and order conditions. Hence, maintaining law and order in Swat was responsibility of the district administration and civil law enforcement agencies comprised of police and Frontier Constabulary. All of them were unable to maintain law and order in the region indicating that these institutions were passing under fragility. This fragility becomes more evident with failure of the executive in delivering their basic services. Therefore, Kazmi (2012) has eventually, highlighted that principal component to counter any armed violence is the appropriate service delivery through proper governance system to people. Then the people may be kept away from the hands of violence seekers and propagators i.e. the local people can only be restricted to peaceful ways by establishing efficient and effective administrative governance system. For example, weak response of the police in Swat towards the armed agitation of TNSM, revealed its low capacity. Similarly, civil administration i.e. the commissioner and deputy commissioners at the division and district level, respectively, were unable to establish writ of the government. For example, main Malakand road was occupied and blocked by the protestors of TNSM. But the whole administration setup was looking towards each other i.e. lacking capacity and strength.

As, one of the military officers said “The repeated agitation and sometime armed agitation and violence is the clear indication of failure and incompetency of the district and division level civil executive and administration. Therefore, the federal government had no option to depute the paramilitary in Swat.” When a senior civil officer was asked regarding the deployment of the paramilitary force he said; “When the district administration and the police face hurdles in maintaining law and order, then we request the government to deploy the paramilitary force.” Moreover, a lawyer expressed “When something is weaker from inside then it requires support from the external factors. That was the case with the deployment of the paramilitary in Swat.”

6.6. Post 9/11 administrative governance in Swat

When United States of America and its allies attacked the Afghanistan in 2001, in search of the Al-Qaeda’s head Osama Bin Laden after the deadliest attack on the twin towers in September 2001, the governance conditions in FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Areas) and PATA become more serious and alarming.²⁹ According to Avis (2016) and Fleischner (2011) US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 had created destabilization in the neighboring areas like FATA and Malakand division. It is further supported by Orakzai (2011) that 9/11 incident caused destabilization in Swat which provided strength to the extremist, militant jihadist organizations particularly the TNSM.

As an academia professional narrated “The 9/11 incident has badly, affected the region particularly Swat. After 9/11, a proxy war was initiated and people of the Malakand division were used against the USA. Therefore, 9/11 incident worsened the situation of Swat.” Similarly, one of the military officers stated “The 9/11 incident had adversely impacted the whole world, but Afghanistan, FATA and Malakand region of Pakistan were affected the most. As these regions become the hub of violence and terrorism.”

6.7. Weak response of executive strengthened the Jihad campaign

Reason behind weak administrative governance was weak response of the executive (local bureaucracy and CLEAs³⁰) in whole Malakand division against the Jihad campaign of TNSM. As, the government and security agencies were unable to stop the activities of extremist organizations. Therefore, TNSM was collecting chanda (charity) and recruiting the volunteers to fight the holy war against the United States and its allies in Afghanistan. Figure of these volunteers was around 10,000 (Avis, 2016), which was comprised of young as well old men. Head of TNSM (Sufi Muhammad) facilitated them to enter Afghanistan for fighting against the United States and its allies. But here emerges a very relevant argument that despite of all these activities the executive was unable to restrict TNSM. Therefore, no substantial action was taken against TNSM and its militants in Swat. This weak response of the state institutions exposed their fragility in the form of incapacity i.e. local bureaucracy and CLEAs were unable to maintain the law and order in Swat.

As, one of the Jirga members narrated “I have seen a charpoy (bed) in Matta bazar full of numerous currencies like Riyal, Dirham and Pakistani rupees, which were collected from people by the TNSM”. In addition, a key respondent who has fought after the 9/11 incident against the US and its allies in Afghanistan revealed

Under the leadership of the Sufi Muhammad (Head of the TNSM), we were in thousands to cross the border of Afghanistan. But there was no one to stop us during the complete journey to Afghanistan. Only from my village there were 17 volunteers who fought in Afghanistan, but none came back alive except me.

