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Politics & International Relations

Covid-19 and populist leadership in US and Brazil: Impact on international cooperation and global solidarity

ORCID Icon & ORCID Icon
Article: 2333117 | Received 11 Jun 2023, Accepted 18 Mar 2024, Published online: 03 Apr 2024

Abstract

Did populist leadership in the US and Brazil hinder effective management of Covid-19 at the international level? The study carries out exploratory research to understand leadership styles of Donald Trump in US and Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil and their populist response to international cooperation and institutional coordination related to the global pandemic. Using a comparative approach, the study reviews how populist style of leadership in the two states has impacted on international cooperation and collaboration during Covid-19. The research employs a liberal institutional approach, referring to global institutions, international health protocols, and global cooperation as necessary avenues for dealing with the global health crisis. The article argues that US and Brazilian leadership response in handling the crisis demonstrated populist features, challenging international cooperation while discrediting international health institutions and protocols. In doing so, the two leaders undermined transnational and global institutional cooperation, while they blamed outsiders, associating them with the outbreak of the pandemic. In evading responsibility, the two states populist leaderships’ orientation undermined effective management internationally by blaming (and calling them ‘others’) foreigners, immigrants and ethnicities (mainly Chinese) for the spread of Covid-19.

Introduction

The outbreak of the global Covid-19 crisis has granted scholars with the opportunity to study populism’s impact on administration of the health crisis, spawning across various sectors. Covid-19 is a global pandemic; not solely a domestic health problem – a phenomenon transcending state boundaries in terms of the impact and effect. As a global pandemic does not respect state’s boundaries, failure to curtail the virus at a domestic level would have impacted an effective transnational response. Adequate international measures based on the spirit of global solidarity warranted joint efforts to deal with the international health crisis. The global health emergency demanded global cooperative measures, especially cooperation facilitated by international institutions through intergovernmental coordination among stakeholders transcending domestic borders.

The article employs exploratory research to address an engaging connection between populism and international governance. It investigates populist influence on intergovernmental response to the pandemic. There has not been any previous investigation towards the impact of populism on international cooperation and coordination in response to global pandemic, Covid-19. The article correlates the populist style of governance with mismanagement of intergovernmental health coordination, having its direct impact on trans-national cooperation and solidarity. There has not been adequate exploration of how populism plays its role in determining domestic and international policy responses in countries that have been most affected by the health crisis. Moreover, we have not seen what role populism played specifically during Covid-19 when United States and Brazil were the most affected states in the first year. Did populism determine the policy choices of the leadership and what impact did the policy choices of leadership (if informed by populist worldview) have on international cooperation required to deal with the health crisis? And, how the failure to effectively counter Covid-19 at a domestic level in the United States and Brazil impeded international cooperation and social solidarity against Covid-19? These questions are important to address so that we can have a better understanding of how populists respond or react to health crisis, do they cooperate internationally through global health institutions, and are they willing to follow health protocols at home and abide by necessary health measures abroad.

As Covid-19 erupted in 2019, Donald Trump (2017–2021) and Jair Bolsonaro (2019–2022) led the United States and Brazil respectively. A year later, both the leaders continued in office when their states (United States and Brazil along with India) topped the list of Coronavirus confirmed cases and death counts (BBC News, Citation2020a). The pandemic had hit severely two major economies having territorial size and population among the top-10 states in the world. By the fall of 2020, as US and Brazil faced massive number of transmitted cases and deaths, their leadership came under increasing criticism for downplaying the crisis, discrediting scientific advice and criticizing experts and institutions (Béland et al., Citation2021). Several studies emerged, which criticized Donald Trump and Jair Bolsonaro for their display of populist mechanisms and exacerbating the health crisis (Lasco, Citation2020; Ringe & Renno, Citation2023; Roberts, Citation2022; Gideon, Citation2020). Researches showed that both the presidents employed essential characteristics of populist politics during Covid-19 – oversimplifying medical remedies, ignoring expert advice, discrediting health institutions, downplaying the severity of the pandemic and forging divisions on identity lines (Béland et al., Citation2021; Casarões & Magalhães, Citation2021; Lasco, Citation2020).

The study has focused on populist leadership of Donald Trump and Jair Bolsonaro because both the presidents were not able to effectively deal with the pandemic and both consistently used the populist lens to frame the crisis and rebuke national institutions and medical experts. Their cases are specifically chosen to understand how crisis response was shaped in America’s two biggest countries – in terms of size, population and extent of health infrastructure. Another significant reason for picking these cases is that the United States and Brazil were the most affected states during the first year of the pandemic. In terms of number of cases, death toll and spread of the pandemic, they were leading other states by a huge margin. Although both the former presidents are out of office and face intense legal battles at home, their popular base in still very much intact. Donald Trump is the Republican frontrunner for the US presidential race in 2024, and Jair Bolsonaro lost presidency with just one percent more vote going against his favor in 2022. Thus, both the figures and their support base to a populist vision is still relevant to domestic politics and therefore international political sphere as well. Therefore, it is important to learn about why these states (led by populists) were affected so much and what were the policy responses that could not result in the considerable mitigation of the crisis.