6.8. Dilemma of power struggle and surfacing of militants in Swat

In 2002, local governments were formed in Swat according to which the district and Tehsil executives were made answerable to elected district Nazim and tehsil Nazims, respectively. During this period, it was noted that overall executive was unhappy to be accountable in front of elected Nazims. These developments gradually, widened the gap between the elected local government representatives and bureaucracy operating in Swat. For example, deputy commissioner (DC) became the district coordination officer (DCO³¹) and some of its powers were given to elected district Nazim. As, the district Nazim was now authorized to take administrative decisions at district level and the respective Tehsil Nazims at Tehsil level. So, district executive including the police officers were unwilling to facilitate the respective elected Nazims. This gap resulted in more weakness of existing weak institutions. As, administrative institutions and governance in Swat were already, in fragility therefore, power struggle between the district administration and the elected Nazims exacerbated it. Fleischner (2011) also viewed the gap created by the power struggle between the Nazims and district administration as the factor which significantly, contributed to the deterioration of law and order in Swat. Therefore, a former district Nazim of Swat revealed

The district coordination officer and police officers were unwilling to facilitate and obey us (District Nazims) in a proper way. These officers were arguing that we have passed competitive exams like the CSS³² and PMS³³ exams, but we are answerable to illiterate elected Nazims.

Therefore, the bureaucracy created hindrances in implementation of administrative power of Nazims i.e. bureaucracy was considering the elected Nazims as inferior to them. This power struggle resulted in ultimate poor service delivery and bad administrative governance in the region. Consequently, according to arguments of Kazmi (2012) the militants precisely exploited the gaps in the legal and governance system of the government and filled up the gaps by establishing their own strong militant network. Therefore, in 2005, a branch of National Bank of Pakistan was looted by several militants in the Chuprial area of tehsil Matta where, cross firing was exchanged in which 1–2 militants were killed and few policemen were injured. The rest of militants escaped to nearby mountains of the Peochar³⁴ valley. It means the presence of militants in Swat was not a new phenomenon they had already strong holds in the Peochar valley in Tehsil Matta. It was also revealed by key informants that even Osama bin Laden has been remained in the valley but there is no consensus over the specific period of his stay. Some said he arrived in pre-9/11 era while, others argued his presence in post 9/11.

As a key respondent revealed “In the mountains of Peochar there was the presence of militants in 1990s in which some were foreigners. Even the Osama bin Laden has also been remained in Peochar in 1990s” Similarly, a journalist narrated “Almost 95% of the militants were locals and 5% were foreigners. Osama bin Laden has also stayed in Peochar in post 9/11 era.” Therefore, a young political leader said, “A lot of foreign militants and terrorists (Arabs, Uzbeks, Chechens) had also arrived at both FATA and Swat”. Similarly, a young respondent shared “Peochar valley was place with very huge weaponry including gun powder mills”.

Therefore, it is extracted that phenomenon of militant’s presence in Swat was not new i.e. there were already hide outs of the militants. However, it is interesting to say that the administration and CLEAs were either unaware of activities of the militants or unwilling/unable to counter them.

6.9. Bad administrative governance as the main driver of armed conflict in Swat

As discussed earlier the fragility in the administrative governance in Swat caused serious issues of law and order. Furthermore, after 9/11 the region has already experienced a new wave of instability which pushed weak institutions to brink of collapsing. Here, it is interesting to see whether, need for speedy justice, economic inequalities, poor economic development or poor infrastructure development is the factors that drove the armed conflict in Swat during 2007–2010? Orakzai (2011) has linked the armed conflict to historical, religious, gender and economic dimension. Rome (2009, 2010) highlighted flaws in judicial system prevailing in Swat as the main driver of conflict. In addition, Fleischner (2011) highlighted flaws in both judiciary and governance as the drivers of armed conflict in the form of insurgency and militancy in Swat. Moreover, Adnan (2012) declared bad governance as the cause of armed conflict during 2007–2009 in Swat. But, Adnan (2012) and Fleischner (2011) did not specify which kind of bad governance led to the initiation of armed conflict in Swat. The major factor which resulted in insurgency and armed conflict was the incapacity and weakness of the district administration. So, the inefficient and weak administrative governance in Swat provided ground to the armed conflict. It may be termed as the main driver of the armed insurgency which caused huge devastation across the valley. Findings of this study can be further validated through other studies conducted in North Waziristan region of Pakistan by Malik (2013) and Shakirullah and Elahi (2019) that during 2006–2013 the militants had gained full control of North Waziristan region in Pakistan as a consequence of collapsed civil institutions and their respective governance system. So, the establishment of militant’s own governance system in Swat was a befitting response of militants/insurgents to the government that all legitimate institutions like police and other administrative setup have been dismantled.

As, an academia professional narrated “It is very true that the prevailing administrative institutions were much weaker. Their worse and ineffective governance encouraged the Taliban in establishment of their writ and initiation of armed conflict in the form of insurgency/militancy.” Similarly, one of the military officers expressed “In Swat the civil administrative institutions and their governance completely, collapsed. It was very much needed to deploy military in the region to counter the militants/insurgents.” In addition, a lawyer stated “There is no doubt that the bad governance was the main driver of the armed conflict in Swat. From the bad governance in Swat I mean the poor performance of the civil executive.” Moreover, one of the police officers revealed “We were lacking training and the resources as compared to the Taliban. Lack of training and resources adversely, affected our performance.” Now, it is clear that bad administrative governance provided ground to the militants or insurgents of Taliban in Swat to expand their illegitimate control and governance system. Because if there were good administrative governance then it was very hard for the militants to establish their illegitimate control. If we revisit the available literature then we find that the best tool to end an ongoing and avoid a forthcoming armed conflict is an effective and reliable administrative governance system (Yiew et al., 2016). For example, in 1989 the bad governance was the root cause of civil wars in Liberia (Bah, 2010; Vinck et al., 2011). Similarly, many reasons are associated with emergence of an insurgent group Boko Haram in Nigeria, but the most prominent had been the ineffective and inefficient governance system (Mustapha et al., 2019).

6.9.1. Inefficiency of judiciary or executive?

Numerous questions are raised after TNSM was operating in Swat like how can Tehreek-e-Nifaze-Muhammadi (TNSM) recruited thousands of volunteers to fight against the United States in Afghanistan? Was this the inefficiency and poor performance of the Judiciary or the local executive? How can extremist groups propagate their views openly in the presence local executive in Swat? How can radical organizations collect charity for their progress? Was it due to economic inequalities, lack of development, loopholes in judiciary, or weakness of district level executive? The answer is simple i.e. inefficiency of executive. Moreover, if we acknowledge the religious and historical dimensions by Orakzai (2011) as the main drivers of armed conflict. Then why the local executive failed to identify and addressed these risks?

It may be argued that weakness and incapacity of the local executive comprised of local bureaucracy and civil law enforcement agencies (CLEAs) paved path to armed conflict i.e. emergence of armed conflict was deeply associated to poor law and order conditions. All institutions prevailing in Swat responsible for the maintenance of law and order were struggling to overcome hurdles in their way. When institutions are fragile then they are unable to perform well and lose their legitimacy and writ. As, Fitzsimmons (2008) has stated that most western thinkers have declared legitimacy of government as an important part of counterinsurgency. Whereas, the legitimacy can only be achieved by efficient and effective government through durable and reliable administrative governance system. Therefore, other causes of armed conflict or insurgency in Swat may also never be neglected but it is significant that main driver behind the initiation of armed conflict in the form of insurgency and militancy was the persistent weakness and fragility in the administrative governance. As, Mustapha et al. (2019) have rightly argued that almost the primary cause of every insurgency and militancy everywhere in world could be accredited to the lack of political will from the government i.e. absence of good governance. Furthermore, Mustapha et al. (2019) have concluded that in Nigeria and surroundings the Boko Haram can be eliminated only by establishing an effective and resilient administrative governance system.

Apparently, maintaining law and order as well as, peace in Swat was not the responsibility of judiciary but was of local executive. Since, it is not the theme of the discussion that what were the motives of the militants/insurgents but, how and why they were succeeded in abolishing the writ of the state and establishing their own? The institutions responsible to maintain law and order in an area are not concerned with motives of the militants/insurgents. There only concern has to establish writ of the state in which they struggled a lot in Swat. As, the militants of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) took over Swat valley and banished all government functionaries operating there particularly, the police stations which were named as the Taliban Stations. Almost all the local prominent people were made hostile and powerless. This was done to terrify the locals i.e. poor response of the executive gave an easy way for the militants to replace completely the writ of the state. As a military officer said

The civil administration was unable to resist the Taliban and then the military step in to combat them. Police and Frontier Constabulary left their posts vacant as Taliban were equipped with very sophisticated weapons i.e. CLEAs were not in position and trained to counter them.