The rational or justification for the research work is based on two additional factors. Firstly, scholarly research on state responses to Covid-19 has focused on national level of analysis as solo case studies indicate (Greer et al., Citation2023). At another level, studies have adopted the national levels of analysis in a comparative perspective to determine if state governance and social policy frameworks had shown marks of compatibility in response to Covid-19 (Greer et al., 2020, Citation2022). However, scholarly research focusing on the individual level of analysis employing a comparative approach is a gap area in scholarly literature which the present paper seeks to fill in through academic research. Using a comparative approach of the United States and Brazil, the research seeks to determine the populist impact on international solidarity and cooperation in managing Covid-19. Secondly, as the research work focuses on the individual level of analysis, it seeks to determine the impact of how regime type or leadership style has impacted international co-operation in the world’s worst hit Covid-19 affected nations. Moreover, the pandemic has provided scholars with the opportunity to explore if populism had impacted intergovernmental cooperation internationally in times of the global health crisis. Interestingly, the study reflects an endeavor to draw a similarity or difference index on how populists’ leaders in two of the world’s biggest democracies have co-operated on international health protocols and global collaborative measures in dealing with the crisis.

Methodology and theoretical framework

The two former presidents of the United States and Brazil have been identified as populist leaders representing their nationalist and right-wing worldviews during their election campaigns and their terms in office (Penha-Lopes, Citation2022). The study explores populist governments in the United States and Brazil (independent variable) and the international management of Covid-19 (dependent variable). The study seeks to explore if the two leaders exhibited anti-institutional conduct, exclusionary politics and populist nationalism (causal factors/indicators of populism) and while their designing of counter-pandemic measures had an impact on international cooperation and global solidarity (effects of populism).

The article incorporates a comparative approach to study populism’s response to global governance in dealing with the global health crisis. This research provides a comparative perspective on two administrations (with federal presidential system of government) led by populist leaderships in the United States and Brazil. Studies on populist responses and databases about Covid-19 figures show a definite linkage between populist attitudes and bad governance. The literature, therefore, has been used to come up with some common features of populist governance, which led to common responses and, in turn, similar consequences for the global health situation during Covid-19. Hence the paper analyzes Trump and Bolsonaro’s populist challenge to international cooperation and global solidarity related to the health crisis.

For methodological rigor, the present study has focused on leadership style and regime-type of governance. The United States and Brazil were the most affected states during the Covid-19 pandemic and both states shared populist regime type, which determined their leadership response to Covid-19 and institutional collaborative measures internationally. The article offers original research work at the individual level of analysis in a comparative perspective. Employing case studies of the United States and Brazil, the study offers populist leadership response to international cooperation and collaborative measures in two of the world’s most populous democracies. Scholarly accounts have explored the relationship between populism and the pandemic such as India’s response to Covid-19 or Covid response in Central Asia, or in case of Latin America or Europe (Greer et al., Citation2021; Ghosh et al. Citation2020; Ibbotson, Citation2020; Burki, Citation2020; Iftekhar et al., Citation2021). The theoretical contribution and merit of the present scholarship pertains not to how populism has fared badly on response to Covid-19 compared to non-populist state or regime but how populist responses have lacked the tendency for international cooperation or collaboration based on regime type.

The research methodology employs conceptual content analysis as the research method, relying on rhetorical and discursive characteristics of populist responses to Covid-19 in the United States and Brazil. For that purpose, data employed for conceptual content analysis was identified and collected from print, electronic and social media outlets. The research has relied on statistical data on the US and Brazilian governments’ responses to Covid-19 from government surveys; scientific publications from World Health Organization, Coronavirus Dashboard, Research Dashboards on health statistics such as John Hopkins Coronavirus Resource Center, media reports from BBC, Lowy Institute, Tony Blair Institute and Al-Jazeera; trackers on the Covid-19 situation such as Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, CDC for Covid Data Tracker; and statistics of international health organizations such as United Nations’ World Health Organization and National Health Ministries of selected countries. To conduct conceptual content analysis and analyze public collaboration during crisis management, the study has relied on multiple communication sources such as selected institutional websites, national/international newspapers, international news channels, and national/international press and print media as primary data on the initial phase of Covid -19, utilized for its greater reliability and validity.

The study has referred to the role of neoliberal institutions such as World Health Organization (WHO) and International Health Regulations (IHR) in fostering international cooperation and global solidarity in dealing with the pandemic. The article seeks to explore and establish the correlation, if any, between anti-institutional populist and exclusionary practices – exemplified in this case by Trump and Bolsonaro – and the resultant impact on intergovernmental coordination and international cooperation as advocated by WHO and IHR. The article establishes the many similarities between the Trump and Bolsonaro regimes in their campaigns, governance, and response to the pandemic, which had an outsized effect on the international health regime. The populist leaders’ anti-institutional rhetoric and policy action undermined furthering of global health protocols and obligations. Specialized health agencies and regimes faced contempt and disregard from populist leadership. The latter prioritized interests of the nation states over those of the international community. With the two leaders attempting to undermine international cooperation by discrediting global public health institutions and protocols, populist leadership in the United States and Brazil challenged global governance in times of health emergency.

Populism, crisis and international health governance

To grasp the governmental response required to effectively treat Covid-19, it is significant to understand the essentials of Covid-19 as a health crisis and its impact on crisis management and governance. Christensen and Lægreid (Citation2020), for instance, have shown that crises challenge the government’s capacity as well as legitimacy and trust. The authors have argued that as per se major crises (as Covid-19 evidently has been) strike at the core of both democracy and governance: they require preparing for the unexpected, dealing with uncertainty, managing urgent threats, and responding to citizens’ expectations. The Covid-19 pandemic posed enormous internal administrative and global institutional challenges for governance structures and democratic institutions due to its nature.

Colin Hay has identified different features of crisis. According to Hay, a crisis, depending on its nature, poses serious challenges for public administration due to the uncertainty, unpredictability of consequences, and instability that it brings (Hay, Citation1999). Covid-19 produced a high level of uncertainty while having trans-boundary features, which transcended administrative levels. Though the Coronavirus pandemic is identified as a health crisis, it has transcended several administrative sectors and ministerial areas. Covid-19, due to the acute impact it particularly had on health governance, has been referred to as a global health crisis (United Nations, Citation2020). Populist-led states had to confront such a global health crisis as well. This provided scholars with the opportunity to develop understanding and explanation of how populist leadership tends to respond to global pandemics.

Incorporating an ideational approach in explaining populism along with the literature review on populism, crisis and Covid-19, this study underlines three traits that define populist response to Covid-19. The three traits – denialism or downplaying the virus by distrusting international institutions and global experts (“elite”); contempt of international institutions; and blaming "others", especially outsiders – can be viewed as features that have an impact on the Coronavirus pandemic globally. These features have been employed as the indicators of populism for analyzing populist leaders in United States and Brazil government policy responses in times of the health crisis and the impact on international cooperation and global solidarity in turn.

Two studies have guided this research to formulate three features of populist response to Covid-19. First, Gideon Lasco’s “Medical populism and the COVID-19 pandemic.” (Lasco, Citation2020) And second, McKee at el., “Are Populist Leaders Creating the Conditions for Spread of COVID-19?” (McKee et al., Citation2020) These studies have informed the understanding of response to Covid-19 in the two populist-led states: the United States and Brazil. In dealing with Covid-19, this article compares similarity of responses and differences in approach to ascertain how populism has influenced policy responses in the United States and Brazil and how has it impacted international cooperation and global solidarity in turn.

The study focuses on the role of institutions in enabling the flow of information and opportunities among states. Institutional arrangements, according to Robert Keohane, allows governments to ‘monitor compliance and implement their own commitments,’ thus prevailing expectations and promoting intergovernmental collaboration (Robert, Citation2018, p. 2). Such collaboration and cooperation becomes imperative in times of a global crisis. The research has reviewed the policies of Trump and Bolsonaro in the perspective of World Health Organization protocols and International Health Regulations (IHR). While analyzing the political and discursive strategies of populist leaders, the paper focuses on the aspect of dialogue to understand populist response to international cooperation. Two populist features – ‘contempt for international institutions’ and ‘blaming outsiders’ – has enabled the present researchers to correlate the populist style of governance with mismanagement of intergovernmental health coordination with its direct impact on trans-national cooperation and solidarity.

Donald Trump and Jair Bolsonaro: Populist manifestation in the United States and Brazil

In the United States, Donald Trump’s rise to the presidency in 2016 was marked by a populist election campaign based on a right-wing anti-immigrant and anti-establishment programme. His narrowed conception of the real people challenged the multicultural and pluralistic makeup of American society. Trump announced his entrance into the presidential race with an anti-immigrant speech to count Mexican immigrants and Muslims as ‘others’ (De La Torre, Citation2018). His racist and xenophobic election platform saw him call Mexicans as ‘rapists’ and Muslims as ‘terrorists’ (Romero, Citation2018). Carlos de la Torre establishes that Trump’s exclusion and anti-pluralism were not limited to Mexicans and Muslims as he challenged as well the multicultural recognition for women and non-whites in American society (de la Torre, Citation2017).