Similarly, a civil officer revealed

The civil administration and CLEAs were nothing in front of militants. Due to the fear of militants they evacuated their posts and stations i.e. governance vanished. They were unable to counter the insurgents therefore; Taliban occupied these posts and stations i.e. established their own writ.

Similarly, Kazmi (2012) has concluded that in Afghanistan the militants of Taliban took advantage of hurdles in the way of formal governance system. Therefore, they exploited the circumstances and dismantled both the formal as well as, informal (Jirga system) governance system by establishing their own governance system. Hence, a young political leader in Swat argued “The governance was paralyzed due to the weakness of the administrative institutions”. As, Eubank and Weinberg (2001) have termed weak state institutions and their governance as the main driver in transforming an insurgency to brutal terrorism. Similarly, the insurgency or militancy in Swat later transformed into organized terrorism. Therefore, a government official narrated

The operational governance system in Swat in pre conflict scenario was struggling a lot. As a result, Taliban appeared and announced that all the government servants are infidel and ‘Wajibul Qatal’.³⁵ Therefore, some government servants left their services due to the fear of Taliban and some due to the fear of the infidelity. Hence circumstantially, the governance system in Swat became nearly zero i.e. Civil Administration was demoralized and unable to perform. As, the narrative of Taliban was very much strong i.e. Civil Administration is infidel and agents of the west. After gaining full control the militants of Taliban brutally slaughtered innocent people and terrorized the whole region by frequent suicide attacks in Bazars

6.9.2. Had the government officials having soft corner for the militants/insurgents?

Now to critically, analyze and discuss whether the executive (Bureaucracy and CLEAs) operating in Swat, was unwilling to deliver or it had in reality serious capacity issues. Both situations are directly related to their governance. If an institution is unwilling to perform whatever the reasons may be, surely, it will affect its performance and deliverance. Similarly, if an institution has some serious capacity issues then again, its performance will see major decline. On the other hand, if both the situations are prevailing simultaneously, in an institution then it is almost near to collapse and demolish. The same circumstances were prevailing in Swat regarding the administrative institutions i.e. their governance almost vanished and the militants filled the gap by establishing their own writ.

As a senior Jirga member revealed “The Malakand division (MKD) commissioner was frequently, offering prayers after the TTP chief Fazlullah. Another prominent commander of the TTP was freely moving with MKD commissioner in his official vehicle”.

The civil administration and CLEAs were unable or unwilling whatever may be the reason but, in Swat there was no one to maintain the law and order and establish writ of the government. Therefore, an experienced Jirga member said

That kind of conditions were created in Swat that military should step in, which happened. If the militants can be eliminated in 2009 military operation (Rah-e -Rast) why they were not eliminated in the 2007 as, they were in much smaller number.

Moreover, a police officer confessed with regret in his eyes “Initially, I needed 40 policemen to dismantle the complete network of ‘TTP Swat’ but unfortunately, we had no free hand”.

This aspect cannot be ignored as about 40 policemen at Matta police station surrendered in front of 10 to 15 militants without firing a single bullet. Similarly, the Frontier Constabulary personnel in Tehsil Matta and Khwazakhela also surrendered in the same manner to much smaller number of Taliban.

In addition, the first Taliban’s FM³⁶ radio channel was operating in 2003 from the Binorai (Fatehpur) area in Khawaza Khela by Mullah Alam.³⁷ This FM station was sacked by elders of the area but after some time the same FM station was permitted to operate. Rome (2009, 2010)) has also indicated free operation of these FM channels. As, key respondent revealed

The same FM station started again shortly, as he (mullah Alam) had the support of the government officials and representatives. At that time the federal minister for information and broadcasting³⁸ also supported giving permission to the Taliban leaders for broadcasting through FM. Similarly, this was also regarding the FM station of the Mulla Fazlullah.

These FM channels played a major role in the ideological propagation of militants.