Trump’s anti-establishment rhetoric focused on elite’s policies that ‘empowered immigrants’ at the disadvantage of what he called the ‘true people’ – ‘white middle and working-class Americans’ in the words of Trump’s chief executive of the election campaign Steve Bannon (Joseph, Citation2018, pp. 190–200). He urged elites to fight for “we the People, not for the special interests who want cheap labor and a minority voting bloc” (John, Citation2016, p. 70). Moreover, he portrayed himself as an outsider to the politics of D.C.: a successful self-made businessman who represented the real Americans.

Having a self-perception of belonging to the disadvantaged Americans (disregarded by the liberal elite), Trump, as Norris and Inglehart have noted, claimed that he led an insurgency movement on behalf of ordinary Americans disgusted with the corrupt establishment, incompetent politicians, and arrogant intellectuals (Norris & Inglehart, Citation2016). Michael Sandel argues that the populist uprising in the United States (termed by some as ‘Trumpism’) is a “backlash against elite and mainstream parties.” (Sandel, Citation2018) However, right-wing nationalism and white supremacy guided Trump’s populist view of the real people as he espoused his white-supremacist supporters and embraced members of the Ku Klux Klan and other white nationalist groups (Arlie Russell Hochschild, Citation2016, p. 226).

Trump also enjoyed an unmediated relationship with his supporters with a massive following on his social media accounts (which he used even to announce changes in his administration) to frame issues. Many instances were seen where Trump discredited traditional media outlets that were critical of his administration; he repeatedly described them as ‘fake’ and ‘enemy of the people’ while indulging in many spats with journalists (BBC News, Citation2018). He acted as a charismatic leader and a man of action at his rallies: “I alone understand your problems,” and that “I alone know how to fix them,” he proclaimed when he accepted the Republican nomination in 2016 (Politico, Citation2016). During his presidency, Trump’s anti-pluralistic political outlook was mixed with authoritarian tendencies in his policies and actions.

In his first week in office, he signed executive orders to build a wall on the US-Mexican border. Under the so-called ‘Muslim Ban’, he also placed restrictions on the entrance of refugees and foreigners in the United States from six Muslim-majority states: Yemen, Iran, Sudan, Libya, Somalia and Syria (Khaled & Ayoub, Citation2017). His disregard for other institutions was evident from how he incited a mob attack on the US Capitol, where a joint session of Congress was counting electoral votes (Free Speech Today, Citation2021). Trump rejected the result of the 2020 election, which he earlier threatened to delay and suggested that he would not leave office if he lost.

During the protests against the murder of an African-American, George Floyd, by a police officer in Minnesota, military and federal personnel were deployed against peaceful protestors of the Black Lives Matter Movement. Trump had initially called the protestors in Minneapolis as ‘thugs’ (Forbes, Citation2021). His constant admiration for other authoritarian leaders and their strong-man image showed how authoritarian instincts characterized his era in American politics. Hence, Trump’s exclusionary framing of ‘others’ on identity lines, his identification with ‘real’ Americans while targeting minorities and immigrants, and deep distrust of other institutions showed how Trump manifested right-wing populism with authoritarian overtones during his presidency. Reference to terms like ‘real people’ and ‘anti-establishment drive’ show the core concepts of populism as leaders tend to conceive a distinction between the elite as ‘other’ and ‘real people’ as the masses. Anti-establishment rhetoric implies populist tendencies where deep state structure or establishment is perceived to reflect the elite.

In Brazil, Jair Bolsonaro, a former army captain and a long-time congressman, won the 2018 presidential elections on an anti-establishment, right-wing platform to ‘hand back the country to the good citizens of Brazil’, basically white, middle-class, Christian Brazilians (Casarões et al., Citation2021). Fiercely critical of the established elite and mainstream political parties, Bolsonaro vowed to fight communism, crime, and corruption – issues he deemed as the legacy of his corrupt predecessors. Corruption allegations against competing political parties and economic downturn that severely affected ordinary Brazilians produced anti-establishment cleavage.

Patrick Heller concludes that Bolsonaro was quick to exploit that cleavage by identifying himself with ‘the people’ (Heller, Citation2020). However, his conception of the ‘true’ people, according to Heller, was based on conservative (religious) values with an emphasis on support for the traditional family, the church, the nation, and the military. Evangelical Christians and smaller groups on the right, who were attracted to Bolsonaro’s military background and demanded an iron fist to deal with crime and increasing violence, were important to his election (Duque & Smith, Citation2019). His election campaign slogan – “Brazil above everything, God above everyone” – reflected his conservative, nationalist agenda.

Moreover, his anti-pluralistic and exclusionary understanding of the demos rallied conservative social elements against leftists, feminists, and environmentalists. Bolsonaro’s antagonism towards these groups (which he deemed as ‘others’) was evident from his vows to purge leftists, homophobic slurs against people with diverse sexual orientations, and frequent racist rhetoric against indigenous people. On assuming the presidency in 2018, Jair Bolsonaro did not refrain from carrying his populist style of politics and governance with authoritarian overtones. His disregard for other institutions that could check his presidential powers was demonstrated by his presence at rallies calling for the closure of Congress and the Supreme Court (NPR, Citation2021).

Hunter and Power argue that Bolsonaro’s repeated exaltation of the military rule, coupled with the active participation of armed forces in his government (with thousands of civil posts held by serving military personnel) depicted his intent to refuse legitimacy of representation to the democratic and the elected (Hunter & Power, Citation2019). His declaration that ‘I am the Constitution’ revealed his disregard for constitutional checks and balances that override authoritarian impulses of the executive branch (Grillo, Citation2020). Furthermore, Bolsonaro used social media to attack his enemies and mobilize his supporters in his effort to build a direct, unmediated relationship with the people. Besides, he discredited traditional media for being ‘corrupt’ and ‘propagators of fake news’ (Boadle & Slattery, Citation2018). To portray himself as the sole representative of the people, he called those who would limit his actions as enemies of the people. Bolsonaro has been dubbed by media as ‘Trump of the Tropics,’ comparing him to Trump’s anti-establishment populist style and social media presence.

Writing about his incumbency, Oscar Vieira notes that Bolsonaro used his presidential prerogatives to further constitutional regression by advancing anti-constitutional promises and trying to circumvent systems of checks and balances (Vieira, Citation2021). In his presidential capacity, Bolsonaro frequently attempted to neutralize progressive policies and rights in areas such as environmental protection, indigenous rights, gun control, and social rights. As a right-wing authoritarian populist, Bolsonaro portrays himself as the true and only defender of the ‘true people’; in this attempt, he overrides a system of checks and balances while maintaining an exclusionary framing of who the ‘real Brazilians’ are. Hence, Bolsonaro’s exclusionary framing of ‘others’ on identity lines, his identification with ‘real’ Brazilians while targeting political opponents, media and minorities, and deep distrust of institutional checks and balances showed how Bolsonaro manifested right-wing populism with authoritarian overtones during his election campaign and presidency ().

Table 1. Manifestation of the Conceptual Features of Populism in the US and Brazil.

Responses to the pandemic in 2020–21: Cases of the United States and Brazil

In the United States, the first case of Coronavirus was confirmed on January 21, 2020. On the next day, Trump underestimated the threat of the virus, saying, ‘We have it totally under control,’ later to prematurely assert on February 25: ‘we’re very close to a vaccine.’ (Belvedere, Citation2020) Later in the month, as cases began to surge, the US federal government declared the epidemic as a public health emergency, denying entry from most foreign nationals who had recently travelled to China. One day after Trump announced at a press conference that the pandemic ‘would disappear,’ the first pandemic-related death was reported in the United States (NBC News, Citation2020).

Meanwhile, as the stock market and economic activity began to slow down, Covid tests were in short supply despite Trump’s inaccurate claim “that anybody that needs a test can have a test” (Hirsch, Citation2020). In March 2020, several states issued a state of emergency as Trump declared the pandemic to be a national health emergency, followed by several lockdowns (Facher, Citation2020). On the other hand, Trump publicly undermined his own public health officials by declining to wear a mask against the guidance issued by the Center for Disease Control and Prevention, a national public health agency in the United States. Trump halted funding for the WHO and then, later in July 2020, completely withdrew from the organization in the midst of a global health crisis (Jones, Citation2020).

Implying that the virus was artificially manufactured by China, Trump frequently termed it ‘China Virus’ while consistently alleging CNN of being ‘fake’ and not telling that the mortality rate was going down (Dzhanova, Citation2020). Trump later contradicted Dr. Anthony Fauci (a key member of his own White House Coronavirus Task Force and a leading expert on Infectious Diseases) saying in an interview that ‘I sort of don’t listen to my experts and I banned China’ (Quinn, Citation2020). As the Coronavirus cases began to surge rapidly, Trump continued to hold his election rallies and spread misinformation, falsely proposing hydroxychloroquine as a treatment for the Coronavirus.

The US presidential elections in November 2020 saw Donald Trump lose to Joe Biden, in part due to his (mis)handling of the pandemic, which affected the United States more than any other country (Neundorf & Pardos-Prado, Citation2021). The dynamics of international global power competition was also evident as far as Trump’s attitudes and actions towards international health organizations (like WHO), medical protocols (like IHR) and countries (especially China) were concerned. The competitive relation between China and the United States highly affected the coordination and cooperation of the two states to combat Covid-19 due to Trump’s attempt of politicization and radicalization of the pandemic in relation to China (Sutter, Citation2022).