7. Conclusion

There has been a strong argument that stability cannot be achieved without ensuring effective and accountable governance; likewise, governance cannot be improved without reducing the key aspects of fragility. It is also evident that improved performance of institutions can contribute to strengthening of their governance and reduction of fragility. This is a global phenomenon that fragility in governance and armed conflict both are reversible i.e. each may be a source or consequence of another. Significantly, good governance has contributed in reduction of armed conflicts. So, the best tool to end an ongoing and avoid a forthcoming armed conflict is an effective and reliable governance system. Therefore, armed conflict in Swat was deeply linked with the weak and fragile administrative governance. Weak formal government institutions were the central driver of fragile administrative governance in Swat. In fact, less resilient administrative governance provided ground for the formation and stabilization of militant groups. These militants/insurgents very efficiently, exploited the frustration of locals and gained the administrative control as well as established their own authority. The inconsistent legislation under the PATA regulation act created legal pluralism in Swat. Consequently, gaps and confusion in legislation provided ground for the fragility in the administrative governance system. Which resulted in armed violence in the form of Kisani movement, TNSM and TTP during 1970s, 1990s and 2007, respectively, in Swat. Therefore, other causes of armed conflict or insurgency in Swat may also never be neglected but it is significant that main driver behind the initiation of armed conflict in the form of insurgency/militancy was the continuous weakness and fragility in the administrative governance. Persistent weak administrative governance is identified as the main driver of the armed conflict during 2007–2010 which caused huge devastation across the valley. Apparently, maintaining law and order as well as, peace in Swat was not the responsibility of judiciary but was of local executive. It may be argued that weakness and incapacity of the local executive comprised of local bureaucracy and civil law enforcement agencies (CLEAs) paved path to armed conflict. All executive institutions prevailing in Swat responsible for the maintenance of law and order were struggling to overcome hurdles in their way. When institutions are fragile then they are unable to perform well and lose their legitimacy and writ. Consequently, the insurgency or militancy in Swat later transformed into organized terrorism.

Lastly, the study has also highlighted three key future research areas in the region such as identifying the bottlenecks in the capacity building of the civil administration, exploring mechanisms for the proper establishment of grievances management mechanism, and analyzing the underlying challenges posing threats to sustainable peace building process.

Acknowledgements

We would like to thank Muhammad Humayun Khan, Waqar Ullah Khan, Abdul Mateen Khan and Hamdan Khan for their assistance in the field during data collection. In addition, we are grateful to Dr Bahadar Nawab Khattak for his continued guidance during the whole research process.

Additional information

Funding

The authors received no direct funding for this research.

Notes on contributors

Safi Ullah Khan

Mr Safi Ullah Khan is Research Associate at Department of Development Studies, COMSATS University Islamabad, Abbottabad Campus, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistan. His research interests are Pre and Post Conflict Governance Analyses, Armed Conflict, Countering Violence and Extremism.

Email:(1) [email protected] (2) [email protected]

Dr Abda Khalid is Assistant Professor at Department of Development Studies, COMSATS University Islamabad, Abbottabad Campus, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistan. She has studied her PhD in International Environment and Development Studies at Norwegian University of Life Sciences, Norway. Her research interests are Gender & Human Security, Conflict & Post Crisis Development.

Email: [email protected]

Dr Noor Elahi is Assistant Professor at Department of Development Studies, COMSATS University Islamabad, Abbottabad Campus, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistan. He has studied his PhD in International Environment and Development Studies at Norwegian University of Life Sciences, Norway. His research interests are Conflict and Post Crisis Development, Institutions and Governance, Media and Conflict.

Email: [email protected]

Notes

1. Country policies and institutions performance assessment.

2. Field Manual 3–24/Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3–33.5, Counterinsurgency (Washington DC: HQ, Dept. of the Army; HQ, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Dept. of the Navy, Dec. 2006) (hereafter referred to as FM 3–24/MCWP 3–33.5), 1–21.

3. Formerly the North-West Frontier Province or NWFP.

4. Fazal Hayat more commonly known by his pseudonym Fazlullah was an Islamist militant who has served as the leader of the Tehreek-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi, an organization aiming to enforce their interpretation of Sharia in Pakistan, and was the leader of the Tehreek-e-Taliban-e-Pakistan in Swat Valley.