In Brazil, the first Coronavirus case was detected on February 25, 2020, and then on March 12, the Ministry of Health reported the first death caused by Covid-19. As the number of cases increased, the incumbent President Jair Bolsonaro took selfies with his supporters during rallies, ignoring medical advice to quarantine (Reuters, Citation2020). The virus began to spread more rapidly, with 22 deaths reported till March 22 and 1000 total deaths confirmed till April 10 (BBC News, Citation2020b). Bolsonaro attempted to jeopardize preventive measures by opposing lockdown and downplaying the pandemic as he called Coronavirus ‘a little flu’ (Walsh et al., Citation2020). Like Donald Trump, he also refused to wear face masks, while pushing for unproven remedies: promoting hydroxychloroquine as a preventative drug against the virus (Stargardter & Paraguassu, Citation2020).

The Brazilian government closed land borders for the neighboring states in March but never imposed a countrywide lockdown to curb the spread of the virus internally. Meanwhile, the death rate increased, as the country faced an average mortality rate of 1000 deaths per day in early June 2020 but the spread of the virus eased in early August. A temporary drop in the number of cases made way for the easing of preventive measures, soon ending the downward trend that lasted for brief 16 weeks and ceased in the last days of November 2020 (Andreoni, Citation2021).

Meanwhile, the Brazilian President continued with his anti-scientific rhetoric. He warned in December 2020 that vaccines against the Coronavirus could ‘turn people into crocodiles’ (Hall, Citation2020). When signs of a possible second wave began to appear, he dismissed them: “All of us are going to die one day,” he told reporters, urging the Brazilian people not to be ‘a country of sissies’ (Farzan & Berger, Citation2020). On the other hand, Covid-related deaths began to jump again – often surpassing the mark of 1000 per day – as the second wave of the pandemic reached its peak in June 2021. Deaths due to the health crisis, reached the 600,000 in October, but the virus spread and fatality experienced a downward trajectory due to vaccinations (of which Bolsonaro remained skeptical) and developing immunity.

However, Bolsonaro’s handling of the pandemic faced widespread criticism as he downplayed the severity of the medical emergency, rejected necessary measures for prevention and spread misinformation surrounding the health crisis. Consequently, a Senate inquiry report in Brazil proposed that the president should face charges for being ‘principally responsible’ for errors during the pandemic that cost thousands of lives (Aljazeera, Citation2021).

Both Donald Trump and Jair Bolsonaro demonstrated populist characteristics during their Covid-19 response. The two leaders downplayed the seriousness of the pandemic while discrediting institutions and health experts. Instead of trusting scientific evidence and health guidelines, the two leaders propagated unproven remedies and unscientific medical assumptions. By blaming foreigners, particular identity groups, and institutions, Trump and Bolsonaro hindered societal solidarity and cooperation by undermining unity and trust-building among their population and foreigners. Several studies emerged that criticized the role of Trump and Bolsonaro in mishandling and aggravating the crisis by downplaying it, spreading misinformation, and taking inadequate measures (Bayerlein et al., Citation2021).

Covid-19 crisis: the need for intergovernmental cooperation

Covid-19 showed no respect for national borders. The spread of the infectious disease made international cooperation necessary to prevent the transmission of disease through regulatory coordination under global public health agencies. The novel global public health emergency further reinforced the need to preserve and enhance global solidarity by strengthening global institutions and promoting multilateral governance (Pevehouse, Citation2020). Coordination and collaboration with intergovernmental institutions (like the World Health Organization of the United Nations) responsible for multilateral governance in the realm of global health has been imperative in advancing international health cooperation.

Liberal perspective on international institutions argues that international institutions play a significant role in enhancing cooperation among states. Robert Keohane and Lisa Martin, strong proponents of this school of thought, argue that in enhancing cooperation among states, international institutions "provide information, reduce transaction costs, make commitments more credible, establish focal points for coordination, and in general facilitate the operation of reciprocity” (Keohane & Martin, Citation1995). Liberal institutionalism envisions cooperation between states on agreed institutional framework or set of agreed principles, which regulates the behavior of member states. The observance of international institutional norms or principles become applicable or binding upon member states of the international community. The rules imply behavioral obligations, which member states seek to comply with in their international life as part of the international community of sovereign states. These institutions imply a rules-based world order in which states have to comply with their international obligations. In a global health crisis, the role of institutions to provide such benefits enhances the prospects of cooperation among states to seek incentives and overcome emergencies. Therefore, institutional cooperation among states under the umbrella of global health organizations is imperative to effectively deal with a global health emergency.

World Health Organization (WHO) is the international organization sought to foster intergovernmental cooperation and global coordination by promising international responsibility for infectious disease control. By seeking to coordinate and direct international action to bring nations together in responding to global health threats, WHO is at the forefront of the global response to the Covid-19 pandemic. Such responsibility under the WHO is encapsulated in the International Health Regulations (IHR), which aim to “prevent, protect against, control and provide a public health response” to infectious disease while avoiding unnecessary interference with international traffic and human rights (World Health Organization, Citation2016, p. 11).

IHR (last revised in 2005) is the primary instrument governing global response to public health emergencies. It includes requirements for the development of the state’s capacity to rapidly identify, report, and respond to public health emergencies of international concern (Gostin et al., Citation2015). However, such clear guidelines and obligations provided under the institutional umbrella of the WHO have experienced challenges of disengagement in the response to Covid-19 – especially in the populist-led United States and Brazil. Right-wing populism and nationalism were prevalent in response to Covid-19 in many countries as nations withdrew from multilateral partnerships and international health agencies. Studies have shown that with the distrust of international institutions illustrated by casting public health professionals as part of the global elite, right-wing populist leaders undermined global governance goals by turning states inwards (Bueno De Mesquita & Mason Meier, Citation2020). These trends were widespread in populist responses to the global public health crisis of Covid 19 as seen in the United States under Donald Trump and Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil.

Populist challenge to health protocols and institutions

Instead of emphasizing the need to promote a common and robust response to the health crisis, both the nationalist leaders in the United States and Brazil sought to retrench their nations inwards – impeding multilateralism and promoting isolationism. Their anti-institutional rhetoric and policy action undermined furthering of global health protocols and obligations. Trump and Bolsonaro challenged intergovernmental health institutions by fueling the disenchantment of people who demanded a greater voice in the decision-making process (involving ‘unaccountable elites’) at the international level (Lewis, Citation2019). Specialized health agencies and regimes faced contempt and disregard from the populist leadership in the United States and Brazil as it prioritized interests of the nation states over those of the international community.

Showing contempt for global health institutions, Donald Trump initially halted the US funding to the WHO, accusing China (without any evidence) of pressurizing the organization to “mislead the world” about the virus (BBC News, Citation2020c). Later, Trump completely withdrew Washington from the WHO in the midst of the Coronavirus pandemic. In addition, under the Trump administration, the US blocked a vote on UN Security Council Resolution calling for a global ceasefire during the Covid-19 pandemic. The United States blocked the passage of resolution because it urged support for the operations of WHO – to which the Trump administration objected to. With Trump’s unilateral and isolationist response towards the Covid-19, the United States paralyzed the UN efforts for global solidarity through political attacks on China and with threats to hoard Covid-19 vaccines and treatments (Gostin et al., Citation2020).

Jair Bolsonaro also threatened to follow the US president’s footsteps by withdrawing from the global health institution. Bolsonaro, much like his American counterpart at that time, accused WHO of ‘ideological bias’ and threatened to leave the UN body, which he criticized as being ‘political’ (Al Jazeera, Citation2020). He consistently slammed the UN health body for being a ‘partisan political organization’. Brazilian president’s disregard for international cooperation and global solidarity on health made him a fierce critic of the WHO: “We don’t want foreigners sticking their noses into the health situation here,” he declared while threatening to leave the UN agency. The populist president, along with his health ministers and close advisors, also ignored a series of alerts to Brazil’s federal government issued by the WHO to take a more proactive stance on the pandemic (Muggah, Citation2021). Under Jair Bolsonaro, Brazil refused to co-sponsor the UN General Assembly resolution to establish global access to medicine, vaccines and medical equipment for treating the Coronavirus pandemic (Gomes Saravia & de Mello e Silva, Citation2020).

Discrediting of the global health institutions in the wake of the deadly pandemic demonstrated the populist challenge by these states to global solidarity required to deal with a global health emergency. The impact of populist sentiment on global governance was evident from the reluctance in populist-led states (as seen in the cases of United States and Brazil) to follow WHO health protocols; this defiance was coupled with efforts to question international guidance on issues like travel restrictions (Wilson et al., Citation2020). Trump and Bolsonaro further undermined global solidarity by discrediting public health protocols announced by intergovernmental health institutions.

Antagonism toward China – seen as the ‘other’ to blame

Intergovernmental collaboration on the Coronavirus pandemic got further complicated by the fact that the Covid-19 outbreak coincided with intensely deteriorating US-China relations. This further provoked Donald Trump to forge divisions in international politics by blaming China and linking the pandemic with Chinese ethnicity. David Fidler maintains that the commentary in the United States “framed the epidemic in China in geopolitical terms, used it to blame China’s political leaders and system for the tragedy, and faulted WHO for complicity with China’s perceived deception and propaganda” (Fidler, Citation2020). Fidler sees a grim future of global health solidarity and international cooperation due to deep domestic polarization with leading democracies looking inwards.