5. Informal social and judicial system in Pakhtun society.

6. Tehsil Matta is 683 square kilometers with population of 465996. The landscape of the study area has picturesque highly elevated snow filled mountains of Hindu Kush range and scenic ferocious crisscross flow of the river Swat, as well as, of the two huge streams known as Barwai and Aronai. Likewise, the peach, apple and persimmon orchards covering almost all the agro-land periodically, upsurge its beauty.

7. This armed movement was emerged in 1972, during which the landless people (almost all were the Gujjars) took arms and occupied the lands of their respective landlords (almost all were Pakhtuns).

8. Tehreek-e-Nifaze Shariati Muhammadi.

9. Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan.

10. A veteran nationalist leader and politician born in 1926 and died on 1 November 2015. He has been considered as the symbol of bravery due to his firm stance and resistance against the Taliban in the region. Therefore, in acknowledgement of his sacrifices the government of Pakistan awarded him the highest civil award the Hilal-e-Shujat in 2009. While, the government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa honorary, named the post graduate college in Matta over his name.

11. An elected administrator through local government elections.

12. A place in the Pakhtuns culture where only males are allowed to sit and discuss their matters i.e. females are strictly, prohibited. Moreover, Hujra is a place used for occasions of both happiness and grief like marriage functions and death rituals. In addition, religious rituals like Eid are also celebrated in Hujras.

13. A buffer zone between the inside and outside of someone’s house known as “Manrai” in northern parts, “Deodai” in central, and “Darmaan” in southern parts of the Pakhtuns belt. Where, the non-relative adult males can speak the adult non relative females behind the fabric, wooden, or concrete barrier called pardah. Traditionally, non-relative adult males are strictly, prohibited to enter inside the house.

14. Provincial Administered Tribal Areas.

15. 1973 Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan.

16. Ibid.

17. Deputy Commissioner: The highest civil bureaucratic head in a District.

18. Assistant Commissioners: The highest civil bureaucratic head in a Tehsil.

19. Riwaj Nama is written collection of the decisions and judgements taken by ruler of Swat whether it may be verbally or in written form.

20. Prime Minister of Pakistan and Head of Pakistan People’s Party.

21. The National Awami Party (NAP) was the major progressive political party in East and West Pakistan. It was founded in 1957 in Dhaka, erstwhile East Pakistan, by Abdul Hamid Khan Bhashani and Yar Mohammad Khan, through the merger of various leftist and progressive political groups in Pakistan. Commonly known as the NAP, it was a major opposition party to Pakistani military regimes for much of the late 1950s and mid-1960s.

22. A law enforcement force operating under the authority of federal government.

23. TNSM (Tehreek-e- Nifaze Shariat-e-Muhammadi), which later on transformed to Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan Swat chapter in 2007. Initially, it was a non-violent political movement formed in district Dir of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in late 1980s, by the active members of all the mainstream political parties existing in the region. Sufi Muhammad was made the head of TNSM with mutual consensus by all the political members of the Movement. TNSM later on spread over the complete Malakand and Bajaur region. The basic objective of the TNSM was to demand the enforcement of the Islamic Law (Shariah) in the whole of Malakand and Bajaur region.

24. A military dictator born on 12 August 1924, who later on toppled the democratic government of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in a coup on 5 July 1977. While, remained for almost 11 years in power as he was killed in a mysterious plane crash on 17 August 1988.

25. A martial law administrator and Governor of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province from 1978 to 1985 during the regime of military dictator General Zia-ul-Haq. He was born on 10 September 1928 and was assassinated on 3 October 1991.

26. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

27. A court headed by a Qazi (Judge) operating under the Shariah Nizame Adl act 1999.

28. Frontier Corps which is a paramilitary force.

29. The government was unable to stop the militant organizations particularly, the TNSM from recruiting the people in PATA and some parts of FATA to fight against the ISAF and NATO forces in Afghanistan.

30. Civil law enforcement agencies.

31. The Deputy Commissioners (DC) were called the District Coordination officers after the promulgation of Local Government act 2002, during the General Musharraf regime.

32. Central Superior Services.

33. Provincial Management Services.

34. It is a valley situated in Tehsil Matta of Swat, known as the most famous strong hold of the Militants.

35. A religious obligation to kill someone.

36. Frequency Modulation.

37. A prominent militant commander.

38. Shaikh Rasheed Ahmedwas the federal minister for information and broadcasting.