Trump’s inward-looking response to the Coronavirus pandemic was accompanied by his propagation of damaging myths, deliberate misinformation against WHO, and racializing of the virus. The reality check team of BBC News reviewed claims of the American president against WHO to find little and no evidence to back his accusations (BBC News, Citation2020d). As mentioned earlier, Trump’s politicization of the health emergency was reflected in his frequent use of terms like “Chinese virus” and “Kung flu” to describe the Covid-19. Such racial slurs impacted Asian American community with increasingly reported hateful incidents (Jeung, Citation2020). Racial rhetoric of the American president to redirect anger towards China received condemnations from Chinese officials.

Instead of becoming an opportunity to enhance intergovernmental coordination under international guidelines between the world’s two biggest powers, Covid-19 became a battleground for directing hostile and inflammatory rhetoric against other states, escalating geopolitical rivalry, and shifting the blame on ethnicities and foreigners. International Health Regulations were violated when the medical crisis was framed as a foreign problem – as Trump frequently did during his presidential tenure. Moreover, the WHO discouraged naming viruses after specific ethnicities and regions; it caused people to blame and stigmatize particular ethnicities for the spread of the disease (World Health Organization, Citation2015). Trump, however, repeatedly linked the Coronavirus with China despite health experts and officials saying that ethnicity does not cause a virus.

Much like Trump, the Brazilian President also demonstrated a hawkish policy stance towards China way before the pandemic began. Jair Bolsonaro engaged in frequent critiques of China (Brazil’s biggest trading partner) during his election campaign and portrayed Beijing as a “predator looking to dominate Brazilian economy” (Spring, Citation2018). His combative style towards China only further intensified after the outbreak of the global pandemic. Being a strong critic of China’s role during the Coronavirus pandemic, the Brazilian president jeopardized intergovernmental coordination with China by fueling Sinophobic conspiracy theories. He suggested that Covid-19 is a part of China’s biological war as China benefitted economically from the global pandemic (Ribeiro, Citation2021). The president’s vaccine skepticism hindered collaboration on the distribution and supply of treatments and counter-infection measures.

Bolsonaro’s confrontational rhetoric was directed against Chinese-made Sinovac shot as he denied buying Chinese vaccines (Liete, Citation2020). Moreover, his politically influential son Eduardo Bolsonaro, along with the president’s other closest aides, publicly blamed China for the spread, saying it was “China’s fault” (Phillips, Citation2020). Widespread antagonism against China over the pandemic generated objections and condemnations from the Chinese officials. Consequently, as the hostile exchanges continued between government officials on both sides, the prospects of intergovernmental cooperation and transnational solidarity got further undermined between the two countries.

Therefore, Trump and Bolsonaro’s common populist features were also pervasive in the international realm, with the two leaders attempting to undermine international cooperation. By discrediting global public health institutions and protocols, populist leadership in the United States and Brazil challenged global governance in times of health emergency. The attitudes of both presidents on the international stage were characterized by an inward nationalist approach, compromising global cooperation and solidarity. Moreover, populist leadership, by forging "insider-outsider" divisions, intended to undermine transnational trust-building along with blaming ‘others’ to escape accountability. Divisive populist rhetoric challenged intergovernmental coordination and cooperation as officials in these countries blamed others – especially the Chinese government – to evade responsibility.

Conclusion

This article has established that the Covid-19 crisis handling in the United States and Brazil was characterized by leadership failings in the domestic context, which resulted in poor responses to the health emergency. Common populist features of Trump and Bolsonaro’s response to the pandemic were also pervasive in the international realm, with the two leaders attempting to undermine international cooperation. By discrediting global public health institutions and protocols, populist leaders in both the United States and Brazil challenged global governance in times of health emergency. Their attitudes on the international stage were characterized by an inward nationalist approach, compromising global cooperation and solidarity. Moreover, populist leadership, by forging "insider-outsider" divisions, intended to undermine transnational trust-building along with blaming ‘others’ to escape accountability. Divisive populist rhetoric challenged intergovernmental coordination and cooperation as political leaders in these countries blamed others – especially the Chinese government – to evade responsibility. Therefore, the dismal performance of the two governments during Covid-19 partly owes to populist worldviews and leadership styles of Donald Trump and Jair Bolsonaro. Our study reinforces the view of liberal institutionalism that international cooperation, global solidarity and intergovernmental coordination are significant in dealing with the global crisis. The case study of Covid-19 in the United States and Brazil allows us to make a theoretical contribution to the study of international institutions by demonstrating that international institutions and cooperation are necessary in mitigating crisis by effectively coordinating at the international stage and promoting global solidarity

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Data availability statement

Data sharing is not applicable to this article as no new data were created or analyzed in this study.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Sumeera Imran

Dr. Sumeera Imran, Assistant Professor at the Department of International Relations, National Defence University Islamabad, Pakistan.

Humayun Javed

Humayun Javed, Fulbright Grantee for Master’s Program, 2023. Holds an undergraduate degree in International Relations from National Defence University Islamabad, Pakistan.

Reference